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This thesis examines the use of Facebook as a campaign tool by British 
political parties over the last decade. The thesis measures and conceptualises 
party approaches to Facebook, through examining extracted Facebook posts 
(n=49,551), hand-coded Facebook posts (code n=882, posts n=1481), Facebook 
Audience Insights and survey data. The thesis finds that the two major parties’ 
campaigns are defined by a traditional Facebook campaign, alongside a 
subsidiary new methods Facebook campaign. This use of different pages for 
different audiences is defined as Janus-faced campaigning. Overall, the thesis 
argues that Facebook is centrally used for the digital recreation of a traditional 
offline campaign. Information provision is far more central than participation 
content, with participation content (if seen) focused on engagement, registering 
to vote and voting. Although Facebook is showing evolution rather than revolution 
for party campaigns, the platform offers enhanced abilities for recreating tried and 
tested traditional campaign methods. Facebook has abilities for superior 
campaign content such as video, while parties have generated larger more 
representative virtual memberships (than official memberships) that can be used 
to campaign to Facebook’s broad audience base. Facebook has given political 
parties a powerful broadcast tool that bridges the digital and physical doorstep, 
where social context allows for enhanced message impact. Thus, it is in the 
mainstream use of Facebook that we likely see its potential electoral impacts. 
Although the central approach seen by parties is via recreation of a traditional 
campaign, satellite pages are also examined through the study of Momentum. 
Satellite campaigns are found to offer parties the ability to campaign in more 
adventurous ways without threatening their traditional Facebook campaign. 
Momentum during the 2017 General Election campaigned in a more radical way, 
including a very strong focus on participation, partisan viral content and using 
virtual members like official members. This approach offered Labour the best of 
both worlds. Finally, permanent campaigning is conceptualised and then 
examined through Momentum’s content across 2018. The page shifted towards 
an internal campaign role showing how parties can use Facebook in a partisan 
marshalling role outside of elections. 
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We are living through the first few decades of a colossal worldwide 
experiment. We are at the thin end of the wedge, as the internet is rapidly 
remoulding and changing society into its image. Such is the rapidity of change 
that this thesis’s earliest studied date of 2010 saw worldwide internet penetration 
at 29%, today it is at 62%1. This phenomenal change in worldwide access to 
information and inter-connectivity is not immediately visible like other 
technological revolutions before. Outside of new wireless towers and many more 
screens, the internet’s impact is physically invisible. Data can be hidden behind 
locked doors, advertising can be personally targeted, users can be anonymous 
or pseudonymous and information flow can be impossible to chart.  
Given this esoteric nature the impacts of the internet are hard to examine. 
Studying the internet is difficult, as digital information and evidence can be easily 
hidden behind encrypted walls, while direct impacts are less easily measurable. 
As such the transformative effects of the internet can be veiled, making the 
internet both a fascinating but also dangerous political beast. Some impacts within 
the general population are seen in endpoint human behavioural variation. For 
example, in how we now gather or deliver political information, or how we interact 
with politics and politicians. While, when appreciating how the powerful (such as 
political parties) use the internet, we can see impacts through examining changes 
in tactics and approach. Thus, although impact is often hidden due to the 
complexity of the internet, we are not wholly blind. However, given the novelty of 
the internet, and the fact that methods and effects are often impenetrable, 
scholars have for the last two decades been playing catch-up.  
This thesis is centrally interested in one important aspect of the internet’s 
impact; political campaigns. Specifically, how British political parties are using the 
internet to campaign through social media via the largest and most important 
platform Facebook. Although a specific area of study this thesis speaks to a wider 
context; how new technology is used by politicians to win hearts and minds. For 
 





political parties, social media may have upset pre-existing power relations, 
offering them a new powerful tool that changes the nature of campaigning and 
how democracy can operate. Social media may offer a levelling power, increasing 
the importance of public voices, smaller parties and diminishing the role of opinion 
leaders and traditional hierarchical communications. However, in contrast social 
media may merely replicate prior systems in a new environment, adjusting the 
function but not the nature of campaigning. This would mean social media is 
helping maintain the fundamental nature of party based democratic systems but 
in an online setting. Thus, this thesis’ examination is a case-study that illuminates 
a far wider field, as the study of Facebook use by British parties offers insight into 
the worldwide impact of the internet on politics. 
Examining social media is imperative, these platforms are crucial for 
political parties. Today, over 45% of the world’s population are active social media 
users, with a person on average spending 2 hours and 22 minutes a day on social 
networking and messaging apps (GlobalWebIndex, 2019). Social media is now at 
the core of voter’s information systems and how people communicate and gather 
information. This significant digital avenue can clearly offer parties a new 
opportunity for their campaigns. However, all the many social networks available 
today are not equally useful for political parties, as each has different capabilities 
and userbases. TikTok and Snapchat feature a younger userbase and are 
currently less political, Twitter is skewed to the politically active and open in 
network formation, Instagram is a social photo-visual platform and Reddit 
provides interest-based pseudonymous networking. Each network offers its own 
unique aspects that are pertinent for political campaigns and modern voter 
behaviour, however of all the social networks that currently exist, Facebook is 
without doubt the most important.  
Facebook with its 2.5 billion users is the most popular social network in the 
world, the platform accounts for much of the growth in the global ad market2, 
alongside over 40% of all internet traffic3. It is clear from political campaigner’s 
actions, opinion polling and even from surprising election results, that Facebook 
is the most important social network for campaigns. Unlike most other social 
 








networks, the platform is broadly used with a vast array of applications from event 
planning to group creation. Facebook is utterly versatile, but most importantly its 
network formation is centrally friend and family based, meaning the platform at its 
core is recreating people’s real offline lives online. This inherently makes 
Facebook an influential platform, unlike looser less-cohesive interest-based 
networks such as Twitter. Facebook is thus a powerful campaign tool, both as a 
levelling tool linking billions of ordinary users together, but also as a hierarchical 
tool where corporations or political parties have major presences. Groups like 
Black Lives Matter can gain a foothold, but so can President Trump. This grants 
Facebook an asymmetrical form. Facebook is as much a destabilising influence 
as it is a recreation of traditional power structures, thus the platform has capacities 
to reimagine politics and parties, but also an ability to recreate the offline world.  
Facebook itself likes to highlight that it is defined by the 2.5 billion people 
that use the platform, professing its users to be its very character. However, with 
large global corporations, major political parties, celebrities, and news 
organisations so central to the platforms’ information system; the character of the 
platform appears less bottom-up than we are led to believe. With its 33,000 
employees from California to Kuala Lumpur, at its heart Facebook is a business, 
as such any democratic or electoral impacts will be shaped by this inherent 
nature. Despite the fundamental potential of Facebook to reform hierarchies, 
change parties and connect millions of users, have we instead seen offline life 
replicated online? Are parties thus centrally recreating traditional campaigns 
through a new online avenue? These questions feed into this thesis’ central 
examination of British parties’ use of the platform, as although Facebook is 
undoubtedly a platform of immense power and scale; as a political campaign tool 
it is also somewhat of an enigma.  
Studies of Facebook have been far more limited than those of the arguably 
more inconsequential Twitter. This is partly due to Facebook’s mixed history of 
data access and research cooperation. Studies have also generally focused on 
the United States, with European scholarship only developing more recently. 
Analyses are also often either very small-scale analyses of politician’s content 
approaches, or macro-level studies of greater questions such as voting impact. 
Each of these avenues loses sight of the actual way Facebook is used as a 





disparity by examining major UK parties’ use of Facebook longitudinally, while 
engaging a specific high definition study of the Conservative and Labour parties. 
Overall, Facebook is changing political campaigns, however the nature 
and power of this impact is an unknown. On one side utopian visions have 
developed that argue the power of the internet and social media to truly reframe 
political parties and their campaigns. Work such as Margetts’ ideas of the Cyber 
Party (2001) or later re-imaginings of the concept (see Chadwick, 2013; 
Gerbaudo, 2019), indicate the radical potentials of social networks for political 
campaigns and party politics. In contrast, others assert a ‘political as usual’, e-
minimal effects position (Margolis, 2000) with the internet and social media 
centrally bringing offline systems online. Facebook thus offers to campaigns two 
competing abilities. It may offer a radical upgrade in parties’ capabilities, as the 
platform allows sociological campaign practices in an interactive and audio-
visually engrossing system. Offering parties features to reach new audiences, 
cultivate virtual memberships, and develop novel organisational avenues. 
However, in contrast Facebook may offer more limited impacts, usage may show 
restricted capacities for campaigning that centre on activating party loyalists and 
basic forms of campaign information. Content may not move past that seen in 
Party Election Broadcasts or leaflets, with parties using the platform as a 
traditional campaign tool. Finally, we may see a mix of the two impacts with 
Facebook an evolutionary tool but offering no revolution for party campaigns. This 
is the central debate upon which this thesis builds its analysis. 
 
Research aims and findings 
 
This thesis examines party approaches on Facebook, using coded data as 
well as other data sources, to evaluate in detail how parties are using the platform 
across a period from 2010-2019 as well as across the 2015 and 2017 General 
Elections. Several key terms are used throughout this thesis that should be 
clarified. Facebook is referred to as a platform, one of a group of social media 
platforms such as Twitter. In its use as political campaign tool, Facebook is 
referred to as a campaign tool as part of a wider toolkit, alongside other campaign 
tools such as leaflets or Snapchat. Finally, parties’ tactics upon Facebook (as well 





used within one tool, as well as an overall approach definable for each tool. 
Feature/s is a term used to define the potential approaches and abilities of a tool 
or platform. Alongside chapter-based specific questions, this thesis examines 
three central research questions that engage with three areas of political science 
literature; campaigning, communications, and voter behaviour.  
 
Central Research Question: How are parties making use of Facebook in terms of 
the scale of communications, the dissemination of information and the 
encouragement of participation in the content they post? 
 
This research question explores in terms of scale, information, and 
participation how Facebook is used by political parties. Scale defines the capacity 
of Facebook as an information medium. It concerns who receives messages, the 
pages used, the number of messages sent, and the subsequent engagement 
received. Information examines the nature of parties’ posts, what they consist of, 
their character and nature. Finally, participation examines the use of participatory 
practices in content, from asking users to share to engaging with a poll. This 
participation theme also examines organisation and approaches to mobilisation. 
The question focuses on comparatively examining approaches to these areas 
across parties, page types and election periods.  
The thesis finds important results; by the 2017 General Election all the 
studied parties were using Facebook’s opportunities for an innovative scale of 
communications. Clear differences are seen across time periods, parties, page 
types and election years. All the parties have generated large virtual member 
audiences and can achieve impressive levels of engagement no matter the party 
size. Nevertheless, trends in virtual membership and engagement are clearly 
more beneficial for larger parties. In examining information and participation, the 
trends are more mixed, although parties on Facebook show a wide array of 
nuanced and creative approaches to content, the opportunities taken by parties 
are conservative. Instead, more novel approaches to information and participation 
are seen via satellite page Momentum, signalling clear differences of approach 
across page types. Overall, information was generally prioritised over 
participation, while organisation is even more selectively seen. Examining the 





Facebook’s features for information and participation than the Conservatives. 
However, across these two page types, both parties underutilised Facebook’s 
novel information and participation capacities for their central campaigns. Instead, 
these novel features were used selectively from specific page sources such as 
Labour’s satellite campaign Momentum. Thus, parties are not necessarily averse 
to more adventurous approaches to information and participation, but use is 
clearly tied to audience and aims. This evolutionary approach to scale, 
information and participation clearly shows parties view the opportunities of 
Facebook centrally lie in its abilities to be a broadcast tool. This shows that parties 
believe Facebook is offering them genuine capacities to speak through virtual 
members to the broader public. Given the potential electoral importance from this 
strategic approach, a broad mainstream campaign use of Facebook will continue 
to influence how parties’ use Facebook’s features in future. Thus, although novel 
features are being developed to unleash alternative features of the platform, party 
usage of Facebook content speaks as much to Margolis & Resnick’s vision of 
‘politics as usual’ (2000), as to the utopian vision of the cyber-party (Margetts, 
2001).  
 
How does the content posted on Facebook by parties retain the features of 
traditional campaign material? 
 
This question seeks to appreciate and theorise parties’ use of Facebook 
within a wider understanding of traditional campaign practices. Facebook offers 
to parties a whole new body of content forms and the freedom to radically alter 
their communications approach. Parties can send meme’s featuring huge 
amounts of multi-layered policy detail, train activists through Facebook Live video 
or post eye-catching short-form video content that breaks tradition. However, just 
because something is possible does not mean that it will be used. In the case of 
Facebook content, we may see that parties are creating Facebook content that 
retains the features of more traditional mainstream campaign tools such as 
leaflets or PEBs. This is because of the core goals parties have in their political 
campaigns have not altered in the Facebook era, including the importance of 
speaking to the broad public, promoting messages that can be understood by as 





may mean that parties are being cautious in how they are using Facebook, 
focusing on recreating traditional style campaign content online rather than 
developing something new. Facebook’s use as a campaign tool may therefore 
not start from zero, its use may follow the model seen in how parties use these 
other tools. To answer the question the Facebook content data gathered is 
conceptualised and then contrasted with understandings of traditional 
campaigning content, such as in audience and core goals. Secondly, where 
possible Facebook content is directly compared to other campaign tool content 
across viable parameters including topic, sentiment and use of leadership. 
This thesis finds that Facebook is used dualistically, via what is termed 
Janus-faced campaigning. The concept defines that through Facebook parties 
are using different pages with different approaches to reach different audiences, 
thus presenting different faces of the same political party to the public. Centrally, 
party approach occurs via what is use is termed the traditional Facebook 
campaign. Through this approach parties take some of the most important as well 
as mundane aspects of traditional campaigning and recreate them online. Parties 
are retaining many key tried and tested features of traditional campaigning 
through Facebook. For example, through leader and party pages we see parties 
engaging in broadcast mainstream campaigns on the platform, with content 
designed to be as broad and accessible as possible. Forms that would not speak 
to a mass audience are seen minimally such as identity based content, minority 
issues or novel content forms such as memes. Instead, inclusive content forms 
akin to those seen in traditional campaign materials are chosen to enhance party 
communications, such as posters that feature leadership personalisation, policy 
detail and public representation. However, the content seen on Facebook does 
not solely retain the features of traditional campaign material. Labour’s satellite 
page Momentum approached content in a different way. Termed the new 
methods campaign, during the 2017 General Election Momentum engaged in 
more adventurous in information and participation approaches, including a focus 
on younger people, memes, humour, and live video. Thus, Labour were 
supporting their central traditional Facebook campaign with the new methods 
campaign, allowing the party to match messaging more effectively with audience. 
Overall, the content parties send on Facebook maintains the core features of 





many as possible. However, as we saw via Momentum, parties are also interested 
in speaking more selectively to certain groups and developing new campaign 
approaches that are outside the features seen in traditional campaign material. 
Although at the moment a subsidiary approach, evidently the relationship 
between the traditional and novel Facebook campaign will evolve over time, with 
the possibility that Facebook use will develop to be a form not so directly 
comparable with traditional campaign material. 
 
What are the likely longer term implications of parties’ use of Facebook, in terms 
of broader campaigning practices? 
 
This question seeks to outline the likely longer term impacts Facebook is 
having on party campaigns through reviewing how the parties are making use of 
the platforms different features. Facebook offers a wide array of new abilities that 
offer current and likely future change to who parties can speak to, how their 
campaigns can be delivered, how participation is developed and how campaigns 
(and campaigners) are organised. It is found that the platform presents new 
implications for parties campaigns across both the traditional Facebook campaign 
and the new methods campaign.  
Firstly, the platform provides evolved traditional campaign capacities within 
a powerful online-based sociological network, parties can harness everyday users 
as campaigners, a radical evolution upon the traditional one-way forms of older 
campaign tools. Secondarily, the novel approaches seen via what is termed the 
new methods campaign point the likely direction of overall campaign evolution. 
Parties are engaging in ever more Janus-faced campaign approaches because 
of the benefits of fitting message to audience, with barriers between official and 
virtual members being broken down and new fluid organisational practices being 
developed. Finally, the platform also has capabilities to blend novel and traditional 
styles, showing the platform to be a universal and flexible tool. This flexibility is 
the unique power of Facebook, and the key character that will continue to 
influence how parties use the tool in future. Although the likely long term trend is 
towards more novelty through increasing use of satellite campaigns, given the 
huge scale and breadth of the Facebook audience, the traditional Facebook 





electoral importance of Facebook as a broadcast tool, while also developing new 
ways to communicate to and activate different groups. This slow evolution means 
that despite Facebook’s radical abilities to reform political parties’ organisation 
and campaigns, potentially making parties more representative and responsive to 
the public, we will instead see long term implications being likely more limited. 
Overall, Facebook is a revolutionary tool not necessarily used in a revolutionary 
way, but for the near future the platform presents the greatest single campaign 
tool available to political parties. The tool allows for parties to engage in effective 
applications of new, improved or replicated campaign capacities, including 
delivering campaign information, generating participation, and organising 
supporters. Facebook’s impact therefore occurs not from its radical possibilities, 
but from its pluralistic catch-all abilities, with its utility meaning it will be a central 
core of parties campaigns for many years. 
 
Empirical focus, generalisability and why this study matters 
 
This thesis examines major UK political parties, with a special focus on 
Labour and the Conservatives. Given that Facebook is not just a peer-to-peer 
network, but in fact is potentially offering parties more than it is offering 
laypersons, it is vital we understand important actors on the platform. British 
political parties on Facebook are an under examined group worthy of greater 
study. Time and again our political parties are shown to be using advanced 
methods on the platform, both through targeted advertising and the novel 
development of organic communications. It is the UK that saw Corbyn arise on 
Facebook well before Bernie Sanders took the US by storm. While UKIP’s organic 
engagement helped prime our later Brexit vote, a factor that was mirrored in the 
Trump victory of 2016. Facebook in the UK has been at the centre of many 
important political developments over the last decade, with analysis long overdue. 
Thus, although a local story, the British context highlights far wider political trends 
than those solely within our own shores.  
This thesis due to its longitudinal nature from 2010-2020 has a varied 
party-political context, four General Elections plus three UK-based referendums 
stand in the background. It is important to outline this history in order to appreciate 





campaigning. A full outline of the use of Facebook by these parties across the last 
decade’s elections can be seen in Appendix 1. Although we know that all the UK’s 
major parties are using Facebook, we do not know the specifics of how they use 
Facebook as a campaign tool and how it fits into their wider campaigns. Thus, 
this thesis focuses upon the tactics and presences British political parties have 
on Facebook. Examining in detail their campaigning content approaches, across 
electoral and permanent campaigns, as well as across the different page types 
parties’ use on the platform.  
This thesis explores all the major UK parties, allowing for a wider level of 
analysis, as well as more refined specific study focussing on Labour and the 
Conservatives. The focus on all major UK political parties is because of an ability 
to draw from the analysis a wider appreciation of how different types of parties 
campaign, including smaller parties and those with specific goals outside of 
government. This offers the thesis the ability to gather a wide understanding of 
how Facebook is used by parties within a nation, across party size and goal. The 
thesis places greater focus upon the two major UK parties of government; Labour 
and the Conservatives, because of methodological expediency as well as 
intellectual value. This thesis would not be able to undertake a detailed content 
analysis for all the UK parties because of the time-consuming nature of the 
process. As such, a smaller sample of parties is chosen to be examined in greater 
detail, including the analysis of different page types. Labour and the 
Conservatives offer the greatest source of insight into how parties campaign on 
Facebook in the UK because they feature increased engagement, have a higher 
usage rate of Facebook, fully utilise both leader and party pages and campaign 
to win elections rather than to push for other goals. They also lead the other UK 
parties in how Facebook is used, meaning they offer insight for how smaller 
parties campaigns will develop over time.  
Within Labour, Momentum is examined because it is a powerful case study 
of how satellite campaigns operate within wider party Facebook campaigns. The 
Labour Party, as a broad tent organisation that works hard to innovate its 
campaigning practices, provides the clearest example of the satellite campaign 
phenomenon within the UK. Other political parties also have pressure groups and 
campaign organisations affiliated to their associated parties, but the case study 





organisation both permanently and during election time. They are also pertinent 
due to their position as a left-wing radical organisation that promotes social media 
to be a central part of its identity. 
In the specific political sources chosen, the empirical focus of this study 
also focuses on specific page presences on Facebook across party, leader, and 
satellite pages. Outside of the specific Momentum case study, throughout this 
thesis party and leader pages are carefully examined. This focus is chosen 
because these are the central presence political parties have on Facebook, a 
pattern seen worldwide. These pages also tend to be controlled via central offices 
rather than candidate or regional offices, this dynamic allows for a direct analysis 
of the central core of party campaigns, where the greatest amount of time, effort 
and money is placed by parties. Although regional campaigns on Facebook are 
of importance, this thesis had to choose its subjects carefully, with a study of 
candidate or regional Facebook pages of too large a scope for this research.  
Given the UK focus and the unique characteristics of British democracy, 
culture, parties and political behaviour, generalisability is understandably limited. 
This thesis nevertheless offers insights for the understanding of other nations 
parties use of Facebook. This is because of this thesis’ focus on the structural 
elements of Facebook use such as page type. Given the ubiquitous usage of party 
and leader page forms across the globe and across the political spectrum, this 
thesis bring insight in the interplay between these two sources, as well as the 
interplay between these page types and satellite pages. Equally, this thesis’ broad 
study of different types of parties means it offers insight into how goal based 
parties, smaller parties, or parties of government may use Facebook. The thesis 
also charts the campaign relationship between party and voter, a relationship 
seen worldwide across nations and cultures. This thesis operates a detailed 
content analysis that goes beyond local factors, instead it also examines 
approaches to communications that are universal, such as the use of emotion, 
rhetoric, the general public’s voice, or identity depiction. This gives this thesis’ 
findings greater insight into understanding how social media is being used by 
parties worldwide, because many of key factors at the heart of political 
communication are universal. Thus, although generalisability is constrained due 
to political national circumstances structurally this study offers valuable 





 This study matters because social media is changing how we interact with 
politics and politicians, with this thesis charting a key part of this new relationship; 
how parties are using Facebook to communicate with the public. This thesis 
examines key aspects that determine how this new relationship operates. Social 
media is both offering new avenues that are upsetting the old systems of 
campaigning, but also recreating old systems online. Firstly, key factors are 
changing the relationship between parties and the public. We see the rise of 
virtual membership challenging the traditional notions of party organisation, digital 
engagement offering parties huge levels of reach online, and a growing dynamism 
in how parties are presenting themselves online. These factors may over time 
change how voters view parties and interact with them. Secondly, the thesis 
charts the vitality of traditional but evolved approaches to Facebook. Parties are 
taking the best elements of how they campaigned before social media and 
utilising them online. This matters because social media is now ubiquitous 
meaning that parties must reach different audiences in the most appropriate 
ways. For Facebook, given its older userbase, this means parties using the 
language of the past on a platform that allows for so much more. This thesis thus 
matters, because it shows the nuanced complex story of how a social network is 
used to campaign. It illustrates that overt narratives of change heralding a utopia 
or dystopia, as so often seen within the media, are not reflective of the 

















Structure of the thesis 
 
Table 1. Chapter plan, research questions examined, and methods used 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
Through the communications, campaigning and voter behaviour literature, 
the thesis outlines why parties are using social media alongside the potential 
effects. Literature fields such as; voter behaviour, e-campaigning, 
communications flow, network formation and social network studies are explored 
to understand the mechanics of how social media campaigning works. Alongside 
this theoretical layer, a large amount of literature concerning Facebook’s use as 
a campaign tool by parties and movements is outlined. This includes studies of 
engagement, rhetoric, content approaches, framing, media use and participation. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
Quantitative content analysis and the formulation of a comprehensive 
typology is chosen as the optimal method. This is because the potential level of 
detail is purely down to time limitations, with the method offering an important 
gateway to understanding how and why parties are using Facebook to campaign. 
Chapter 
Research 
Questions Sub areas examined Methods used 
4: Facebook 
demographics  
Q1 & 3 
Scale, virtual members across 
pages and parties 





Q1 & 3 
Scale, engagement, technology, 
popularity, interactivity, party 
leader pages 
Dataset 1. Descriptive 
statistics 
6: 2015 and 2017 
General Election  
Q1, 2 & 3 
Information and content forms, 
participatory practises, 
personalisation, leadership 
Datasets 2 and 3. 
Quantitative content 
analysis, typology 
7: Momentum  Q1, 2 & 3 
Organisation, satellite campaigns, 
Janus-faced campaigns, 
information, participation, and 
organisation 







This allows the examination of campaigning to be both in high definition but also 
of a pertinent scale, rather than the either overtly macro or micro-cosmic methods 
seen from many other studies.  
 
Chapter 4: Facebook demographics, virtual members and cyber party 
ramifications 
 
To understand Facebook campaigning today, one must comprehend who 
uses the platform. Through examining the demographics of who uses Facebook, 
alongside exploring the concept of ‘virtual membership’, this chapter examines 
parties’ Facebook audience demographics in comparison to their official 
memberships. The unique benefits of Facebook are made clear, as all the parties 
have amassed vast numbers of younger and more female virtual members. 
Facebook offers a unique more representative population to campaign to and 
organise, with significant implications for cyber party politics. However, the 
benefits are not equal for all parties, as offline issues are reflected online.  
 
Chapter 5: Facebook content and engagement, a new avenue for campaigns? 
 
Through the analysis of 49,551 official party page and party leader page 
Facebook posts sent from 2010–2017, this chapter examines the content 
approaches and engagement levels of the parties. The chapter explains the 
development of Facebook as an engagement tool highlighting the role of 
technology, party politics and leadership in changing patterns of engagement and 
approach. Through conceptualising the importance of different types of pages, 
there are marked differences found in party and party leader page engagement 
and content approach. Examining the potential reach of Facebook against other 
campaign tools, Facebook offers something new to political parties’ campaigns 
via novel information approaches and huge reach via engagement. However, 
Facebook is clearly a very volatile tool, where engagement is not mindless 
clicktivism: parties can achieve or fail dependant on how they activate their virtual 
members. Finally, engagement and content are examined both electorally and 
through the permanent campaign, with the platform found to be offering greater 





Chapter 6: The 2015 and 2017 General Elections: The ‘traditional’ Facebook 
campaign? 
 
This chapter examines the Labour and Conservative parties’ party and 
leader pages’ approaches on Facebook across information and participation, via 
a coded dataset of 1,208 posts examined across 826 variables. The chapter 
determines how parties are campaigning across the 2015 and 2017 General 
Elections. Approach is then compared to other online and offline tools such as 
targeted adverts and leaflets. It is found that the parties approached Facebook 
differently over time with approach reflecting party political and technological 
changes. Information is found to be used more than participation, highlighting the 
rise of what is termed the ‘traditional’ Facebook campaign. Although Facebook is 
clearly vital to party campaigns; the two parties were not prepared to risk the 
benefits of virtual member led engagement by utilising overtly novel content 
approaches.  
 
Chapter 7: Momentum: Satellite, Janus-faced and permanent campaigning? 
 
This chapter examines 153 Momentum posts from the 2017 General 
Election alongside a random 120 post sample of 2018 posts, coded across 830 
variables. The 2017 Momentum data is compared to 2017 Labour party and 
leader page data, while Momentum’s 2018 data is compared to their 2017 data. 
The chapter conceptualises satellite campaigns, offering a comprehensive 
typology of the phenomenon. Examining the 2017 General Election, it is found 
that Momentum uses a much more interactive and less traditional content 
approach than the other Labour pages, with participation content as integral as 
information. The use of Facebook as an organisational tool is visible via many 
offline calls to action, online activities, and events. In terms of approach, 
Momentum clearly benefits from an absence of structural hindrances, because 
the group was focused on a different audience to the other Labour pages. This 
ability for Labour to campaign in a Janus-faced way is theorised as a clear benefit 
for the 2017 Labour campaign. The party was able to reach out to both younger 
and more middle-aged voters using language and policy that connected. This 





with this accelerating as more satellite campaigns are formed. In permanent 
campaigning, Momentum is shown to become an internal campaigning 





The conclusion brings together the results of the four chapters and 
answers the research questions, alongside an analysis of this thesis’ title. Finally, 
a future research and data access agenda is discussed, while the lessons learnt 




This thesis makes several contributions to the fields of political 
communication and campaigning. The contributions are three-fold. 
Methodologically generating new measures, as well as improving existing 
measures used to examine online campaigning. New procedures are created that 
are not seen within the literature, with other pre-existing measures improved 
upon. It does this by generating a content analysis scheme relevant for modern 
digital campaigns that feature large amounts of video content. The typology was 
also created with a deliberate future focus to promote re-use and comparative 
study. The study also uses underutilised sources, such as Facebook Audience 
Insights and the Wayback Machine, which should be promoted to the academic 
community given a lack of direct access to data. The analysis also contributes to 
the debates around data access on Facebook, highlighting the democratic need 
for tools such as Netvizz. However, the work also emphasises the methodological 
flaws apparent in academic work on Facebook given issues with API access, data 
quality and Facebook’s ever-changing data policies.  
Theoretically the thesis contributes by proposing an important looser 
definition of engagement as part of a cascade of participation, arguing that online 
engagement and virtual membership should not be dismissed as second order 
slacktivism. Further, through re-examining the sociological model of voting 





engagement and virtual membership in Facebook’s impact as a campaign tool. 
Facebook merges offline worlds with online capacities, offering a more volatile 
digital avenue for party campaigns that allows parties’ virtual members to deliver 
content to their subsequent networks. Although this system is also seen via other 
networks, Facebook’s broader userbase and more genuine friend-based network 
allows for sociological pressures to operate more effectively. The analysis also 
contributes to theories surrounding the changing nature of the political party, 
showing that virtual members are clearly important to political parties in different 
ways, depending on page type and goal. We see differences in how virtual 
members are used across the traditional and new methods campaigns. The thesis 
conceptualises how this new group, used in a more complex way by satellite 
campaigns, can potentially alter the nature of the campaigning party into a more 
fluid entity. The thesis also addresses the theoretical issues associated with 
conceptualising the campaign usage of social media, analysing with a wide lens 
how parties are using the platform. Facebook use is shown to be defined by 
Janus-faced campaigning, through the traditional Facebook campaign and new 
methods campaign. Within the new methods campaign, satellite campaigns are 
outlined and conceptualised, with this thesis providing a clear theoretical 
grounding of why parties’ presences on the platform are changing. Finally, 
permanent campaigning is conceptualised and examined, with permanent 
campaign approach clearly dependent on internal party position and goals. 
Empirically, through the creation of a comprehensive typology and detailed 
longitudinal quantitative content analysis, this thesis offers future research a 
superior framework for the comparative analysis of content and engagement. 
Challenging the lack of a joined-up approach within the literature, by focussing on 
maximal detail and reproducibility, the thesis offers the broadest and most 
detailed typology available. The subsequent party, party leader and satellite page 
longitudinal datasets are the most detailed ever undertaken. The level of detail 
offered means that the thesis has had the ability to conceptualise deeper 
understandings of how parties use Facebook to campaign, including the 
importance of party leader pages and satellite campaigns, the use of humour, 
memes, permanent campaigning, negative personalisation and other content 
forms. The thesis thus provides comprehensive evidence of what occurred on 
































2: Literature Review  
2.1: Introduction 
 
This review focuses upon modern literature inquiring into social media’s 
effects upon parties’ campaigns, alongside traditional campaigning, e-
campaigning, and communication literature. This chapter provides a theoretical 
and research framework through which the usage of Facebook can be 
understood, within the context of wider campaigning approaches. The focus is the 
United Kingdom’s political parties, but this review also examines international 
academic enquiry upon campaigning and social media. The review illuminates 
current evidence for why parties are using Facebook, how they use the tool, 
where it fits within the campaign, potential benefits and what factors influence 
usage. 
Through the Columbia and Michigan models of voting behaviour the 
importance of Facebook for campaigns is examined theoretically, with the 
platform offering parties new capacities to socialise, persuade & mobilise voters. 
Conceptually Facebook is theorised as requiring a new simpler frame of analysis 
via scale, information, participation, and organisation. These elements represent 
the core logic of use, with each offering considerations for how Facebook may 
offer parties something new to their campaigns. Wider ideas of impact are 
examined via the concepts of virtual members and the cyber party. Finally, across 
the communication and campaigning literature, the evidence of Facebook’s use 
as a political tool is examined. Large gaps in knowledge are found especially in 
real-world studies of campaign content. 
 
2.2: Voting behaviour models and communications in 
the era of social networks 
 
 Although this thesis is not specifically examining election outcomes or 
voting behaviour in relation to Facebook use; electoral effects and the nature of 
voting behaviour will still influence why and how parties use Facebook. This is 





behaviour through altering the nature of how the models can operate and how 
communications flow.  
 
Sociological models of voter behaviour 
 
Facebook is an online social network that recreates many social aspects 
seen offline. Users are part of online versions of offline communities with the 
central difference being interaction mechanisms. Given this nature, the Columbia 
sociological model can offer an insight as to the potential power of Facebook as 
a campaign tool. Three works developed the Columbia sociological model; ‘The 
People’s Choice’ (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944), ‘Voting’ (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954) and ‘Personal Influence’ (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). 
‘The People’s Choice’ examined 600 individual supporters of the Democrats and 
Republicans. Importantly, the study undermined its own central thesis; that voting 
stands as an individual act, affected mainly by the personality of the voter and 
their exposure to the media. Instead, the study ascertained that media and 
campaign effects were minimal, and that the major factor influencing vote choice 
was the social groups an individual voter belonged to and their partisan 
identification. Following these findings, Lazarsfeld et al. asserted that “social 
characteristics determine political preference” (1968, p.27). Identity is key in the 
Columbia model’s vision of politics, with this a system accurately recreated on 
Facebook, albeit with some changed dynamics. Facebook operates a real name 
policy and users are avatars of themselves. Although there is some online 
network formation through a user’s interest’s, user’s online networks are 
commonly recreations of their offline networks. Thus, Facebook offers parties a 
gateway to the power of identity within a new more fluid medium. 
Lazarsfeld et al. also detailed that ‘party changers’4 were shown to be 
winnable votes, but mainly via powerful effects apparent from social transmission, 
not base party outreach or campaigning. As they affirm, “…the group which 
campaigns are most eager to reach, (the undecided) is the very group which is 
less likely to listen to propaganda” (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968, p.124). Thus, 
sociological pressures associated with the groups to which an individual belongs 
 





are argued to be the crucial factor influencing voting behaviour and vote choice. 
The capacities of Facebook to merge the power of social group affirmation with 
fluid communications offers parties something very new. Identity is key, with the 
rise in identity politics coinciding with how people represent themselves online. 
Thus, through Facebook there are new potentials for sociological characteristics 
to be hyper-charged, allowing parties to reach out to (and through) new groups. 
Individuals who have differentiated personal views to the candidates, or 
who are outside the standard classifications of their social grouping, are said to 
be under “cross-pressure” (Berelson et al., 1954, p.27). This concept asserts that 
as people have several contending social affiliations, these pressures often lead 
to intrapersonal conflict arising when decision motives are incompatible. Voters 
suffering from ‘cross-pressures’ are not influenced by the proposals of a 
candidate, but instead by the forces exerted upon them via their associated social 
groups (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). This influence leads to these 
individuals having difficulty reaching a decision, thus delaying their decision 
making until late in the campaign or abstaining altogether (Nilson, 2002). Later 
research has supported this assertion of cross pressures having effects on 
participation and voting (Hillygus & Shields, 2008; Andina-Díaz et al., 2009)5. 
Facebook is thus a new dynamic environment where cross-pressures can 
operate, offering parties new avenues to exert social pressure on wavering voters. 
Sociological campaign effects have been argued to operate via the 
“activation of the indifferent, strengthening the link to the political party and 
conversion of the undecided”; with “the influence of social groups to which the 
individual belongs crucial for results, since it is identified as the mediation 
process” (Antunes, 2010, p.148). Thus, across campaign processes undertaken 
via both permanent and election period timescales, as Lazarsfeld et al. assert 
“people vote, not only with their social group, but also for it” (1968, p.147). What 
this means for parties is that Facebook may offer potentials in solidifying the 
cohesiveness of party supporters around proposals, alongside wider social 
identity influence.  
Clearly social influence is of paramount importance to the operation of 
Facebook, but factors of identity are only part of the picture, psychological factors 
 
5 Although others have challenged the evidence (Leighley, 1996) or argued it can decrease 





are also of importance. These factors are explained by a second model, the 
Michigan social psychological model. The ideas were published in ‘The People 
Elect a President’ by Campbell and Kahn (1952) with further analysis presented 
in ‘The Voter Decides’ by Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954), and ‘The American 
Voter’, by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960). The model highlights 
the importance of psychological inputs such as environmental affinity in campaign 
effects. The central offering is the notion of ‘partisanship’ shaped by the concept 
of reference groups, this adds a key psychological dimension to voting processes 
and political choice. Partisanship is acquired through a socialization process, 
influenced by the values and attitudes of family, colleagues and peers. Similar to 
anticipatory socialization (Merton & Kitt, 1950), individuals can select a reference 
group which they do not belong to, and then begin to act to (what they perceive) 
are the rules of that grouping. The partisanship process means emotional bonds 
can be created between a voter and chosen political party, with different strengths 
and levels of involvement. Partisanship is therefore seen to be a genuine form of 
social identification, as “citizens have an enduring sense of what sorts of people 
belong to various parties and whether they identify with these social groups” 
(Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002, p.9). Partisanship is therefore a 
psychological filter whereby parties can benefit from socialising within 
communities, but also restrains huge dramatic shifts in political allegiances. 
Partisanship is a foundation that can be built upon as well as broken down via 
Facebook. 
Facebook presents parties with a new tool to generate partisanship, 
maintain a closer-knit support base and use this group to campaign for them. The 
platform offers parties a powerful avenue for anticipatory socialisation. Allowing 
parties to generate bonds with users, with these users in turn creating further 
flows of partisanship. Nevertheless, it is important to note that “the relationship 
between social-psychological factors and partisanship is challenged by 
researchers who believe that the Michigan model overestimates the role of long-
term partisan loyalties (Dalton, Flanagan, & Beck, 1984; Dalton, 2000)” (Antunes, 
2010, p.157). Nevertheless, the dynamic power of partisanship will play out via 






Overall, both models offer insight into how Facebook can be used as a 
campaign tool and the new powers the platform offers parties to socialise voters, 
engender partisanship and to activate ordinary users to campaign to each other. 
However, it is important to note that these models offer relative stability in 
campaign power. Given, the Columbia and Michigan models promote social 
factors as key, they thus do not generally model for voters to radically change. 
This rigidity is however not the whole picture of British politics, as recently we 
have seen huge voting shifts from Brexit to the ‘Red Wall’ turning blue. As such, 
this research maintains the continuing importance of spatial and temporal factors 
alongside sociological factors. Given a more volatile electorate, Facebook offers 
parties novel sociological impacts, allowing for the utilisation of traditional 
concepts of voter behaviour in a more fluid way. Through Facebook parties can 
harness social and psychological aspects of the two voting models, while utilising 
new capacities in how parties can reach out to people via engaging socially 
located content forms such as video and memes.  
 
Campaign learning and priming 
 
In the traditional campaign literature, parties are found to send voters 
information to develop campaign learning, prime voters and persuade them to 
vote in a certain way. ‘Campaign learning’ is the process by which voters in an 
electoral setting have their knowledge of candidates or issues increased via an 
information-rich campaign environment. Political campaigns can disseminate 
authoritative and persuasive information to the voting public, with resultant 
campaign learning able to influence election outcomes (Lenz, 2009). Traditional 
campaigners use communication mediums such as the media, leaflets, or face to 
face contact, to prime individuals on what issues they should evaluate the 
candidates. This information is argued to increase voters’ knowledge of issues 
surrounding an election (Seldon & Snowdon, 2005; Fridkin & Kenney, 2011); 
shaping how voters make up their minds (Popkin, 1995) and impacting upon 
voters issue saliency (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Togeby, 2007). Thus, as a 
campaign progresses, campaign learning causes voters to have uncertainty 





Alvarez, 1998; Fridkin & Kenney, 2011). This is important as voters are averse to 
voting for unfamiliar candidates (Jacobson, 2013).  
The campaign learning process helps to decrease incumbency advantage 
(Bartels, 1993; Holbrook, 1999) and increase issue voting (Kahn & 
Kenney, 1999). This process is argued to create an informed voting public (Delli, 
Carpini & Keeter, 1996), helping voters make decisions that mirror their 
predispositions (Gelman & King, 1993). The general learning process is well 
evidenced, however there is debate over which mediums (Table 2) are most 
effective for information dissemination. Further study is required because 
evidence of social media campaign learning is not yet clear (Bode, 2015), while 
emerging trends of permanent campaigning have altered potential impacts. 
 
Table 2. Campaign tools across traditional, e-campaign and social media themes 
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Priming, which is heavily related to agenda setting, is where a political 
campaign formulates a specific issue into a salient factor for voters, by changing 
the values voters attach to different political issues (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). 
Campaign teams can, by specifically drawing attention to certain issues and 
ignoring others, shape the narrative by which political candidates are tested by 
voters (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Druckman, 2004). Evidence of priming effects 
have been gathered by both observational and experimental studies 
(Iyengar, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Mendelberg, 2001).  
A selection of parameters can be activated by campaigns, including; party 
identification (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954; McClurg & Holbrook, 2005), 
ideology (Gelman & King, 1993), economic evaluations (Vavreck, 2009), policy 
issues (Johnston et al., 1992), race (Mendelberg, 2001), gender (Kahn & 
Goldenberg, 1991), candidate image (Druckman, Jacobs, & Ostermeier, 2004) 
and emotion (Brader, 2006). What remains unclear within the literature, is which 
of these parameters are most effective. The cognitive processes behind how 
voters weigh these different competing factors are not well understood (Miller & 
Peterson, 2004). It has been argued that campaigns mainly ‘bring home’ wayward 
voters, through reinforcing partisan attachments and prompting voters to recall 
why they affiliate with a party (Berelson et al., 1954; Finkel, 1993; Kramer, 1970). 
However, research has found that ideology or issues are more likely to be 
activated than partisanship (Achen & Bartels, 2006; Gelman & King, 1993; 
Hillygus & Shields, 2008), meaning that parties may struggle to draw back voters 
who see the parties as ideologically different to themselves. Given the high 
volatility of modern electorates including in the UK, declining partisan 
identification is a new factor for campaigners and researchers to contend with.  
A central consideration in how political parties utilise Facebook for 
campaign learning and priming, are the topic and issue choices they engage in. 
Messaging and issue choice are known to follow certain rules, with there being 
an established rhetorical angle, such as an interest in repetition (Claibourn, 2008) 
or hyperbole (Bostdorff, 2017). Equally there is a voting behaviour angle, 
depending on the view taken of how the issue agenda operates alongside party 
competition. There is disagreement over how parties and voters approach the 
issue agenda, whether via a classical ‘Downsian model’ (Downs, 1957), 





ownership theory’ (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik et al., 2003). 
Running through all these models is the innate importance of voters weighing up 
‘ideology vs. competency’ (Green & Hobolt, 2008). With this important relationship 
being altered by both the partisan and ideological natures of the voting public and 
the parties themselves. Green and Hobolt found that up until 2008 UK “parties 
were becoming more converged ideologically” (p.460), with other academics also 
noting the trend in Labour, the Conservatives (Deacon & Wring, 2002) and even 
the press (Brandenburg, 2006). With this there was also a rise in voters’ 
evaluations of competence rather than ideological positions. However, since the 
Great Recession this trend has reduced or reversed. We have seen the return of 
greater ideological separation and the slow recurrence of ideology across the 
voting population (Temple & Grasso, 2018) and in what the two main parties offer 
voters (Schmitt & Loughran, 2017). How parties are presenting themselves on 
Facebook, including how they position themselves ideologically and how issues 
of competency are addressed requires examination.  
Overall, despite the uncertainty in today’s political environment, campaigns 
judiciously design messages for dissemination no matter the medium. Empirical 
research on traditional information dissemination shows that voting behaviour can 
be affected by awareness of political parties or candidates and their associated 
causes (Schmitt-Beck, 2004). This system will logically be replicable on 
Facebook, but processes may potentially operate differently. Table 3 shows the 
current landscape and development of different types of campaigns. It includes a 
formulation called ‘Janus-faced campaigning’, a concept that describes the 
nuanced manner in which parties use Facebook as a campaign tool, including 














Table 3. Different types of political campaigns based on Norris (2000), Gibson & 
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A personalised network, the flow of communications and opinion 
leaders 
 
A key element that makes Facebook a unique campaign tool, but also very 
difficult to analyse, is the personalised and individualised nature of each user’s 
Facebook network. No two networks are the same as every user’s ego-network 
is personalised according to their own content algorithm. Facebook pages 





between offline and online mediated relations indistinct (Enli & Thumin, 2012). 
Facebook also lacks traditional gatekeepers (Polat, 2005) and offers users 
instantaneous response, as such campaigners must maximise these powerful 
capacities (Svensson, 2011; Marichal, 2013). For users, Facebook use has been 
argued to be driven by expressive motivations (Zhao, Grasmuck, & Martin, 2008; 
Rosenberg & Egbert, 2011). User actions, interactions or reactions are argued to 
be devices of self-presentation (Zhao et al., 2008). Political campaigners must 
therefore appreciate that for their content to be read or disseminated by voters, it 
must fit within the user’s political identity and intended ego-network (Svensson, 
2011). Parties in a similar manner to shaping their messages for mass media 
redistribution (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck, 2008), must do the same 
for public redistribution.  
Facebook’s network formation and users’ networks have been 
understudied due to the impossibility of accessing appropriate Facebook data or 
user algorithms. Not only is the algorithm a closely guarded secret, but every 
single user’s algorithm is personally unique. Thus, although we cannot 
understand an individual’s network or why they see which content, we can at least 
understand that Facebook use is a personalised experience. This knowledge is 
vital for understanding how parties should use the platform. The nature of the 
Facebook network suggests the vitality of sociological personalised connections, 
with the strongest power likely to occur from trusted sources within smaller 
homophilic networks. Given a lack of campaign network studies we cannot certify 
this as fact, nevertheless we can appreciate the flow of communications through 
the platform and how parties sculpt their content. For example, we may see 
political campaigners using socio-demographic depiction in content to enhance 
impact (what Kreiss et al. call ‘political identity ownership’, 2020) or using certain 
pages for specific audiences.  
Although this thesis is not specifically examining the flow of 
communications upon Facebook, the nature of communication flow on the 
platform will inform how parties use the tool and its potential reach. This is 
because successful organic communications on the platform require individuals 
to share the content sent by parties, with the make-up and nature of the primary 





as Facebook has potentials for both expansive viral communications via multiple-
flows, alongside microcosmic echo chambered one-step communications.  
Three key theories contest how communications can flow on Facebook 
and social media; the one-step, two-step, and multi-step flow models. Lasswell 
(1938) asserted a communications model of one-step communication flow, also 
labelled the ‘magic bullet theory model’ (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The thesis 
evolved during the rise of radio and cinema, with state control and propaganda a 
new hegemonic entity within Europe (Bennett, 1982). Taking these ideas Bennett 
and Manheim (2006) conceptualised a contemporary one-step flow of information 
within today’s highly differentiated media landscape. They defined modern 
capacities for the targeting of messages directly to individuals rather than 
Lasswell’s mass-audience flow. Within this system “opinion leaders are 
increasingly less likely to lead”, because the “mass media in the one-step flow are 
increasingly fragmented and differentiated” (Bennett & Manheim, 2006, p.1). The 
direct communication paradigm (one-step flow), has thus been revived and seen 
in hyper-mediated communication practices such as Facebook targeted election 
campaigns6 (Moore, 2016; Lilleker & Pack, 2016).  
The largest body of work upon communications flow and voter behaviour, 
asserts a traditional but modified two-step flow model (Lotan et al., 2011; Choi, 
2015; Hong, 2016; Pang & Ng, 2017; Lui et al., 2017). This system describes how 
messages originate from larger more important sources such as news websites, 
with this content then rebroadcast by smaller pages and users. Empirical studies 
have observed clear evidence of the two-step flow of communications, in political 
Twitter networks (Wu et al., 2011; Choi, 2014, 2015), Arab Spring campaigning 
on Facebook (Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009; Lotan et al., 2011) and during the 2005 UK 
General Election via websites (Norris & Curtice, 2008). The model has been re-
emphasised in the social media age, because increasing numbers of people 
receive their news directly from social networks (Mitchell et al., 2011). This new 
communications structure propels information forward to individuals, mediated via 
powerful pages, individuals, or other amplifying opinion leaders. However, unlike 
the past, through social media networks ‘‘socially-located opinion leaders spread 
information to many kinds of people, including citizens with little interest in news 
 





to begin with’’ (Thorson & Wells, 2012, p.13). Therefore, parties have a new 
opportunity as campaign information may have become unavoidable. 
It is also argued that social media offers something more complex than 
one- or two-step communications flow. The internet age has advanced the idea 
of multi-step flows via networked structures as originated by Weimann (1982). 
Multistep-flow specifies a process in which messages are distributed via a 
multitude of intermediary channels (Harik, 1971; Robinson, 1976; Iyengar, 1994; 
Park, 2013). Individuals now have control of the networked groups of which they 
are a part. For example, they will be members of small personal groups on 
WhatsApp or Facebook messenger, larger groups via Facebook pages and even 
larger bodies via Twitter and Facebook news feeds. The new capacity for average 
online social media users to use a myriad of channels to rebroadcast information, 
has been argued to give a new level of fluidity to communications, including large 
spill over effects (Choi, 2014; Hilbert et al., 2017). When users share content, this 
content will be further shared and rebroadcast by others, it may also be taken up 
by larger forces once again, meaning messages can be repeatedly fed into the 
online realm. Recently there has been a dominance of multi-step models given 
their flexibility in explaining use of both one- and two-step flows, alongside more 
complex communication strategies (Wright & Hinson, 2010).  
Although communications may spill-over, communications do not flow 
equally as some people have more power than others. Parties can also take 
advantage of this hierarchical system via opinion leaders. The 2015, 2017 & 2019 
UK general election campaigns saw the major parties’ use multiple-step 
information flows from party or supporter pages to individuals, often via opinion 
leaders, alongside post virality and user engagement7. Within network studies 
and voter behaviour, the concept of opinion leadership concerns who powerful 
influencers are and what impact they have within communications networks. Both 
ideas are important, however given its supply side focus this thesis is more 
concerned with understanding who opinion leaders are. Researchers have tried 
a range of different analyses to identify opinion leaders online using a combination 
of variables (Lee et al., 2010; González et al., 2013). However, as there are 
multiple ways to operationalise influence, clear results are sparse (Dubois, 2014). 
 
7 Alongside their party pages, in 2017 Labour benefitted from pages created in support of 





Describing someone as an ‘influencer’ (Rogers, 2010) or an ‘opinion leader’ can 
be problematic because it is difficult to identify traceable practices, specific tools 
or strategies, or even structures that are exclusive to influencers. Nevertheless, 
we know that parties have always used influential people such as celebrities or 
religious leaders to deliver their messages. These individuals act as opinion 
leaders for certain groups and are chosen for their characteristics including 
nationality, gender, ethnicity, or age.  
In network studies and voting behaviour, opinion leaders are examined as 
a key element of information flow. Social media has arguably changed the nature 
of how opinion leaders can be used. Their ability to reach and influence certain 
groups may have been either amplified or diminished. Platforms such as 
Facebook have made it easier for parties to use or reach opinion leaders. 
However, as the public can not only consume information but also create it 
(Chadwick, 2011), candidates can now “preach through the converted” 
(Vissers, 2009), potentially reducing any need for traditional style opinion leaders. 
Although opinion leaders are clearly still targeted by political campaigns on social 
media. Academics disagree as to whether we have seen an increase or reduction 
in the power of traditional opinion leaders, or if there has been a radical change 
in their character8.  
Some find that the traditional view that opinion leaders are characterised 
by higher social status, sociability and more social contacts (Lazarsfeld et al., 
1944) do not hold true in today’s online environment. Chang and Ghim (2011) 
discerned that on Twitter social status is not a powerful concept, instead expertise 
is prized. With opinion leaders “with more knowledge resources more engaged in 
producing content than other users” (Park, 2013, p.2). Thus, it is argued opinion 
leaders still exist online (Hwang & Shim, 2010) and have important roles, but their 
character and power has undoubtedly changed. Social networks also feature 
more leaders, as although a few opinion leaders will have supreme positions 
within these networks, other individuals’ power has also increased (Sun, Youn, 
Wu, & Kuntaraporn, 2006; Park, 2012). Overall, online opinion leaders are partly 
self-selected by action, rather than the traditional concept of leadership operating 
via reference groups (Lazarsfeld, 1944). Although social media opinion leaders 
 





still tend to play traditional roles as agenda or news disseminators, they are not 
as easily defined by their social, economic, or political standing. This has clear 
implications for political campaigning, as now anyone can become a leader, 
including those outside of traditional power systems9. The powers of anonymity 
granted by certain websites and discussion networks, means opinion leaders are 
potentially not chosen via ascribed socio-cultural-demographics, but instead their 
content. Although Facebook runs a real name policy10, there is clearly much 
greater fluidity in how parties can use opinion leaders or how they develop.  
More research is needed to understand opinion leadership more fully upon 
Facebook, with network architecture still under-appreciated (Bossetta, 2018). 
However, Facebook arguably offers parties the best of both worlds. Today’s 
expanding online space, delimited via various means such as websites network 
construction or position, has led to the role of opinion leaders being a more 
fragmentary construct than before. Alongside the continuing but changed role of 
opinion leaders is the capacity for everyone to be an influencer (Bakshy, 2011). 
Nevertheless, both avenues are affected by the traditional sociological and 
expertise characteristics that previously defined opinion leaders. Clearly party 
campaigns must be smart in how they generate or use opinion leaders.  
 
A ‘social’ network?  
 
Facebook has created a network that recreates many social elements of 
people’s worlds; people share online networks with their offline work colleagues, 
family, and friends. Thus, the sociological model offers a pertinent gateway for 
appreciating the platform, offering important considerations for voting and other 
key campaigning practices, especially persuasion, socialisation & mobilisation. 
Facebook offers parties the ability to reach undecided voters, the maintenance of 
party members and the assembly of an activatable body of online followers. The 
platform consequently has enormous potentials as a campaign tool. Facebook 
offers parties a new avenue for campaign learning and priming, however success 
is intermediated by the users of the network. Although Facebook offers parties 
 
9 For example @Rachael_Swindon on Twitter or Another Angry Voice on Facebook. 





new technological capacities there are high stakes, as parties must understand 
their online audience and how to effectively communicate to different groups.  
The widest application can see parties socialise or promote emotional 
bonds with large numbers through organic content, secondary virality or 
advertisements. However, Facebook’s key is that it allows for the socialisation of 
interested users who will in turn act as socialisers of their wider networks via 
rebroadcasting content to friends and family. This socialisation process may have 
electoral consequences, but even at a smaller level Facebook can have impacts 
on the generation and maintenance of a core support group. This online virtual 
membership no longer needs to be an official membership, as Facebook offers a 
more fluid drop in/out framework that suits a possibly de/re-aligning populace. As 
such, this offers parties the ability to generate a more fluid partisanship than was 
previously possible. The platform provides parties a replacement of the church or 
bowling league, offering parties a new location to reach out to both partisan and 
de-aligned voters, with the capacities seen in the traditional sociological model 
now capable across a new medium. Facebook therefore offers political parties a 
powerful supplementary arena for organisation, socialisation, and network 
building. This is a lifeline in an era of declining social capital and the slow 
breakdown of offline community (Putnam, 2000).  
Facebook is however not a perfect replacement as it operates via a 
different system with dissimilar pressures. We understand little about users’ 
online social networks given each is unique, while the nature of the Facebook 
network is also opaque due to the secrecy of its algorithms. The current 
uncertainty of what sort of social network Facebook recreates presents a dilemma 
for the parties. Facebook may offer parties a stable recreation of users’ offline 
networks giving parties a new gateway towards influencing voter behaviour in a 
traditional way. In this situation identifying the church or opinion leader 
equivalents on Facebook will be imperative. In contrast, due to differentiated 
network structure, and a basis in interests and activity, the platform could offer a 
sociologically based but more volatile campaign environment. Given the growing 
body of voters who feature weak party ties (Dalton, 2004), the potentials and 
pitfalls of this system will be greater. This more chaotic sociological system could 
mean that parties can reach out to new voter groups and more powerfully 





communications to enter echo chambers or be dismissed due to lower emotive 
connections. Finally, Facebook may be an ineffectual system, socialisation may 
be arbitrary and fleeting, with users’ online recreation of offline institutions not as 
powerful as those seen offline. If this were the case, then its use as a tool would 
be constrained towards partisan activity.  
Facebook may be a volatile tool for an unpredictable age. We have recently 
seen greater volatility in voting patterns within the UK. Symptomatic examples of 
greater volatility are seen in the collapse of the Red Wall alongside the rise of 
Brexit politics. The BES has found that the last three elections 2015, 2017 and 
2019 saw an incredible rate of voter movement, far beyond the level of volatility 
seen over the last few decades. This new volatile landscape has occurred within 
the context of the rise of social media. It may be no mere coincidence that both 
are concurrent as through social media new voting populations could be rationally 
updating their positions, or potentially taking up new less solid political positions 
that can be in flux. As such, social media may be acting as an accelerant of 
volatility, or as a catalyst for wider voter behaviour changes. Although we are 
seeing an electoral landscape in flux, this volatility doesn’t mean Facebook is not 
effective as a campaign tool, as it is the platforms’ persuasive capacities that may 
be adding to this fluid landscape. 
Finally, given it is the focus of this thesis, it is important to highlight the 
vitality of organic campaigning. Facebook is both a personalised algorithmically 
based network, where information flows across steps and is socially based, but 
also a one-step direct communication tool via targeted advertisements. Parties 
now spend vast sums reaching voters directly without specific focus on organic 
message dissemination, perhaps exhibiting a loss of faith in the role of opinion 
leaders and organic reach. Most academic and media focus is currently on 
targeted advertising; however, the unclear power of targeted advertisements in 
academic evidence alongside declining UK Facebook advertising spends 
(Hotham, 2020) suggests restricted capacities. Targeted advertising is not a 
magic bullet, with organic campaigning given its sociological nature more 
important. Research highlights this fact, as Bond et al. in their study of 61 million 
Facebook users found, “the effect of social transmission on real-world voting was 
greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves” (2012, p.295). 





The platform adds ‘social leads’ through linking the advert to users’ friends, 
arguing that social placement improves performance. Having users see that their 
friends follow a political page that is sending the advert increases the messages 
power, clear evidence that shows targeted advertising succeeds when it mirrors 
organic campaigning. The evidence accumulated over the last decade shows the 
vitality of organic campaigning, however given a lack of evidence on dark posts, 
where the transformative political power lies in the use of social media is a 
continuing debate that requires further examination. Nevertheless, a sociological 
understanding of Facebook as a ‘social network’ that appreciates its capacities 
for multiple-steps of information flow is the most precise model for understanding 
Facebook’s power. 
 
2.3: Facebook as an information dissemination tool 
Studies of scale; adoption, engagement and reach 
 
Many different areas relevant to an understanding of scale have been 
examined by researchers. A large focus of the literature is the study of usage as 
adoption. The study is important as “social media adoption by politicians is far 
from homogenous” (Quilan et al., 2018, p.2). However, the field has little to add 
to this study given that Facebook usage has become normalised across Britain. 
A less popular area are studies that focus on party Facebook engagement, or the 
number who are reached online. Only a handful of studies examine this area 
purely, instead most focus on engagement and approach, or engagement and 
participation, areas examined later. Larsson and Kalsnes studied Facebook 
campaign engagement in Norway and Sweden, they uncovered evidence of both 
an “election effect” and the “permanence of political campaigns” (2014, p.292). 
Later Larsson found ‘likes’ the most common engagement form for Norwegian 
party leaders, and that sizable parties receive the greatest engagement (2015). 
In Turkey, Sobaci & Hatipoglu discovered engagement levels of party content to 
be low and struggled to flow across audiences (2017). In contrast, Santana & 
Camaj found during the 2012 US Presidential election that messages were 
popular and spread towards greater audiences via engagement (2015). Studying 





ascertained that their use was unpopular compared to ‘like’ or ‘share’ interactions 
(2017). Gerbaudo et al., examined user engagement and emotive messaging of 
Facebook posts during the 2017 UK General Election campaign, the study found 
high Labour engagement, but used very limited codes gathered through text 
analysis (2019). Finally, a growing body of work looks at engagement with 
election results. Bene found that candidates Facebook pages share counts are 
associated with the electoral outcome (2018), while Lin identified a similar trend 
in Taiwan across all engagement forms (2017). Overall, we can appreciate 
millions of voters globally are engaging with parties on Facebook, however 
engagement is an under-examined area with many important questions still not 
fully understood. These include the role of different pages, temporal qualities 
such as permanent campaigns and the importance of internal/external events. 
 
Studies of content approaches  
 
An area of attention are studies of usage as approach, examining 
candidate or party use of content, language, and rhetoric. The field is generally 





The use of populist rhetoric has received attention. Zulianello, Albertini & 
Ceccobeli examined “eighty-three political leaders from twenty-six Western and 
Latin American countries” finding little evidence of a populist communications 
strategy (2018, p.439). Koc-Michalska et al. studied 117 parties across 14 
countries during the 2014 European Parliamentary election. They ascertained 
that populism occurred in content or in style within 1/3 of the communications 
made. Finally, Lilleker et al. (2018) examined the content forms of Facebook 
posts, they found logical patterns of populist rhetoric in Facebook use. Outside of 
populism, gender and rhetoric has also been examined. Yarchi & Samuel-Azran 
(2018) observed that female and male Israeli 2015 candidates used similar 
rhetoric, whilst Aristolian rhetoric has been found popular in Israeli politicians 





the platform to maximise their content’s impact, with the rhetoric strategies used 
requiring further study beyond those seen11.  
 
Content topic  
 
A select but growing group of studies examine content topic differences 
between pages during an election. In examining US users and parties’ Facebook 
content. David et al. (2016) found that left wing parties and voters were more 
likely to mention “protest” in their Facebook posts, whilst right-leaning parties and 
voters mostly mentioned religion (this finding is also supported by Vaccari et al., 
2016). Alashri et al. (2016) examined post sentiment during the 2016 Presidential 
Election via 9,700 posts across five candidates (Clinton, Trump, Sanders, Cruz, 
and Kasich). Their conclusions assert “that Republican candidates were more 
likely to share information on controversial events… whilst Democratic 
candidates focussed on social policy issues” (Alashri et al., 2016, p.231). Stier et 
al. (2018) discovered that 2013 German Federal Election candidates used 
Facebook and Twitter differently, with parties using different topics than those the 
mass audience cared about. Gerbaudo et al., (2019) examined textual topic 
choice of 2017 UK election posts, Brexit featured greatly. However, the study did 
not examine the non-textual content of the posts, a key failure given the nature 
of modern communications. Overall, there are many gaps in understanding topic 
approaches; coding schemes are partial with limited longitudinal study, while 
topic choice modelling focuses on text thus failing to appreciate video or images. 
 
Content forms and quality 
 
Video has arisen recently as the content form of choice. However, the 
number of studies that specifically examine content approaches, especially forms 
such as video or photo is limited. Content analyses upon the Obama campaign 
ascertained that Obama’s Facebook page used only a few text-only messages 
during the 2012 campaign (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015), with partisan 
aligned media resources used by both parties in crafting Facebook responses to 
 
11 Most rhetoric studies, studies of topic or content form examine content approaches in 





the debates (Edgerly et al., 2016). A new field examines user generated content, 
such as memes and humorous user made videos, these have been found to be 
important for carrying information (Edgerly et al., 2016). This growing area is 
important as parties diversify their communications approaches. Content quality 
is of vital importance as voter awareness has been found to be significantly 
related to the quality of traditional campaign material. Conroy et al. (2012) found 
that a probable reason for Facebook groups having limited impact on political 
knowledge or participation was poor quality content. As the Facebook information 
space has become larger and more competitive, content quality has also 
increased, leading to a continuing arms race and battle for engagement. Overall, 
Facebook has allowed parties to use a new range of content mediums such as 
interactive video and photo, yet evidence of how parties have employed these 
forms is limited.  
 
Personalisation of politics 
 
Although personalised content approaches are apparent across a myriad 
of media sources; the most important element of personalisation is the modern 
focus on politicians and party leaders, not parties themselves. This is likely driven 
by what some academics argue is our political systems ‘presidentialization’ 
(Mughan, 2000; Poguntke & Webb, 2005), or wider ‘mediatization’12 (Rintel et al., 
2016). As McAllister (2007) asserts, there is ‘substantial evidence’ that during 
campaigns leaders have become increasingly visible in the media at the expense 
of parties (Plasser & Lengauer, 2008), this has been a deliberate party campaign 
approach such as with New Labour (Street, 2012). There is a large body of 
research upon personalisation, however its focus is generally upon the traditional 
media not social media campaigning. Twitter has received the greatest body of 
examination (e.g. Samuel-Azran et al., 2015; Kruikemeier et al., 2016; Loader et 
al., 2016; McGregor et al., 2017), while Facebook is seeing a smaller but growing 
research body. Facebook appears to exhibit high levels of personalised content 
from not only the media, but also from party and party leader Facebook pages.  
 
12 Mediatization argues that the media shapes and frames the processes of political 





Firstly, some studies have found personalisation, even if not the specific 
goal of the research (see Gunn & Skogerbø, 2013; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; 
Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015). Of studies specifically testing for 
personalisation, Macnamara & Kenning (2011) examined the 2010 Australian 
General Election, they found that Julia Gillard and party leaders dominated 
Facebook content. This is supported in evidence from Taiwan, where Wen 
compared web 1.0 (candidate messages) and 2.0 messages (candidate 
messages highlighted by “friends”), finding “that while the 1.0 messages 
emphasized policy more than character, the 2.0 messages emphasized character 
over policy” (Wen, 2014, p.19). In Europe, Gunn & Skogerbø (2013) observed the 
2009 Norwegian General Election to be heavily personalised, with Facebook 
viewed as an important campaign tool. Obama’s 2012 Facebook campaign has 
also shown evidence of being heavily personalised via his usage of family 
imagery (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015). Recently Metz et al., examined 
personalised communications finding that emotive content is well used and yields 
greater engagement (2019). Overall, it is vital to appreciate whether British parties 
are using Facebook in a way that “has become increasingly focused on 
personalities and personal traits of politicians” (Gunn & Skogerbø, 2013, p.758 
referring to Hjarvard, 2008). Facebook may present a clear example of the radical 
shift in how politics is being communicated using leaders above party brands. 
 
Attack advertising/negative campaigning 
 
Although empirical studies of attack advertising on Facebook are limited, 
campaign content targeted at political opponents and their policies is well 
evidenced on social media (e.g., Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008; Druckman et al., 
2010; Ceron & d'Adda, 2016). Deemed an alternative practice to information 
dissemination; negative campaigning is an age-old phenomenon. Some scholars 
have asserted the form to be growing in use in the social media age (Fridkin & 
Kenney, 2012; Walter et al., 2014; Ceron & d'Adda, 2016; Borah, 2016). This is 
because social media has fewer gatekeepers alongside less stringent codes for 
factuality/formality. One only needs to view the Conservative or Momentum 
campaign on Facebook to see that parties clearly love to engage in negative 





practitioners (Kamber, 1997) that it (electorally) works”, which “has reverberated 
throughout the scholarly literature” (Lau & Rovner, 2009, p.295). It is theorised 
that as vote choice operates on candidate evaluations, attacks can lower opinions 
of those targeted creating a logic for effectiveness. However, there is a potential 
backlash threat if attacks appear meanspirited (Garramone, 1984; Kahn & 
Kenney, 1999). Nevertheless, if one can attack and still achieve a net gain from 
the act, then logically campaigners will engage in the practice despite potential 
negative effects. Despite this; empirical studies have found a lack of evidence of 
campaign effects from negative campaigning. Lau et al. (2007) examined 43 
studies finding little evidence of vote choice effect, but that negative attack ads 
can stimulate knowledge.  
So, if the effects are minimal why are parties still using the form? One idea 
that is continuously asserted is the demobilisation hypothesis (Ansolabehere et 
al. 1994; Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1995). In the original study Ansolabehere et al. 
found that participants exposed to a negative ad were 5% less likely to intend to 
vote13. Demobilisation of opposition groups is potentially a clear reason for use, 
but attack advertising also offers partisan mobilisation abilities. Negative 
campaigning can help energise party members and certain voter groups. It has 
been said that “negative campaigning fits better with an offensive campaign 
(rather than a defensive one). This is because the first is aimed at volatile voters 
and the opponent’s adherents, but the latter is aimed at mobilising a party’s own 
adherents’ (Walter, 2014, p. 45). This is potentially why we see the form so much 
on Facebook given the potential to activate volatile groups. Nevertheless, attack 
advertising on the platform may be more related to activating partisans than 
floating voters. Overall, negative attack advertising is common. However, as well 
as little evidence of any effect on vote choice, there is also a lack of Facebook 




Paid-for elements on Facebook, including a myriad of options for micro-
targeting intended voters, have presented themselves as invaluable to certain 
 





parties as important voters can now be directly reached. Parties have always 
targeted voters, especially on a local basis as seen in UK leaflets (Shephard, 
2007), however the ability to target has radically improved in the social media age. 
As Farrell (2006) asserts, campaigns in the digital age ‘differ in fundamental ways 
from those of a mere ten or twenty years before’ as new capabilities are helping 
parties ‘find out what the public wants to hear and market the product accordingly’ 
(Farrell, 2006, p.125). Targeted campaigning is observable in campaign content 
targeted at specific voter segments or interests (e.g., Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; 
Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008; Bimber, 2014), with content developed in conjunction 
with party data, consumer data and other data sources. Facebook itself can 
deliver targeted advertising through its own highly detailed data on users, allowing 
even laypersons to send bespoke hyper-targeted messages to users. This new 
toolkit for hyper-personalised campaigning constitutes an important form of 
personalisation at the disposal of parties’ campaign teams. The ability for content 
to be targeted specifically to recipients is a radical increase in the level of detail 
available to parties.  
The more ‘one size fits all’ logic that dominated the pre-internet era has 
thus shifted to more segmented approaches. However, it is important to 
appreciate that use is more limited than many imagine, with a focus on broad 
targeting seen in 2019 for example (Hotham, 2020). Evidence of effectiveness is 
also very limited in part due to data access issues. In the best current study on 
Facebook adverts available, Hager finds “tentative support that online ads 
positively affect vote choice” (2019, p.1091). Much more in-depth analysis needs 
to be undertaken as direct campaign effects are still a relative unknown. However, 
targeted advertising has uses outside of pure campaigning to voters, for example 
it is extensively used for A/B testing (Hotham, 2019). Parties today have a 
powerful avenue to test messages via clickthroughs and engagement, no longer 
having to rely on focus groups. As such, parties have a new tool to increase the 
effectiveness of their online and offline messages. 
What is being sent via targeted advertisements in the UK is also an 
unknown. A study by Anstead et al., (2018) examined whotargetsme.com 
Facebook advertising from the 2017 General Election, they found 60% of 1,376 
Labour ads attacked the Conservatives. However, the work only examined the 





of content of targeted advertising is seen in recent work on the 2017/2019 General 
Election14 (Hotham, 2019). There was a heavy focus on the EU and leadership, 
with targeted adverts of a different form to organic posts. Overall, targeted 
advertising is underexplored requiring ground up investigation. 
 
Content and interaction analyses 
 
The largest body of studies are those that have examined Facebook 
engagement in conjunction with political content. These examinations have tried 
to ascertain what content types users are more likely to engage with. The general 
findings are that personalised, negative and humorous forms of content spark the 
greatest engagement. Study in the US has focused on Presidential campaigns. 
Woolley et al., (2010) found Obama to be more popular in terms of interactions 
and portrayed more positively. Gerodimos & Justinussen (2015) found Obama’s 
most popular posts contained personalised pictures of his two daughters. 
Personalised communications are clearly popular with audiences. More recently, 
Xenos et al., found for US party Facebook pages, that “variations in the tone, 
timing and content of posts (distinct from contextual factors) are significantly 
related to how users respond through likes and comments” (2017, p.826). 
Examinations in the US show that parties engage in considered content 
approaches with audience engagement discerning. This importance of content 
approach is also seen outside the US. Muniz et al. found that across Spain and 
Mexico “differences in citizen engagement derive from the different engagement 
activities deployed by political actors on Facebook” (2019, p.112). Efforts made 
by parties have effects, with one of the approaches commonly seen being 
negative campaigning. This has been shown to be effective in gathering 
increased Facebook engagement in Israel (Samuel-Azran, Yarchi & Wolfsfeld, 
2017) and Europe (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014).  
In the most comprehensive analysis available Bene examined Hungarian 
electoral candidates’ political content. His results demonstrate that citizens are 









demanding posts” (Bene, 2017, p.514). The study also showed that virality was 
especially enabled by memes, videos, negative content, mobilizing posts and 
posts containing calls for sharing. Bene (2017) later examined the top 25 most 
viral posts during the 2014 Hungarian General Election campaign, finding 
negativity to be most vital for high engagement. As for large multi-case analysis 
Lilleker et al. (2016) provide the strongest study. They examined 28 nations’ 
parties’ content during the 2014 European elections. Examining total relationships 
between content and engagement, they found videos and photos more viral than 
other forms. They also ascertained that followership positively influenced 
interactions, this suggests some architectural elements to online success outside 
of content choice15. 
In the UK only one study has examined party Facebook content with 
engagement thoroughly, Lee & Campbell examined ‘posters’ sent by parties on 
their Facebook pages between 2013 and the General Election of 2015. They 
found that; “despite a clear emphasis on sharing images, few received 
widespread attention, arguably limiting their persuasive role, however prevalence 
suggests a role for parties trying to maintain relationships… by displaying virtual 
presence, credibility, and belonging, paralleling traditional window posters” (Lee 
& Campbell, 2016, p.313). This is interesting as it follows the idea that 
campaigning on social media mirrors campaigning practices offline. However, the 
study only comparatively examined posters by total engagement, failing to 
examine the content or subsequent engagement in more detail.  
In contrast to the studies seen above, not all assert the importance of 
content approaches. Steka, Surowiec & Mazak found that in Czechia and Poland 
the “level of support for a party status is largely independent of the content of the 
message in both countries” (2018, p.1) with policy related subjects gathering the 
greatest negativity. Equally, Silva et al., established that news content 
engagement was related to the importance of events not the content form (2018). 
Finally, Lilleker et al. found the importance of content frequency and timing rather 
than content form on engagement (2016). There is also a potential link between 
audiences, engagement and page approach. Fenoll & Cano-Oron (2017) found 
that audiences of pages over the 2015 Spanish election differ, with newer or 
 
15 There is also limited evidence of the impact of content tone on engagement, with negative 





traditional parties’ audiences engaging with content in different ways. Thus, there 
is some debate around whether engagement is a form of mindless clicktivism, or 
if content approaches inform engagement. This thesis stands with the body of 
work that supports the latter; even party members do not just mindlessly consume 
political content they do not find engaging. Although some nuance is required, 
parties spend millions in developing engaging content for a reason. 
Overall, in the United Kingdom, Facebook based quantitative content 
analysis remains an underexplored area. Gaps exist in the literature across how 
parties craft Facebook content and the impact it has on their online audience. 
However, there is also the question of what we learn about Facebook from 
content/engagement analyses. Engagement is useful for appreciating success 
and reach online. However, as this thesis is more interested in the potentials of 
Facebook as a campaign tool in terms of approach, this thesis uses engagement 
to solely appreciate scale and participation. This research is therefore interested 
in examining the gaps that exist with the classification of Facebook approach as 
related to a typology, rather than simply what messages are the most engaged 
with.  
 
Information dissemination on Facebook 
 
Social media and e-campaigning have given parties new opportunities to 
create and disseminate exciting visual communication information. However clear 
evidence of the effects of this new informational tool are limited. Bode in one of 
the few studies on campaign learning, asserts that “the potential for users to learn 
political information from social media exists, but is not always realized within the 
general population” (Bode, 2016, p.24). Although social media can “influence 
perceptions of candidate traits” (Bystrom & Dimitrova, 2014, p.1568). Evidence of 
overall learning effects is slim, except for in younger people (Edgerly et al., 2018). 
Given the complexity of the modern media environment and the “idiosyncrasies 
across individuals in the rate and mode through which they encounter political 
information” (Edgerly citing Thorson & Wells, 2016), it is understandable that 
direct effects have not materialised. Nevertheless, despite these considerations 
Facebook is a central core of parties’ campaigns, meaning they clearly believe 





of evidential clarity can therefore be addressed from the supply side, by 
examining how parties are using Facebook as an information tool. Although this 
approach fails to show a direct causal relationship on learning, we can still show 
how parties are using Facebook to try to generate campaign learning.  
Although Facebook is a unique system for the delivery of information, there 
is a lack of study of the approaches used (Ceron & d’Adda, 2015) and how these 
fit with the sociological dimensions Facebook affords. Theoretically, information 
provision may fit into ideas of the sociological model of voting behaviour. Parties 
may play the system via appropriating opinion leaders and developing interactive 
representative content that is more likely to be shared. Equally important, is the 
technological improvements that Facebook offers, with its capabilities in audio-
visual communication vastly superior to other tools. Parties now effectively have 
their own cable-TV channels, as well as the ability to deliver a myriad of other 
content forms from posters to memes. Previous evidence has found that 
information dissemination is highly standardised (Lilleker et al., 2011). However, 
as well as the landscape changing fast, e-campaigning mediums and social 
media have been found to provide parties greater autonomy to determine what, 
when and how campaign information is disseminated (Gibson & Ward, 2000a, 
2000b; Foot & Schneider, 2006). Consequently, more research needs to be 
undertaken to show whether Facebook has enabled parties to innovate their 
campaign information and sustain voters’ interests.  
The weaknesses of traditional mediums for information dissemination and 
priming, such as their broadcast nature or lack of social placement and 
interactivity, signal Facebooks specific benefits. Although academic findings 
present a mixed picture and usage appears overwhelmingly conservative, many 
avenues of impact and approach are still not addressed. Key underexamined 
aspects that may be central to information dissemination include; comparative 
longitudinal examination across parties and page types, the study of different 
temporal campaign periods such as the permanent campaign, and how novel 







2.4: Facebook as a tool for participation  
Participation in the Facebook era 
 
This thesis is interested in the supply side approaches taken by parties to 
engender engagement, participation and mobilisation. Content can push for direct 
action, asking the viewer to vote, visit a page, join a party or attend a rally. Most 
academic study is interested in the direct causal effects of different campaign 
mediums on different forms of participation. This area of research is outside the 
direct remit of this thesis given a supply side focus. However, a firm understanding 
of the capacities of campaigning for participation is required as it defines a core 
logic of Facebook use. 
In the traditional and e-campaign literature mobilisation and participation 
are the main studied effects. Examinations focus on tools used and overall effects 
such as voting. Mobilisation in the traditional literature is normally defined as get 
out the vote operations, with the goal to push party supporters to vote on Election 
Day. Participation is viewed as other forms of action such as attending a rally, 
joining a party or canvassing. However, as more participation tools evolved the 
definition of political participation has become wider (Christensen, 2011; Van 
Deth, 2014). This has blurred the margins between political and civic participation, 
reducing clarity between participation and mobilisation. Scholars now study a vast 
array of forms of action from voting to online political discussion as ‘participation’ 
without using the term mobilisation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Dalton, 2008; Fowler 
et al., 2008; Kavanaugh et al., 2008). Some literature even uses the terms 
mobilisation or participation interchangeably (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, p.25). 
While other studies use the term participation as a broad definition, and 
mobilisation as an organisational voting concept (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; 
Bennett & Segerberg 2013; Theocharis et al. 2015). To clear up this confusion, 
within this thesis participation is seen as the broad definition of all online/offline 
action including offline mobilisation, online/offline participation and participation 
via engagement. This thesis views three levels of participation under one umbrella 
term. This thesis also places a difference between online and offline participation 





to clearly demarcate what parties are intending as the outcome of their content 
approaches. 
 
Figure 1. Participation in three themes 
 
 
This thesis has decided to investigate a wider interpretation of participation 
because Facebook’s nature is one in which there is a cascade of participation. 
From the lowest level of engagement, towards participation online or offline and 
then electoral mobilisation. The potential breadth of impact from Facebook means 
it is important to use a wide definition for understanding participation on the 
platform. This thesis thus supports the extended spill-over model of participation 
as asserted by Cantijoch, Cutts and Gibson (2016). This position is against 
researchers who negate the importance of engagement as an effective form of 
participation and a starter action towards greater activities. These proponents 











Direct/indirect mobilisation and participation in the traditional and e-
campaigning literature 
 
Mobilisation like many other aspects of campaigns is hard to measure 
because of the difference between direct and indirect mobilisation. Studies must 
fight against endogeneity and self-selection; often this is an impossible task due 
to the diffuse way information can travel. Direct mobilisation is where a party 
contacts a voter directly and this contact leads to the voter’s electoral mobilisation. 
In contrast, indirect mobilisation defines the subsequent information cascades 
that occur after direct contact, as the voter may motivate voting amongst their 
social circle (McClurg, 2004). It is important to note that there is also the potential 
for direct and indirect participation, where social contact prompts a friend to attend 
an event. The concept of direct and indirect effects has many similarities to the 
flow of communications previously examined. The key difference is a focus on the 
impact these activities have on participation rather than on other effects such as 
learning.  
Traditional campaigns have been found to exert a direct mobilisation effect, 
via experimental studies (Gerber & Green, 2000; Lassen, 2005), large-scale 
comparative analyses (Karp & Banducci; 2007) and several individual country 
studies (Carty & Eagles, 1999; Hillygus & Shields, 2008). Within the UK, a variety 
of indicators both at the individual and aggregate levels, show that intense 
campaigning at district level delivers electoral payoffs (Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; 
Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2009; Fisher et al., 2011; Whiteley et al., 2013). However, 
traditional campaign evidence of indirect campaign effects is more mixed. 
McClurg found “the primary social consequence of party contacts is to alter the 
substance, but not the volume, of politically oriented conversations (indirect) that 
occur in social networks. These conversations increase the salience of the 
campaign in the electorate but have only a mild effect on levels of campaign 
involvement” (2004, p. 406). Indirect mobilisation effects therefore matter, but 
these are not as cut and dry as direct campaign effects and are more limited. 
Examining wider forms of participation, traditional communication approaches 
have been found to have a direct effect on some behaviours. Traditional media 
had been found to be related to higher levels of direct civic participation (Shah et 





indirect effects (McLeod et al., 1999). Overall, despite difficulties in analysis, there 
is evidence that traditional campaign activity can mobilise and engender 
participation.  
When the internet entered the campaign toolkit, e-campaign mediums 
were thought by optimists to offer new avenues for boosting mobilisation and 
participation. This would occur by these new tools’ lowering costs and creating 
new pluralistic political networks (Ward et al., 2003). Early on, studies found 
websites to be an important part of a winning election strategy (Gibson & 
McAllister, 2006; D’Alessio, 1997) especially studies of the Howard Dean 
campaign (Hindman, 2005; Rainie, Cornfield, & Horrigan, 2005). Equally, email 
was found to be ‘plausibly effective’ in boosting turnout in the US (Nickerson, 
2007). However, web 1.0 methods, due to pre-modern capabilities and the low 
usage of the internet by voter bases worldwide, led many researchers to find 
evidence of ‘politics as usual’ across direct and indirect mobilisation (Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000; Greer & LaPointe, 2004).  
E-campaign tools show even clearer results when examining participation. 
Norris found that websites “function as pluralistic forums by facilitating 
oppositional challengers and increasing the visibility of minor and fringe parties… 
facilitating interactive links between citizens and parties” (2003, p.21). Blogs were 
used successfully to organise people during the Howard Dean campaign 
(Hindman, 2005; Rainie, Cornfield, & Horrigan, 2005) and email was found to 
have an important role in building up a solid contactable support base (McCarthy 
& Saxton, 2001; Jackson, 2001, 2004). Internet use has thus been found to be 
related to direct political participation (Shah et al., 2002), with online interaction 
supplementing indirect interpersonal relations, leading to greater voluntary 
association membership and political participation (Wellman et al., 2001, 2003). 
These studies display the abilities of digital campaign tools to engender some 
direct and indirect participation, however revolutionary capacities were elusive.  
With increased study and application development, the relative academic 
consensus of an ‘e-minimal effects’ thesis, has changed to one where web 2.0 e-
campaigning mediums are now recognised as important tools. However, web 2.0 
tools such as websites are today not viewed as a game changer for direct or 
indirect mobilisation or participation, but as a key element of a wider toolkit. With 





and dominated the narrative of change. There is a lesson from this body of 
research; it is difficult to study something given a lack of data access. With it clear 
that over time evidence becomes stronger, as researchers’ abilities to examine 
the phenomenon increases.  
 
Direct/Indirect mobilisation and participation in the social media 
literature 
A medium for direct/indirect electoral mobilisation 
 
Social media can develop direct voter mobilisation through party-political 
messages, calls to contribute and outreach operations (Gibson & McAllister, 
2008; Bimber, 2014). Facebook use by voters has been linked with increased 
voting turnout via apolitical GOTV ‘I’m voting’ messages (Haenschen, 2016). 
However, as Boulianne highlights, “although metadata offer a broad picture of 
increasing effect size… we cannot address whether the relationship between 
online political information and voting is increasing in the United States” (2018, 
p.18). Equally, evidence of direct mobilisation is less compelling than that seen 
for indirect mobilisation. Bond et al. in their study of 61 million Facebook users 
exposed to voter participation information during the 2010 US congressional 
elections, found that “the effect of social transmission on real-world voting was 
greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves” (2012, p.295). Thus, 
it appears the indirect capacities of social media may be where the power lies, 
while direct effects are less pronounced. This mirrors studies that have found 
social media enlarges people’s social networks, thus increasing users’ exposure 
to mobilizing information (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Tang & Lee, 
2013). Parties appreciate Facebook as it is a fusion offering both direct and 
indirect avenues of influence. Content can be sent directly to activate voters via 
organic and targeted advertising, with this content in turn potentially propelled 
further by viewers rebroadcasting the content. 
Examining parties’ approaches to mobilisation via Facebook content, 
outside the UK in Switzerland Klinger found “only 6% of party postings were aimed 
at engaging voting” (Klinger, 2013, p.719). Magin et al. found similar interest with 
only 10% of party posts in Germany and Austria pushing viewers to vote (2017). 





alternative uses for Facebook content. The sole UK study on party approaches to 
mobilisation content is Lee & Campbell’s study of 2015 Facebook party posters. 
The study found 19.5% of party content pushed users to vote, however there was 
“some significant variation between the parties, suggesting different strategies 
possibly at work” (2016, p.337). Even though only focusing on poster content, the 
study highlights the potential wide divergence in tactics seen between parties. 
Overall, mobilisation appears to be an important supply side approach and 
potential effect, with the growing number of studies finding positive electoral 
results highlighting the importance of comparative examination.  
 
A medium for direct/indirect participation  
 
Participation relates to the potential of Facebook pages to deliver direct 
offline or online effects, such as making people partake in campaign meetings, 
join in canvassing or discuss politics online with their friends (Conway et al., 2013; 
Graham et al., 2013). These forms of activation of the voter base can spill over 
from both the online and offline. However, social media is unique in its abilities to 
allow mobilizing information to travel so seamlessly through users’ networks or 
be micro-targeted to specific voter groups. Facebook has been side-lined for 
studies which examine Twitter (see Appendix 2 for a literature review). While 
much of the focus has been upon youth participation online and civil activism, not 
political campaign participation.  
Early on, business as usual e-minimal effects results were returned akin to 
those seen for web 1/2.0 tools (Boulianne, 2012). Overall evidence of the effects 
of social media on political participation was mixed, however evidence is evolving 
rapidly. Boulianne’s excellent series of meta-analyses have found effects to be 
growing; “contemporary research has shown a substantial positive coefficient. 
These results provide some reason to be optimistic about the significance of 
digital media in citizen’s participation” (2018, p.18). However, as she adds “the 
dramatic increases do not align with the cycle for U.S. presidential elections” 
(2018, p.18) meaning that increased engagement and participation is often 
happening outside of electoral periods. This suggests not only the impact social 
media can have on participation online and offline, but fascinating potentials in 





the greater evidential clarity is due to “diffusion of technology across the masses 
and changes in the types of use, particularly the rise of social networking sites 
and tools for online political participation” (2018, p.1). This rise coincides with the 
greater capacities of social media for direct and indirect influence on participation. 
An explanation not posited by Boulianne for growing effects is that parties are 
getting better at using social media. Parties have changed their content on 
Facebook and other social media, this may have helped alter participation effects. 
The use of video and larger followership may add to greater direct and indirect 
participation. Parties have also generated better permanent campaign avenues 
for participation via hybrid modes of offline/online participation. As Boulianne 
asserts “further research might want to re-evaluate the separation of online and 
offline activities implicit in this body of research, opting to study hybridity in media 
use (Chadwick, 2014) and mixing modes of participation, blurring boundaries 
between online and offline activities” (2018, p.1).  
The limited number of Facebook studies on participation approach in 
content have found an innate conservatism mirroring mobilisation content. Klinger 
found “only 11% of Swiss party postings aimed at engaging participation” (2013, 
p.719), while Magin et al. found similarly low rates as only 6% of Austrian parties’ 
posts pushed for event participation (2017). UK studies that have looked at 
parties’ Facebook participatory content approaches is still limited to Lee & 
Campbell’s study (2016). They found 64% of studied content featured mobilising 
elements such as asking to share (40%) or visit a website (15%). Results show 
an interest in generating participation over mobilisation, with British party interest 
potentially far higher than that seen in other European countries. This potential 
interest is increased as a study by Bossetta, Segesten & Trenz studying the Brexit 
campaign, found a “general spill-over effect from media pages to campaign pages 
suggesting a positive correlation between political interest and online participation 
on Facebook” (2017, p.173). On Facebook there is a whole new ecosystem of 
participation that can be harnessed by parties. Although parties are showing 









A medium to develop two-way relationships  
 
This thesis is interested in parties’ use of Facebook content to develop 
relationships as well as action. The interactive capabilities of the internet did lead 
some scholars to believe it may be a ‘magic elixir’ that would solve the problems 
facing modern democracies (Stromer-Galley, 2000). It was argued it could do this 
by facilitating direct methods of communication between politicians and citizens. 
Social media and e-campaign tools allow voters the ‘chance to enter into real 
online dialogues with representatives’ (Baumgartner et al., 2010, p.23), 
developing voter engagement, campaign feedback and building relationships 
(Bechmann & Lomborg, 2013; Briones et al., 2011).  
However, despite possibilities it has been commonly found that parties 
generally avoid genuine voter dialogue. Oelsner & Heimrich examined German 
MP use of Facebook across 2012, they found little politician enthusiasm for 
dialogue with users (2015). Similarly, Ross et al. (2014) examined 1148 wall posts 
of New Zealand MPs before the 2011 General Election, they also found that most 
politicians did not invite dialogue with readers. Within the UK, a study on Scotland 
during the 2010 UK General Election found that Facebook “was adopted by a 
significant number of parties and candidates but was used primarily for one-way 
flow of information to known associates and party activists” (Baxter, Marcella & 
Varfis, 2011, p.464)16. Even recent studies have seen similar results, Magin et al. 
found that Facebook is used only as a mass communication tool by parties with 
little interest shown in forming real voter/party relationships (2017), with this also 
supported by Heiss, Schmuck & Matthes (2019). This top down one-way 
approach to communications by politicians is well demonstrated in the evidence. 
Studies show that Facebook content is not designed to initiate dialogue, with 
usage not presenting the democratic revolution envisaged. Facebook appears to 
not be used for two-way communications. Instead, as Bronstein et al. assert, 
parties are using the platform “to disseminate their ideas, plans and strategies, 
politicians focus their interactions with the audience on the creation and 
maintenance of affective alliances” (2018, p.551). Given the higher rates of 
interest shown by British parties in participatory content (Lee & Campbell, 2016), 
 
16 This finding has been challenged by empirical (Lilleker, 2014) and descriptive UK studies 





it is possible UK parties may be different. Therefore, the idea must be retested 
with a focus on communications via avenues such as discussion orientated 
language or links within posts.  
 
Facebook engagement as participation not slacktivism 
 
Research undertaken has repeatedly emphasised engagement as a key 
characteristic of online political communications. Engagement offers an important 
new avenue for participation in politics (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009; Vromen et al., 
2016; Xenos et al., 2017). However, at the same time as an optimist vision was 
forming so was a slacktivist critique. This position argues that social media 
engagement operates in isolation from other participation forms, with interactivity 
a one-way online only relationship, unrelated to other online or offline participation 
forms (Jurgenson, 2011). Mirroring the research on the use of two-way 
communications, critics associate little importance to the bonded engagements of 
party-political content and users’ likes, shares and comments. However, I believe 
that this slacktivist thesis fails to account for the reality of contemporary 
campaigning.  
Engagement has been conceptualised poorly within the literature, with 
engagement in studies of social media operationalised and defined through 
divergent conceptions. A large focus is on supply-side studies examining parties 
approaches to developing and instigating public interaction (in the hope of 
democratic renewal), and the development of two-step flows of information. With 
the bar set so high, these studies overwhelmingly find top-down one-way 
communications (Lee & Shin, 2012; Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013; Ross & 
Bürger, 2014; McQuail, 2015a). They assert business as usual communications, 
because “politicians ignore the reactions from their voters” (Bene, 2017, p.2), 
contending that Facebook engagement only offers a spectacle of interactivity 
(Theocharis et al., 2015, p.7). This position, taken alongside evidence of parties 
making little effort to promote two-way interactions (Karlsson, Clerwall, & 
Buskqvist, 2013), means that some academics disregard the millions of social 
media engagements that parties receive weekly. Consequently, although many 
content analyses and studies show huge numbers of users interacting and 





Facebook party pages, 2009 & 2015), social media has been found to be a one-
way street of communications17. In contrast, a much smaller body of work 
examines the question of interactivity from the demand side, with some studies 
appreciating Facebook engagement as two-way interaction with the propensity to 
cause multi-step flows of information (Vaccari & Nielsen, 2013; Hilbert, Vásquez, 
& Halpern, 2017; Bene, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Homero & Liu, 2017).  
Although politicians are arguably failing to utilise online tools for true 
dialogue relations, those academics who assert a continuation of campaign 
practices and one-way flow of communications, fail to consider the unique nature 
of Facebook. As Neumayer & Svensson emphasise; different “forms of online 
political engagement must be considered when studying online activism, as there 
are difficulties in how one defines or assigns values upon interaction and 
interactivity” (2014, p. 131). In analysis of the literature from this understanding, 
one can argue that those studies that find engagement lacking (Larsson, 2013; 
Magin et al., 2016), are viewing Facebook through conventional interactivity 
concepts, “from the lens of traditional, ‘dutiful’ conceptions of citizenship and 
political engagement” (Vromen et al., 2016, p.513). As Marton Bene asserts; 
“…these (concepts) are used in a context where the participants and the audience 
of the interaction are bounded, whereas participants of Facebook engagement 
perform themselves in front of different audiences” (Bene, 2017, p.4). 
 Engagement on Facebook is not designed only for the parties themselves, 
or the interactors, but for the interactor’s ego-network, which is based on their 
offline relationships (Boyd & Elisson, 2008). Thus, one can caveat that when a 
user engages with political content, they are interacting as much for their 
personalised communication network, as they are for the party itself. Thus, 
concepts behind participation and engagement are highly intricate, questioning 
the value of studies that consider Facebook and social media to replicate offline 
effects. Instead interactivity on Facebook is a new entity with new rules for political 
campaigning, albeit one in which many traditional ideas of voting behaviour still 
carry great weight. Barriers to participation are now much lower, with offline and 
online participation operating within a cycle where engagement is continually 
important. Engagement for Facebook is the gamified lifeblood of how and why 
 
17 Although see Sorensen’s study of Danish MP’s having a “high degree of engagement in 





any of these actions take place, with the scale of engagement on the platform 
refuting potential unimportance. The slacktivism position fails to capture the 
unique capabilities of the medium as a campaign tool and how it operates. 
Facebook allows users to feel ownership of the content they interact with, unlike 
almost every other campaign tool in existence. Facebook’s nature is still one 
where engagement is at the core of user experience and it remains an interactive 
platform with interactivity key for message reach and campaign success. Thus, 
although one may assert the internet has been featuring merely a ‘façade’ of 
interaction for political parties (Stromer-Galley & Baker, 2006); engagement really 
matters for users, parties and Facebook’s informational ecosystem.  
Although parties are invariably wary of two-way interactivity, Facebook 
arguably does remain largely a two-way medium, as user-based engagement 
seen on the platform via reactions (likes, shares and comments), offers two-way 
or multi-level flows of participation. What appears is a system where, because 
user responses can be ignored by parties, some academics have conceptualised 
this lack of dialogue as a traditional conception of one-way communications. 
However, Facebook arguably offers a split two-way system, as almost every piece 
of content is reacted to, with that content if shared, then further reacted to on a 
potentially infinite chain. The step of engaging via likes, comments or shares, is 
one step beyond merely viewing the content, and thus constitutes something akin 
to participation in the traditional sense. Parties thus design their content to 
develop user engagement as this generates greater message reach with resultant 
statistics considered in developing content. Engagement is therefore important 
and is worthy of inclusion as a form of participation as it means a lot, especially 
given a “growing number of studies showing relationships between user 
engagement and vote share” (Xenos, 2015, p.2).  
Overall, the literature on Facebook engagement can currently be split into 
supply (politicians use only) and demand side (user engagement only) studies. 
The field requires more studies that utilise a joined-up approach as seen in a few 
articles (Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013a, 2013b; Xenos, 2015, Magin et al., 2017; Bene, 
2017). Current academic focus on whether social media can spur different forms 
of traditional participation online and off, without consideration of the first form of 





weakens the clarity of research, fails to delineate how parties are campaigning 
and undermines a unique potentiality of Facebook.  
 
2.5: Facebook as a tool for party organisation 
 
Social media offers parties new avenues for activism and organisation, 
potentially revolutionising the idea of the party and how it can campaign. As 
Montero Sanchez asserts, “Obama showed how the Internet could be used for 
new forms of collaboration… and replace the traditional membership and meeting 
based model practised in many democracies” (2009, p.28). New avenues for 
participation and mobilizing information exist via Facebook, this corresponds with 
arguments in the wider literature about; moves towards ‘multispeed’ models of 
membership via a new class of ‘virtually members’ (Bartlett, 2013), Margetts’ 
(2001) concept of the “cyber party” and Chadwick’s ideas of organisational 
hybridity (2017). 
 
The cyber campaign party? Virtual members and organisation  
 
In traditional campaigning, parties’ support mobilisation typically focusses 
on assuring that pre-identified supporters have voted (Denver & Hands, 2002). 
Today, Facebook has enabled parties to lessen these challenges in support 
mobilisation (Ward et al., 2008; Gibson, 2012). This is because social media has 
enabled parties to build online communities, more fluid organisational structures 
and support activities (Gibson, 2012). Online campaign activities can push users 
into other mediums of participation such as canvassing, or the spreading of 
campaign information through online tools. This has been found in the UK, as the 
rise of ‘citizen-initiated campaigning’ (Gibson, 2015). Facebook has thus enabled 
political parties to interact and engage with a wider group of voters, particularly 
those who may be disengaged with traditional voter interaction mediums, namely 
television and radio18 (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This has allowed “supporters to 
 
18 Or as a fascinating example of reaching outside the box, the Obama 2008 campaigns 





play more than a spectator role in the campaign” (Owen, 2008, p.98), alleviating 
the requirements of parties to engage in large GOTV operations.  
Two core theories speak to what we are witnessing via social media and 
the internet. Margetts’ (2001) concept of the “cyber party” foresaw what we are 
now seeing on Facebook. Her theory was based on changing circumstances 
emerging for European parties, including a decline in membership, growth in 
single issue political activity and rise of symbolic actions via campaigns rather 
than mass mobilisation. Cyber parties are characterised by “technologically-aided 
relationships between party and voters rather than formal membership” (2001, 
p.1). The cyber party model allows: “ICTs to expand parties at the grassroots level 
by facilitating an informal definition of membership, whereby individuals could sign 
up to a supporter network, send money… leading to a new integrated form of 
relationship that would provide supporters with a similar level of inclusion 
reserved previously for full members” (Gibson, 2016, p. 89, citing Margetts, 2001). 
Later this idea was further developed by Heidar and Saglie (2003) with their idea 
of a “network party”, they asserted that actually a cyber-party is still dominated by 
the parliamentary leadership “but they maintain and value mass membership as 
a source of policy ideas and leader recruitment” (Heidar & Saglie, 2003, via 
Gibson, 2016, p.90). 
Chadwick’s idea of media hybridity is also of importance. He contends that 
in contrast to the decline of parties thesis, that parties are not dying but are “going 
through a process of adaptation to post-material political culture… shaped by 
interactions between the organizations, norms and rules of electoral politics; post-
material attitudes toward political engagement; and the affordances and uses of 
digital media” (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016, p.283). Chadwick argues that 
“digital media foster cultures of organizational experimentation and a party-as-
movement mentality that enable many to reject norms of hierarchical discipline 
and habitual partisan loyalty” (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016, p.283). 
Alongside the structural changes brought by social media, Chadwick contends 
that social media and traditional methods are now existing within a hybrid media 
system via merged online/offline approaches with complex resultant effects. 
Chadwick asserts that the hybrid logic of communications whether via news or 
political campaigns is only partly changing campaigns, as he argues effectiveness 





(Chadwick, 2017). With hybridisation, we have seen social media become 
important for regeneration, as Chadwick asserts, “parties are being renewed from 
the outside in, as digitally enabled citizens breathe new life into an old form by 
partly remaking it in their own participatory image” (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 
2016).  
Behind any potential cyber party organisational hybridity, is the importance 
of understanding the new body of online support parties have generated on 
Facebook. Virtual members are theorised as followers of parties online but not 
official members (see ‘virtually members’, Bartlett, 2013), with this group offering 
a new potentially important resource for parties. Webb, Poletti & Bale (2017) 
examining campaign activism across members and ‘supporters’ on Facebook and 
Twitter found differences in engagement between the groups, with supporters 
rather than party members making up a huge segment of activity online. There 
are thus potential capabilities via virtual members, with the tacit changes seen in 
parties’ make-up and moves towards organisational cyber-activism needing to be 
further examined. This important new political group requires further 
conceptualisation and examination. 
The new relationship seen between party and users may even be more 
fluid than the concept of virtual members. In empirical research using online 
surveys conducted in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Vaccari and 
Valeriani found that “party members engage in a wider variety of party-related 
activities than average respondents, but the same can also be said of non-party 
members who informally discuss politics on social media” (2016, p.294). This 
ultra-informal group are thus potentially also of importance to parties, as “the 
strength of the relationship between party membership and engagement 
decreases as the intensity of political discussion on social media increases… 
suggesting that political discussions on social media can narrow the divide in 
party-related engagement between members and non-members, and to some 
extent flatten rather than reinforce existing political hierarchies” (2016, p.294). 
These findings speak to the power of social media to offer parties a new fluid 
activatable group beyond even the looser idea of virtual membership. 
Finally, targeted advertisements may have also undermined the need for 
traditional membership or even virtual membership. The modern popularity of 





As such adverts are popular because not only are they likely to reach desired 
audiences, but the information does not rely on organic popularity for reach. Thus, 
for parties with inactive or smaller online support such as the Conservative Party; 
paid for advertising presents a necessary tool. Targeted advertising may also 
have major implications for organisation and party politics more generally, given 
how adverts are used for fundraising, voter registration and membership calls 
(Hotham, 2019).  
 
Facebook’s unique abilities for organisation; permanent and Janus-
faced campaigns  
 
Related to the change Facebook offers in organisation is the role of the 
permanent campaign. As Vergeer, Hermans and Sams (2011) suggest, “with the 
advent of the Internet, permanent campaigning to build public support becomes 
easier” (2011, p.485). Ceccobelli identified through studying 18 election 
campaigns on Facebook that there are “qualitative and quantitative differences 
between campaign and peace-time periods” (2017, p.122). With greater posting 
frequency, negative rhetorical strategy and personalisation during elections but 
less use of policy issues (Ceccobelli, 2017). Continuous Facebook campaigning 
by politicians is on the rise (Klinger, 2013; Tenscher, 2013; Enli & Skogerbø, 
2013; Strandberg, 2013; Hermans & Vergeer, 2013) with each campaign period 
used for different purposes. Thus, alongside the questions of party change, the 
nature of permanent campaigning is also becoming an important feature of 
Facebook to examine. The permanent campaign offers new opportunities for 
parties to reach out to, socialise and organise both official members and the 
growing body of virtual members. In depth examination of the phenomenon is 
needed to appreciate what parties are trying to do across each campaign type. 
Facebook also offers parties multifaceted campaign approaches. 
Theorised as Janus-faced campaigning, this concept sees parties tactically 
present different faces to different audiences, using different avenues to 
maximum advantage. This is because audiences, even within a single social 
media network like Facebook, are distinct and split. As such, we are seeing the 
fragmentation of campaign messaging online as audiences are becoming 





in the right way, across multiple social networks and even within single large 
networks such as Facebook. The ‘traditional’ one size fits all social media 
campaign is now being superseded by an approach that appreciates the power 
of matching content to audience. The concept is thus related to the idea of 
offline/online hybridity asserted by Chadwick, however rather than the nature of 
modern campaigns as online and offline hybrids, we are now seeing parties online 
campaigns becoming hybrids of novel and traditional online methods. A full 
explanation of the idea is available in Chapter 7 through the examination of 
Momentum. 
 
2.6: Hypothesis generation  
 
Outside of the research questions that this thesis examines, from this 
literature review several pertinent predications can be tested through this thesis’ 
chapters. Based upon the four sections of the literature review, four iterative 
hypotheses have been generated. These hypotheses are examined in the 
conclusion using all gathered evidence.  
 
Voting behaviour models and communications in the era of social networks 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Facebook will offer political parties the ability to generate and 
campaign through virtual members.  
 
Facebook as an information dissemination tool 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Parties will make use of Facebook’s capacities for a high 
frequency of content, improved content forms and content engagement, but their 
information dissemination will focus on maximising reach and impact through 









Facebook as a tool for participation 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Parties will focus their participation content on prompting 
traditional voting efforts such as registering potential voters, rather than on trying 
to activate and utilise virtual members as they would official party members, such 
as organising “just-turn-up” doorstep campaigning sessions. 
 
Facebook as a tool for party organisation 
 
Hypothesis 4 – Parties will use the ability to operate multiple different pages on 
Facebook to organise their campaigns in novel ways, for example through the 
development of ‘satellite’ campaign pages that operate in distinct ways from core 
party pages. 
 
2.7: Conclusion  
 
It has been asserted that there is minimal deviation across elements of 
what we might term the ‘ground war’, with campaigns in target seats “conducted 
along similar lines” (Lilleker & Pack, 2016, p.42). The one exception is e-
campaigning (Koc-Michalska et al. 2014), an arena where parties have far greater 
scope for experimentation. Of the new e-campaign tools available Facebook is 
clearly of major importance, however it is only one of many tools open to parties. 
Successful campaigns will thus use each available campaign tool for its most 
effective audience. This heightened campaign complexity has destabilised the 
once solid foundations of political science. Where once posters, canvassing and 
television were the central campaign forms, with mass populations reached 
through mass communications. Instead, a new fluid campaign landscape led by 
the Facebook catalyst is visible. This new landscape is volatile, defined by novel 
content capacities, new positional and valence issues, public mistrust, media 
diversification, fake news, and hyper-personalised campaign tools. 
It is apparent there are large gaps in understanding Facebook content 
approaches. With those that attempt to appreciate impact hindered by the fact 





examined the development and change in Facebook use that has occurred over 
the last 10 years. As Lee & Campbell assert; “in evaluating the shift from 
traditional to online campaigning techniques, the use of social media’s 
increasingly visual capabilities has been comparatively neglected in research” 
(2016, p.313). Studies on Facebook content have operated at relatively low detail, 
without consideration of; how participation is engaged, how content is formulated, 
comparative analysis between parties over election years, the importance of 
party, leader and satellite pages and the differences between them, how virtual 
members are organised, the permanent vs. campaign period or the general type 
of approach evident. This research landscape has informed the research 
questions explained in the introduction and the methodology used.  
 




Overall, this chapter sought to explain and summarise relevant literature 
fields, identify where the thesis fits and finally develop core concepts and frames 
to help operationalise the research questions and hypotheses. A large body of 
research exists upon Facebook, however interest in examining effects far 
outstrips interest in usage. Thus, this thesis’ research questions are designed to 
promote the detailed comparative examination of use, offering an enhancement 
of the Facebook literature theoretically, empirically, and methodologically.
 

















 RQ1 - How are parties making use of 
Facebook in terms of the scale of 
communications, the dissemination of 
information and the encouragement of 
participation in the content they post? 
Quantitative content analysis of 





















RQ2 -  How does the content posted on 
Facebook by parties retain the features 
of traditional campaign material?  
Quantitative content analysis of 
datasets 1, 2 & 3, typology of usage of 
datasets 2 and 3. Secondary sources 
examining other campaign tools 
RQ3 - What are the likely longer term 
implications of parties’ use of Facebook, 
in terms of broader campaigning 
practices? 
Quantitative content analysis of 












































Due to the embryonic nature of social media studies, no specific 
established methodological approach has been created to study Facebook. The 
literature developed over the last 15 years can be split into four key 
methodological approaches; quantitative studies using real-time extracted 
Facebook data, quantitative data the researcher has created themselves via 
experiment, quantitative study of survey data and qualitative study. Similarly, no 
specific established methodological approach has been delineated for examining 
campaigning. Some scholars have created a broad set of measures with regards 
to e-campaigning (see ‘citizen-initiated campaigning’, Gibson, 2015) and 
politicians’ social media influence on wider social environments (Effing et al., 
2016). These distinct approaches have informed this thesis’ approach. A major 
issue is that the literature is still unsure of what constitutes a Facebook campaign; 
this thesis’ approach mitigates these questions via setting out how parties are 
using the platform as a tool. Providing this foundation means that later studies will 
have a greater understanding of where effects may originate from. Although, 
challenges exist in pinning down “effects” of campaigning as conceptualising uses 
is difficult (Choi, 2015), this landscape gives this thesis opportunity to develop a 
novel methodology for the appreciation of Facebook campaigning.  
Methodological approach is designed around the questions the researcher 
wishes to answer. However, for the study of Facebook, approach is heavily 
dependent upon the feasibility of data access. Thus, the research questions within 
this thesis were based around viability, as Facebook data is naturally limited to 
providing evidence for platform phenomena. This issue of data is also seen in the 
literature because of Facebook’s continuous changes. Access to data has been 
restricted or opened, with new methods for data extraction or analysis created. 
Consequently, the different methodologies and measures used to examine 
Facebook over time means much of the literature is incomparable. In future more 
stable research access is required to avoid this. Nevertheless, despite 
imperfections Facebook data is the best resource to examine the parties’ 





studies in the field (Bene, 2017; Magin et al., 2017; Metz et al., 2019), quantitative 
content analysis (Krippendorf, 2018) and typology is used. This allows for the 
clarity needed to understand approach as pure engagement data, content 
analysis or microcosmic qualitative study each have limited horizons.  
 
3.2: Data created or used 
Created datasets  
 
While some studies have manually extracted Facebook data (e.g. Williams 
& Gulati, 2013), this study utilised automated collection of basic Facebook data. 
Automated approaches are useful but have certain drawbacks such as the lack 
of detail within the data. Data collection was performed via Netvizz (Rieder, 2013), 
which allowed for the extraction of basic Facebook public-page activity. Other 
extraction tools are available such as Facepager, however Netvizz extracts data 
more quickly and effectively. To provide a neutral extraction point, a new 
Facebook account was created, it followed the pages the data was extracted from 
following recommendations by Netvizz19. The posts sent by a page and the 
associated engagement data (likes, comments and shares over a specified time) 
were gathered. All base data used for the 7-year dataset and one-month 
2015/2017 General Election dataset was collected over 2 weeks from 1/01/2018 
to the 14/01/2018, the Momentum 2017 and 2018 datasets were collected on 
29/02/2019. The coding occurred over a period of 8 months undertaken by the 
author. Excel was used for the coding of the data; data was examined via Excel, 
SPSS or R dependant on the analysis undertaken.  
It is important to note that the number of posts extractable from Facebook 
is limited. Netvizz, which like all other legitimate harvesters is constrained by 
Facebook’s API20. As Facebook outline on their developer’s site, “the API will 
return a maximum of 600 ranked, published posts per year” (Facebook, 2018), 
these top 600 posts are understood to be the posts sent by the page that are the 
most engaged with in the year. This arbitrary limitation inherently leads to some 
degree of data exclusion. For example, a voter cannot find all the public posts 
 
19 https://apps.facebook.com/netvizz/?ref=br_rs accessed 11/11/2018 






made by the Labour Party in 2015. Even via the in-platform search function, only 
the 600 “top posts” are shown, this is less than half the posts published by Labour 
that year. These 600 top posts are also the only posts you can view if you search 
the actual Facebook page, which as Netvizz explains means “endpoints now 
show the same posts the logged user would see on the page surface”21. A solution 
some recommend is for “social scientists to use real-time manual collection” 
(Villegas, 2016, p.161). Given this study’s interest in historic data this was not 
possible. It is important to note that almost all studies on Facebook content do not 
make clear Facebook’s 600 post restriction, with ramifications for analysis not 
appreciated within the literature. Consequently, all analysis of posts within this 
work operates within this natural limitation, with the data available still offering a 
large quality sample. As the ‘top posts’, they are the content with the most value 
for political analysis, given they are the most engaged with posts for each page. 
The data is also as complete as possible, having checked the datasets versus 
2020 Crowdtangle data, the data used within this thesis is more complete than 
Facebook’s own resource. 
 
Dataset one. Background study January 1st, 2010 – December 31st, 2017 
 
To understand the rise of Facebook, the scale of engagement with parties 
on the platform, the role of different pages in engagement, the permanent 
campaign vs. election campaign and wider technologically driven approaches to 
content form, a broad approach is required. Analysing base extracted Facebook 
data is perfect for this task. Dataset one is a 7-year dataset containing all the 
public posts sent by a political FB page alongside the posts associated 
engagement (likes, shares and comments) from the 1st of January 2010 to the 
31st of December 2017. There was a total of 49,230 posts, the total number of 
posts for each party page is displayed below. The data contains the engagement 
metrics of each post across likes, shares and comments, and the basic structural 









Table 5. Dataset one: pages examined, number of posts extracted and followers 
 
Dataset two. One-month General Election campaign study; 9th April to 7th May 
2015 & 4th May to 8th June 2017.  
 
To examine how parties are using Facebook in detail during an election 
across content form, participatory and organisational practices, we need to code 
Facebook data. Dataset two focusses on two election periods, the 2015 & 2017 
General Elections. The data set is generated via hand coding using a 
comprehensive scheme of 882 codes, these are outlined in Appendix 3. The 
coding occurs on top of the basic data Netvizz provides, such as engagement 




Number of Followers as 
of 12/03/2018 
Conservative Party 2,654 652,116 
Theresa May 291 457,711 
David Cameron 1,502 1,218,540 
Labour Party 4,477 1,016,836 
Momentum 1,467 189,303 
Jeremy Corbyn 1,700 1,386,549 
Ed Miliband 1,495 149,329 
JeremyCorbyn4PM 1,774 330,369 
United Kingdom Independence Party 4,052 587,084 
Nigel Farage 3,710 786,957 
Green Party 4,105 305,808 
Caroline Lucas 3,787 92,815 
Natalie Bennett 3,155 55,472 
Scottish National Party 4,713 287,818 
Alex Salmond 1,151 173,730 
Nicola Sturgeon 1,452 299,872 
Liberal Democrats 3,177 186,339 
Nick Clegg 767 95,432 
Vince Cable 1,161 11,962 
Tim Farron 2,640 35,338 






the original Netvizz data. Hand coding provides greater data quality appreciating 
all the aspects of a post, such as video or image elements, rather than just the 
text as seen in studies that use automated approaches (e.g. Gerbaudo et al., 
2019). The dataset features relatively stable numbers of posts across election 
years (641 – 2015 / 567 – 2017) but there is a skew towards the Labour Party of 
266 posts, and a skew towards party pages of 388. 
 
Table 6. Dataset two: pages and number of posts extracted 
 
 
Dataset three. Momentum General Election and 2018-year case study: 4th May to 
8th June 2017 and 1st January to 31st December 2018.  
 
Given the hypothesis of the growing importance of satellite campaigns 
(Dommett & Temple, 2018), this dataset examines Momentum across 2017 and 
2018. This dataset used data collected from one month before the 2017 General 
Election, from the 3rd May to 7th June 2017 alongside a randomised sample of 
posts from 2018. A random number generator was used to select 10 posts from 
each month from an extracted total year dataset of all posts sent by the page. The 
dataset’s variables whether independent, dependent or control were all the same 
as dataset 2. The analysis of this dataset followed the same operation as dataset 
2 via quantitative content analysis and typology.  
 






Labour Party Page 8th April to 6th May 2015 237 
Ed Miliband Page 8th April to 6th May 2015 78 
Labour Party Page 3rd May to 7th June 2017 278 
Jeremy Corbyn Page 3rd May to 7th June 2017 144 










Conservative Party Page 8th April to 6th May 2015 188 
David Cameron Page 8th April to 6th May 2015 138 
Conservative Party Page 3rd May to 7th June 2017 95 
Theresa May Page 3rd May to 7th June 2017 50 
Total Conservative posts 471 







Table 7. Momentum posts 





Secondary sources and survey data 
 
Given the horizon of Facebook data, and its ability to only illuminate what 
is happening on the platform not the wider campaign, secondary sources are used 
to broaden this thesis’ examination. The British Election Study and the Electoral 
Agent Survey offer large electorally representative datasets collected over 
election and non-election periods. BES and EAS datasets were examined via 
exploratory statistical analysis to provide supportive or triangulated evidence in 
relation to Facebook data. These data sources allow for the grounding of the 
research undertaken upon Facebook within evidence of traditional and e-
campaigning tools such as leaflets and email. These sources are nevertheless 
limited as they are not designed to examine social media content form 
approaches, however the resources offer several key areas of pertinence both 
from the supply side (EAS) and the demand side (BES) of campaigning. 
Consequently, they are used to examine the reach and adoption of Facebook, 
alongside other traditional and e-campaign tools. Sources used are: 
 
- Wave 12 of the 2014-2018 British Election Study Internet Panel for the 2017 
General Election. 
- Wave 5 of the 2014-2018 British Election Study Internet Panel for the 2015 
General Election. 
- Survey of election agents for study of constituency campaigning at the 2017 
British General Election. 
- Survey of election agents for study of constituency campaigning at the 2015 





Other demographic secondary sources are used. Facebook audience data 
from Facebook Audience Insights22 allows anyone to examine the socio-
demographic statistics of all Facebook users across many parameters. This data 
was analysed in comparison with the British Election Study, Party Members 
Project data, and WeAreFlint polling data. This was to test Facebook’s 
representativeness and examine the make-up of the party’s online supporters in 
comparison to official membership.  
To examine Facebook information approaches in comparison to other 
tools, novel secondary sources were utilised to provide comparison. These 
resources offered a small direct gateway into understanding where Facebook fits 
as a content tool in comparison to targeted advertisements and leaflets, allowing 
for the consideration of Facebook as a differently used tool. Unfortunately, content 
analysis data for offline posters, newspaper adverts, emails or other campaign 
tools were unavailable for this study’s examined periods.  
 
• Leaflets. Milazzo et al., (2017) engaged in a comprehensive analysis of 
2015/2017 General Election leaflets, comparable codes were examined 
against datasets 2 and 3 including – use of party leader, topic issue choice 
and the mentioning of opponents. 
• Targeted advertisements. Tambini and Anstead et al., (2018) coded 750 
targeted Facebook advertisements (412 from Labour and the Conservatives) 
from the 2017 General Election via Whotargets.me. Comparable codes with 
datasets 2 and 3 include topic choice and use of party leader.  
 
3.3: Measuring Facebook. Creating a coded dataset for 
quantitative content analysis and typology  
 
Through liking, sharing or commenting on content, users can engage with 
parties on Facebook. Engagement is the lifeblood of the platform, as engagement 
acts as the appreciation matrix. As numerical count data these forms of 
engagement act the Facebook dataset’s dependent variables, as each post has 
these engagement numbers related to them. Engagement is also used as a 
 





measure of reach and scale, as engagement metrics signal how far a page’s 
messages are spreading through Facebook’s ego-network. As such, as well as 
being a dependent variable to understand the success of information approaches, 
engagement is also used as a variable in and of itself. Explanations of what likes, 
shares and comments are can be found in Section 5.1. Engagement is however 
only one side of the relationship; the independent variables are therefore the 
coded content elements of individual posts.  
 
Creating a coding scheme 
 
Quantitative content analysis is used to examine the features of posts and 
describes what content approaches are undertaken. It is the only flexible effective 
way of examining Facebook political content approaches given the nature of the 
medium, the data available and how information is consumed and created on the 
platform. It offers the capacity to examine longitudinally, large quantities of 
naturally occurring data. Analysis can also cover both content and form, this is 
important as “both content and form characteristics ought to be considered… 
given form characteristics are often extremely important mediators of the content 
elements” (Neuendorf, 2002, p.24). Although there is a myriad of strengths to 
content analysis; potential level of detail, explanatory power, conceptual 
capabilities and ability to link data with other elements, there are also 
weaknesses. Firstly, developing a coding scheme involves some degree of 
interpretation, there is the propensity for bias akin to other qualitative methods 
(Insch et al. 1997). As such this thesis operates intercoder reliability tests. 
Secondarily, the level of abstraction of coded content removed from its original 
context can potentially cause a loss of meaning. As Shoemaker and Reese argue 
“reducing large amounts of text to quantitative data… does not provide a complete 
picture of meaning and contextual codes, since texts may contain many other 
forms of emphasis besides sheer repetition” (1996, p.32). To counter this, the 
coding scheme focussed as clearly as possible on dichotomous factors that are 
clear to interpret, as well as on maximising detail on content form. Finally, content 
analysis can lead to interpretations of content that ignore key aspects, a coding 





breadth (882 codes) and offers its dataset and the text of the post as a 
comparable checkpoint against what is coded. 
This thesis follows two literature fields in its quantitative content analysis 
coding approach. Firstly, in terms of developing an implementable scheme to 
quantify how parties campaign via content forms, content focussed approaches 
seen in Alashri et al. (2016), Lee & Campbell (2016) and Bene (2017) are 
followed. Taking elements of their methods but operating in greater detail, unlike 
those studies this thesis focusses more upon the content analysis and less upon 
relationships between content and engagement. This is because we know little 
about how parties are using Facebook, with there a large gap in elucidating 
approach rather than engagement. Secondarily, the coding scheme simplifies 
major themes seen in wider campaign studies such as in Gibson (2015) and Foot 
& Schneider’s (2006) features analysis. Their approaches are only partly 
comparable to Facebook, thus this thesis’ development upon these studies 
themes is outlined in Table 8/9. The coding scheme operates via four core 
themes; scale, information, participation and organisation.  
Content is becoming more complex, and as such a coding scheme that 
can appreciate this complexity was developed. The coding approach taken allows 
posts to be part of all the given categories and does not exclude each post into 
one set form, instead most of the variables are treated as potentially existing 
within each post. It is important to appreciate that some related codes can 
potentially exist at the same time within only one post. For example, in some 
codes approach is deliberately non-dichotomous, a post may feature the positive 
use of a celebrity alongside the negative use of a celebrity, or positive tone and 
negative tone. This approach has an upside as well as a downside. The upside is 
that the data this scheme generates is superior to other binary approaches, 
allowing it to capture the rise of video more accurately. A coding scheme must be 
able to demarcate the modern media landscape, with today’s video heavy 
approach particularly three dimensional. No longer are political messages static 
posters or leaflets that were much more likely to convey only one tone, today a 
video can begin with a joke and then hammer the opposition negatively. Currently, 
other coding schemes fail to adequately represent the modern communications 
parties are sending. This research pushes forward a scheme that allows for the 





binary coding. The downside of this approach is that it can create issues of double 
counting within the data, with the use of combined totals for some similar codes 
limited as they may represent fewer cases than the total describes. As such 
combined totals of these areas are avoided or if used are caveated, while for key 
areas of content dichotomous codes were also used to generate incidence. 
Finally, in terms of analysis, the longitudinal nature of the data and the use of 
multiple types of pages across different parties, warrants descriptive statistics in 
the vein of Larsson (2016). 
Some important conceptual developments are found within this thesis’ 
coding scheme that are an original development of social media content analysis. 
Firstly, content via Facebook is understood to be potentially aimed at core 
members or external core members, membership here defines those who follow 
the page or receive the message. Within this wider membership, two distinct 
categories are theorised, with core members being viewed as party members and 
external core members being viewed as interested virtual members but not official 
support. This distinction is important as content may be used differently to 
influence these two groups, for example messages asking external core members 
to join the party, or official members to help doorstep campaign. There is also the 
potential for the blurring of these lines between official and virtual. Secondarily, 
information is examined across visual and textual content separately. This is 
because Facebook content can deliver more than one message, with flaws in 
previous studies visible in the lack of codes used to define the technological and 
material nature of social media content. Similarly, in content topic modelling, given 
the rise of video Facebook has the capacity to deliver more than one message, 
whether this is the case can be examined for the first time within this thesis, due 
to the implementation of a triplicate coding system. Finally, as per Gibson (2015) 
online and offline participation are split as these two types of participation need 
to be conceptually understood as different. This thesis also enhances analysis 











Table 8. Typological features analysis approach across studies  
 
Overall, via 882 codes across data sets two and three, there were 1,199,610 
data permutations. The process created a detailed dataset that allows for 
longitudinal cross comparison across pages and election years. This dataset can 
examine content approaches and engagement levels in detail, including the role 
of leaders, satellite pages, usage of minority and female politicians, negative 
advertising, the role of policy areas and content form’s, the rise of personalisation 
and parties’ news sources.  
 
Table 9. Conceptualisation of scale, information and participation  
 
Foot & Schneider (2006) Gibson (2015) This thesis 
n/a n/a Scale 
Informing Message production 
Information 
Connecting Community building 
Involving Resource generation Participation and 
organisation Mobilizing Voter mobilisation 
 
Scale Information Participation Organisation 
Interested audience 
members of page 




Internal core  
online participation 
Systems of content used across 
different types of pages 
Video views Personalisation 
Internal core offline 
participation 
Use of leader/party/satellite 
pages 
 Targeting 
External core online 
participation 
Post-modern information forms 
 Framing 
External core offline 
participation 
Systems of organisation 
 Trust building 
Mobilisation (calls to 
vote) 
Internal core systems, 
participatory systems 
online/offline 
   
External core systems, 
participatory systems 
online/offline 






Examining scale  
 
Scale is conceptualised as the capacity of Facebook as an information 
medium. It concerns who receives messages, the number of and content form of 
messages sent, and the subsequent engagement the messages receive. The 
examination of scale operates via analysis of dataset one and Facebook 
Audience Insights. To appreciate the reach of Facebook, virtual members via 
Facebook Audience Insights are examined against Party Members Project data. 
The examination of scale also covers analysis of engagement and video views 
from 2010-2017 in dataset 1, 6 major parties are examined: Labour, 
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, Green Party and the SNP. The different 
pages engagement metrics, likes, shares and comments are examined 
longitudinally, specific hypotheses in areas such as the permanent campaign and 
the use of party leader pages are tested. The general findings upon the reach of 
Facebook pages is discussed in comparison to the reach of other tools using the 
BES/EAS datasets and other secondary sources.  
 
Examining information  
 
Information examines the nature of parties’ posts, what they consist of, 
their character and nature. Not much is known about what parties send or how 
this has developed, parties may have honed their content to a clearer 
professionalised form. Content possibilities have radically increased from the 
options of early Facebook, where images, website links and text only posts were 
the norm. This thesis engages in a comprehensive study of information across six 
themes outlined in Table 9. The study of information uses datasets one, two and 
three. Dataset one examines structural content form (video, link, note, photo & 
status) across a large pool of parties, but detailed study in datasets 2 and 3 
examines Labour, Conservatives and Momentum.  
 
Examining participation  
 
Participation examines the use of participatory practices engaged by 





Facebook is used to generate participation, but the systems of use are not well 
understood. Using a simplified model of participation datasets two and three are 
examined. The participatory practises engaged for core party members and 
external party supporters are charted via both online and offline participation. 
Mobilisation practises are defined as approaches to GOTV and voting operations. 
Finally, engagement is examined as a new form of participatory practice. 
Approaches to generating these forms are then comparatively examined across 
election years, parties and page types.  
 
Examining organisation  
 
Facebook is theorised as a system that allows for a new more fluid 
online/offline system of party organisation, via virtual membership and online to 
offline activity. Organisation is studied under the umbrella of participation. This 
research examines organisation through the way parties organise their online 
supporters via content, such as asking non-members to join the party, or asking 
virtual members to help doorstep campaigns. The basic conceptualisation of the 
coding scheme is seen in Table 10. The examination of Facebook as an 
organisation tool follows a more theoretical approach. Consequently, BES/EAS 
data are not used within the discussion section. Instead secondary sources and 
Margetts’ and Chadwick’s theoretical work is used to examine how the medium is 
potentially altering how parties can organise and campaign.  
 
A conceptual typology of usage 
 
Quantitative content analysis can get lost in detail, with so many codes 
used it can be hard to see the overall picture, thus the development of a typology 
from the data is important to answer the larger elements of the research 
questions. This more interpretivist approach to the dataset allows for wider 
conceptualisation of party approach to Facebook by “forming and refining 
concepts, drawing out underlying dimensions and sorting cases” (Collier, 2012, 
p.217). The typology is developed from the quantitative content data, with 
scholarly work informing approach. Gibson’s index of citizen-initiated 





websites, not Facebook specifically. Her work, a development upon previous work 
on ‘features analysis’ (Schneider & Foot, 2004) used indices to “measure the 
amount of a particular activity or function (i.e. information provision or networking) 
that is performed on a website” (Gibson, 2015, p.188). Gibson’s CIC index 
examines across four areas; community building, resource generation, voter 
mobilisation and message production. This thematic approach provides a mode 
of analysis that goes beyond the specific content approaches of messages and 
infers reasons for use and intended outcomes, a system this thesis replicates. 
Gibson’s approach, akin to most typologies of web campaigning, examines only 
the presence or absence of certain features, with the focus of analysis on adoption 
as usage. This thesis uses the conceptual core of Gibson’s features analysis 
whilst going further in detail, reframing Gibson’s CIC index towards Facebook 
use.  
This thesis’ typological approach creates dichotomous labels that explain 
the basic key elements of the parties’ use of Facebook. This is useful as the 
scheme broadens the analysis of approach towards greater potential cleavages, 
making differentiation easier. Overleaf in Table 10 an outline of the typology can 
be seen, with a party receiving the label if it follows one element more than the 
other. Although the data is still quantitative, analysis follows a more qualitative 
interpretivist scheme. This typology is used to illuminate how Facebook is used 
overall, with key divergences and themes made clear.
83 
 
Table 10. Conceptual typology of approach to Facebook 
 
 
Descriptor  Information Disseminators Participators Organisers 
Primary Label Will focus on delivery of information 
Will focus on online and offline 
participatory practises and engagement 
Will focus on the utilization of virtual members 
as an active core for campaigning 
2nd 
Topic builders, topic introducers or 
topic avoiders 
Interactivity seekers or one-way 
traditionalists 
Internal core organisers or external core 
organisers 
3rd 
Content traditionalists or content 
modernists 
Internal linkers or External linkers 
 
Virtual members or traditional structures? 
4th Popular depicters or elitists Partisan preachers or public engagers Data gatherers or free organisers 
5th Problem solvers or problem identifiers Social media or website linkers 
Organisational traditionalist or free flowing 
organisers? 
6th 
Positive orienteers or negative 
orienteers 
Offline activators or online activators  
7th Leader focus or party focus 
Professional participators or free 
participators 
 
8th Expertise users or celebrity engagers   
9th Detail merchants or depicters   
10th 





The thesis also uses the data it generates across the typology and content 
analysis datasets to develop theory describing how campaigns on Facebook 
operate. Using the model of Grounded Theory, the thesis sets out to construct 
ideas from the data it obtains and analyses. As Walsh et al. assert “Grounded 
Theory is simply the discovery of emerging patterns in data… the generation of 
theories from data (2015, p.12). The thesis thus uses its data in a flexible manner 
to maximise its value. Through summarising the quantitative and qualitative 
insights generated, this methodological approach allows the thesis to maximise 
its conceptual power and develop wider insights into how parties are using 
Facebook to campaign.   
 
Checking the datasets  
 
A key issue for this study is data quality. This thesis uses a retroactive 
approach, with analysis of Facebook after an election having positives and 
negatives. A Facebook page is a museum of interactions frozen in time, and thus 
is arguably a more solid evaluation foundation as it can reduce bias, because 
engagement is a stable number. However, the ability to analyse or examine 
people in the context of an election via experimental approaches is lost, meaning 
that there is no ability to link social media usage to specific vote choice, e-
participation or direct participation offline. Facebook data is also subject to some 
change over time, for example, some posts are deleted by the parties after 
posting. Engagement metrics are not 100% stable over time, while as semi self-
reported social data there is also the potential for the data to be inaccurate. This 
social angle to Facebook data is an important consideration and why the data 
was checked carefully. 
The data was cleaned, missing data checked for and incomplete data 
removed. For dataset one, given that no large-scale coding was undertaken, to 
test reliability a separate Facebook profile was created, the same data range was 
then extracted via the new profile through Netvizz. The number of posts extracted 
was the same, thus showing that the dataset was as complete as possible. To 
test the quality of the coding of the other datasets Krippendorf’s alpha intra-coder 
(α) was used. A paid coder was hired to re-code a set of posts according to the 





posts) sent to be recoded. All binary nominal variables excluding topic issue 
choice were examined, topic choice was not examined due to the triplicate 
system. The result for dataset two was an α of 0.81 which is considered a good 
result as “it is customary to require α ≥ .8, while where tentative conclusions are 
still acceptable, α ≥ .67 is the lowest conceivable limit” (Krippendorf, 2004, p.241). 
The results of the testing show a high level of reproducibility via the coding 
scheme; however, some elements of the coding scheme were more reproducible 
than others. Information variables received an α of .86, Framing .74, Mobilisation 
.84 and Personalisation .72 (full results are in Appendix 4). It is clear the less 
explicit elements of the coding scheme produce more variable results, but that 
the coding scheme is reliable and represents Facebook communications 
accurately. Some codes are clearly weaker than others with there a need to 
appreciate the inherent subjectivity in some elements of Facebook content. 
Overall, this thesis’ methodology offers a new level of detail upon previous 
studies, utilising a comprehensive approach that is more appropriate for 
understanding Facebook use by political parties. This is the first ever study that 
has measured UK parties approaches to Facebook in high detail. The 
methodology considers present and future longitudinal and comparative analysis, 
achieved through the creation of a comprehensive typology and coding system, 
alongside the novel use of underutilised data sources, tools and supportive 
datasets.  
 
All under the algorithm  
 
 What a user sees on Facebook is dependent on the Facebook algorithm. 
No two networks are the same as each user’s experience is personalised 
according to their own content algorithm. As Facebook explain “the Facebook 
algorithm ranks all available posts that can display on a user’s News Feed based 
on how likely that user will have a positive reaction… with a focus on what the 
algorithm determines as meaningful interactions”23. Therefore, the pages, people, 
hashtags and searches individuals like and/or follow will innately be interest 
based. This creates separate information spaces, as certain peoples will 
 





invariably be attracted to certain informational sources or networks, thus creating 
social and informational bubbles for users. Parties must appreciate this fact, as 
understanding the operation of Facebook is important for creating effective 
content. Unfortunately, researchers do not have access to most social media 
platforms’ algorithms (not only is it a closely guarded secret, but also every single 
user’s algorithm is personally unique) as they are a major element of their 
intellectual property. This is constraining research; however, we can nevertheless 
appreciate that parties can learn to play the systems algorithms. Thus, although 
we cannot understand an individual’s network or why they see what content, we 
can at least understand that Facebook is an individualised personalised 
experience.  
 
3.4: Ethical considerations 
 
The collection and analysis of social media features ethical challenges. 
The nature of this thesis’ examination of political parties leads this thesis to avoid 
many of the ethical pitfalls other papers have suffered from. Some studies such 
as Bode (2010) or Facebook’s own experiments24, have been heavily critiqued 
due to a lack of informed consent, or even nefarious goals. This thesis stands 
within a body of literature that examines Facebook pages through extracted 
Facebook data (Gulati & Williams, 2013), with its focus on political parties within 
the public interest not users’ personal data. The understanding of public vs. 
private spaces on Facebook is a key ethical area. In contrast to Twitter, which is 
defined by the “public nature” of tweets and replies (Bruns & Highfield, 2013, 
p.671), Facebook offers the opportunity for private, public and semi-public 
interactions and content. Some users do set their privacy settings to allow access 
to everyone, but many users opt for more restrictive privacy settings, especially 
since the Cambridge Analytica scandal. If researchers are collecting private 
information or interacting with Facebook users, then there is an ethical obligation 
to adequately inform users about the research, gain their consent, and protect 
their information (Solberg, 2010). However, this thesis is not examining individual 
 
24 E.g. Facebook’s unethical experiment where they attempted to change users’ sentiment by 





Facebook users, with the only reference to users’ data through anonymised 
totalled engagement metrics of party-political content or anonymised socio-
demographic information. 
Netvizz is incapable of accessing or extracting private Facebook data, 
whether private page posts, personal user information or private user posted 
content. Netvizz acts via the user’s Facebook identification using their application 
programming interface (API), and thus has only the same access as the Facebook 
account used. Consequently, Netvizz has no power to go beyond the boundaries 
of what is visible and legitimate content a personal account can view. This is 
important as some advanced programmes of data mining, can reverse this 
important privacy wall and extract personal (privately designated) Facebook data. 
Finally, Netvizz operates within Facebook as an app, following Facebook’s 
interface and the rules it assigns. Although Netvizz is now shut down, 
Crowdtangle - Facebook’s research tool, uses the same system and data that 
Netvizz used to operate. This thesis thus only uses extracted data that has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy on behalf of the social media user. This data is 
open for fair research use, as all Facebook users have agreed to a set of terms 
and conditions featuring clauses that outline how their public data can be used by 
researchers25.  
Although the public nature of the data is important, several key elements 
also inform the ethics this thesis’ research. A key aspect of ethical research is 
assessing the risk of harm. Anonymity is vital for the analysis of social media data, 
as it reduces the risk of harm. Consequently, all data is anonymized within the 
datasets; this means there will not be direct representation of individuals. 
Secondly, there is a very low risk of harm to the public from this research, as the 
data used cannot allow an actor to trace content back to the originator (see 
Narayanan, & Shmatikov, 2009). Similarly, no personal political opinions are 
recorded other than an openness to share, like or comment in abstracted data. 
This thesis upholds high ethical standards and follows the ESRC’s Research 
Framework 2015, aiming to maximise benefit for individuals and society whilst 
minimising possible risks or harm. The research has a clear line of accountability, 
to both Bath University and the ESRC’s research and ethical standards. The 
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Examining Facebook audience insights data, BES survey data and Party 
Members Project data, this chapter examines who uses Facebook in the UK, and 
who parties’ ‘virtual members’ are. It is vital to appreciate who the parties are 
reaching on Facebook, as content success is dependent on supporters 
rebroadcasting information into wider networks. The parties themselves will also 
be influenced by who they can reach, potentially tailoring content and organisation 
strategies to their audience. This addresses key elements of RQ1, with Facebook 
potentially offering a new body of supporters to campaign through, and a large 
mass population to campaign to. Four questions are used to appreciate any 
potential cyber party capability. Firstly: is this body larger than official 
membership? What are the socio-educational-locational demographics of virtual 
members? Does this support offer opportunity in contrast to official membership? 
Finally, do virtual members alter across page types, suggesting the importance of 
leadership?  
 
4.2: Who is on Facebook in the UK? 
Friends and usage  
 
Individual’s Facebook networks are growing, in the UK one study (n=2000) 
has attempted to show the size of a user’s ego-network. Dunbar found users’ 
have an average of 155 friends, with the study finding that “27.6% of each 
Facebook user’s friends were considered ‘genuine’ (i.e. close) friends” (Dunbar, 
2016, p.21)26. Facebook users’ networks thus somewhat mirror the existence of 
genuine offline friendship networks, meaning powerful elements of the 
sociological model can operate. The ‘kitchen table’ has to some extent been 
replicated online, with the phenomenon growing. Political parties consequently 
have a gateway into a very personal world, and if successful in generating share 
 





engagement, important access to individuals’ subsequent networks. Political 
parties have benefitted from this expansion of users’ online networks: according 
to the Reuters Institute by 2017 42% of United Kingdom social media users 
followed a politician or political party page. Unlike past tools, individuals at high 
rates are personally deciding to follow and engage with party politics. 
 



































Today most access to Facebook occurs through smartphones. In 2017 a 
monthly average US user spent 41 minutes per day on the network, up from 36 
minutes in 2014 (eMarketer, 2017), although growth has stalled recently. 
Facebook’s use in the UK has also peaked in some demographics reaching 
saturation levels, in 2017 Facebook was reaching 83% of UK millennials and 62% 
of adults each week; only 1% more millennials and 3% adults than in 201628. 
Despite declining growth, Facebook today is a platform only rivalled by television 
and email (UK usage rates are 66% social media, 82% email – ONS internet 
study). Facebook also offers a key gateway to the public for political parties 
because we spend so much time on the platform. Facebook with its 2.3 billion 
users is the central network of choice for the World. The social network accounts 
for much of the growth in the global ad market and ~40% of all internet traffic29, 
we are on the platform and we are paying attention to the content that comes our 
way. Huge levels of engagement are seen with political content on the platform, 
with the ability of political content to go viral, pushing political communications into 
the smartphone screens of even the most apolitical individuals. Although many 
do scroll past political content, the scale and level of engagement with politics in 
the digital age has opened up a key new avenue for political campaigns 
(Boulianne, 2016). Half of people now get their news from social media (Ofcom, 
2019) and thus never before has there been such a direct communications path 












28 Although growth has stalled recently - https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Time-Spent-with-







The UK Facebook population  
 
Facebook is a useful campaign tool because of a diverse userbase, while 
its real name policy means users are avatars online of their offline selves. This 
contrasts with other social networks more fluid approach, such as Twitter. Across 
income, class and location Facebook’s userbase is shown to be an electorally 
useful one to tap into. WeareFlint, a UK based design agency engaged in two 
polling reports in 2016 (n=2,092) and 2018 (n=2,008), they provide the best 
longitudinal data available.  
Graph 2. WeareFlint poll, UK 2016 and 2018 Twitter and Facebook usage rates 
by household income 
 
The data in Graph 2 shows Facebook is relatively representative of lower 
income households. WeareFlint’s class data shows similar trends, in 2018 
Facebook was used by 87% ABC1 and 74% of C2DE income brackets, in contrast 
Twitter is shown to be a middle-class tool with only 38% C2DE usage. Facebook 
also features strong representation of rural users, in 2016 Facebook was used 
relatively equally between urban 79% and rural 77%, against 46% urban and 40% 
rural for Twitter. Clearly, Facebook’s reachable audience is one the parties are 
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Audience Insights allows us to examine the basic socio-demographic statistics of 
all Facebook users according to their interests. Facebook is the social media 
platform with the greatest capability to reach voters (Mellon et al., 2017), having 
achieved this over time through technological and demographic change.  
Graph 3. Age profile of UK Facebook users 2013–2018 (Facebook data 2013, 
2014 and 2018)30 
 
Older cohorts especially those over 35 have used Facebook more over 
time, with over 65s having become a far larger population from 3.1% in 2013, to 
9% in 2018. However, usage among 18-24-year olds has declined from 24.5% in 
2013 to 17% in 2018, showing how younger users have abandoned Facebook in 
favour of other networks such as Instagram or TikTok. Facebook and ONS data 
show 56% of the UK population were on the platform in 2016. Over 2018, 35-40 
Million UK people were using Facebook monthly (Facebook Audience Insights, 
2018). Although the platform features relatively stable gender demographics, 
some age cohorts do exhibit a skew to one gender or the other. Facebook’s older 
 
30 Data for 2018 sourced from Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/; 2014 Facebook data from 
DazeInfo - https://dazeinfo.com/2014/01/08/66-internet-users-u-k-facebook-inc-fb-report/, and 




































demographics skew more heavily towards women, with younger demographics 
more accurate of the UK’s gender breakdown.  
Only a handful of studies have examined the demographic 
representativeness of social media against the UK electorate (Duggan et al., 
2015; Greenwood et al., 2016). The only study to examine this question in the UK 
is by Mellon and Prosser et al., (2017). In examining BES 2015 General Election 
data, they find users of Facebook younger than the rest of the representative 
sample, but older than Twitter. Facebook presents opportunities to the parties in 
gathering younger support but also highlights a limited use in reaching older 
populations. However, it is important to note the age of the study, as shifting 
patterns of Facebook use means over time the platform has become more 
representative of a wider population. For UK political parties, with campaigns 
having finite resources and time constraints, the capacities of Facebook as a 
campaign tool to reach core and marginal voter groups has become unparalleled.  
 
4.3: A cyber party? Party Facebook support  
Followers and interested users as ‘virtual members’ 
 
Parties will not be consistently reaching the entire Facebook population 
with their organic communications, instead they will primarily influence closer-
networked followers and interested users. A follower is a person who has chosen 
to receive updates from a page they follow, with posts from this page being placed 
in their news feed (subject to the Facebook algorithm). Although it is still not clear 
exactly what it means to ‘follow’ or to ‘like’ a party or an individual, there is a 
strength to these actions, as these engagement relationships are public to the 
user’s network of friends, and thus are actions that are both personal and public. 
There is therefore an instrumental value within the action of following. 
Nevertheless, the scale of this value is uncertain and further research needs to 
be done on what type of political relationship it describes. The number of followers 
a page has is important for several reasons; followers can be mobilised online 
and offline akin to official members, followers through sharing expand information 
dissemination capacities with followers’ friends potentially disseminating 





their own personal approval and often with their own twist on the messages 
campaign information. As Elizabeth Linder former UK Facebook politics manager 
asserted; “people don’t trust campaigns…. they trust their friends" (Linder, 2015).  
It is important to consider that different types of party pages exist in how 
parties’ campaign on Facebook. This thesis examines party and leader pages as 
they are the biggest political pages. Given their scale these pages most 
accurately represent any party virtual membership seen online. This contrasts 
with the smaller followership’s accumulated by local and satellite pages, which do 
not represent the potential of virtual membership as effectively. It is also likely 
someone who follows a local/satellite page will follow a party or leader page, thus 
making these pages the best proxy for examining virtual membership. 
“(Facebook) audiences are a significant gap in our knowledge” (Lee, 2016, 
p.322). With no specific way to examine followers of a Facebook page above pure 
numbers, alongside analysis of follower numbers this thesis examines these 
users via proxy through Facebook Ad Manager’s Audience Insights database of 
‘interested users’. The data source allows for the analysis of the number and basic 
demographics of UK-based monthly Facebook users who are ‘interested’ in the 
studied pages. The interested audience group is determined by factors including; 
“pages followed, apps used, ads clicked, pages engaged with, the activities 
people engage in on and off Facebook, purchase behaviours, demographics, 
mobile device used and speed of network connection” (Facebook Business, 
2018). There is clear overlap between the number of followers and interested 
users (Graph 4), although the relationship is not perfect. Interested users for each 
page provides (normally) a higher population than the specific pages’ followers 
count (8049920 followers to 9695000 interested users, 32% larger than follower 
numbers)31. As Graph 4 shows, although not perfect, interested users are a great 
proxy to examine page followers. Labour and Conservative party pages appear 
to have a strong advantage in reaching more interested users. Why users do not 
follow the pages yet are still interested in the pages is potentially related to 
contextual elements, including interest being drawn from the news, television or 
other political events. Information on Facebook is subject to the algorithm, with 
 
31 The data studied on 15/03/2018, data not retroactive and is subject to change as it is social 





the nature of communications heavily linked to activity, thus content of interest is 
pushed to users irrespective of whether they follow the specific page. 
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Followers (as also studied via interested users) are conceptualised in this 
chapter as ‘virtual members’. This concept of virtual membership stands as a third 
position of activism for parties. As a middle ground between official membership 
and general interest, virtual membership describes a group who are mainly not 
official members but are still connected and can be organised. This new human 
resource is a lynchpin of any impact Facebook can have, because of their 
potential to campaign on a party’s behalf or be organised for online and offline 
campaigning (Lee & Campbell, 2016; Bartlett et al., 2013). It also represents the 
realisation of elements of Margetts’ ideas of the ‘cyber party’ (2001) with the 
breakdown of barriers between members and non-members. This is important as 
most parties’ virtual members are not party members. BES data shows an 
average of 24% of the respondents who gave a Party ID across the studied parties 
follow candidates or parties on the platform (BES 2017 Campaign Wave 12, 
n=17,415). Rates for Conservative followership was 12% and Labour 26%. This 
shows that that millions of UK individuals follow a party page online but are still 
not official members of a political party. 
Some scholars originally asserted that social media supporters are 
ineffective for campaigning because of their “politically partisan” social groupings, 
lack of non-partisan interpersonality (Rainie, Smith, Schlozman, Brady, 2012) and 
damaging levels of homophily (Grevet, Terveen & Gilbert, 2014). However, this 
academic position has been shifting towards a position that argues online social 
media communications are not as heterogeneous as previously envisaged 
(Barbera et al., 2015), with real potentials to activate supporters on and offline 
(Bale, Webb & Poletti, 2018). Having a large virtual membership thus presents 
clear opportunities to parties, even when partisan. Although Facebook virtual 
members have not received examination, in the wider literature some studies 
have examined the similar phenomenon of non-member supporters (Webb et al., 
2017). Webb estimates that there are 8,852,903 million ‘supporters’ of UK political 
parties who are not official members. This support closely matches the 8,049,920 
followers and the 9,695,000 interested users found on the Facebook platform in 
2019. This group of un-official support is important as “at the aggregate level, 
campaign work done by supporters matches that done by party members” (Webb 
et al., 2017, p.64). As Table 11 shows, Webb finds that supporters engage at 21% 





element is that rates of activism on Facebook were very high from both members 
and supporters. Further, for Facebook activity, supporters engage at 39% of the 
activity level of members when liking Facebook content. Thus, although Facebook 
supporters may differ from offline supporters in demographics and scale, the rates 
of activism seen make them an important resource for campaigning. The large 
number of Facebook virtual members’ parties can gather means a huge new 
potential reservoir of activism is available. Importantly this is also not exclusive, 
with high rates seen for both Labour (18.8%) and the Conservatives (10.2%). 
 
Table 11. Webb et al.’s estimations of activism of members vs. supporters using 
2015 BES data for general and Facebook activities 
 
Given the huge difference in numbers between official membership and 
supporters, there is real value in cultivating and using unofficial support, because 
this is where the majority of activism occurs from on Facebook. The potential to 
convert online users to offline campaigners is an unparalleled resource unseen in 
any other tool. The high activism rate of supporters on Facebook represents an 
opportunity for parties, but also indicates a fundamentally different landscape for 
party organisation. 
 
How many virtual members are there? 
 
The best available data upon the number of followers of the pages over 
time is used. Access to data is problematic, thus figures used present an 
amalgamation of data from roughly similar periods (within 3-4 months), taken from 
a combination of journalism, Google image searches of the pages at the specified 
time, the Wayback-machine (a website that saves websites over time) and 
academic articles. Given the benefits of having a large diverse follower base, 
Activity 
 
Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total 
Activism Index 
(additive scale) 
Members 2.15 2.56 2.38 2.28 2.43 3.02 2.5 
Supporters 0.25 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.79 0.8 0.5 
‘Liked’ something by 
party/cand. on FB 
(percentage) 
Members 39.6 51.1 47.4 44.2 67.6 72.7 53.4 






political parties have spent years building support bases for their party and party 
leader pages. This has occurred through organic support growth or other means 
such as advertisements, as seen in claims levelled against David Cameron 
‘buying’ followers in 201432.  
Table 12 shows a comparison of follower numbers for the leader and party 
pages of the 8 most important political parties. From late 2010 to 2019 
followership increased 2,572% across all the pages. The rise in followers seen 
cannot be wholly linked to the increase in the UK Facebook population, as in 2010 
Facebook boasted of 26 million UK users, meaning that Facebook from 2010 to 
2018 has only seen a 54% increase in userbase.  
 
32https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-resorts-to-paying-for-facebook-
fans-because-not-enough-people-like-him-9180055.html accessed 09/07/2018 
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 Party Page Late 2010 Mid 2013 Late 2015 Early 2018 Early 2019 Late 2019 
L Labour 61,271 143,244 304,875 1,016,836 1,034,070 1,038,311 
C Conservatives 111,690 159,044 480,955 652,116 652,556 669,655 
LD Liberal Democrats 7,652 92,078 113,126 186,339 188,469 199,253 
U UKIP 1,069 25,906 462,672 587,084 580,848 571,305 
G Green Party 7,858 19,165 215,955 305,808 302,066 310,447 
S SNP 4,079 . 203,883 287,818 290,955 294,518 
B Brexit Party . . . . . 143,431 
C Boris Johnson . . . . . 680,825 
C Theresa May . . . 477,941 515,501 537,376 
C David Cameron 50,240 128,000 695,173 1,218,540 1,192,922 1,185,615 
L Jeremy Corbyn . . 71,849 1,386,549 1,425,142 1,483,129 
L Ed Miliband 12,441 30,200 101,263 149,328 145,451 144,359 
U/B Nigel Farage . . 269,646 786,957 822,454 875,557 
U Richard Braine . . . . . 643 
G Caroline Lucas 5,900 . . 92,815 95,190 96,895 
G Jonathan Bartley . . . . . 10,989 
G Natalie Bennett . . 24,000 55,472 52,648 52,097 
S Nicola Sturgeon . . 193,076 299,872 301,410 305,191 
U Alex Salmond 1,718 91,709 162,679 173,730 169,098 168,035 
LD Jo Swinson . . . . . 12,206 
LD Vince Cable . . . 11,962 13,839 14,860 
LD Nick Clegg 41,023 80,689 90,692 95,432 Page private 
Page private 
(working for FB) 





Online virtual membership started slowly with political parties on 
Facebook in 2010 a minority pursuit. Party membership dwarfed online 
followership, with usage of Facebook partially a gimmick or used to drive website 
traffic. ‘Social media was important, but mainly in creating ‘buzz’… to drive 
people to websites where they could lay out their wares’ (Newman, 2010, p.1). 
Craig Elder, former Conservative Digital director highlights a skin-deep 
appreciation; ‘we wanted to show people we were smart and clever… we wanted 
to show them shiny things” (Ross, 2015). However, by 2017 usage and 
implementation was ubiquitous. Two important trends are visible in followership, 
first is the radical rise in followers from 2010-2015, second is the slowdown in 
followership growth after 2018. The data suggests that offline political events, 
growing political interest by Facebook users and potential Facebook 
developments spurred growth.  
The nature of support on the platform offers insight into the question of 
normalisation or equalisation. As Lev-On & Haleva-Amir assert; “the equalization 
hypothesis claims that Internet platforms predominantly aid peripheral and 
marginal players… conversely, the normalization hypothesis suggests that 
online activity will eventually reward established and dominant players” (2018, 
p.1). In terms of Facebook followers, one would expect to see a clear trend in 
numbers towards Conservative and Labour supremacy, or the splintering of 
support across the smaller parties.  
 
Table 13. Follower numbers of; Labour and Conservative party and leader 
pages, and UKIP, SNP, Liberal Democrat and Green party pages 




172,961 302,288 785,830 1,668,952 1,686,626 
Other party pages 20,658 137,149 995,636 1,367,049 1,362,338 




62,681 158,200 796,436 1,864,490 1,940,643 
Other leader pages 48,641 172,398 547,017 1,214,982 1,232,893 






2015 saw the greatest degree of equalisation in online virtual membership 
bases across both party and leader pages. The Conservative and Labour pages 
only had 39,613 more followers than UKIP, SNP, Liberal Democrats and Green 
Party combined. This supports studies such as Southern & Lee (2015) who found 
peripheral parties highly active on Facebook at the time. This trend was also 
reflected in the 2015 General Election where smaller parties received a larger 
segment of the popular vote than ever before (Audickas et al., 2017). Although 
the equalisation trend is visible in 2015, followership by 2018 returned to the two-
party norm seen from 2010-2013 (in large part due to Labour’s growth). Since 
2015 the Labour and Conservative parties have seen their followership grow to 
a 1 million lead over the smaller parties. However rather than a clear trend 
towards normalisation over the last decade, there has been consistent volatility 
between followership levels of smaller and larger parties. Social media is not a 
stable influence on either a normalisation or equalisation process. Although we 
recently see a stabilising normalisation trend, positions are in flux. The literature 
also finds social media leading to equalisation and normalisation. Across similar 
time periods, Gibson & McAllister (2015) and Samuel-Azran, Yarchi & Wolfsfeld 
(2015) asserted equalisation, whereas Van Aelst et al. (2017) found 
normalisation. Overall, there is a clear trend of follower supremacy for the UK’s 
two major political parties, however the two main party’s hegemony should not 
be taken for granted as followership can fluctuate enormously. 
Even though Facebook use has continued to grow, the fact we have seen 
recent low growth in political followership speaks to a new landscape for parties’ 
campaigns. If we are witnessing the end of ever-increasing organic reach this 
creates new challenges for the parties on the platform. Parties will need to seek 
new followers from reducing circles of new users, battle for new audiences from 
within the large group of less politically interested Facebook users, or contest for 
those who are already engaged with others political pages. With an inability to 
increase followership into new younger demographics, a stagnant online support 
base suggests the increased need for targeted advertisements and other tools 
to reach and activate voters. Finally, if reflective of wider trends, it may be the 







Graph 5. Official membership vs. party and leader page followership 2018 
 
Is the body of virtual members larger than official membership? Clearly 
yes, although there are growth problems, as Graph 5 shows there is a huge scale 
of followership far larger than official membership. Today over 8 million people, 
1 in 5 UK Facebook users, follow one of the examined party or party leader pages 
(See Appendix 5). The parties have access to a body of virtual members that are 
interested in party politics, but who are not willing to be official paying members. 
The capacity to reach these individuals, and subsequently socialise and 













































































Socio-educational-locational-demographics of virtual members 
 
 It is important to understand who these virtual members are, and whether 
there are opportunities for parties in reaching new groups directly and through 
these new connections. This is important as it is highly likely that users offline 
socio-demographics will influence their online network formation because offline 
friendship networks will be partially replicated online. Political parties’ page 
audience’s may be echo chambers of certain demographics heavily represented 
in official membership, or conversely virtual membership may be broader in 
support. The implications of this are that when parties’ supporters share the 
political content to their friends, they may only be reaching socio-
demographics/groups that are more likely to support the party already. Parties 
virtual members may also be generally reflective of their traditional official 
memberships meaning that associated benefits and problems are reflected 
online. This may force a party to rely more on targeted advertisements to 
communicate to key demographics outside the reach of organic 







































































































































What are the socio-educational-locational demographics of virtual 
members? Firstly, using interested audience data, we can examine the age 
ranges of the party pages in contrast to the Facebook average population. 
Labour, SNP and the Green Party feature younger followers than the other 
parties and are more representative of the Facebook population. In contrast, the 
Conservative Party, SNP and UKIP feature skews towards older demographics. 
Appendix 6 presents the same data but split by gender. When examining male 
and female demographic skews away from the UK Facebook population, the 
parties overall suffer from a greater female skew (20%) than male (16%). All the 
pages’ followers are generally more male than female; parties, especially right-


















































































Graph 7 shows right wing followers of parties are more educationally 
representative, followed by the left and then centre. Against the Facebook 
average, almost all-party pages except UKIP feature more educated individuals 
than the Facebook average (perhaps exhibiting the ‘left behind’ support that 
Goodwin et al. claimed in 2013). The highest educated virtual members of the 
Liberal Democrats and the Green Party are the least representative of the 
Facebook population. Claimed trends about the changing nature of parties’ 
support are reflected in the data. The Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn and 
Momentum Page have followers that are more educated than the Facebook 
average. This perhaps reflects the shift of the Labour Party from working class 
support to cosmopolitan middle-class support (Bale, YouGov, 2017). See 
Appendix 5 for number estimates. 
 
Graph 8. London based party membership and followers (interested audience) 









































London based official party members





Location is also important for the capacities of Facebook as political 
parties have areas of strong electoral support that constitute safe seats, but also 
important areas of contention via their target seats. As virtual members on 
Facebook will feature elements of their offline networks replicated online, this 
means that information shared by supporters that flows to their friends will 
ultimately be tied to spatial factors. As such there is an interest, depending on 
political factors such as target seats, for parties to be able to influence or 
organise users within important geographic areas. Surprisingly, Graph 9 shows 
that the party page with the most London-centric followership when compared to 
the Facebook average, is the Conservative Party. Whilst Labour, which is often 
asserted to be a particularly London-centric force is not, this is potentially due to 
the huge membership change that occurred after Corbyn came to power in 2015. 
When comparing results to PMP data, some similar trends are visible, with the 
Conservatives seeing a comparable London skew suggesting that more 
virtual/official members are London dwellers than expected.  
 



































When examining leaders in Graph 9, London exhibits a leftwards focus. 
However, against expectations David Cameron has more of an audience in 
London than Corbyn. This may potentially be due to his status as a Prime 
Minister, given that many more people will follow the page out of interest even if 
not a supporter, however it also suggests that some of the metropolitan-London 
narrative of Corbyn’s support is untrue. There are clear ramifications for how 
parties can utilise their virtual members given these results, as online actors are 
heavily related to their offline characteristics. Trends are also seen in other major 
cities such as Manchester. 
 
Do virtual members differ to party membership? 
 
Does virtual member support offer opportunity in contrast to official 
membership? Examining Labour and the Conservatives specifically, Facebook 
offers the different parties diverse benefits from virtual membership. The Labour 
Party page has an equal gender distribution of 50/50, this is only slightly different 
to the Facebook average (52% Female, 48% Male). Most importantly, this ratio 
is superior compared to its official party membership at 53% Male, 47% Female 
(Bale et al., 2018). In contrast, the Conservative Party page is starkly different 
from Labour, with gender heavily skewed towards men at 58%. This is obviously 
problematic for the Conservative Party’s organic reach, and the page’s capacity 
to reach women. However, it is an improvement upon the party’s real-world 
membership at 71% male (Bale, Webb & Poletti, 2018). Thus, when questioning 
the real-world benefits of Facebook, for the Conservative Party, Facebook offers 
a vital gateway to women. 23% more women are interested users in the 
Conservative Party page than its official membership gender breakdown. In 






Graph 10. Gender demographics of Labour and Conservative party pages 
If parties are trying and succeeding in mobilising online virtual members, 
then the ability to promote female voices online can potentially offset a male 
gender skew offline. Further, if these online virtual members are capable of being 
organised, or generated into official members, the greater female representation 
on Facebook offers a new source for more representative membership alongside 
potential improvements in offline campaigning. This pool of female interested 
supporters not only helps challenge political parties’ male dominance (Campbell 
& Childs, 2015), but can potentially improve campaign efficiency. Gillespie found 
in his focus group study of canvassers “in general… the gender of the visitor had 
a huge impact on whether one would open the door” (Gillespie, 2010), there is 
no reason to doubt similar effects will not occur on Facebook. Although Facebook 
offers the Conservative Party a greater scale of benefit from its official 



























































in this area. The Conservative Party’s members are older and male, and although 
capacities to saturate these key demographics online is important, Labour clearly 
has a far more balanced and influential audience base. The Conservatives via 
organic Facebook communications will struggle to reach female voters, perhaps 
highlighting why the party has placed so much weight on targeted advertising.  
As well as gender, there are benefits in virtual members being younger 
than official members as seen in Graph 11. For the Conservative Party, this new 
pool of more diverse younger people, who can be potentially stimulated into 
online/offline campaign action, is currently an underutilised resource. Currently it 
appears only Labour is attempting to spur into action their online audience, 
although from the data it is obvious that the potential exists for all the parties. 
 
Graph 11. 2017 Labour Party and Conservative Party, leader and party page 
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Both Labour and the Conservatives maintain a group of virtual members 
that is larger and more representative of the UK than official membership. Issues 
are still apparent, with offline party problems reflected online. However, 
Facebook offers an opportunity for parties to reduce the male dominance of 
official membership. While the platform provides a good space to promote female 
centred policies, voices and activism. As such, Facebook offers parties a 
fundamental shift from past capacities in generating a support base.  
 
What role do leader pages play in virtual membership? 
 
Do virtual members alter across page types, suggesting the importance 
of leadership? Different types of pages may also see different audiences 
generated. Virtual membership demographics may therefore play a role in 
Janus-faced campaigns, as parties utilise party, leader and satellite pages with 
differing approaches and demographic targets. Party leader pages have been a 
central feature on Facebook since 2010, although some central party figures took 
a long time to create a public Facebook profile such as Theresa May.  
As Graph 12 shows, party leaders’ pages in 2019 were the central focal 
point for political parties’ followership on Facebook. This represents a major 
political shift on the platform. Leaders are now not only the vehicle offering 
increased follower growth but are the central focus for followership on Facebook. 
Although seemingly a recent trend, as previously seen in Table 12, party leader 
page growth has outstripped party page growth consistently. The 2013-2015 
rapid growth phase seen for party pages was replicated across party leader 
pages. It was this era that saw UK Facebook users flocking to follow politics on 
the platform. From 2013-2015, Labour’s party page received 113% growth 
against 202% growth for the Conservative party page. While for the leader 







Graph 12. Party page vs. party leader followers  
 
Table 14 shows that party pages are more representative of the UK 
Facebook population than leader pages, suggesting a marmite effect via leader 
pages. The differences are clearly exemplified in the Labour Party; the party 
page does not see large amounts of support from 18-24-year-old young people. 
Instead this trend is seen in Jeremy Corbyn’s page especially for those aged 25-
34. The lack of a large under-24 support base alludes to the myth of the 2017 
‘Youthquake’. As Prosser et al. explain “a slightly larger (turnout) rise for those 
aged 30-40” was picked up in the BES, with their being no “dramatic surge in 










































































































































Table 14. Party and leader page average follower demographics 
Age group 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
2017 Leader pages 13% 23% 19% 18% 13% 13% 
2017 Party pages 18% 26% 19% 16% 11% 10% 
Facebook average 18% 26% 20% 17% 11% 8% 
 
Overall, the trends suggest age and gender influences within internal 
political support, alongside the importance of leader pages in generating 
differentiated virtual membership. This will have ramifications for campaigning 
and organisation. There is a relationship between age and gender and the 
followership of party leader pages, as Graph 13 shows, the trend for being a 
follower of a leader page is correlated with older age groups. 
 
Graph 13. Average audience skew of party and leader pages away from 




































Party leader pages are struggling to reach younger people compared to 
party pages. The role of politics cannot be ignored as high levels of older female 
and male Farage and Theresa May followers influence the swing. However, 
Caroline Lucas and Nicola Sturgeon also badly underperform in reaching 
younger men and women. Thus, the trend is arguably less to do with politics and 
more likely connected to demographics. If the personalisation of politics plays a 
role in the development of audiences for party leader pages, there is the potential 
that effects are being seen in older demographics more than young. The potential 
for leaders to gather different audiences is one that is very important to the 
campaign use of Facebook, including the development of Janus-faced 
campaigns via multiple pages. The fact that party leader pages and party pages 
feature different follower demographics is important for; organisable virtual 
membership, organic message dissemination, content approaches taken and the 
need for advertising. 
This study is the first to place weight on the differing natures between 
page types, and on leader pages themselves. With party leader pages now the 
central focus of parties’ follower support on the platform. As well as appreciating 
party and leader page differences in virtual membership, it is also important to 
consider wider political implications of leader-led politics. The growth of leader 
pages over party pages suggests a further rise in the personalisation of politics 
(Karvonen, 2010; Enli & Skogerbo, 2013), or in parties attempts at generating 
celebrity politicians (Street, 2012). Thousands of Facebook users in the UK are 
choosing to receive campaign information from leaders not parties. This means 
that personalised content via leader pages is today a vital campaign medium, 
both due the way that party leaders can put a face to a policy choice, but also 
because of the importance of leaders over parties. Parties now need a popular 
figurehead on Facebook to achieve effective follower support, with the latest 
example being Boris Johnson. There has been a lack of focus within the field on 
leader’s pages, however the current growth trends and huge scale of 
followership signal leader pages as vitally important, whether similar trends are 






4.4: Conclusion  
A potential cyber party?  
 
Margetts’ (2001) cyber party model asserted that the internet would create 
a more fluid relationship between parties and internet users. This would see 
hugely reduced costs for participation, with organisation refreshed through the 
reformulation of meetings and canvassing through online means. This body of 
online support could engender “virtual belonging towards the specific online 
group enhanced by the possibility of interacting directly with likeminded people” 
(Bartlett et al., 2013, p.11). The potentials of the cyber party are numerous on 
paper; however, to have a cyber-party you must have virtual members. 
Facebook has helped parties develop a new group of supporters that is 
far more representative of the wider UK and Facebook population than official 
membership. The virtual members examined are younger and more female, 
offering a huge opportunity for party renewal in an era where party membership 
skews towards older males. This group of supporters is an important tool for 
parties’ campaigns as activism rates are high (Webb et al., 2017) and numbers 
large. This was seen at the 2017 General Election, as former press adviser to 
David Cameron, Giles Kenningham, asserted “Labour’s very polished social 
media presence… worked. It energised people and got the base out” (Guardian, 
2017). Labour’s development of offline action via participation saw the party 
“channel their social media-enabled activism into party politics and to integrate it 
with face-to-face doorstep campaigning” (Chadwick, 2017, p.87). This novel 
resource is very real; however how virtual members are being used is still 
unclear. 
There are important differences found across and within the parties. The 
platform appears to offer opportunities for smaller parties in generating online 
support; normalisation or equalisation in the scale of support (followership and 
engagement) appears to fluctuate. However, in general the continued 
dominance of the main two parties on Facebook is apparent. Major demographic 
differences are seen, right-wing parties skew older but are more educationally 
representative, while proportionally the benefits of Facebook’s younger userbase 





representative of the UK Facebook population; having greater capacities to 
organically reach and influence diverse demographics through its virtual 
members.  
There are also differences across pages, demographic differences 
between leader and party pages suggest that virtual members are 
heterogeneous even within parties. For example, Jeremy Corbyn and Theresa 
May have different followers to their party pages, suggesting that virtual 
membership is linked to political choice. People do not just mindlessly follow the 
leader and the party page, instead the differences seen show deliberative 
decision making on the part of virtual members. Wider differences are also seen; 
party pages are more representative of the UK population than leader pages, 
suggesting a leadership marmite effect that presents both opportunities and 
drawbacks for communications and organisation. If the driver of followership of 
leader pages is the personalisation of politics it appears to be a turn off for 
younger people, while conversely older groups flock to leader pages. Overall, 
the differences seen across the pages shows that parties must utilise Facebook 
holistically. The parties have either inadvertently developed different page-to-
page virtual memberships or have done so deliberately, either way Janus-faced 
campaigning is now a necessity as the parties control pages with dissimilar 
virtual memberships.  
Examining whether Facebook offers fundamental change for parties’ 
campaigns, the development of a novel body of online support via virtual 
members suggests the answer is yes. Facebook allows parties to not only 
‘preach to the converted' (Norris, 2003), but also ‘preach through the converted’ 
(Vissers, 2009) across election campaigns and permanently. Parties are now 
able to reach, inform and engender millions of UK residents who would not likely 
sign up to formal party membership, to be ‘virtual members’. These audiences 
and virtual members are younger and more diverse than official membership. 
Unlike other tools there is huge scope for different audiences on the platform, 
with the vitality of leaders’ pages feeding into Janus-faced campaigning. Parties 
are now able to present different images of the party to different groups to 
maximise intended goals. New tools have also benefitted the parties, the use of 
Facebook audience data is allowing parties to inform themselves of who they are 





parties are less likely to leave electorally important voters untouched. Not all is 
positive however, as there are also threats to this new dynamic. Firstly, Facebook 
has stopped growing, parties must now compete for the politically interested, 
especially via leader pages, with younger generations slowly avoiding the 
platform. Secondly the parties still feature unrepresentative virtual memberships 
in comparison to the UK population. Virtual members are generally older and 
more male, London-centric and educationally unrepresentative. Despite these 
weaknesses, the dawn of the cyber party is visible in the huge numbers of virtual 
members the parties have gathered. However, these virtual members and their 
subsequent networks must engage with content for Facebook to offer a 





















































Facebook content and 










As seen in Chapter 4, Facebook has allowed parties to gather and 
communicate with virtual members, with these people potentially able to 
campaign on the party’s behalf. The easiest level of participation from this group 
is via their engagement with party content. The ramifications of engagement, 
given the average user has 155 friends (Dunbar, 2016), is that from only a 
handful of shares thousands of Facebook users can potentially be exposed to a 
party’s political content. Parties will likely use Facebook to both reinforce political 
views through content designed for virtual members (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). 
While also pushing content of wider public interest to help diversify voters political 
information (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016). Both these avenues rely on 
engagement, as higher engagement helps promote the content to virtual 
members and increases subsequent spread to wider communities. 
Investigating British parties’ engagement and structural content 
approaches across 49,230 posts from 2010-2017, this chapter questions 
whether Facebook engagement and content are offering parties something new 
to their campaigns. Engagement gives us a lens through which we can 
understand the success of the parties’ content approaches, virtual membership 
activism levels and the wider reach of the parties on the platform. Five questions 
are examined that investigate how parties use content and what engagement 
they achieve:  
1. Are parties beginning to reflect one another in engagement and content?  
2. Across the permanent and one-month campaign, do we see engagement 
and content differences?  
3. Across page types (party and leader pages), do we see engagement and 
content differences? 
4. Do we see normalisation or equalisation (between larger and smaller 
parties) in engagement and content differences? 





5.2: Facebook engagement and other campaign tools  
 
Engagement on Facebook is still a relative enigma, but likes, shares, 
reactions and comments are externalising actions that have value. The 
Facebook platform is designed with a view that user actions are public to their 
friend network, with a user choosing to participate in sharing a message forwards 
to a wider audience. These actions are consequently performed for others as 
well as the user. The three key engagement forms are likes, shares and 
comments. 
Likes are a vital litmus test for parties’ content and overall popularity. 
“Clicking like below a post on Facebook is an easy way to let people know that 
you enjoy it… people will be able to see that you liked it… a story will be posted 
on your timeline that you liked it… and the person who posted the video will get 
a notification that you liked it” (Facebook, 2018). Some more sceptical 
academics have argued that liking requires minimum effort and thus attracts 
users with lower political interest (Erikson, 2008; Vitak et al., 2011). Although 
liking is an easy action, given its public nature it does present some level of 
emotive resonance between party, content and user. Reactions added in 
February 2016 allow a user to choose an emoticon in place of the like; Love, 
Haha, Wow, Sad, Care and Angry. Reactions allow for some element of 
sentiment to be visible, but in this thesis’ data, the form was much less commonly 
used than the traditional like button (see Appendix 9).  
 Shares are vital for externalising a message to Facebook users outside 
the normal follower circle centred around a page. Through one click, a user will 
replicate the post on their own personal Facebook page, this will then be placed 
(owing to the algorithm) within their own circle of friends via the news feed. The 
share function thus allows users to become arbitrators of other pages’ content, 
acting as what Bruns et al. (2012) call “producers”, as gatekeepers for others 
(Sundar & Nass, 2001). In terms of the strength of the action, a sharing user is 
often adopting the content as their own, distributing its message to those within 
their friend network, as such the relationship is arguably one of major importance. 
Negative sharing is also common, with sharing allowing for negative commentary 





sharing likely follows the motto that all publicity is good publicity, because shares 
can lead to page growth in followers and in total engagement. Shares are the 
most powerful force on Facebook for developing communications flow outside of 
the ‘converted’ (Norris, 2003), because of the importance of social characteristics 
influencing political behaviour (Bond et al., 2012). Generally, emotive content is 
found to promote sharing (Nelson-Field et al., 2013; Shifman, 2012; Southgate 
et al., 2010). 
 Commenting is an integral part of the social nature and user experience 
of Facebook. Comments help make the platform a participatory campaign tool 
unlike many others, as comments allow for political feedback and user 
engagement with content and each other. With little evidence of two-way 
communications between party and public (Magin et al., 2017), comments 
generally exist for peer to peer debate and political criticism or praise. As such 
comments act as a virtual public square informed by the content above the line. 
Comments do not generally increase content reach, although recent changes to 
the Facebook algorithm has led to commented posts being placed on users’ 
news feeds33. Content that features elements of persuasion has been found to 
receive the greatest number of comments (Bronstein, 2013). 
 
Other campaign tools  
 
BES and EAS data help to conceptualise the scale and approach political 
parties take to the wider campaign. As Graph 14 shows, the reach of Facebook 
is very impressive especially when compared to core campaign tools used by 
parties. Sharing content on Facebook stands above traditional forms of 
participation and contact, surpassed only by leaflets, party election broadcasts 
and TV debates (although only 21% of Wave 12 of the BES watched the first 5 
leader election debate, n=20,315). The platform therefore has capacities for 
party-controlled information transmission not seen outside of a few core tools. 
 
 






Graph 14. 2017 Wave 14 Participation and contact forms as percentage of total 
BES sample (n=33,726) 
 
One major area of difference is frequency, in 2017 across 664 Labour, 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat and SNP agents, 1,048,532 posters and 
25,147,540 leaflets were given out. Although nearly everyone on the UK will 
receive at least one leaflet, Facebook allows for higher frequency campaign 
content. If 29% of the UK electorate (38,371,400 people) read campaign leaflets, 
11,127,706 individuals’ will be reached, however if 13% of the UK electorate, 
4,988,282 individuals’ share Facebook content subsequently read by 66 friends 
(via video view/shares relationship - 30% of Dunbar’s 2016 study average) 
329,226,612 people will be reached. Facebook offers a fundamentally new scale 
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Graph 15. EAS 2017 data on effort placed into different tools by electoral agents 
 
Parties place different levels of effort into different campaign tools, as 
Graph 15 shows, in 2017 Facebook received a large degree of effort, with only 
leaflets ahead. Traditional tools are shown in the data to still be favoured, but 
over time have been supplemented with Facebook. However, the overall trend 
has been Facebook and social media growing in importance while other tools 
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5.3: Party engagement from 2010-2017 
What engagement do parties achieve? 
 
Who are the parties reaching, the public or virtual members? To examine 
this, we can use video views as they act as measure of total reach because they 
auto-play. Over the one-month before the 2017 General Election, the Labour and 
Conservative leader and party pages received 102,306,685 video views from 
videos shared 1,550,654 times. This would equate to each piece of shared video 
content being viewed by 66 friends. The reach of Facebook is therefore 
enormous, passing far beyond the parties’ virtual members. Shares of video 
content was equivalent to 43% of the parties’ total followership, given the Labour 
and Conservative pages’ 3,627,269 followers. The number of shares seen in 
video content across the two one-month campaigns suggests a high level of 
engagement from a smaller group. Shares are only actionable once by each user 
for each piece of content, thus through examining the relationship between total 
follower numbers and video shares we can determine that the group of those 
sharing are more likely virtual members. If each follower shared one piece of 
video content over the one-month campaign, under half the party’s virtual 
members are likely active. Minimising those sharing to an absolute minimum via 
dividing the video shares by the 29 day one-month period, 53,470 individuals are 
sharing content per day. This suggests a potentially small core of active support, 
but still a huge reach of 3,527,817 video views a day. Despite the potential for 
highly active members repeatedly sharing content to be where all engagement 
is occurring from. The evidence suggests that engagement is driven by both a 
base of highly active support, (and through them) a subset of the wider public, 
thus most virtual members will be engaging sporadically. This will be dependent 
on the nature of the content, as some content goes more viral than others.  
To illuminate total engagement trends, likes, shares and comments were 
combined to provide an overall picture for the parties. This was quantified by 
combining in sum the engagement for the party and associated leader page 
during their periods of leadership. Where leadership overlap in a year was seen, 





leaders did not have presences on Facebook, the party’s most prominent 
consistent figurehead Nigel Farage was used.  
Graph 16 shows the radical rise in engagement we have seen over the 
last decade. Early Facebook saw incredibly low engagement, with posts 
averaging only 55 likes in 2012 against 2,560 today, a 4,555% increase. 
Engagement began its rise in 2013, this trend reflects the period of rapid 
followership growth seen. Reflecting that followership is plateauing on the 
platform, average engagement has peaked with 4,466 engagements per post in 
2016, but 4,110 in 2017. Parties are now in a more competitive environment, with 
rising engagement not a given.  
Graph 16. Average number of engagements per post across studied parties from 
2010–2017 (n=49,551)  
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Comments 24 42 57 144 390 564 718 729
Shares 1 5 21 92 347 825 817 821




























Despite a slowdown in growth, engagement rates are still high. There are 
important party-based trends. Engagement stagnation is not seen for the Labour 
Party, who received 12,594,556 individual engagements in 2017, over double 
their 2015 engagement. There is clearly a large amount of volatility, as 
engagement has shifted considerably between the Conservative Party, Labour 
and UKIP from 2015-2017, but by 2017 Labour were in clear supremacy. 
Average engagement data is seen in Appendix 9. 
  
Graph 17. Sum post engagement for relevant leader and party pages by year 
(n=40,659) 
 
Some important engagement trends are visible. Firstly, Labour has 
advantage in shares, this occurred to some extent in 2015 but later accelerated. 
With shares so important for message spread, Labour had a huge advantage in 
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leader and party page. Those virtual members or the public who reached out to 
their friends on Facebook were centrally Labour supporters. Comments per post 
display a different picture, with UKIP never the central location of debate in any 
year; instead the Conservatives achieved the most comments. This is to be 
expected as the Conservatives have been the party of government across the 
entire study period, and thus likely to receive more comments. 
Graph 18. Average number of post comments for relevant leader and party 
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Overall, the numbers of people parties are reaching is huge, unparalleled 
bar the most ubiquitous of traditional tools. However, unlike these other tools, 
Facebook offers a cheaper party-controlled avenue for communications that 
retains all the capabilities of the most engrossing forms of communications, such 
as television. Millions can be reached directly, with those millions then engaging 
with millions more, this is important as “followers of parties and politicians on 
Facebook are opinion leaders and are especially active in online and offline 
networks” (Karlsen, 2015, p.301). The engagement trends seen reflect wider 
electoral and political reality. UKIP are seen to disappear in 2017, Labour through 
Corbyn had social media supremacy, and the Conservatives underperformed in 
2017 in part due to Theresa May’s weak performance. This reflective relationship 
shows that millions of actions by Facebook users are not mindless clicktivism; 
but are offering an insight into deeper political trends. This echoes several 
studies that have found links between social media engagement and electoral 
performance in aggregated web 2.0 analysis (Effing, van Hillegersberg, & 
Huibers, 2016), Facebook shares (Bene, 2018) and Twitter adoption 
(Kruikemeier, 2014; Sobaci et al., 2016) or followership (Cameron et al., 2015).  
 
Do we see engagement differences across the permanent and one-
month campaign? 
 
One key feature of Facebook over other campaign tools, is that it offers 
new capacities for permanent campaigning. As Gerodimos & Justinussen assert 
“the digitization of the permanent campaign has allowed political parties to reach 
out to both loyal and swing voters throughout the electoral cycle, renewing early 
hopes regarding… a more substantive relationship between elected 
representatives and citizens” (2014, p.115). Facebook is always on, the 
audience is always available, and parties are shown to send content throughout 
the year, albeit with greater intensity around election times (Ceccobelli, 2018; 
Larsson, 2016). Permanent campaigning thus allows for the socialisation and 
mobilisation of online support via consistent communications delivered by parties 
and virtual members. As EAS survey data shows, Facebook is currently a key 
tool within a wider campaign toolkit, standing among other campaign approaches 





treated with similar importance to websites and leaflets. This data however 
presents constituency campaigning. Permanent national social networking is 
potentially even more important for major party pages. 
 
Graph 19. Labour, Conservative, Lib Dem, SNP & UKIP EAS 2017 constituency 
survey data showing effort into forms of pre-election activity 
 
Those who are engaged year-round may be a small core of selectively 
exposed virtual members, thus meaning that Facebook permanent campaigns 
are relatively insular and have reduced capabilities. However, engagement 
levels may be consistently high throughout the year. This would suggest that 
virtual members are ‘always on’, with greater potential for engaging the public 
with reshared content. One would expect that engagement is highly related to 
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of normalisation has been found in posting frequency, labelled the “election year 
effect” (Larsson, 2014). This would constitute some degree of ‘politics as usual’ 
(Margolis & Resnick, 2000) with limited impacts from permanent campaigning. 
However, Larsson’s study examined post frequency rather than engagement, 
and election years rather than the one-month before the election. This short 
campaign period is when political campaign activity spikes and is the temporal 
period used in most political study.  
By examining the average engagement of the one-month campaign 
versus the rest of the year (both excluding Election Day), we can delineate the 
power of permanent campaign and the scope of those engaged. Graph 20 shows 
that there is a clear 2017 ‘campaign dividend’, with a large jump in average 
engagement during the one-month campaign period. Between campaign and 
non-campaign periods, there is an 86% increase for Theresa May’s page and a 
131% increase for Jeremy Corbyn’s page. For Corbyn this jump is mostly in likes 
and shares, whereas for May this occurs in comments and likes. These clear 
results highlight that any ‘election year effect’ (Larsson, 2016) is dwarfed by the 






Graph 20. 2017 Labour and Conservative party leaders’ average post 
engagement across one-month and permanent campaign (n=2,223) 
 
Virtual members and the Facebook public were far more engaged during 
the 2017 election campaign period. However, average engagement rates outside 
of the one-month campaign are still high. In fact, Jeremy Corbyn’s year-round 
average engagement is close to Theresa May’s campaign engagement. 
Thousands of users were spreading Corbyn content throughout 2017 creating 
large waves of indirect exposure, whilst hardening a core of virtual support 
around the leader. Although academics posit that Jeremy Corbyn used novel and 
effective methods on Facebook via a permanent campaign footing (Walsh, 
2017). When examining the 2015 Facebook data in Graph 21, it appears that 
David Cameron’s use of the platform was the original permanent campaign. 
David Cameron was engaged with so consistently over the whole year that his 
average engagement declined during the campaign period. This suggests 











































throughout the whole year, using Facebook as a tool to reach out to supporters 
and the public consistently. 
Graph 21. 2015 Labour and Conservative party leaders’ average post 
engagement across one-month and permanent campaign (n=1,836) 
 
One would expect less divergent levels of engagement between 
campaign and non-campaign periods for the 2017 General Election given it was 
a snap election. However, the reverse is true as the party leaders saw much 
closer levels of engagement between campaign and non-campaign periods in 
2015. Ed Miliband only saw a 25% increase in engagement, against -59% for 
Cameron. Examining Labour and Conservative party and leaders’ pages 
















































2017 shifted towards engagement during the one-month campaign. This shows 
a support base that is not necessarily ‘always on’ but instead activated during 
electoral periods. The engagement seen suggests either genuine public interest 
with the parties during the 2017 election campaign, or that across 2015 
engagement was more muted across the campaign period. Using the video 
reach calculated earlier to examine all shared content, Table 15 shows that 
102,536,412 users were reached across 2017, against 124,970,010 during the 
one-month campaign. More people were being reached in 29 days than across 
the rest of the year. Nevertheless, for a campaign tool to offer a reach of 102 
million throughout the year is a fundamental shift in parties’ capacities to reach 
the public. 
 
Table 15. Calculated reach of Labour and Conservative shared content across 
2017 campaign and non-campaign periods (n=4059) 
 
Table 16 overleaf shows average engagement for the Labour and Conservative 
pages, 2017 average engagement levels effectively doubled during the one-
month campaign.











Non-Campaign 241,125 66 335 15,914,250 
Campaign 282,621 66 29 18,652,986 
Labour Party 
page 
Non-Campaign 519,860 66 335 34,310,760 
Campaign 683,110 66 29 45,085,260 
Theresa May 
Non-Campaign 53,585 66 335 3,536,610 
Campaign 73,776 66 29 4,869,216 
Jeremy Corbyn 
Non-Campaign 739,012 66 335 48,774,792 
Campaign 853,978 66 29 56,362,548 
Total 
Non-campaign 1,553,582 66 335 102,536,412 











































Likes 2,827 4,107 2,268 6,947 1,754 2,038 1,403 1,436 
Shares 787 768 537 869 1,324 342 739 383 
Comments 781 1,035 1,014 2,281 399 369 516 388 



































Likes 5,006 6,377 1,642 3,914 3,663 14,108 1,812 6,392 
Shares 2,962 1,371 508 476 2,361 5,934 1,247 1,907 
Comments 3,002 3,526 1,183 1,685 724 1,362 739 975 
Total 10,970 11,274 3,333 6,075 6,748 21,404 3,798 9,274 
Difference 
from 2015 





The 2017 data shows that Conservative virtual members were less active 
until the one-month campaign period, showing a virtual membership that is less 
engaged with the permanent campaign. With their virtual membership having 
become more electorally focussed, they have lost capacity for permanent 
campaigning since Cameron made way for May. In contrast, the Labour Party in 
2017 saw a campaign period characterised by slightly higher average 
engagement than its 2015 General Election performance, with Labour’s colossal 
improvement in engagement driven by Corbyn’s page. Jeremy Corbyn’s non-
campaign average engagement surpassed that of the 2017 Labour Party page’s 
campaign engagement. This shows how many supporters preferentially followed 
and engaged with Corbyn over the Labour Party, mirroring the followership 
trends seen. It also suggests that Corbyn took over from Cameron regarding 
permanent campaign engagement levels. As well as a shift towards campaign 
engagement, there is a clear trend of generally increased average engagement 
from 2015–2017. The trends of greater 2017 campaign engagement are mirrored 
across all the party pages as seen in Appendix 9.  
Overall, parties have an opportunity to campaign permanently, but 
audiences are still engaged at much higher rates during election campaigns, it 
appears this is driven by wider public engagement alongside virtual members. 
Facebook acts as a permanent campaign tool unlike any other available, with 
consistently engaged users providing an opportunity for the parties. However, 
Facebook is becoming more of a campaign period machine, with engagement 
levels of the one-month campaign period now radically increased. Although 
much of this is due to Jeremy Corbyn’s popularity, positive trends are seen 
across all the parties. As Graph 22 shows, party page average campaign 
dividend has increased enormously, with each shared 2017 campaign period 
post reaching 76,032 more people than the rest of the year, as opposed to 
12,936 for the 2015 campaign. The engagement rates seen in the non-campaign 
periods, driven by leaders such as Corbyn, show that Facebook can act 
effectively as a permanent tool. Although the engagement levels year-round 
suggest that there is a core virtual membership who are consistently engaged, 
the spill-over into the public seen via Corbyn and Cameron’s pages suggest that 
Facebook has high reach over the year. Thus, Facebook since 2015 has become 





of engagement is towards the latter. However, rather than defined lines, the 
boundary between campaign and non-campaign periods may be becoming 
blurred. As Gibson asserts in recommending Elmer et al.’s The Permanent 
Campaign; “we are seeing the development of permanent campaigns that are 
less about temporal periods but are instead “a more ubiquitous social and 
spatially embedded concept, in which 'flux' itself becomes the new permanence” 
(Gibson, 2012).  
Graph 22. Party pages’ average one-month campaign engagement dividend 
2015 and 2017 (n=18,286) 
 
Engagement – normalisation or equalisation? 
 
 Facebook potentially offers smaller parties the ability to reach millions 
more voters and organise far larger pools of online support than previously 
possible. This is especially important because smaller parties generally lack 
resources, meaning the low-cost nature of Facebook allows for smaller parties 
to reach millions of voters without the need for a large paid up membership or 
expensive campaign materials. Despite this potential, some studies have found 


































akin to the domination they have in other media forms. Lev-On & Haleva-Amir 
found normalisation in Israeli Facebook engagement (2018), whilst Southern & 
Lee (2018) found normalisation in UK candidate adoption. However, when 
examining Labour and Conservative party and leader engagement against the 
other smaller parties (SNP, UKIP, Green Party & Liberal Democrats), there are 
clear benefits from Facebook use for smaller parties. 
Graph 23. Total leader and party pages’ engagement. Small parties vs. Labour 
and the Conservatives (n=49,551) 
 
Totalled like, share and comment engagement levels show greater 
equalisation from 2010-2016, with the trend reversing by 2017. This reflects the 
2013-2015 period of greatest followership equalisation seen earlier. Two-party 
hegemony in Facebook engagement is a recent phenomenon with the 
equalisation trend seen in 2015/16 now quashed. The smaller parties’ challenge 
to the two major parties now looks relatively weak as engagement numbers show 
growing normalisation. This supports most of the academic literature, however 
trends can alter. Facebook offers to alternative parties, potential levels of reach 
far outside the possibilities of traditional campaign tools. Thus, although a 































always there. Total engagement also masks the internal engagement trends 
across the different forms; likes, shares and comments. Normalisation is mostly 
seen in likes, with shares and comments closer between the major and smaller 
parties. The like difference suggests real public interest in major parties 
especially around election times, while the closer ranges in shares and 
comments show that smaller parties feature enthused and active support bases. 
Given the different sizes of virtual membership, this suggests the potential 
vivacity of smaller parties on the platform, they are waiting in the wings for the 
two major parties to falter. 
  
Do we see engagement differences between party and leader 
pages? 
 
With the continuing role of the personalisation of politics (Langer, 2007) 
and ever ‘decreasing focus on parties’ (Dowding, 2013, p.618). As Enli & 
Skogerbo assert “social media fits into long-term ongoing processes where 
political communication has become increasingly focused on personalities and 
personal traits of politicians” (2013, p.759). “Personalisation is extensively 
regarded as a defining and pervasive feature of contemporary politics… 
developed as a result of… (post)modernity and the individualisation of society, 
declining party identification and membership, the weakening of binding 
ideologies and the rise of ‘life-style’ and identity politics…” (Langer, 2007, p.371). 
The importance of leaders has already been seen in followership. However, 
leaders have other potentials, including an ability to represent a different face to 
the main party page (for example Jeremy Corbyn and Labour) as part of Janus-
faced campaigning. The public appear to appreciate leaders, thousands of virtual 
members are choosing to follower leader pages over party pages. Although 
studies have examined party leader pages on Facebook with regards to content 
and engagement (Larsson, 2014, 2016, Bene, 2017), no study has 





To examine the trends, the like engagement of party pages was examined 
against the like engagement of the relevant party leader of the time (Farage was 
used for UKIP). Likes were used as they present a broader avenue for 
engagement than shares and suggest more clearly the wider popularity of the 
pages. Average like engagement was charted across page types contribution to 
the total for all 6 parties in Graph 24.  
Graph 24 – Percentage of average post like engagements with party page vs. 
active leader page (n=40,659) 
 
Engagement is clearly now driven more by leader pages than party pages, 
with this shift occurring after 2015. This closely mirrors the trends seen in 
followership, with the shift to leader pages occurring in 2015-2017. As previously 
shown, leader pages are now slightly ahead of party pages in followership, 
however the engagement gap is much clearer. This suggests that virtual 
members are choosing to engage with leader pages rather than party pages, 
with the only uptick in like engagement for party pages across the two election 
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force for permanent campaigning, whilst party pages’ virtual members are 
activated more during campaign periods. Overall, the data shows a clear growth 
in Facebook users engaging with leaders over parties. The parties appear to be 
succeeding if they are attempting to promote their politicians as celebrity like 
figures (Street, 2012). To check whether averaging the total engagement created 
the relationship, Appendix 9 examines the same question via sum like 
engagement. A similar trend is visible albeit one that is slightly less strong. 
Examining the main parties, Labour and the Conservative’s show the 
trend towards party leader clearly, with the Conservatives returning to party 
centred engagement during the leadership of Theresa May. Labour as expected 
has seen engagement centred upon Corbyn’s page since his rise. 
Graph 25. Labour percentage of total post like engagements with party page vs. 























































Graph 26. Conservative percentage of total post like engagements with party 
page vs. relevant party leader page (n=4,362) 
 
The trend towards party leaders is not seen across all the parties. Using 
the same data approach as the Graphs, Table 17 shows the percentage of 
average like engagement received by the leader page over the party page. It is 
clear the Liberal Democrats (after Nick Clegg’s leadership) have seen their party 
leaders provide very little engagement compared to their party page. 
Nevertheless, the overall trend is very strong, with 63% of the 2017 like 























































Table 17. Percentage average like engagement with leader as opposed to party 
page (n=40,659) 
 
Overall, it is apparent how important party leader pages are for campaigns 
on Facebook. Facebook offers parties an avenue to exploit personalised 
leadership and fits into wider trends of personalised politics. Many virtual 
members and Facebook users prefer to engage with the leader not the party. 
This signals a broader shift in Facebook’s political environment towards citizens 
identifying and developing new kinds of emotional resonance with leaders 
(Langer, 2007, p.373). The public are responding to personalised politics at the 
broadest level, this trend is examined in the content approaches taken across 
the page types in Chapter 6.  
 
5.4: Content forms from 2010-2017 
 
 Although some suggest a slacktivist critique of online support, with 
engagement typified by fandoms engaged in partisan clicktivism (Morozov, 
2009), the qualities of content play a major role in engagement (Del Valle et al., 
2018; Xenos et al., 2015; Bene, 2017). Those on the platform are selecting what 
content they engage with, with parties now rightly spending millions of pounds 
on their social media communication operations. Parties appreciate that content 
must be both tailored to inform, but also be engrossing to prompt engagement 
and thus greater reach. Given a lack of longitudinal study what remains unclear 
 Year 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Conservative Party 
Leader 
0% 0% 0% 69% 75% 68% 70% 69% 
Green Party Leader 19% 37% 33% 24% 17% 15% 43% 44% 
Labour Party Leader 19% 40% 40% 25% 53% 54% 86% 78% 
Liberal Democrat Leader 55% 60% 63% 69% 49% 17% 36% 17% 
SNP Leader 0% 60% 0% 17% 77% 63% 78% 79% 
UKIP Leader 100% 63% 42% 29% 18% 42% 72% 89% 
Average engagement 
with leader page 






is how content approaches to Facebook have evolved within the context of 
technological and political change.  
Content covers both the structural and informational elements of 
Facebook communications. Facebook offers a variety of post structures that can 
be used; photo, video, status, link, event and note. Each form offers different 
capabilities. Status, photo and video content forms have greater capacity for 
visual, personalised and creative content, with video offering huge capacity for 
information. Links offer parties the capacity to bring the outside internet into 
Facebook, allowing for them to legitimise arguments via linking to news websites 
or sending supporters to party websites. Finally, event posts offer the greatest 
capacity to organise and push the formed online community offline34.  
 
How do parties use content? 
 
Overleaf in Graphs 27 & 28a/b the content forms used by the party and 
leader pages across the study period’s 49,086 posts are displayed as a 
percentage of total content per year, years with no data are removed.
 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Three major forms of content are used by parties today. Photo, video and link 
content made up 91% of the communications sent by leader and party pages in 
2017, however large changes have occurred over time between these forms. Photos 
have many form including; infographics, graphically written content, posters, images 
highlighting a campaigning community, or photos of leaders or MP’s. As Graph 27, 
28a and 28b show, by the turn of 2013 content approaches had altered rapidly 
towards the use of photo, with photo content in vogue from 2013 to 2015 especially 
for party pages. As such the 2015 General Election can be characterised as a photo 
social media election, with this data reflecting Lee & Campbell’s 2013-2015 online 
poster study. They found posters “in common usage… by different parties, with a 
dramatic increase in the run-up to election” (2016, p.336). Photos are still a major 
content form on the platform, even seeing a rise in use from 2016 to 2017 by leader’s 
pages. However, the content form does appear to be in general decline given the 
rise of video.  
Video content includes; gifs, meme style videos, infographics, party election 
broadcasts, TV segments and footage of campaigning. Graphs 27, 28a and 28b 
show the rapid growth of video usage by party and leader pages from 2014-2017. 
There has been a general trend across all the parties towards video content 
reflecting other studies (Bene, 2017; Magin et al. 2016). The trend towards video is 
most keenly seen in the Labour Party page, with video content rising from 32% in 
2016 to 95% in 2017. The radical shift between photo in 2015 and video in 2017 
shows how the two general elections crossed an important technological period. 
The popularity of video is due to its greater capacities for powerful personalised 
emotive information, multiple messaging and real-world representation (Keller & 
Kleinen-Von Konigislow, 2018). Today parties have in effect their own cable-TV 
channels, as Towner asserts “television altered the relationship between voters and 
candidates... this political visual rhetoric has spread from campaign websites to 
social media” (2017, p.27). Across leader and party pages on average 37% of 2017 
content sent was video. The fact that the trend towards video is seen less in party 
leader pages, signals a difference between leader and party pages. For example, in 
2017 Jeremy Corbyn’s page featured 65% video to Labour’s 95%. This shows page 
differences in approach either spurred by internal political divisions, differing levels 
of professionalization or a lack of central party control. The rise of video upsets many 





messages, this makes many previous studies’ methodological approaches less 
capable of appreciating today’s more complex content.  
Graph 29. Video content as a percentage of party posts (n=49,551) 
 
Links allow Facebook pages to not be endpoints, but instead become hubs 
of the wider internet, allowing parties to send users across to external websites via 
clickthroughs, integrating Facebook within parties’ wider campaign strategies and 
helping develop organisational impacts. Links can prompt users to visit a party 
website, join the party, signing up to campaign or give personal information. Finally, 
links can also let parties use news content sources, both reputable and highly 
partisan, to legitimise their ideas, justify their policy agendas or attack the 
opposition. Graph’s 27, 28a and 28b show links were a huge part of early Facebook, 
with the use of links having generally declined over time as other content forms have 
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photo and video content, this suggests parties are prioritising internal content over 
external content; personalisation and interactivity over evidence and organisation. 
The trend shows that parties have become less interested in linking audiences with 
external party or news websites, instead parties are happy for Facebook to be the 
endpoint where information and organisation occurs. This situation suits Facebook 
who have engendered the user experience to favour staying on the platform. For 
the parties, the decline of links challenges Chadwick’s idea of a hybrid media 
system; where “actors in this system… create, tap, or steer information flows in ways 
that suit their goals and in ways that modify, enable, or disable the agency of others, 
across and between a range of older and newer media settings” (Chadwick, 2017, 
xi). Rather than utilising the wider web to deliver official information from news 
sources or links to party websites, it instead appears that parties are forgoing 
hybridization, in favour of Facebook as an insular communication system. This 
means that Facebook is not so much part of a hybrid system but is instead a 
campaign system onto itself. The trend away from links is more strongly seen in the 
major parties (links see continued use by UKIP and the Greens for example). This 
is because the use of media links allows fringe parties to legitimise their viewpoints, 
suggesting these parties are keener to push virtual members and the public to party 
websites.  
 
Do we see content differences across the permanent and one-month 
campaign? 
 
Given the differing levels of engagement seen between the one-month 
campaign and the rest of the year, it is probable that content forms will alter as well. 
This will be due to parties replacing their permanent campaign approach with one 
designed for the short campaign. This is an unknown in the literature, as although 
studies have examined content approaches over the short campaign and over 
election years (Bene, 2017; Larsson, 2014), no study has compared campaign with 
non-campaign periods. Table 18 shows the party and leader pages’ content 








Table 18. 2017 party and leader one-month campaign content vs. rest of the 









40% 46% 9% 2% 2% 
 
Non-campaign 37% 48% 12% 1% 2% 
Theresa May One-month 
campaign 
42% 40% 4% 0% 13% 
 
Non-campaign 31% 42% 9% 2% 17% 
Labour Party  One-month 
campaign 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Non-campaign 92% 1% 6% 0% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn  One-month 
campaign 
68% 25% 6% 0% 1% 
 
Non-campaign 64% 14% 21% 0% 2% 
UKIP  One-month 
campaign 
29% 27% 41% 0% 2% 
 
Non-campaign 25% 17% 52% 0% 6% 
Nigel Farage One-month 
campaign 
45% 15% 28% 0% 11% 
 
Non-campaign 41% 19% 32% 0% 8% 
Green Party  One-month 
campaign 
33% 45% 20% 0% 2% 
 
Non-campaign 24% 24% 52% 0% 0% 
Caroline Lucas One-month 
campaign 
19% 35% 35% 0% 10% 
 
Non-campaign 17% 11% 54% 0% 19% 
SNP  One-month 
campaign 
64% 27% 8% 1% 0% 
 
Non-campaign 45% 38% 16% 1% 0% 
Nicola Sturgeon One-month 
campaign 
28% 25% 28% 0% 20% 
 
Non-campaign 24% 12% 41% 0% 24% 
Liberal Democrat  One-month 
campaign 
72% 11% 11% 0% 5% 
 
Non-campaign 47% 17% 34% 0% 1% 
Vince Cable One-month 
campaign 
32% 37% 12% 0% 18% 
 






There is a swing in content away from link forms towards video and photo 
content during the 2017 one-month campaign. This presents clear evidence that 
parties adopt different content forms during an election. Interest in externalising 
content is reduced in favour of more visual forms via video and photo. There are 
major differences between smaller and larger parties. Major parties’ campaign’s see 
video use increase, while for the smaller parties both video and photo increase. 
There is a greater change in smaller parties’ campaign period approaches, 
suggesting a normalised campaign dynamic, as there are technological barriers to 
video content. Larger parties do not adjust their approach as much because their 
permanent campaigns already feature large quantities of photo and video. Although 
all parties are focussing on content for a wider audience during the election 
campaigns. The data shows that major parties do not radically alter structural 
approach across electoral periods, this suggests the potential power of permanent 
campaigning. Previously a traditional one-month campaign would see parties invest 
money and effort into a variety of outreach tools, utilizing complex systems to deliver 
higher quality information than the rest of the year. Facebook has arguably upset 
this framework as the nature of the platform warrants quality content throughout the 
year.  
Levels of video use between smaller and larger parties across 2017 show a 
clear normalisation effect, especially during the permanent campaign. The major 
parties used higher rates of video (59%) than smaller parties (31%). The higher 
thresholds needed for the creation of quality photo/video content does affect use by 
smaller parties. As Magin et al. suggest in seeing video frequency higher in larger 
German parties, “this might reflect the higher production costs of videos compared 
to photos, which the mainstream parties can afford, while the smaller parties cannot” 
(2016, p.1701). This result although expected, is surprising given the ease with 
which video and photo content can be created today, quality content only requires 
a smartphone. Although the data supports the ‘politics as usual’ thesis (Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000), smaller parties the SNP and Liberal Democrats see very high levels 
of video content. These trends must be examined further as it is possible that smaller 







Table 19. 2017 content form choice across two groups; Labour and Conservative’s 
vs. smaller parties (n=6,698) 
 
 
Are parties’ content approaches beginning to reflect one another? 
 
 Are we seeing the beginning of a template for Facebook use, with the 
ubiquitous use of video leading the way? Through the pressures associated with 
success, one would expect Facebook’s architecture to force parties over time to 
mirror one another. Research has suggested the importance of digital architecture 
on political campaigns (Bossetta, 2018), but no study has examined content 
approach similarity across parties. Analysis shows parties’ collective approaches 
have over time fluctuated. From 2010-2013 Labour and the Conservative’s closely 
mirrored one another with only a 5-7% average divergence in content approach. 
The rise of photo and use of links led to divergence in approach until 2016, where 
again the parties mirrored each other, but video upset the balance again with 2017 




Video Photo Link Note Status 
Conservative Party page 37% 48% 11% 1% 2% 
Theresa May 38% 39% 6% 1% 17% 
Labour Party page 95% 1% 4% 0% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 65% 18% 15% 0% 2% 
Main parties 59% 26% 9% 0% 5% 
UKIP page 25% 19% 50% 0% 5% 
Nigel Farage  41% 18% 32% 0% 9% 
Green Party page 25% 28% 47% 0% 0% 
Caroline Lucas 17% 13% 52% 0% 18% 
SNP page 48% 37% 15% 1% 0% 
Nicola Sturgeon 25% 13% 38% 0% 23% 
Liberal Democrats page 52% 16% 29% 0% 2% 
Vince Cable 17% 12% 52% 0% 20% 











When factoring in the other party pages the trends show greater divergence, 
but a similar fluctuating trend. Before the video trend emerged, the parties were 
starting to mirror one another, albeit to a less cohesive degree than for just the 
Conservatives and Labour. Overall, video upset any trend there was towards a 
unified template for campaigning, today parties do not mirror each other in 
approach. For the moment we exist in a period of experimentation and innovation, 
however the Labour Party page’s all-video approach likely signals the end of this 
phase. 
 
Do we see content differences between party and leader pages? 
  
As Table 21 shows there are some major differences between leader and 
party pages’ approaches over time. Party pages are 21% more likely to use video 
content and 13% more unlikely to use status content than leader pages. The year 
with the greatest similarity between the types of pages was in 2013, with a 38% 
skew between party and leader pages’ approach. From 2010-2017 the difference 
increased from 42% to 46%, with much of this due to the radical shift in party page 
video content. Party and leader pages show similar levels of divergence to those 
seen between parties. 
 
 
Year Link Video Photo Status Average range 
2010 79% 13% 10% 79% 45% 
2011 69% 22% 11% 62% 41% 
2012 34% 14% 18% 23% 22% 
2013 73% 10% 68% 17% 42% 
2014 62% 4% 60% 6% 33% 
2015 47% 17% 36% 4% 26% 
2016 23% 12% 31% 4% 17% 





Table 21. Party and leader page type approaches to content over time (n=49,551) 
 
 
Rather than leader pages being ever more professional tools that copy the 
approach of party pages, it appears these two types of pages are being used 
differently. With higher usage of link content Leader pages’ act as the gateway to 
the wider internet, party websites and the news. They also still appear to be more 
personal featuring politician’s status updates, although this has declined rapidly. 
Leader pages’ lag party pages in the complexity of content forms used. This is a 
poor utilisation of campaign resources, as most of the trends are towards virtual 
members being interested in engaging with leaders first and parties second. 
However, it may be this genuine character that attracts users to leader pages over 
party pages in the first place. 
 
 
Year Page type Link Video Photo Note Status 
Total Skew for 
leader and party 
pages 
2010 Leaders pages 43% 4% 2% 0% 50%  
2010 Party pages 56% 9% 5% 0% 29% 42% 
2011 Leaders pages 46% 5% 13% 0% 36%  
2011 Party pages 79% 9% 4% 0% 8% 74% 
2012 Leaders pages 56% 7% 11% 0% 27%  
2012 Party pages 71% 10% 13% 0% 6% 41% 
2013 Leaders pages 54% 6% 19% 0% 21%  
2013 Party pages 51% 9% 35% 0% 5% 38% 
2014 Leaders pages 42% 6% 29% 0% 23%  
2014 Party pages 49% 5% 43% 0% 2% 43% 
2015 Leaders pages 37% 16% 27% 0% 20%  
2015 Party pages 32% 22% 44% 0% 1% 47% 
2016 Leaders pages 38% 23% 14% 0% 25%  
2016 Party pages 39% 26% 32% 1% 2% 46% 
2017 Leaders pages 36% 26% 22% 0% 15%  





What engagement do different content forms achieve? 
 
The effectiveness of different content forms on engagement is a central 
consideration as to how Facebook content is used and why. This analysis follows 
the work of studies that examine content and engagement (Bronstein, 2013; 
Larsson, 2014, 2016; Magin et al., 2017; Bene, 2017, 2018), however the capacity 
to examine this relationship in a longitudinal manner over a longer period, allows 
core themes to be drawn out that these studies could not. In 2015 the party pages 
used a wide variety of content to campaign on Facebook. As previously seen, there 
was a strong focus on photographic content, alongside use of links and some video 
content. As Graph 30 shows, the actual effectiveness in gathering engagement was 
more spread across the content forms.  
Graph 30. 2015 average number of shares per post by content form and party page 
(n=3,248) 
The number of shares a video achieved was on average not as numerous as 
photo content, other than for Labour and the SNP. This is fascinating, given that 
2017 shows a radical change in the popularity of sharing video content. It is apparent 



































forms, with UKIP far ahead in per post share engagement for all content forms. UKIP 
on average were gathering 2,331 shares per photo post. In contrast, the 
Conservatives were achieving 967 shares. However, by 2017 the story of content 
and engagement had changed markedly. 
Graph 31. 2017 average number of shares per post by content form and party page 
(n=3,816). SNP engagement levels should be interpreted with the caveat that the 
population of Scotland is 5.4 million compared with the population of England at 56 
million. 
 
By 2017, video had become supreme for all parties except UKIP. Whilst UKIP 
had gone backwards Labour and the Conservatives had pushed forwards in 
engagement across the two key content forms – video and photo. The Labour Party 
heavily pushed video in 2017 (95% of content), however it is interesting to note that 
photo content sent would have also provided respectable engagement levels for the 
party. Labour’s radical video strategy appears to have been smart and forward 
thinking given increased average shares. Overall, not all content forms are equal, 
video attracts superior levels of engagement followed by photo content, with all other 



































5.5: Conclusion  
A new avenue for campaigns? 
 
As Gerodimos & Justinussen argue; “the Internet has had an undeniable 
impact on the ways and means through which the public engages with politics” 
(2015, p.115). Facebook offers radical change in the scope, nature and way 
campaigns can operate. This is because virtual members and the wider Facebook 
public are heavily engaging with parties’ content across one-month election 
campaigns and permanently over the year. Engagement has risen steeply from 
2010-2017, accelerating from 2014 onwards. It is apparent that rather than mindless 
clicktivism (Morozov, 2009) the engagement relationship is one that is clearly related 
to content, technology, temporal periods, page type and party size dynamics. 
Millions of Facebook users are deliberatively engaging with the parties, with this 
increasing over time. Examining whether Facebook is just adding to the campaign 
toolkit or if use represents a fundamental change, the platform offers a scale of 
communications unparalleled bar the most ubiquitous tools such as leaflets. 
However, unlike leaflets or other traditional one-dimensional tools, content is socially 
located, is interactive and far more visually engrossing. Challenges do lie ahead, 
akin to the followership plateauing seen in Chapter 4, average engagement has also 
plateaued since 2015, presenting ramifications for the future of the platform. It is 
clear we are heading into a new Facebook campaigning landscape that is more 
competitive.  
Structural changes in approach are found, with the technological 
improvements available altering how Facebook has been used. Only three forms 
remain widely used; photo, video and link content make up 91% of the 
communications sent by leader and party pages in 2017. Video has risen recently 
and is becoming ubiquitous; Labour is leading the way with a majority video 
approach. The 2015 and 2017 General Election years stand very far apart, signalling 
the rapid changes that have occurred. The rise of photo and then video to the 
exclusion of other structural approaches such as links, shows that parties are 
favouring information alongside internal Facebook activities. Facebook is today 
used as a campaign endpoint, not as part of a wider hybrid campaign system. Over 
time parties have become reluctant to send users off the platform to other locations 





Are we seeing a different approach to the platform from traditional methods? 
Given the nature of Facebook, with social activity central to message success, the 
parties are clearly approaching the platform with intent to maximise reach. This 
chapter’s results show high levels of voter activity on Facebook in line with other 
studies (e.g., Magin et al., 2016; Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Klinger, 2013; Larsson, 
2016). Facebook is offering parties new avenues to campaign that are 
fundamentally different from other tools available. Millions of virtual members and 
the general public are choosing to engage with party politics online. Facebook offers 
organic communications and socially located campaigning. Elements of Margetts’ 
(2001) cyber party model are clearly apparent, as Facebook has connected voters 
and the party in new ways. Virtual members, who are more representative than 
official party membership, are now an active key component within this new system. 
Facebook thus offers parties access to millions of younger and more female 
Facebook users. As Bene asserts “political communication has always required 
reactions to exert influence over citizens or political discourse. However, until now, 
the reactions by the mass media and the elites within it have been what really 
matters” (Bene, 2017, p.526). Today Facebook allows parties to influence users’ 
private reactions whether via conversations or engagement, with individuals now as 
important to message delivery as major media corporations. Huge levels of 
incidental and selective exposure are occurring from virtual members; “Facebook, 
has… dramatically expand(ed) the reach of citizens’ causal political conversations 
and statements” (Bene, 2017, p.526).  
Other key trends are visible across content and engagement. Facebook 
offers parties capacities for permanent campaigning. Although engagement levels 
are much higher at election times, the ability to reach thousands of virtual members 
and thus a large segment of the UK Facebook population daily, is a powerful new 
feature. Engagement year round is very impressive for some parties, with Corbyn 
achieving yearly engagement above that seen by Theresa May during the election 
campaign. Thus, this chapter’s findings support Boulianne’s posited explanation for 
an increase in campaign effects due to permanent campaigning (2018). Parties, 
(although centrally the major parties currently) due to technological development 
and knowledge, have the capacity to send year-round visual content of consistently 
high quality, in turn leading to impressive capacities for permanent campaigning. 





engagement. However, as seen with followership engagement and content 
approach; there is considerable volatility, so major parties should not be complacent 
when it comes to their permanent campaigns.  
Photo, video and link content make up 91% of the communications sent by 
leader and party pages in 2017. The technological leap seen is visible between the 
2015 and 2017 General Elections, with 2015 a photo election and 2017 a video 
election. This is important as these forms receive higher average engagement than 
other structural forms. Video is now vital for success on the platform as video 
receives the most engagement followed by photo. In the future it seems likely that 
parties will mirror one another via heavy video content, given that parties mirrored 
each other in photo use before the rise of video. However, we are not there yet, as 
it is the Labour page that is currently innovating via a near all video approach. 
Overall, the changing content approaches seen from 2010-2017 show that parties 
“will adopt new strategies once they deem them useful enough to spend the money 
they consume” (Magin et al., 2016, p.1718). As “strategies and political 
communication are mediated by varying sociotechnical affordances of social media 
platforms” (Stier et al., 2018, p.72), parties have somewhat been behind the curve 
in the trend towards video. However, we can see through this chapter that the parties 
are innovating, now using Facebook akin to their own cable-TV channels.  
For smaller parties Facebook offers opportunities and pitfalls. The platform 
generally shows a normalised environment in both the complexity of content used 
and in engagement. As one may expect, major parties appear to have considerable 
power. However, a major theme from 2010-17 has been volatility. Although trends 
seen in content approaches and engagement suggest the continuing influence of 
Facebook as a normalising power, previous years have shown the pendulum swing 
the other way. From 2012-2015 smaller parties featured content approaches and 
engagement levels closer to the major parties. Smaller parties have also been able 
to engage millions of users who they would otherwise not have access too. UKIP, a 
party with tiny financial resources and low membership found great success on 
Facebook, forcing a referendum all via an active body of virtual members. This is 
important as social media provides populists with a much more direct link between 
voter and party (Ernst et al., 2017) and offers smaller parties a “bypassing strategy” 
for hostile media (Magin et al., 2016, p.1718). Socially mediated content powered 





raised as an issue to them through viral UKIP content on Facebook. Continually 
spreading messages that went unchecked for years, UKIP shows how smaller 
parties can have big impacts via Facebook, even if not strictly direct. Thus, although 
we currently see normalisation, with the necessary electoral volatility, on Facebook 
smaller parties can make impressive impacts.   
As Heiss et al. asserted in examining weaknesses of the literature, the “type 
of Facebook page may play a role in user interaction and thus warrants a more 
thorough investigation” (2018, p.1498). This chapter has found such evidence. The 
rise of leader pages has given parties new opportunities for engagement and 
differentiated content approaches. Leader pages are now the central location of 
engagement and feature different content approaches. This suggests diversified 
communications due to internal political differences, differing levels of 
professionalization or tactics. The personalisation of politics has also played a vital 
role; Cameron, Farage and Corbyn signal the importance of the leader over party. 
Satellite campaigns are also shown to be recent but vital new avenues for 
engagement. All these potentials and novel approaches are still nevertheless 
powered by virtual members engagement. Thus, when we appreciate engagement, 
it is vital to remember that individual virtual members, with their own ideas, 
backgrounds and ways of thinking are behind this activity. Virtual members and their 
engagement are now essential to the success of party campaigns on Facebook, 
with parties succeeding when they appreciate, cultivate and activate this new group 


















































The 2015 and 2017 General 






6: The 2015 and 2017 General Elections: The ‘traditional’ 
Facebook campaign? 
6.1: Introduction  
 
Alongside high levels of engagement and a new body of online support, 
Facebook features new communications approaches to information and 
participation. At parties’ fingertips are innovative ways to communicate and organise 
beyond traditional campaign tools such as election broadcasts, posters or leaflets. 
The question of how Facebook is used has not received great interest from the 
academic community. This is because most studies examine information or 
adoption and subsequent effects on voting, participation or engagement. This 
chapter instead focuses on supply side approaches, examining across the Labour 
and Conservative party and leader pages, how Facebook is used as a campaign 
tool and the unique aspects it is offering to party campaigns. Information and 
participation are the supply side themes used to orientate study. Overall, across the 
chapter, elements of research question one, two and three are examined through 
three key questions: 
 
1. How is Facebook used to send information?  
2. How is Facebook used to generate participation? 
3. Are we seeing a ‘traditional’ campaign on the platform? 
 
Conceptualising the party and leader page Facebook campaigns 
 
Facebook’s social nature, it’s capacity for information flow and the use of 
engagement to deliver political information, present inherent uniqueness compared 
to other tools. However, we may see a traditional broadcast style campaign from the 
parties on the platform, with a traditional style campaign benefiting from both the 
abilities of Facebook and the generalist capabilities of a broad political campaign. 
The sociological nature of Facebook means that even traditional style content can 
receive the powerful benefits of social location, social message transmission, peer 
influence and network flow. Thus, when conceptualising party and leader page 





traditional and e-campaign tools, as well as within the potentials of Facebook itself. 
Thus, what we may now today consider a ‘traditional’ Facebook campaign is still a 
fundamental development over previous tools.  
The core presences the parties’ have on Facebook are their party and leader 
pages. These pages have the largest numbers of followers and receive the greatest 
public attention. How these pages are used to campaign during an election is not 
clear, with novelty or conservatism demonstrating the wider impact Facebook is 
having on party campaigns. Three types of potential Facebook campaigns are 
conceptualised in Table 22. 
 







campaign Overall balance Information Participation 
Traditional 
campaign 
A focus on 
information over 
participation 
Focus on broad information, simple 
content forms & core topics, use of 
personalisation and leadership in 
figurehead style, news media used in 
traditional form, depiction of core groups 
Focus on participation as 
voting, little effort 




A focus on 
information over 
participation, but 
greater interest in 
activating virtual 
members 
General focus on broad information, but 
use of more partisan topics/information 
to activate virtual members, novel use of 
content forms, use of personalisation 
beyond leader presence, some focus on 
depiction of interest groups, news media 
edited 
Focus on participation as 
voting and engagement, 





A focus on 
participation over 
information 
Information approaches are novel, use of 
internet-style structural forms such as 
humour/memes/edited news, content 
will be personalised with high levels of 
depiction, information focuses on 
engagement 
Participation heavily 
promoted both online 
and offline, little interest 
in whether an actor is an 
official or virtual 





Across information and participation, how party and leader pages are 
campaigning is examined within a framework that covers three approaches. The 
least novel campaign approach we may see from the pages on Facebook is the 
traditional campaign. Here the party and leader page focus on broader topics of 
public concern, there will be focus on information rather than participation, with any 
participation content centred upon voting. Secondly there is the transitional 
campaign, here the parties push for participation and the use of virtual members, 
however there is a clear overall focus on a broad information campaign. Finally, 
there is the novel campaign; this approach is without precedent within the campaign 
toolkit, information content is adventurous, and participation heavily pushed without 
a care for traditional membership boundaries.  
Alongside the wider trends seen across Facebook use, approaches to 
information or participation may vary across; political parties, structural content 
forms, time periods and page types. Equally, Facebook approach may have become 
homogenised due to professionalization and technological development, or there 
may be divergence in approach as the Conservatives and Labour have separated 
ideologically over time. There is also the potential that different page types are used 
to engage in different approaches. For example, leader pages may focus more on 
information than party pages, this Janus-faced approach shows nuance within how 
parties are campaigning on the platform. These important aspects are examined 
throughout the chapter across the studied elements. 
 
The balance between giving information and encouraging participation  
 
Conservatism in approach is understandable given slow party adoption and 
the innate risk in novel approaches. At the core of political campaigns is a desire to 
send information to inform supporters and influence the public’s positions (Foot & 
Schneider, 2006). For example, we may see Facebook used as a pure information 
dissemination tool focused on broad communications to the public rather than 
activating virtual members, an approach similarly seen in leaflet materials. However, 
it is expected that across the elections the use of more novel capabilities of 
Facebook will increase. The increasing technical skills seen within the parties 
means there is the potential for innovation over traditional campaign approaches. 





unique pools of virtual members in new ways to alter the top-down style of traditional 
campaigns. Finally, we may see a middle ground, with top-down information used 
to inform the general public in a traditional manner, but also novel approaches to 
public engagement and the activation of virtual members.  
Political parties are likely to push online support towards online and offline 
participation. Both parties may be attempting to use their virtual members for online 
and offline campaigning, generating a cyber-party framework and a real revolution 
in how parties campaign. The parties may be pushing for both online and offline 
activism, from online engagement to doorstep campaigning, utilising the unique pool 
of virtual members at their disposal. We may see participation content centred on 
voting as the focus, with little effort placed into harnessing the power of virtual 
members or dissolving activism barriers. The parties may thus utilise Facebook in a 
way to which they are accustomed, using the platform to replicate offline tools in an 
online setting. The parties may even ignore participatory content forms altogether, 
instead concentrating on using Facebook solely as an information tool. There is a 
third position, that the parties are using the platform to push for online activism and 
content engagement such as sharing, rather than offline participation. This approach 
shows Facebook to be an evolutionary tool with unique capacities, but not yet 
revolutionising campaigning. 
The wider abilities of Facebook can impact how parties organise and use 
virtual members. Two utopian conceptions in the vein of Margetts’ Cyber Party 
(2001), are from Chadwick (2007, 2013) and Gerbaudo (2018, 2019). Chadwick 
argues that the internet has fostered a period of organizational change, as parties 
that were once strongly hierarchical can use social media to apply the strategies 
and more horizontal systems of social movements (2007). This “organizational 
hybridity has resulted in the formation of new structural forms that use digital media 
to provide innovative forms of mobilisation” (Dennis, 2019, p.99). As such we should 
see parties using the fluid opportunities for participation and organisation Facebook 
offers, rather than a central focus on information. Gerbaudo takes an even broader 
view. In what he describes as the Digital Party, he states that for political groups 
social media has not only become a mode of communication but is now intrinsically 
linked to their structure and tactics (2019). This idea is very similar to Chadwick and 
Margetts’ ideas. These conceptualisations of central party campaigns need to be 





Facebook as a participation tool depends on the potential partisan nature of the 
reached audience. As such, participation for this study is understood as content 
either meant for virtual members or the general public. A second conceptual split is 
used across content designed for online participation and offline participation, as 
innately these are both mobilising actions but differ in activity.  
 
New sociological avenues for information and participation 
 
Facebook is a network that recreates many social aspects seen offline but in 
a new more fluid environment. Through the different groups seen online; party 
members, virtual members and the general public, Labour and the Conservatives 
have new opportunities. The parties can utilise new human resources through 
activating party/virtual members to campaign online and offline, creating new 
avenues for communications flow into the public domain. The large size and scale 
of engagement and the number of virtual members seen, means the parties have a 
real potential to break through to wavering, undecided or even disinterested voters. 
Facebook is thus offering a new volatile avenue for communications. However, this 
volatility doesn’t mean Facebook is not effective for persuasion, because powerful 
sociological characteristics are embedded within how information flows. Thus, 
although the networks created online are not as rigid as those offline, the parties do 
have new opportunities to develop and support genuine social networks. These 
abilities are however potentially more fluid, as connections are more easily built 
across the old orders of class, wealth and location. Finally, this chapter (alongside 
the Momentum chapter) requires a caveat emptor. Given this study’s descriptive 
focus, claims as to intents and effects are self-limited, as impact could be equally 
political or external to Facebook. 
 
6.2: How is Facebook used to send information? 
 
Given different numbers of posts across pages, all post data is analysed as 
percentages. To appreciate the scale of what the data represents, in Table 23 the 
number of posts analysed for each page is shown. It shows what each graph’s data 
represents when using averages across 2%, 25%, 50% or 100% scales. In order to 





scales. Not all graphs are set at 100%, because using the different scales allows 
the viewer to ‘zoom in’, allowing for easier comprehension of less common content 
forms. Table 23 displays a 2% scale lens as this is the lowest possible denomination, 
it represents 1 post for Theresa May (50 total), or 6 for the 2017 Labour Party page 
(278 total).  
 
Table 23. Percentage representation of each post 
 
Novel approaches to structural content 
 
Chapter 5 found that over time parties’ campaigns have become more 
professionalised, with a narrower band of content approaches used. Although photo 
and video have become dominant, the type of photo and video content sent is still 
unknown. Overleaf in Set’s 1 & 2, examples of the content forms can be seen. Table 
24 subsequently shows the average prevalence of features for video content across 
party, page type and election year. The video forms coded for accounted for a total 
of 58% of the video content seen in 2015 and 47% in 2017. The video content not 
described in the data were more general approaches that featured activists, the 




2% 25% 50% 100% 
2017 Labour Party 278 6 70 139 278 
Jeremy Corbyn 144 3 36 72 144 
2017 Conservative Party 95 2 24 48 95 
Theresa May 50 1 13 25 50 
2015 Labour Party 237 5 59 119 237 
Ed Miliband 78 2 20 39 78 
2015 Conservative Party 188 4 47 94 188 
David Cameron  138 3 35 69 138 
Leader average 410 8 103 205 410 
Party average 798 16 200 399 798 
2015 641 13 160 321 641 






Image Set 1: Post examples – Content form  
 
Poster Image Video - PEB Text only image 





















Link to party website / features 
relevant worker  
Praise of party 
campaigners 
Use of celebrity / alternative media Use of opposition leader 

























2017 Labour Party 278 100% 3% 6% 58% 2% 0% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 144 68% 18% 3% 8% 2% 0% 0% 
2017 Conservative 
Party 
95 40% 15% 0% 5% 1% 0% 0% 
Theresa May 50 46% 2% 4% 2% 2% 0% 0% 
2015 Labour Party 237 44% 22% 0% 4% 0% 0% 1% 
Ed Miliband 78 6% 4% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
2015 Conservative 
Party 
188 27% 7% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
David Cameron 138 20% 4% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Leader average 410 35% 7% 2% 3% 1% 1% 0% 
Party average 798 53% 12% 2% 17% 1% 0% 0% 
2015 641 24% 9% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
2017 567 63% 10% 3% 18% 2% 0% 0% 






Across the pages during the 2015 and 2017 campaigns, 51.5% of content 
sent (622 of 1,208 posts) were videos. The high amounts of video content show that 
Facebook stands as a tool apart from traditional campaign materials. Party 
approaches to the platform focus on the most visual forms, with content principally 
bespoke for Facebook. Infographics have seen the largest rise in use, this is 
primarily driven by the Labour Party page with 58% of their 2017 content 
infographics. It is apparent that the Labour Party page replaced posters with 
infographic videos, with the form having a clear broadcast campaign learning role. 
This is clearly an evolution in information provision given videos capacities for more 
information, greater interactivity and visuality. Infographics were not commonly seen 
on Corbyn’s page, instead the page used the public, activists or Corbyn to convey 
information. The differences between these pages show a divergence between 
leader and central party office strategy, as well as nuanced appreciation of page 
audience.  
 
Image 1. 2017 Corbyn’s use of the Labour Party PEB35 
 
PEBs are a traditional campaign material seen on the platform, use of PEBs 
increased from 1% in 2015 to 3% of content sent in 2017. Parties will inherently 
want to re-use expensive and well-crafted content online, even if made for traditional 
 






communication mediums. However, it is surprising to see parties utilise PEB’s in a 
traditional ‘spotlight’ manner on the platform. For example, Labour’s 2017 approach 
was through ‘premiering’ Loach’s long-form documentary film on Facebook the 
same day as the PEB was released on TV. This use of Facebook like broadcast TV 
shows some hangover of a traditional campaign approach. Recently tactics may be 
shifting, the 2019 election saw a novel approach to PEBs, in 12 Questions for Boris36 
the Conservatives crafted a PEB for TV that clearly had social media in mind. This 
more revolutionary approach realises that social media engagement (even 
negative) trumps any traditional TV audience.  
 
Image 2. 2017 Labour’s use of Facebook Live video37 
 
Facebook Live is a novel form of video, although uncommon even in 2017 
(2%) it is rapidly growing in importance. Facebook Live allows the parties to 
broadcast live political campaign events. For example, Theresa May’s ITV news 
interview (famously interrupted by Jeremy Corbyn) or Labour’s 2017 rallies. In 2017 
Labour utilised a novel approach informed by the Bernie Sanders campaign. 
Powered by virtual member engagement, the party broadcast its rallies live into 
millions of people’s news feeds, adding to the Corbynmania that marked the 
campaign. The party showed the early markings of an innovative approach to 
 
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97zPDojMWiQ&t=2s accessed 1/04/2020 






information that appreciated the interactive and visceral nature of Facebook Live, 
as well as the potential of accessible socially spread content. Facebook Live offers 
to parties a powerful new tool for public and virtual member outreach, with the format 
now becoming common in the USA within Trump’s campaign rallies, and in the UK 
as part of Johnson’s ‘People’s PMQs’38. Examining news use, Table 24 shows the 
use of mainstream media is popular, remaining stable from 2015 to 2017 (9% to 
10%). In contrast, alternative media is not common for the party pages (Appendix 
10). The use of media content is examined later in the section upon news media.  
Image 3. 2015 Conservative poster example39 
 
Examining photo content in detail across the elections, approach was 
centrally via posters and images. Posters are graphical mediums that convey 
information, an example can be seen in Set 1. The main difference from images is 
the use of larger amounts of text and/or graphics. From 2015 to 2017, poster use 
declined from 19% to 11% of content. The fact that only 19% of 2015 content was 
posters is important. The data shows that Lee & Campbell’s (2016) poster analysis 
was only scratching the surface of Facebook content. Any potential for posters to 
 
38 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1k4q3nDQLiQ accessed 25/08/2019 






have a “role relating to parties trying to maintain relationships with existing online 
supporters”, is far outweighed by other content forms (Lee & Campbell, 2016, 
p.313). Posters appear to be a party page (22%) not a leader page approach (7%); 
campaigners thus view party pages as the location to deliver this simpler traditional 
content. Highlighting the difference between party and leader pages. In contrast to 
Labour’s radical shift to video, in 2017 the Conservative Party page increased their 
use of posters, signalling a cautious campaign that failed to adapt. The continued 
use of posters highlights the unadventurous side of information provision. Despite 
the form being more limited than video, the two parties still believe that posters have 
function for promoting simple messages.  
 
Image 4. 2017 Conservative example of text only image40 
 
 















Is text only 
image 





2017 Labour Party 278 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 144 26% 1% 1% 8% 1% 2% 1% 
2017 Conservative 
Party 
95 47% 4% 2% 33% 0% 0% 0% 
Theresa May 50 38% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
2015 Labour Party 237 55% 1% 18% 29% 0% 1% 0% 
Ed Miliband 78 31% 3% 9% 10% 0% 0% 5% 
2015 Conservative 
Party 
188 43% 5% 6% 28% 0% 2% 6% 
David Cameron 138 48% 0% 3% 7% 0% 1% 0% 
Leader average 410 36% 1% 3% 7% 0% 1% 1% 
Party average 798 37% 3% 7% 22% 0% 1% 1% 
2015 641 44% 2% 9% 19% 0% 1% 3% 
2017 567 28% 2% 1% 11% 0% 1% 0% 






Other image forms were not common. The reuse of newspaper front pages 
was not seen, showing that interest in merging traditional media with social media 
is not a key tactic unless the content can be edited. Although Bene (2017) found 
memes to be common across Hungarian Parliamentary candidates, negligible rates 
of use are seen across the Conservatives and Labour. Only Jeremy Corbyn’s page 
used memes, showing a limited interest in applications of daring content. The parties 
showed a general lack of interest in memetic internet-infused communications 
strategies. This contrasts with Momentum, as well as the Conservative’s 2019 
approach, where memes were very common. Of the other forms, only image 
collections, infographics and text only images are also of note. The decline in these 
forms by 2017 shows the evolutionary professionalization that has occurred. 
Overall, we are seeing parties utilising more novel approaches over time, 
however there is still a clear interest in simple broadcast style communications. 
Technical development has occurred as shown with the rise of video and Facebook 
Live. However, these new capacities are used to improve previous approaches to 
content, rather than utilise new stylistic and structural forms. There was clearly 
limited interest in more adventurous novel approaches. Nevertheless, around the 
edges of the campaigns (especially Labour in 2017) there was evolution beyond the 
traditional, with this reflected in trends seen more recently.  
 
How are topics used, higher frequency and greater diversity? 
Content topics – frequency of information 
 
Through Facebook parties can send more political information representing 
a shift in how parties can campaign. This greater complexity may be due to 
professionalization from improved use of technology and/or political change. To 
examine this each post’s topic frequency was coded, the scheme operated a triple 
system permitting primary, secondary and tertiary topic modelling. The reason for 
this is that many issues are incorporated with one another, whilst given the changing 
nature of communications through the rise of video, the potential of content to send 
multiple messages within one entity has increased. To engage in a more concise 






Graph 32. Topic usage, total posts and average number of topics used by party 
(n=1,208) 
 
Graph 32 shows the average frequency of topic usage; parties are now 
consistently using more than one topic in each post. In 2015 the all page average 
saw 51% of posts using only one topic, with this reduced to 40% by 2017. This 
decline was due to minor growth in the use of two topics (+3pp) and major growth 
in three topic posts (+9pp). Coding schemes that have examined Facebook posts 
for only one topic (e.g. Bene, 2017; Larsson, 2014) fail in accurately representing 
campaigning on Facebook. Leader pages are used to cover a smaller number of 
topics while party pages are utilised to offer a greater diversity of information. 2015 
leaders’ pages averaged 1.4 topics per post against party pages at 1.81, this trend 

























































Graph 33. Percentage topic by analytical grouping (n=1,208) 
 
Examining whether this increase in information is due to technological 
development, Table 26 shows the structural content forms behind this shift. 
Although there has been a real term drop in the average number of topics used in 
video content across elections, video does feature more topic information than photo 
or link content (although not status posts41). Video is a marked change as it has 
swept away all other content forms, it is now so widespread that it is being used to 
repurpose the level of complexity previously seen across other content forms. This 
sees videos being used to push single messages like with posters, as well as 
complex multi-dimensional videos with multiple messages. Video is thus used in an 
 













































2015 all page average
2017 all page average
Conservative Party all pages
Labour Party all pages
Conservative Party pages 2015
Conservative Party pages 2017
Labour Party pages 2015
Labour Party pages 2017
All pages
Percentage of content






evolutionary not a revolutionary way, due to the parties’ appreciating their 
audience’s capacities for campaign learning and the benefits of simple content. 
 
Table 26. Average number of topics per post by form (n=1,208) 
 
Given structural content forms are only partly behind increased topic 
frequency, political circumstances and events are likely at play. This is clarified 
because we have seen an increase of topics used in Labour and Conservative 
leaflets. Using Milazzo et al.’s coded dataset of 2,411, 2015 and 2017 election 
leaflets, the Conservative Party saw a +7pp growth in topic use, with Labour seeing 
+5pp (Milazzo et al., 2017). This increase of message complexity mirrors the 
fundamental political change that has occurred within both the parties between the 
elections, as well as within wider politics. Alongside a de-alignment of the two party’s 
politics, the Conservatives by 2017 were a party who had been in power for three 
years on their own, rather than in a coalition. The circumstances of standing against 
an existing government record likely played a major hand in how the campaign 
evolved. Unfortunately, this thesis cannot dissect ideological change or wider 
campaign circumstances from the Facebook data. As such, we must presume both 
technological as well as political factors influence topic complexity. 
 
Content topics - diversity of information 
 
Given political changes seen between the elections, as well as the 
unrestricted capacity of Facebook for multiple messaging, the parties may see value 
in utilising a wider diversity of political topics. However, parties realise that an 
election is a conjunction between getting out the core vote and converting 
undecideds. Thus, it is expected that parties will utilise a mixed structure; via a 
diversity of topics alongside an interest in repeating policy areas of public concern, 
 2015 2017 
Link 1.6 1.7 
Photo 1.6 1.6 
Status 1.5 2.1 
Video 2.0 1.9 






especially owned issues such as the NHS for Labour, or defence for the 
Conservatives (Green & Hobolt, 2008).  
 
Table 27. Popularity of content forms by use; accumulated data across triple topic 
















Leadership 18% 19% 1% 18% 18% 
Economy 30% 16% -14% 23% 41% 
EU 0% 15% 15% 8% 49% 
Party action 18% 14% -4% 16% 65% 
Health and social 
care 
17% 12% -5% 15% 80% 








Education 2% 5% 3% 4% 89% 
Social identity 2% 3% 1% 2% 92% 
Young people 3% 3% -1% 3% 95% 
Apolitical 4% 2% -2% 3% 98% 
Immigration 1% 2% 0% 2% 99% 
Environment and 
energy 
1% 0% 0% 1% 100% 
Government 
practice 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 n 1,085 1,062    
        Total Change  52pp   
 
Table 27 shows that a range of topics dominates the one-month period before 
the elections; economy, leadership, party action, social care, EU and protection 
make up 86% of the content seen across both election years. These core topics are 
central to how parties are using Facebook to campaign, showing a general interest 
from the parties in addressing the biggest issues of public concern. This data shows 
a traditional style campaign from the parties, with the platform used to address key 
core issues in a manner akin to leaflets or PEBs. However, some elements of 
novelty are seen; there is a subset of more diverse content aimed at virtual 
members, for example party action, social identity and apolitical content.  
Table 27 shows changing trends for content topic between each election. 
There has been a 52pp churn in topic choice from 2015 to 2017 showing that the 






topics in decline are previously core topics used during the 2015 General Election; 
the economy, party action and social care. The data shows that parties’ topic 
approaches are diversifying. In 2015 the four biggest topics made up 83% of content 
sent (economy, leadership, party action and social care), however by 2017 six topics 
made up 85.5% (leadership, economy, EU, party action, social care and protection).  
 
Image 5. 2017 Conservative example of primary  
topic leadership content42 
 
Examining the parties, Graph 34 shows the Conservatives changed topics 
across elections more than Labour, while Labour diversified their content more 
expanding on the number of different topics pushed. The Conservatives saw a total 
96pp change in approach from 2015-17, against Labour’s 45pp change. The Labour 
2017 campaign saw growth in areas including education (+5pp), party action (+5pp), 
protection (+4pp), social identity (+6pp) and young people (+2pp). In contrast, the 
Conservatives used the EU (+28pp), leadership (+9pp), protection (+8pp) and 
immigration (+2pp) more in 2017. Brexit clearly played a central role in Conservative 
content changes. In contrast, Labour focused on other areas of public concern 
deliberately ignoring Brexit, only 1% of 2017 Labour Party content and 2% of Corbyn 
content mentioned it.  
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Examining page types, approach shows the parties’ appreciation of each 
page’s differing audience. Graph 35 shows 2015 party leader content was a total 
31pp different to party pages, however by 2017 this had risen to 41pp. Party pages’ 
generally focus on a broader array of information for the public, especially voting 
information and leadership. Conversely, leader pages have a role focussed on a few 
core areas especially the apolitical.  
























difference to party 2015
Labour leader difference to
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We are seeing the parties engage in more diverse topics, but is this volatility 
due to Facebook’s organic capacities or wider political factors? Examining 2017 
campaign content from Labour and Conservative party pages across; Milazzo et 
al.’s coded dataset of 772 election leaflets (2017), Anstead et al.’s coding of 412 
targeted ads (2018) and 425 organic posts. We can appreciate whether Facebook 
is unique in topic approach. Only strictly comparable codes across all three data 
sources were used, with analysis proportioning incidence to 100%. 
 
Table 28. 2017 percentage point difference of organic post topic content to other 
structural types (n=1,609, n of Facebook posts = 425, n of targeted ads = 412, n of 
leaflets = 772) 




to organic posts 
PP difference paid-
for adverts to 
organic posts 
PP difference 
leaflets to organic 
posts 
PP difference 
leaflets to organic 
posts 
Sum 48pp 52pp 64pp 90pp 
Graph 36. 2017 percentage point difference of organic post topic content to other 





























































There are noticeable differences in topic choice between paid-for 
advertisements, organic posts and leaflets. Examining targeted adverts against 
organic posts, Conservative Facebook advert content was 48pp different to organic 
content, while for Labour this was 52pp. For the Conservatives Brexit was featured 
much more heavily in paid-for content than organic content (+24pp difference), with 
ads featuring the economy far less (-13pp). For Labour major differences were seen 
in adverts featuring far less economic content (-25pp), but far more health and social 
care (+12pp) and education content (+14pp). In terms of topic choice Facebook is 
a very capable middle ground tool. Facebook adverts feature higher specificity 
focusing on a narrower band of information, in contrast leaflets are more diverse 
and try to cover more areas of public concern. This suggests that parties view 
organic Facebook as a middle-form traditional style mass communication tool, but 
one with unique capacities. The platform can speak to the masses (as with leaflets) 
about core issues, reach key voters with more specific key information (as with 
targeted adverts) but also engage with virtual members.  
Overall, across topic frequency and diversity we have seen a large degree of 
volatility across elections, parties and page types. Facebook is offering parties an 
avenue for greater numbers and a wider band of topics especially through video. 
However, the shift may reflect the electoral context rather than how Facebook pages 
are being operationalised, with both factors likely explanations. Thus, political as 
well as technological factors are behind the shift in approach, with different pages 
used in a nuanced manner to deliver more topics. Alongside the radical impact of 
video, we have seen topics chosen shift, with the decline of areas of competence 
visible. Areas such as the economy have been replaced by more ideological areas 
such as Brexit. Party political differences are also visible with Labour being more 
adventurous in approach, but both parties still utilise levels of topic frequency and 
diversity seen in other tools. Facebook offers more capacities, but these are not fully 
utilised, because Facebook is used by both parties as a mass-broadcast generalist 
tool. As such, the platform is used in an evolutionary way to improve topic 









Is all content sent complex? 
 
As seen with the increase in frequency and diversity of topics, the use of high 
detail within an interactive social medium is a novel avenue for campaigning. 
However, complex policy detail is seen less commonly than political information of 
a less complex nature. Not all the information sent on the platform was political, 
although 90% of posts featured this broader category of political information, some 
posts centred on apolitical areas such as personal news. 2015 and 2017 saw similar 
levels of political information, with party and leader pages engaging in the form at 
comparable rates. Differences are apparent in the sentiment of the political 
information sent, with Labour generally more positive than the Conservatives, 
sentiment is examined fully in the section on framing. 
 
Image 7. 2015 Ed Miliband example of policy detail43 
 






Graph 37. Political information (n=1,208) 
 
38% of posts featured policy detail, with use rates different across party and 
page type. Policy is clearly central to how parties are using Facebook to campaign, 
increasing from 2015 to 2017. The differences between leader and party pages 
show that for Labour (but not the Conservatives), the party page is used more to 
increase campaign learning, while the leader focusses on other areas such as 
personality. Overall, Labour has become more detailed and the Conservatives less, 
only 20% of 2017 Conservative Party content featured any policy detail, a sharp 
contrast to Labour at 58%. The very high level of policy detail seen speaks to 

































Graph 38. Use of policy detail (n=1,208) 
 
Examining policy detail across structural content form it is through video that 
we have seen parties deliver this more complex information. 40% of video content 
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Graph 39. Policy detail by photo or video form (n=1,025) 
 
Policy detail is very common showing the campaign learning potential of the 
platform, however not all content sent is complex with high levels of policy detail. 
Overall, Facebook allows for a large amount of political content informality mixed 
with complexity that we do not see in other traditional campaign materials. The 
platform is being used in a nuanced manner, with the parties trying to speak both to 
the general public and virtual members. Different levels of content complexity are 













































appreciating that the generalist audience of Facebook offers wide campaign 
learning possibilities. Unique campaign capacities are observable in the high levels 
of policy detail seen. Through subsequent Facebook engagement, high detail 
complex content offers parties a powerful avenue for complex socially located 
campaign learning. Information sent could be even more complex, but use follows 
the logic of approach seen within a broadcast campaign. Thus, this measured use 
of complex information shows parties are using a deliberately limited evolutionary 
approach, because of audience realities and capacities for consuming information.  
 
Are experts, celebrities and endorsements used? 
 
 One common strategy to enhance information’s persuasive power is to either 
use the legitimising power of expertise or the social power of celebrity. Celebrities 
are found to have a positive influence on younger people’s political engagement 
(Loader et al., 2015; Austin et al., 2008), but there is a lack of investigation into the 
general use of celebrities within campaigns. Equally under examined is how parties 
use party and non-political experts on social media, although “high source credibility 
is known to increase message persuasiveness” (Housholder & LaMarre, 2014, 
p.368). Facebook offers unique capacities for the use of celebrities and experts. 
With the rise of smartphones, greater access to these groups has been opened. 
Parties can not only use celebrities and experts in traditional style high quality video 
content, but also in a more organic grassroots way. Celebrities and experts personal 
videos can be self-recorded and sent in, allowing parties to benefit from more 
opinion leader networks.  
Before social media, celebrities were largely confined to rallies and PEBs, 
Facebook offers new avenues for personalised celebrity content. Similarly, across 
PEBs and leaflets the use of expertise was more limited, Facebook now allows for 
expertise to be both more interactive and visual. Facebook offers new capacities for 
the implementation of these groups. Experts were classified as individuals clearly 
chosen to deliver specific information within their field, non-political experts are 
unaffiliated with the party especially within the post, while party political experts 
include ministers and highly partisan sources that are displayed as such44. Graph 
 






40 shows the use of expertise is common and has remained stable from 2015 to 
2017, however the internal churn amongst the pages shows differences in strategy. 
Experts are more commonly a party page approach, with negative use of experts 
more common than positive use, especially by the Conservatives. The use of non-
political experts declined across the Labour Party page, but rose across the 
Conservative Party page, as Labour’s interest in party-political experts grew. 
 



















































































Image 8. 2017 Corbyn use of non-political expert/s45 
Examining celebrities and endorsements, although media and business 
endorsements are only used by the Conservatives, celebrity endorsements are a 
clear Labour strategy. 6% of Labour content sent in 2015 featured celebrity 
endorsements from individuals like David Tennent and Martin Freeman, this 
accelerated to 15% by 2017, with a more diverse left-wing cast of celebrities 
including Francesca Martinez and Michael Rosen. There is a clear preference within 
Labour to utilise celebrity over expertise, with the majority of these celebrity’s male.  
Image 9. 2015 Labour use of celebrity endorsement  
and female celebrity46 
 
45 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=10155436776263872 accessed 7/4/2020 












































Graph 43. Use of celebrities (n =1,208) 
 
We see parties utilising experts and celebrities, with business endorsements 
less common. Facebook allows for the novel implementation of celebrities and 
expertise in a way that other tools have not been capable of. This is a major benefit 
for parties, an opportunity the parties have taken advantage of, especially those with 
many celebrity resources such as Labour. The use of celebrities and experts on a 
novel platform merges two key aspects together, opinion leadership and sociological 
characteristics. This is a novel power for a campaign tool as opinion leaders shared 
by Facebook users allows parties to influence certain groups and target messages 
more effectively, for example, via the 2017 Labour Grime4Corbyn campaign. The 
development of new technologies, especially smartphones, has allowed for parties 





































are new abilities through celebrities creating quick content for wider distribution 
through their phones. This new resource has allowed parties to utilise opinion 
leadership in a much more organic way, with use of celebrities less managed and 
more visceral than the past. This new capacity offers parties a gateway to greater 
viral reach as well as the sociological benefits of opinion leadership. 
Graph 44. Use of celebrities or expertise (n=1,208)47 
 
47 Worked out from positive use and negative use of non-political and political experts, alongside 











































How is news and other media used? 
 
Media outlets offer parties new capacities to legitimise political positions 
through (nominally) independent sources. Studies have found that “candidates view 
their Facebook pages as the headwaters of mass media and intermediation” (Lin, 
2014), thus one would expect that parties will try to integrate the news with their 
political information to enhance it. Utilised as a sword and shield, re-using news 
content can highlight strong political performances, legitimise policy platforms or 
exploit poor opposition performances.  
Image 10. 2017 Conservative negative use of mainstream media48 
 
Graphs 45 & 46 show that news usage is transitioning towards content that 
can be edited, rather than forms that maintain its original narrative. Thus, we see 
mainstream media use via video very popular, while newspapers front pages are in 
decline. 2017 use of mainstream media was seen most heavily in Corbyn and the 
Conservative Party page’s approaches. In contrast, highlighting a more traditional 
information approach, the Labour Party page saw mainstream media use decline 
markedly from 2015 to 2017. This dualism is interesting as Labour is choosing the 
simplicity of infographics for its party page, while Corbyn’s page is used to push 
mainstream news content. This two-pronged attack shows how the party was using 
 






the pages to talk differently about issues. Media content is used as both a sword 
and a shield, however over time use became much more negative. Parties are 
becoming more partial to select negative stories and edit news in a negative way. 
Content that is designed to be fair and balanced is reframed by parties in a partisan 
way. In 2017, 21% of all the content sent by the Conservative Party page was 
negative mainstream media content. 
The use of media in this way is novel and important. Unlike the past parties 
can now use the legitimacy and qualities of mainstream media content within their 
video approaches; reposting, rehashing or altering mainstream content into their 
own forms. No prior campaign material offered such an easy gateway to the re-use 
of news media content. Inherently this ability has created problems given 
Facebook’s lax policy on media misuse49 (CIPAP, 2020). In 2019 the Conservative 
party rehashed a Keir Starmer BBC interview altering the original piece’s narrative, 
the BBC made an official complaint50. It is however important to note that the 
practice is common across all parties. In contrast to mainstream news, alternative 
media sources such as YouTube declined from 1% of all content to zero. This novel 
source of information is not common but will likely increase in future given younger 
peoples news media habits. Finally, in examining news links both parties have 
reduced use, with parties less interested in sending those viewing Facebook content 
off the platform. The decline of links is an important trend that suggests that parties 
are not interested in offline/online website/social media hybridity (Chadwick, 2013). 
Instead, although parties appreciate using others’ news content and do so in a 
hybrid manner, this is not a reciprocal architectural hybridity, as parties are 
interested in gathering the benefits solely for themselves.  
 
49 https://t.co/J5WvGNkvUd?amp=1 accessed 1/04/2020 
50 https://tristanhotham.com/2019/12/12/edit-the-win-how-parties-reusing-broadcaster-content-fans-






Graph 45. Use of media sources 2015 (n=641)51 
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Graph 46. Use of media sources 2017 (n=567)52 
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Parties are also using other external media content that they repurpose into 
posters, images and especially videos. From using clips of interviews or talk show 
segments, the parties are consistently re-issuing or editing content to both legitimise 
themselves and attack the opposition. As Graphs 45-47 show, an average of 12% 
of all content sent in 2015 and 2017 used external content in altered ways, with 
Corbyn’s 2017 use very similar to Labour in 2015. A large amount of content is also 
re-shared content from other Facebook pages, this trend has increased from 3% in 
2015 to 8% in 2017. The parties are working hard to promote their own Facebook 
networks especially their leaders and certain politicians 
Image 11. 2015 Labour use of newspaper source by link53 




53 https://www.facebook.com/labourparty/posts/10152730888222411:0 accessed 25/05/2020 






Graph 48. Use of external content (n=1,208) 
 
Overall, we see parties heavily reusing media especially the reuse of 
mainstream news content with a negative tone. This ability is novel and powerful 
and is understandably well utilised given its unique capacities. The ability to reframe 
events or even completely alter content (as we saw with the Conservative Party’s 
use of Keir Starmer’s Brexit interview in 201955) is a dangerous unregulated 
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environment that promotes falsehoods and fake news. Thus, a regulatory framework 
must be developed that both protects the impartial nature of public broadcast 
content, as well as the ability for parties and voters to use content online.  
 
Is there a focus on depiction? 
 
 Another key content strategy is the use of depiction. In photo and video 
content parties can use imagery of the public to influence those viewing to identify 
with the content presented. This is important because studies have found that 
certain types of group representation can increase voters emotional resonance and 
enhance persuasive power. For example, with female congressional candidates in 
the US (Plutzer & Zipp, 1996). Equally, a party can use certain issues that have 
greater resonance with a group to communicate with them more effectively. The use 
of depiction is important to examine, as the sociological nature of the Facebook 
platform is so integrated within users’ identities. However, when it comes to using 
depictions and issues associated with underrepresented groups, Graph 49 shows 
there is little interest from the two parties. Only limited amounts of women’s, disabled 
and religious issues are seen. Both Labour and the Conservatives use Facebook as 
a broadcast medium, targeting the broadest elements of the general public not 
special interest groups.  
Image 13. 2015 David Cameron’s use of  
religion, Hinduism56
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The trends change when looking at larger core electoral groups in Graph’s 
50 & 51, these broader core groups of the British public are clearly depicted and 
campaigned to. This occurs mainly through the non-text elements of posts, within 
the images or video elements used. The depiction of these groups has increased 
across the elections and is seen mainly via the leader pages. Although leader pages 
feature less political information, they are more interested in depicting groups often 
alongside the leader, showing a clear personalisation – depiction dynamic.  
Graph 50. Depiction of age groups (n=2,416, n of text elements = 1,208, n of non-
text elements = 1,208) 
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Graph 51. Use of issues associated with depicted groups (n=2,416, n of text 
elements = 1,208, n of non-text elements = 1,208)
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In 2017 Labour successfully linked their manifesto ideas with the people, 
managing to effectively tie policy to public using the sociological nature of Facebook 
to improve message impact. Young people were a clear Labour target, but so were 
older people and the middle aged. Labour thus used Facebook in a clever manner, 
matching public depiction with policy, utilising the sociological dimensions of 
Facebook to increase message resonance, what Kreiss et al. call identity ownership 
(2020). In contrast, the Conservative Party’s use of issues associated with age 
groups declined across 2015 to 2017, the party talked so much about Brexit that 
other groups and issues of concern were ignored. 
Graph 52. Use of general public’s voice (n=1,208)
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In Text - Use of relevant public worker to issue raised e.g. nurse
In Text - Use of non-political ordinary public
In Text - Use of minority non-political ordinary public
Graph 53a. Depiction of public in content, non-text 
elements (n=1,208) 







              Image 14. 2017 Corbyn’s use of public’s voice57 
 
Graphs 53a and 53b highlight that depiction of the ordinary public is well used 
in text and non-text elements (e.g. video). Labour repeatedly used public workers 
voices to enhance their messages, incidence increased in 2017 with an interest in 
using the public more after the rise of Corbyn. Labour also led the way with a large 
rise in the use of minority ordinary public members from 10% to 20% of content. 
2017 thus saw a Facebook campaign that is more reflective of modern Britain. 
Overall, there is a focus on depiction, however this is only in a broadcast sense. 
Wide policy agendas covering issues of major public concern are tied with broad 
identity politics. The platforms’ unique capacity to utilise complex sociological 
characteristics with content is only partially employed, as the data further proves the 
generalist use of organic communications.  
 
How is content framed? 
 
There are many ways to package the content parties send, including 
variations in sentiment, narrative forms and positional issues. One would expect to 
see negative and partisan based approaches utilised, given the nature of how 
 






content goes viral through virtual members. However, given an interest in 
influencing an audience outside of virtual members, we may see content that is less 
negative and traditionally partisan. There may also be clear differences across 
pages given divergent audience roles.  
Sentiment affects how users will consume and engage with content. Most 
studies have found the platform to feature large amounts of negative content that 
receives greater engagement (Bene, 2017). However, research has found that 
“political messages with positive emotions evocate positive response from citizens” 
(Babac & Podobnik, 2018, p.327). Graph 54 shows that positivity is much more 
widely employed than negativity. There is also stability in sentiment across the 2015 
and 2017 elections, as well as between leader and party pages. The Conservatives 
are more negative than Labour, with the Conservative’s consistently relying on 
negative personalisation across the 2015 and 2017 (and 2019) campaigns. 
Examining across structural content forms (Appendix 10) photo content is more 






















































Graph 55. Explicit tone of content (n=1,208) 
 
Using Anstead et al.’s data, sentiment can also be compared across targeted 
advertisements and organic posts. The parties are generally more positive than 
negative through organic Facebook, while targeted advertisements are more 
negative. Labour’s targeted advertisements are more like their organic posts in 
sentiment than the Conservatives. For Labour, what works for organic 
communications via user engagement, also appears to be the strategy the party 
uses through advertisements. The data overall suggests differences between the 
two forms especially from the Conservatives, with negative targeted content 


















































Graph 56. Sentiment tone of targeted advertising and organic posts (n Facebook 
posts = 425, n targeted ads = 412) 
 
As well as the tone of the content, parties have capacities to frame their 
content in different ways. Parties’ framing can either be centred upon actions or 
ideology. This includes the generation of narratives surrounding problems and 
solutions such as in the use of success framing, or in the use of position issues to 
highlight different policy positions. Content that features lots of ideological framing 
is more likely targeted at virtual members. This is because it contains a greater focus 
on the moral battle between parties thus speaking more narrowly to partisan ideas. 
In contrast, content that focusses on events and actions is likely for a broader 
audience. The parties’ use of framing is important, scholars have argued there is 
greater ideological divergence between Labour and the Conservative Party since 
Corbyn came to power (Goes, 2018; Byrne, 2019). This ideological shift has even 
been asserted as the reason for Labour’s comparative success in 2017. As Liam 
Byrne argues; the Labour Party’s 2017 success resulted from “its construction of a 
vivid… alternative future… a far-reaching conceptualisation of a different type of 
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of position issues in Graph 57, from 2015 to 2017 Labour’s party page use of positive 
position issues did increase by 13pp, while negative position issues declined by 
13pp. There was a clear trend towards position issue communications but sent in a 
positive manner. Examining Labour’s leader pages, the shift was minimal, Corbyn 
only used 3pp more negative and -5pp positive position issues than Miliband. There 
was no huge shift in position issue use over time, with the largest shift seen from 
the more moderate Labour Party page. 
Image 15. 2017 Corbyn’s use of negative position issue “dementia tax”58 
 
 






Graph 57. Use of position issues (n=1,208) 
 
Examining approaches to problems and solutions, there has been a clear 













































Graph 58. Approaches to problems and solutions, use of a pledges (n=1,208) 
 
 Use of pledges was common especially in 2017, with policy often framed as 
promises. Use was seen centrally by the 2017 Labour Party page and through 
Theresa May’s page. Across the next three pages via Graphs 59-61, approaches to 












































































































































































































































































































The use of motivation via ‘why we should solve this problem’, the code 
closest to representing elements of ideology, shows that centrally through Corbyn 
but also through the Labour page, Labour changed the way they talked about issues 
between 2015 and 2017. Changes were marked, Corbyn’s page saw use of ‘why 
we should solve this problem’ at 58% up from 27% by Miliband, with similar 
increases seen by the party page. The framing approach also saw Labour use 
greater amounts of explanation, especially prognosis (+23pp party page, +10pp 
leader), pledges (+16pp party page), diagnosis (+24pp leader), motivation (+23 
party page, +30pp leader) and positive problem solving (+23 party page, +10pp 
leader). Although Labour may have been using the same amounts of positional and 
non-positional moderate policy in 2017 as in 2015, they talked about their politics in 
a more ideological and explanatory manner. Approach was not necessarily more 
combative, increases in the use of ‘negative problem definition’ and ‘negative how 
problem won’t be solved’ forms were limited. Thus, the party were using ideology in 
an inclusive manner through explaining their positions and educating on why this is 
the best course to take, rather than using strong ideological framing. Thus, to some 
extent Byrne is correct in that Labour presented a vision well, however rather than 
Byrne’s ideas of this being a ‘radical alternative’ it was presented in a moderate 
manner.  
In contrast, the Conservative pages were more static across election years. 
This reflects a campaign less focussed on motivational ideological content, but that 
still appreciated the abilities of these forms to create powerful framing. Conservative 
Party focus was on diagnosing problems (usually leadership), prognosis of what will 
happen and how they will solve it. Higher rates of problem and solution forms were 
seen in the 2015 Conservative pages, this is interesting as this is despite the issue 
of Brexit arguably deepening ideological division between the parties by 2017. 
Instead in 2015 the Conservatives expended more effort framing their positions and 
content as part of a narrative of success, however by 2017 the party had instead 
switched to a more negative tone. The Conservative’s failure to address previous 
success (party page use went from 61% in 2015 to 29% in 2017) shows how Brexit 
led to the party ignoring so many other issues. 
Overall, Goes’ (2018) thesis of the breakdown of valence politics is not seen 
between Labour and the Conservatives. This is because Labour still presented a 






instead matching issues with a clear vision of what Labour offers59. This was 
achieved through framing their ideas in a more narrative, explanatory and reasoned 
way. In Labour’s approach, Byrne’s idea of ‘real political choice’ in 2017 is therefore 
only partially seen, as rather than a radical shift, the party in 2017 successfully 
merged a moderate Miliband position with Corbyn’s political vision. Indeed, during 
the 2017 campaign more experimental ideologically divisive Labour policies, such 
as a national investment bank did not feature often. Instead the central core of 
approach surrounded economics, healthcare and workers’ rights. When radical 
ideas were presented, they occurred from Jeremy Corbyn’s page, as the Labour 
Party page was cleverly used to present a more moderate face. This Janus-faced 
approach allowed the party to reach out to middle-of-the-road voters and energise 
radicals.  
 
Table 29. Message length of text and video (n=1,208) 
 
 
























2017 Labour Party 278 37 277 00:01:45 69% 23% 7% 
Jeremy Corbyn 144 50 98 00:01:33 58% 35% 7% 
2017 Conservative 
Party 
95 37 38 00:02:35 71% 24% 5% 
Theresa May 50 101 23 00:04:12 74% 13% 13% 
2015 Labour Party 237 27 105 00:01:37 40% 54% 5% 
Ed Miliband 78 100 4 00:01:46 25% 50% 25% 
2015 Conservative 
Party 
188 74 49 00:01:36 45% 51% 4% 
David Cameron 138 65 27 00:02:21 52% 37% 11% 
Leader average 410 79 152 00:02:28 52% 34% 14% 
Party average 798 43 469 00:01:53 56% 38% 5% 
2015 641 66 185 00:01:50 41% 48% 11% 
2017 567 56 436 00:02:31 68% 24% 8% 
Average of posts  52  00:01:51 60% 33% 7% 







Finally, Table 29 shows message length across the core communication 
forms. Videos have become longer over time, although this is largely driven by the 
Conservatives. Labour’s videos have remained similar in length overall, but far more 
videos are now under 1-minute long. The trends show the evolutionary 
professionalism that has been seen across information approaches, the parties are 
appreciating a harder to reach audience. Facebook is evolving as a competitive 
platform, with parties appreciating average non virtual member users are not keen 
to watch long videos. As such parties have refined their content, with the radical 
reduction in video length showing an interest in reaching non-members. 
 
Is personalisation and rhetoric used?  
 
 The personalisation of politics is known to be an important political dynamic 
that sees the rising importance of leaders over parties (Karvonen, 2010; Van Aelst 
et al., 2011). Given that “highly interactive and personalized online communication 
increases citizens’ political involvement” (Kruikemeier et al., 2013, p.53), 
personalised communications are an expected feature of parties’ Facebook 
campaigns. The platform is a perfect location for personalised communications, with 
studies showing extensive use and a positive impact on engagement (Bene, 2017; 
Enli & Skogerbo, 2013). As seen previously in Chapters 4 & 5, party leader pages 
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Examining representation of the leader across pages and content types, high 
rates of usage are seen in Graph 62. Conservative pages have become more 
personalised since 2015, Theresa May was at the centre of the 2017 campaign with 
42% of photo or video content featuring her. Leader pages are more personalised, 
with 2017 being overall a more personalised election campaign despite Labour’s 
party page. Despite the general personalisation trend, the Labour Party page has 
tactically employed de-personalisation, and is by far the least personalised page 
seen. This approach is an interesting companion to the difference seen in how 
content is framed, with Corbyn clearly used to talk to a more radical partisan public. 











































Graph 64. Personalisation in video content (n=1,025) 
 
Graph 63 & 64 analyse the use of leader and opposition leaders in parties’ 
video and photo content. When examining the average of all the pages, video is 
more positively (67% to 52%) and negatively (39% to 17%) personalised than photo 
content. Video is a vehicle for greater personalisation with this increasing over time, 
the form is incredibly popular and demonstrates how leader focused a lot of 
Facebook content is, with the sole outlier Labour’s party page in 2017. Although 
personalisation is clearly seen on Facebook, as Graph 65 shows the data stands 
within a wider trend. Personalisation is also widely seen across leaflets and targeted 













































personalised than leaflets, with far closer similarities between targeted 
advertisements and organic posts than leaflets. The data shows that Facebook is 
part of a wider trend and not necessarily accelerating the personalisation of politics. 
Graph 65. Use of leader in leaflet, party page organic posts and party page targeted 
advertisements (n=1,609, n Facebook posts = 425, n targeted adverts = 412, n 
leaflets = 772)60 
 
Examining direct praise, a stronger form of direct personalisation, overleaf 
Graph 66 shows praise to be common especially via the 2017 Conservative Party 
page. Leader praise is growing, from 10% of content in 2015 to 18% in 2017, 
however it is important to note that leader pages avoid praising themselves as this 
would appear egotistical. As for the sentiment attached, Labour has become less 
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Graph 66. Personalisation via appraisal of leader (n=1,208) 
 
Graph 67 shows that the use of opposition leaders varies across the 
elements of a post, results show the importance of video and text mentions for 
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Personalisation also covers communications that prioritise the personal, the 
use of personalised language and elements that promote personality over policy. 
Examining the trends in Graphs 68 & 69; as Facebook use has professionalised 
traditional elements of the personalisation of politics, including the use of family and 
personal messages, are in strong retreat. Although first person language, the 
simplest personalised form did see increased use, it is apparent that personalisation 
today is more related to the use of the leader as a figurehead and symbol, than the 
actual personality of the leader. For example, Ed Miliband used his family in his 
page’s content (5%) whereas the more private Corbyn did not at all. This reflects 
that leadership personalisation is increasing, but that personalisation is shifting from 
utilising actual personality or characteristics, to the use of leaders as figureheads, 
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Graph 69. Personalised use of first-person language (n=1,208) 
 
Personalisation is not just limited to the leaders themselves; we have seen 
the use of party politicians for their positive or negative individual characteristics. As 
Graph 70 shows in 2015 party politicians were widely used, with this having declined 
by 2017. For Labour the form has fallen out of favour, while the Conservatives still 
like to use opposition politicians. Noticeable growth was seen from the Conservative 
Party page in 2017. The rise of Corbyn and close allies such as Diane Abbott and 
John McDonnell, saw the Conservatives include these figures in attack posts. 
However, overall parties are representing themselves more through a leader/public 
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Humour is another form of content seen. Humour offers parties informality, 
allowing them to either break up their dry political content with alternative humorous 
forms, or engage in political humour that can reach different supporters. Overall, as 
shown in Graphs 73 and 74, the form is in decline from 6% in 2015 to 4% in 2017. 
However, this is centrally due to a decline in party page use and the role of Theresa 
May. Due to declines in humour use from 2015 to 2017, party pages are now used 
as serious vehicles of political information. In contrast, for leader pages humour has 
remained a consistent form, bar Theresa May’s page. For Corbyn’s page, humour 
is a core part of a personalisation strategy used to humanise the leader. 
 

























































































































































































































































Use of us versus them rhetoric
Use of metaphors





































































































































Use of party catch phrase
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Other rhetorical tools are also common, Graphs 75 & 76 show that repetition, 
us versus them signposting, three-part lists and party catch phrase use are 
common. Questions are also popular, growing in use from 8% in 2015 to 12% in 
2017. All the rhetorical tools studied saw large increases from 2015 to 2017. The 
parties are becoming smarter at using hooks to entice people towards content. 
Overall, personalisation and rhetoric are popular strategies. The advanced 
use of rhetoric shows the professionalised nature of party communications. 
Reflecting the wider literature, parties like to campaign positively using the face and 
voice of their leader, and negatively using opposition leaders. However, it is 
apparent that we may have reached peak personalisation, while the form has 
become hollow. Today’s personalised campaigns are not personalised in the 
traditional stylistic sense of communications research. Leader pages are used as 
limited routes for genuine personality, leaders instead act as figureheads, avenues 
for information or the voice of the party. The Conservatives have arguably 
professionalised the form to an impersonal level, while the Labour Party page 
tactically avoided the form. Personalisation is clearly a trend that Facebook has 
enhanced but not revolutionised. Nevertheless, the quality and nature of modern 
negative personalised communications is a clear evolution of previous abilities, 
given the ability to edit news content or interviews. 
 
6.3: How is Facebook used to generate participation? 
How is partisanship and praise used? 
 
 Parties can also use text and imagery of their members to promote party 
activism and partisan emotion. Heavy use of depiction and partisanship would show 
an interest in energising the electoral base, virtual members and partisans. Graphs 
77 and 78 show the use of party members and politicians across text and non-text 
content. The use of party members is a clear communications strategy across both 
elections and parties, this is centrally via the non-text elements of a post especially 
images and video. Rates of depiction are much higher for Labour than the 
Conservatives, with interest in depiction focussed on broader party groups centrally 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Image 16. 2017 Corbyn use of ordinary party members61 
 
The high rates of depiction show the interest parties have in; reporting their 
everyday campaign approaches, promoting people behind the movement, matching 
policy to party member activism and in highlighting leaders alongside party 
members. Outside of the broadest party groups, other party groups depiction is less 
common. The depiction of minority, male, female, LGBT or disabled politicians is 
very limited with rates only around 1% at maximum (see Appendix 10), reflecting a 
lack of portrayal seen in public depiction. The parties are also using Facebook to 
show and promote their wider party-political talent. This was especially seen in 2015 
by David Cameron, who showcased dozens of new prospective MPs in target seats. 
Overall, the generation of positive partisan identity is seen mainly through Labour, 
but usage is relatively stable across elections. Clearly party identity is central to how 
parties campaign on Facebook, however this approach does not necessarily show 
the parties are placing greater focus upon virtual members over the public. This is 
because, as seen in the high rate use of broad group depiction, a lot of content is 
focussed on putting party members alongside the public. Thus, rather than showing 
an interest in just energising virtual members, use appears dualistic as it is about 
 






showing the activities and care the party and its activists have in the wider voting 
public. This conclusion is reflected in Graphs 79, 80 & 81 examine the use of praise. 
Direct praise is limited, members are used as images of activism, with Facebook 
mainly aimed at those who are not already party members. Generally partisan based 
appraisal communications are positive. Only four core forms of partisanship are 
commonly seen; praise of members, campaigners, MPs and negative appraisal of 
opposition MPs. Negative appraisal is focussed on opposition MP’s, however some 
negative appraisal based upon campaigners or party members is seen.  
 
Image 17. 2015 Cameron use of minority politician of same party62 





62 https://www.facebook.com/DavidCameron/10155373792308872 accessed 3/3/2020 
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Overall, the data shows that parties are using Facebook to generate limited 
partisan identity and praise party campaigners, with the central focus bringing 
together the party and public. The parties are trying to do three things via 
partisanship and praise communications. Firstly, promote virtual and official 
members activity. Secondarily, thank and highlight activists. Finally, highlight to the 
general public that the party is grassroots in nature, on their side and putting 
considerable effort to speak to them on their terms. Thus, rather than partisanship 
and praise being a form focussed on speaking to only virtual or official members, 
the parties are trying to reach the public through imagery of their memberships.  
 
Are parties using internal or external links? 
 
 Links are a widely used form that enable parties to encourage viewers of 
content to go off the platform and engage with other e-campaign tools such as 
websites or social media. By acting as signposts, links allow for the steering of 
audiences to online locations for potential campaign information or participation, a 
novel capacity for a campaign tool. Two core strategies are used by parties, external 
and internal links. External links drive those who view the content, off the content, 
page and platform onto other websites. In contrast, internal links promote the 
visitation of other Facebook pages, meaning that viewers are not encouraged to 
leave the platform but are prompted to leave the content and page. As links are 
often integrated into other content forms, for example video and photo content, link 
forms can exist on top of the other content forms coded for (e.g. a video can also 
feature a link). Set 3 shows examples of the participation content forms seen 











Visit party website Call to share 
Volunteer Join event 
Link to opposition Facebook page Call to join party 


















































One would expect party websites, a central location for party information and 
other forms of organisation, to be extremely popular. Within the eco-system of party 
websites, alongside official central party websites (for example labour.org.uk), other 
party websites were also coded. Of note is how the parties create separate 
interlinked party websites, such as sharethefacts or schoolcuts that are later closed. 
This approach shows the novel system the parties create around election time to 
gather data, organise supporters or deliver information. Parties are creating their 
own online campaign eco-systems with the use of party-concealed websites 
showing interest in reaching audiences without branding. Party websites are today 
not just central party pages such as conservatives.com, instead the capacities of 
the internet have allowed parties to create bespoke issue or group identity led 
websites. This has allowed the parties to speak to and activate different audiences 
using different websites, for example Labour’s schoolcuts page was used to reach 
families.  
Despite this novel professionalised and nuanced approach to party websites, 
Graph 82 shows that direct calls to visit a party website have considerably declined. 
20% of 2015 content asked the viewer to visit a party website, but by 2017 this was 
only 7%. The largest declines were seen via the Conservatives, with Labour also 
seeing a steep decline but some continued use. In contrast to party websites, Graph 
82 shows that calls to visit other websites have been static at 7% across both 2015 
and 2017. With most of these website links to government vote registry sites. This 
form continues to be significant given the importance of voter registration to Labour, 
with heavy use seen from Jeremy Corbyn’s page. The party believed in his ability to 
reach outside of virtual members through his very high engagement, understanding 
his younger more diverse audience are also those less likely to be registered. This 
approach shows Labour believes the platform has a clear public role given that 
official and virtual members are likely to already be registered. Both Corbyn’s page 
and the party page were strongly used to promote registration, showing how the 
party clearly believes in the power of organic message spread.  
Overall, party websites that were previously so integral to e-campaigns 
(Gibson, 2015), are shown to have become far less important. The two parties, 
across both leader and party pages, have become less interested in pushing 
Facebook users towards more traditional e-campaign mediums and organisational 






very specific purposes, centrally voter registration or limited party website use. This 
may be because over time the parties are using the platform for information rather 
than participation. Or if participation is still key, either; the parties believe Facebook 
is a superior location for many of these elements, or that there is little value in trying 
to utilise virtual members as online and offline activists within a website framework. 
The specific use of external links has also shifted considerably over time; 
Graphs 83 & 84 show what external links the posts’ featured. As is noticeable there 
are more links to party websites than direct calls to visit them, while the trend of 
website decline is mirrored in actual links. Similarly, links are more popular than 
Facebook ascribes because other content forms can feature links (e.g. video) but 
this is not logged by Facebook. This highlights the weaknesses of automated 




































































































































Image 19. 2017 Conservative use of link to Instagram64 
 
Links are seen to other social media for the practises of promotion, however 
this was only a 2015 trend, as the parties have become uninterested in trying to 
increase their followership on other social platforms through promotion on 
Facebook. Outside of external websites, hashtags are used across both parties but 
is a form in decline. In 2015, both Labour and the Conservatives appreciated the 
grouping/externalising capacities of hashtags, including their ability to link cross-
platform content together. However, only Jeremy Corbyn consistently used the form 
in 2017. Corbyn’s continued usage is important as the page exploited the cross-
social-network power of hashtags to integrate his online communities’ activity. This 
shows some interest in organising audiences to engage with content in a novel 
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Data gathering through websites is a structural participation form that is 
stable across elections. It is important to note that this data only shows working 
links, thus due to the age of the campaign many of these websites are now defunct, 
given the date of data collection this means 2015 rates are likely higher, while 2017 
data is more accurate. Graph 85 shows clear party trends, with the Conservatives 
more interested in the form than Labour. The 2015 Conservative Party page saw a 
particularly extensive data gathering exercise, with the snap election of 2017 
showing less defined efforts especially by Labour. Given data is now integral to 
campaigns and that the parties appear to use Facebook to reach the general public, 
one would expect parties to heavily push users to give their data. However, although 
many posts do try to collect data especially in 2015, attempts are now more limited. 
This suggests that Facebook based data gathering is occurring through other 
avenues either; earlier in the year via organic posts/targeted adverts or across the 
one-month campaign by targeted adverts.  
Image 20. 2017 Labour link to donation and 
data gathering party website65 
 






Alongside external links, links to other Facebook pages were also well used. 
These links allow pages to push supporters onto other Facebook pages, as well as 
allowing parties to promote other Facebook communities and different voices. This 
allows party pages to generate their own social network eco-system, where pages 
will reciprocate by rebroadcasting content. As Graph 86 shows, the promotion of 
party-political Facebook pages is prevalent, with this seen firstly by the 
Conservatives in 2015 then heavily by Labour in 2017. News links were not 
common, but Appendix 10 shows mainstream news links were seen for Jeremy 
Corbyn’s page (4%). Unlike external links, internal links are shown to be growing in 
popularity. The growing use of politician, news, charity, activist group and satellite 
page internal links shows that parties are scaffolding their and allies online 
Facebook presences together. Parties are appreciating the forming of online eco-
systems and information networks; however, these are online/platform-only hybrid 
networks rather than Chadwick’s offline/online idea of media hybridity (2013).  
Image 21. 2017 Corbyn use of internal Facebook 










Finally, a novel approach seen is the linking of opposition pages, this tactic 
was only extensively used by Jeremy Corbyn. In 2017 his page would consistently 
feature internal links to Theresa May or the Conservative Party page. Thus, rather 
than just reusing media content or images to attack Theresa May, Corbyn would 
directly tag her Facebook page. Through this process it is possible that Corbyn 
promoted his followers to visit these pages and negatively engage with content. This 
tactical use of internal links suggests the novel deployment of his fired up virtual 
members to harass the opposition. This potential promotion of cyber activism shows 
manifestations of Margetts’ idea of the cyber party, with the online doorstep open to 
all no matter their relationship to the party.  
Image 22. 2015 Ed Miliband use of 
Labour website petition via link67 
 






Graph 86. Use of internal links (n=1,208) 
 
Overall, external links are more popular than internal links, however the trend 
is declining. The parties’ interest in integration of traditional participation architecture 
has declined, with the low usage rate of party websites in 2017 speaking to a 
changing tactical approach on Facebook via organic communications. Parties are 
not consistently trying to organise their online support through non-Facebook 
channels. Only 3% of Corbyn’s content included a link to the party website, with 
Corbyn four times more interested in pushing viewers towards non-Labour websites 






































Link to Facebook page opposition Link to Facebook page other






media environment (Chadwick, 2013), and shows that parties view website citizen-
initiated campaigning to not be worth heavily promoting.  
Approach shows novelty as well as conservatism. Firstly, unlike other 
traditional campaign tools, through internal links parties can act like everyday users 
reissuing content. This ability of parties to act in the manner of traditional Facebook 
users, to be a hub of a wider field of information, offers them opportunities to scaffold 
their presence into wider networks. Equally information approaches are clearly 
occurring through Facebook rather than using Facebook to push users to party 
websites. Finally, we are seeing the beginning of novel uses of audiences, as seen 
via Corbyn’s linking of opposition pages. These aspects show parties are not 
beholden to previous approach. However, if high rates of novel participation 
approaches are not seen, then given current approach, this shows Facebook is 
being used as a general information delivery system. The platform is thus a medium 
for broad traditional elements of participation such as voter registration. The party 
and leader pages’ central role would therefore not be for novel participation actions 
and utilisation of virtual members. Instead Facebook is used as a central 
information-rich hub for parties’ online campaigns. While more novel approaches to 
participation may be seen elsewhere as part of a wider approach to party 
campaigns.  
 
Is Facebook used to engender participation? 
 
Facebook can be used to prompt other forms of online participation that are 
used to organise or promote party members, virtual members and the general public 
to do an action. Graph 87 shows the use of five other online participation forms is 
very limited, suggesting Facebook’s primary use as an information tool, or that 
parties are putting low effort into less vital avenues of public participation. Of the two 
parties Labour stands ahead in using some of these elements, though usage is still 
low. From signing polls and petitions to visiting a party’s shop, interest in getting 







Graph 87. Other forms of online participation (n=1,208) 
 
Parties are prioritising only the most important forms of participation for 
audiences, centrally visiting other Facebook pages, party websites and voter 
registration websites. There is low interest in parties using virtual members as a 
source of revenue or political pressure, from areas such as petition signing, polls or 
funding calls. The data supports business as usual findings (see Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000), as the parties clearly have little interest in hearing the public’s voice, 
let alone allowing it to influence them. The low usage trends seen here may be 
because parties are focusing on less committal forms of participation that encourage 
a wider body of users to participate with the parties. However, Graph 88 shows that 
more complex forms of offline participation clearly targeted at members and the 
highly partisan are common. It thus appears the parties have little faith or perceive 
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Offline participation, despite being more complex for Facebook users, is 
being promoted much more heavily. Across the short campaign of 2017 Labour 
were clearly trying to organise their supporters and their virtual members in some 
capacity. Central focus was seen in getting people to volunteer, doorstep campaign 
and talk to their friends and family. In contrast, the Conservatives only showed 
interest in 2015, with interest very minimal by 2017. The Conservatives appear 
disinterested in trying to harness the power of their virtual membership or organise 
people through new avenues. Across the parties, the most popular forms were to 
volunteer, talk to friends and family, help doorstep campaign or sign up to campaign, 
in contrast, protests and hustings went totally un-promoted (data in Appendix 10). 
Event promotion was also popular, especially through the 2017 leaders; Corbyn 
promoted the party’s rallies across Britain, while Theresa May did phone in events. 
Signalling Labour’s keen interest in organic message delivery, Labour also 
promoted users to talk to friends and family offline. The party still believes in 
traditional kitchen table politics, with this approach showing they believe their virtual 
members are not an echo chamber. 
Image 23. 2015 Cameron call for vote68 
 






Graph 89. Non-official/virtual member forms of offline participation (n=1,208) 
 
The most core but valuable forms of participation to the parties; joining the 
party and voting, show us how important the parties believe talking to non-virtual or 
official members is. Graph 89 shows the parties are not strongly interested in 
pushing users to join the party, this suggests several possibilities. Firstly, given it is 
an election campaign, these calls may be more likely seen after election day, as 
parties wish to solely focus on campaigning. Secondly, parties may no longer care 
about rigid structures of membership, instead adopting a more fluid structure akin 
to Margetts’ description of the cyber party. This structure sees an individual without 
official party membership having no barrier to turning up and helping campaign. This 






































membership. Finally, the lack of interest in getting viewers to join the party may show 
that the parties are campaigning to individuals they believe are likely members, 
however given how broad other elements of information and participation are, this 
seems very unlikely.  
In contrast to joining a party, calling for votes is one of the most popular 
content forms seen across all the codes examined within the data. It is also a form 
that is growing, 55% of 2017 content included a call to vote with very high levels 
seen from the Labour Party page. Although the Labour Party engage in the form 
more, high levels are also seen through the Conservative Party. The generalist 
nature of voting calls suggests parties believe Facebook reaches the public and not 
just partisan virtual members. Parties believe that online calls for votes is a worthy 
expression, suggesting that core offline participation is possible even to the broad 
public. The high rate of calls for votes but lower interest in other forms of participation 
shows a traditional usage of the platform for election campaigning. Facebook 
appears to be used to campaign to the wider electorate, with novel applications 
towards other participation forms more limited. 
 
Do parties promote engagement? 
 
 Although participatory practices other than voting are relatively limited, 
especially more complex practices that aim to prompt members or virtual members 
to go offline, engagement may well see a different picture. Engagement as a 
participatory practice places Facebook in a third position, with its capacities to spark 
resonance between party and user due to the potential for interaction. Given 
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Graph 91. Prompting of shares (n=1,208) 
 
As Graphs 90 and 91 show, across the different calls for engagement only 
one form is very common; sharing. The function of sharing is vital for engagement 
and post reach and so is understandably heavily promoted. 42% of all content sent 
featured a call to share, however from 2015 to 2017 a large drop in use was seen 
from 38% to 27%. This reduction in calls to share is mainly due to Jeremy Corbyn 
and Theresa May’s page not using the form. This huge divergence between leader 
and party pages is also reflected in 2015 to a lesser extent. Why leaders would not 
promote their content, but party pages do, is an interesting finding that shows 
divergence in strategy across pages. Potentially parties are realising that constant 


































more succinct. Of the other engagement forms usage rates are low, collectively I’m 
voting messages and calls to like, only make up a further 4% of content seen. 
Overall, the data shows that the parties believe share engagement to be the only 
form of major importance.  
Image 24. 2015 Miliband call for share69 
 
6.5: Conclusion  
A descriptive typology of approach 
 
Tables 30 and 31 present the descriptive typology of approach for the two 
parties. The labels were generated from the frequency of the form seen in 
comparison between each election year. Rarer approaches were included if a page 
utilised the form at rates far above the other pages. Inherently as a descriptive 
analysis, the typology reflects an interpretation of the data collected, as such to 








Table 30. Descriptive typology of Labour Party approach to Facebook 2015 and 2017
 2015 2017 
















Less Professionalised  
Core-Topic Focussed 
Medium Policy Detail 









Heavily Negative Personalised  
Mainstream Media Use 
Positive and Negative 
Professionalised 
Core-Topic Focussed 
Medium Policy Detail 
High Political Information 
Negative Expert Focus 





Party Page Promoters 
Campaign Participators 






Mainstream Media Use 




Medium Topic Change 
Medium Policy Detail 
High Political Information 
Celebrity Focus 




Partisan Praise  











Medium Topic Change 
High Policy Detailed 







Party Page Promoters 
Register to Vote 
Campaign Participators 







Table 31. Descriptive typology of Conservative Party approach to Facebook 2015 and 2017 
 2015 2017 






















Low Policy Detail 
High Political Information 












Positive and Negative 
Professionalised 
Core-Topic Focussed 
Medium Policy Detail 
High Political Information 















Major Topic Change 
Medium Policy Detail 


















Major Topic Change 
Low Policy Detail 
High Political Information 
Negative Expert Focus 
Mainstream Media Focus 
Anti-Representors 







How is Facebook used for information and participation? 
 
Examining information approaches, in just a few years we have seen marked 
change in structural approach. The parties’ campaigns have evolved considerably; 
the 2015 General Election was a photo election, but the 2017 General Election was 
a video election. Approach by 2017 was professionalised, dependent on a smaller 
class of video forms via infographics and use of the mainstream media. This video-
led approach brought more negative and personalised communications, with 
greater levels of policy detail. However, the use of video was evolutionary not 
revolutionary, across 2015 and 2017 the parties were in an era of controlled 
experimentation. Video was used to expand on previously popular approaches 
through hyper-charging the content parties have always liked to send, with novel 
aspects only visible on the periphery. The use of novel forms including memes and 
Facebook Live were seen tested in 2017, however these approaches became much 
clearer during the 2019 General Election.  
Topic choice and the amount of information sent in each post has changed 
markedly between elections, parties are today sending more complex information 
including greater policy detail. Large shifts were seen across the parties’ content 
topics, with Labour broadening approach while both parties switched topics used 
away from issues of competence. There was also an increase in ideological framing 
across elections, with the parties further apart in 2017 than 2015. However, both 
parties still fundamentally focused on a set of core topics including leadership, the 
economy, the EU, party action, social care and protection. These forms make up 
most of the content, showing the use of the platform to centrally reach the wider 
public, not just virtual members. Political information is also more positive than 
negative, with parties prioritising less detailed political information over policy detail. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note the high rates of detail seen through some 
pages, especially the 2017 Labour Party page. Labour was potentially able to use 
Facebook to combat what left-wing critics have labelled as press bias, including 
promoting policy positions that were deemed too left-wing and not covered by 
mainstream news (Rhodes, 2019). 
Experts are used by both parties but at relatively low rates. In contrast, 






capacities of the platform to match opinion leaders with relevant populations. 
Instead of experts or celebrities, the main way parties would increase the influencing 
power of their information was through edited mainstream media content. This 
powerful new capacity to edit news content was seen across both elections but 
increased considerably in 2017. The parties clearly appreciate the ability to utilise 
trustworthy media organisations as edited mouthpieces, often in negative and 
personalised ways. The use of media centres on this form, with the decline of news 
links showing the parties are only interested in the use of news if they can edit the 
content. 
Personalisation is shown to be a key strategy of communications growing in 
importance across elections. The Conservatives especially employed negative 
personalisation, but Corbyn also used the form heavily. The Labour Party page in 
contrast utilised a tactical de-personalisation strategy; showing an interest in a 
nuanced approach to communications. The platform clearly offers a novel capacity 
for high levels of subtlety in how the parties can represent themselves. Facebook 
fits into the wider continuing trend of the personalisation of politics (Karvonen, 2010). 
However, the personalisation trend seen focused on representation and use of the 
leader, not genuine elements of personalisation. The parties were using their 
leaders centrally as figureheads while complex elements of identity were muted. 
This approach was similarly seen in the use of depiction and issues covered, only 
the most electorally important groups were mentioned, while only Labour placed any 
effort into representing minority groups. This again highlights a cautious approach 
that tries to speak to as many as possible. 
Examining participation, party websites were popular, but use declined 
heavily by 2017, with traditional e-campaign mediums clearly out of favour. 
Facebook is maintained by both parties as an insular network, the pages examined 
were not keen to send users off-site and make them leave their content. Facebook 
is consequently treated as both the communications avenue and endpoint for 
campaigns, disputing Chadwick’s ideas of traditional/novel hybridity (2013). As 
external links have declined, internal links have increased. The parties, especially 
Labour, have become more interested in establishing their Facebook pages within 
a wider Facebook ecosystem. This is an innovative approach and shows an interest 
in digital activism over offline activism. This interest in Facebook based activism is 






virtual members to attack the opposition. These virtual page attacks are a replication 
of offline protests within an online environment. The Labour Party made extensive 
use of partisanship and activist depiction to enthuse its online support and energise 
their vote. However, as levels of praise were low, the central use of partisan 
depiction appears to be the promotion of the campaign to the public, rather than to 
support or thank activists. 
As website use for participatory organisation has declined, parties have been 
trying to organise users through Facebook. Efforts are clearly seen through Labour 
and are focused on core forms of offline participation such as doorstep campaigning, 
rather than online forms such as polls. This is important and shows core participation 
efforts are in pushes to get online users offline, rather than general online activism. 
Party interest therefore appears to be in internal Facebook activism alongside 
traditional offline participation. Labour was trying to utilise their virtual members as 
a campaign force in 2015 and 2017, showing that the party is interested in utilising 
the huge body of virtual members identified in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the 
approach was limited in comparison to their efforts in getting the broader public 
registered or voting. Evidently the use of Facebook to generate participation of 
different forms is a novel application of social media, however the parties could have 
done more to utilise their virtual members online as well as offline. This innate 
conservatism may be because of the type of pages they are. As the party and leader 
page are the core party presence on the platform and thus the most vital for 
information dissemination, participation efforts may occur through other page types. 
The final area of importance to the parties was engagement, with calls for sharing 
seen consistently by the parties across both elections. The parties clearly believe in 
the power of organic Facebook communications to deliver influential information and 
to a lesser extent generate participation.  
 
The ‘traditional’ Facebook campaign? 
 
Did we see a traditional, transitional or novel Facebook campaign across the 
2015 and 2017 General Elections? Facebook offers unique capacities including; the 
utilisation of virtual members online and offline, the ability to send engrossing and 






However, in analysis the parties only partially exploited these aspects. The party 
and leader pages are therefore best described as having engaged in a traditional 
Facebook campaign, rather than something more innovative.  
Many key new capacities of Facebook were underutilised especially by the 
Conservative Party. Interest in novel approaches to information and participation 
were muted, showing evolution but no revolution in approach. Interactivity is also 
deliberately limited, with parties using the platforms’ engagement capacities as a 
top-down tool, limiting any sort of bottom-up influence. As Stromer-Galley asserts, 
“campaigns ultimately construct and use citizens as objects they need to manage 
through controlled interactivity in order to reach their objective” (2014, p. 177). Of 
the two parties, Labour’s approach was much closer to a transitional campaign given 
their greater focus on online activism, as well as more novel approach to 
information. While within Labour’s campaign, Corbyn’s page was more experimental 
in approach than the party page. However, Labour was still focused considerably 
on information provision, while participation approaches were muted secondary 
efforts. As such although Labour was ahead of the Conservatives in 2017, both 
parties’ campaigns are more comfortably described as traditional in style.  
Information approaches showed improved abilities and capacities over 
traditional campaign tools, including; the reuse and editing of news, video content 
with high detail, highly personalised content with large amounts of depiction. 
However, approach follows wider party approaches to other content forms, the 
platform therefore is being used in an evolutionary but not revolutionary way. In 
information approach, Facebook offers a range of traditional tools, bridging the gap 
between leaflets and other more direct tools such as targeted advertisements. 
Facebook is thus used across these two core page types as a broadcast campaign 
learning tool, a catch-all tool used to campaign to the public, party members and 
virtual members. Facebook was not used in a revolutionary way because these 
pages are now central to the political parties’ online campaigns. Incremental 
evolution is seen in the data, suggesting that the two parties do not want to risk a 
frivolous approach with such a core campaign tool. Thus, what has occurred in 
information approach across the elections, has been carefully controlled 
experimentation to test more novel methods. The rise of interactive infographics and 
Facebook Live show that the parties are not averse to change, but do not want to 






Participation content focused on voting or registering to vote, not on utilising 
virtual members like official members. This mirrors the emphasis we see in both 
parties’ traditional campaigns, through doorstep outreach and campaign materials, 
with clear delineation between members and the public. In traditional campaigns 
activism occurs from official members, with little interest in getting the general public 
to participate. This is the general trend seen on the platform, although not in online 
engagement. Of the two parties Labour did show greater interest in using their virtual 
membership to campaign offline. The party pushed virtual members across both 
pages to talk to friends or family, doorstep campaign and campaign online via 
opposition page links. Labour’s party and leader page thus showed some aspects 
of Margetts’ cyber-party (2001), given that there was an interest in just turn up 
campaigning. Equally there was no traditional-style barriers between official and 
virtual members. However, approach was clearly more interested in generating a 
citizen initiated campaigning framework (Gibson, 2015), rather than fundamentally 
changing party activism and organisation.  
As every effort spent on virtual member participation is effort lost in 
information dissemination, selective pressure is apparent in how the parties used 
the platform. Novel applications of participation were clearly of secondary concern, 
showing prioritisation and that both parties are utilising the tool tactically. The 
parties’ leader and party page Facebook campaigns were clearly dualistic; 
prioritising speaking to the broader public over activating virtual members, even 
though Facebook content can adjust to either. The parties are not campaigning in a 
traditional manner because of a lack of professionalised knowledge. Instead they 
are optimising their strategies depending on page and intended goal. This nuance 
in how different page types can be used is seen in other aspects as well, with 
leadership personalisation, negativity, level of policy focus and political narrative 
different on each page type. Both parties are balancing their objectives for the 
pages, with current goals resting most heavily in broadcast information, engagement 
and voting. Labour and the Conservatives thus see more value in Facebook as a 
digital leaflet with socially located engagement, rather than a participatory and 
organisational tool. It may be through other avenues on the platform, including 
satellite pages and targeted advertisements, that these parties push for participation 






Identifying the traditional Facebook campaign, does not mean that the 
platform has not had a fundamental impact upon party campaigns. Facebook’s very 
generalist capacities gives the parties a broad campaign tool that merges broadcast 
information dissemination with sociological networks. The ‘traditional Facebook 
campaign’ is powerful as the political information is shared socially. Information 
when shared utilises virtual member’s social characteristics, therefore the parties 
push heavily for engagement. The new socially located volatility the platform offers 
to parties is a novel avenue for party campaigns. Through multiple-step flows of 
communications political information sent can cascade naturally to where it can be 
most effective, breaking past traditional class, location and age barriers seen in 
offline campaigning. The huge engagement seen in Chapter 5 shows that millions 
of voters are being exposed to what is now shown to be an evolved mainstream 
information dissemination campaign. This is a fundamental shift, as through 
engagement parties can use their virtual members as a powerful new intermediary 
between party and public. This mainstream core campaign therefore comes as 
much from the public’s mouth as from the parties. 
In Facebook parties have a core mass broadcast campaign tool like leaflets, 
but with many powerful unique elements. The party and leader pages are digital, 
editable, infinite in content frequency, with novel avenues for information and 
content form. The pages also feature broad options for participation, posts and 
pages are interlinked to the wider internet and interlinked within Facebook. 
However, most importantly all these elements can be spread socially through users’ 
engagement. Therefore, Facebook offers fundamental change for parties, because 
finally a mainstream campaign tool can bridge the gap between underutilised 
partisan virtual members and the broader voting public. Before Facebook, these 
people would likely influence their closer-knit family and friends, however Facebook 
has increased the scope of these people’s networks creating new avenues for social 
group pressure and increasing volatility. Thus, although Facebook’s differences 
across individual characteristics of information or participation approach may not 
present revolutionary change, collectively the platform offers an unparalleled 
upgrade in how parties can campaign. Facebook is thus a powerful evolution of 
previous campaign approaches, as it has merged established campaign 
















































The influence of external-to party organisations and groups on elections has 
been of central concern to researchers for decades. Across the role of the media, 
unions and charity organisations, it has always been clear that political elections are 
not just battles between parties’ campaigns, other factors and power-groups have 
always been at play (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944). Edwards a decade ago 
posited the notion of ‘democratic intermediaries’ (2006, p.9), a term used to describe 
non-party organisations important within elections. Edwards outlined three forms; 
“preference intermediaries - organizations that articulate and aggregate political 
demands, information intermediaries - organizations that deliver political information 
and details on voter registration, and interactional intermediaries - organisations that 
facilitate political participation” (2006, p.8). The framework “demonstrates the 
different ways in which campaigning initiated beyond the official party campaign can 
occur” (Dommett & Temple, 2018, p.196).  
Before the rise of social media, scholars were debating the effects of the 
internet on this wider body of powerful intermediary organisations that influence 
elections. Some scholars argued that the internet may erode intermediaries’ 
positions (Bryan, Tsagarousianou & Tambini, 2002), others were more positive 
asserting ‘disintermediation… would allow for an unbiased representation of 
citizens’ demands’ (Edwards, 2006, p.1). Academics’ disagreed about which 
direction the internet would push these groups, but it was clear that intermediaries 
were becoming an important force online as well as offline. With the rise of social 
media this idea of democratic intermediaries has expanded via what Dommett and 
Temple call the rise of ‘satellite campaigns’ (2018). Unlike past iterance’s of 
democratic intermediaries which were much easier to delineate, modern satellite 
campaign organisations are much more diverse, capable of merging together 
Edwards’ ideas of preference, information and interaction intermediaries (2006). 
Modern satellite campaigns can be utilised and admixed within parties’ traditional 
campaigns or be separate entities, with the rise of ‘satellite campaigns’ driven 






also not always clearly linkable to parties’ campaigns, with these groups often 
playing upon the differences within their online presence, making the line of 
distinction of what is a party’s online campaign harder to define. Given the lack of 
explanatory validity of Edwards’ ideas in the social media age, there is a clear need 
for a new typology of these types of groups online through the conceptualisation of 
the Facebook satellite campaign landscape. 
Of these new satellite campaigns, Momentum stands out as of major 
importance. The campaign group, with its ~40,000 members (2018), boasted of their 
importance to the 2017 Labour campaign. They asserted that more than 100,000 
people used their My Nearest Marginal tool during the campaign. While their 
Facebook videos reached over 23 million views and were watched by 12.7million 
unique users (McDowell-Naylor, 2019). Momentum were clearly an important player 
on Facebook. As a grassroots Labour Party movement supportive of Jeremy 
Corbyn, the rise of Momentum has seen the real-world application of a satellite 
campaign to an election where social media was central. There are three reasons 
why Momentum is examined over other forms of satellite campaign. The first reason 
is the impressive engagement and reach the page received. Secondarily, as this 
thesis’ focus is in studying political parties’ campaigns, Momentum is a party-linked 
page of importance. Thirdly, Momentum heavily uses social media including novel 
approaches.  
Satellite campaigns present a major opportunity for party campaigns, 
because of the potential for these sub-organisations to campaign in a different way 
or be used for different purposes than official party or leader pages. This new 
landscape is defined as Janus-faced campaigning, with this chapter examining the 
concept through Labour’s 2017 General Election campaign via Momentum, the 
Labour Party page and leader page. The rise of satellite campaigns presents new 
questions for how parties are campaigning using Facebook, but also how they are 
campaigning generally. Alongside election campaigning, there is also the 
unexamined role and use of satellite pages for permanent campaigning, thus this 
chapter also examines a sample of 2018 Momentum posts. Overall, this chapter 
answers key aspects of research questions one, two and three alongside three 







1) What role does Momentum play in Labour’s Facebook campaign? This is 
examined across information and participation. 
2) What are satellite campaigns used for during the 2018 permanent 
campaign? 
3) Was Labour engaged in Janus-faced campaigning? 
 
Conceptualising satellite campaigns 
 
We have seen over the last few decades a continued decline in partisanship, 
a third of voters switched parties between the 2015 and 2017 General Elections 
(Fieldhouse et al., 2019). Volatility is very high with partisanship and community not 
as strongly linked as in the past (Putnam, 1996).  
Figure 2. Vote flows 2015-2017 (Mellon & Evans, 2019) 
 
Parties are also claimed to be in decline, with membership low within political 
and societal organizations, and reduced trust in the leading political and social 
institutions such as the Government, Parliament or courts (Schudson, 1998; 
Putnam, 2000). These issues, within a wider discourse, amount to what has been 
labelled a growing “democratic deficit” (Seidle, 2004) or even a “crisis of democracy” 
(Zittel & Fuchs, 2007). It is commonly accepted that a major way to reverse this 






parties grow in membership recently, the general trend of party membership is 
downwards70. Given this situation, as election campaigning is strongly dependent 
on scarce resources (Margolis et al., 2003; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008; Anstead & 
Chadwick, 2009), some parties have opened themselves up to citizen participation 
fostering new ways to become a campaign volunteer (e.g., Gibson & Ward, 2000b; 
Foot et al., 2007; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008; Schweitzer, 
2011). However, given the low levels of participation content seen from the 
traditional Facebook campaign, we are potentially seeing this online participation 
operating via new satellite pages. As Dommett and Temple state; “…by drawing on 
the energies of citizens who may not feel sufficiently enthused to join a party, but 
who may nevertheless share party values, satellite campaigns can provide a wider 
set of advocates, who may be better placed to articulate their appeal. Digital 
therefore helps to enable the transition back and forth between being a party-
sympathizer to carrying out the role of a party-activist, blurring the lines between 
models of party membership and affiliation” (Dommett & Temple, 2018, p.202). 
Dommett and Temple, in their article Digital Campaigning: The Rise of 
Facebook and Satellite Campaigns (2018), posited the role of Momentum and 
Campaign Together during the 2017 General Election as examples of these ‘satellite 
campaigns’ that “represent a distinctive and important shift in campaigning” (2018, 
p.189). Dommett and Temple outline their concept of satellite campaigns as: 
“Organisations beyond parties were identifying, mobilising and organising citizens 
to deliver leaflets, canvass voters, and organise on- and offline… It suggests that, 
in addition to Whiteley and Seyd’s categories of the central party campaign, centrally 
coordinated local campaigns, and purely locally directed campaigns (2003, p. 638), 
we can also identify campaigns originating beyond party structures and control—
those termed here ‘satellite’ campaigns” (2018, p.201). 
Satellite campaigns are clearly problematic to define, as Dommett and 
Temple assert “affiliate organisations such as trade unions, business organisations, 
and community groups, have long provided additional resources for parties’ 
electoral campaigns” (2018, p.195). Given this clear lack of definition between 
previously identified ‘democratic intermediaries’ (Edwards, 2006) and ‘satellite 
 








campaigns’ (Dommett & Temple, 2018), the need for a new label appears 
unnecessary. However, the need for a new terminology and classification arises 
because of the way social media is interacting with these third parties.  
Dommett and Temple also emphasise, “the capacities of digital appear to 
have altered previous practice” (2018, p.195). Social media has altered democratic 
intermediaries into something different and more powerful, with change pronounced 
enough that a definitional cleavage is necessary. This definitional shift is warranted 
because digital platforms have increased the reach and capabilities of democratic 
intermediaries to campaign. Even small intermediaries have seen their campaign 
reach and impact vastly improved through social media, meaning that many third-
party groups now have a central campaign function rather than an intermediary 
function. As such the essence of what satellite campaigns are and can action, is 
heavily related to the digital tools they use. Today, satellite campaigns exist across 
the full range of social networks available. Facebook is examined over other 
platforms because of its well-defined satellite campaign network, large userbase, 
wider socio-political-demographic representation and greater capacities for different 
campaign approaches. Examining Facebook is essential for understanding what 
satellite campaign organisations are, how they act and what their function is. 
Although we know satellite campaigns exist and are an important 
phenomenon, there is a lack of precision in defining what different satellite 
campaigns are. Although, Dommett & Temple’s contribution to the identification of 
‘satellite campaigns’ on Facebook is important in defining this new campaign 
dynamic, they fail to adequately conceptualise and define the differentiated roles 
satellite campaigns can have. Firstly, Dommett & Temple suggest that satellite 
campaigns feature the “increasing importance of intermediary, unofficial, 
organisations beyond parties that facilitate and promote campaigning activities”, 
suggesting that “a campaign can be classed as satellite when vote-seeking activism 
is primarily driven by intermediary organisations without the control of a party” 
(Dommett & Temple, 2018, p.202). In the case of Momentum, a clear example of a 
satellite campaign, this definition does not fit. This is because Momentum as an 
organisation is still heavily related to the Labour Party; Labour is the parent 
organisation, all Momentum members since January 2017 must be Labour Party 
members, they campaign using Labour platforms such as the Party Conference and 






clearly a satellite, is still part of the overall Labour Party campaign akin to Progress 
or other internal group’s within Labour. Although the lines of control and connection 
are inherently ambiguous and blurred, Momentum is still clearly a party-linked 
satellite campaign.  
Further issues in conceptualisation are also apparent in Dommett & Temple’s 
second example of a satellite campaign; ‘Campaign Together’. Campaign Together 
is a volunteer non-party affiliated tactical anti-Conservative organisation. Simply 
defining this group as a satellite campaign akin to Momentum fails to appreciate a 
core element of satellite campaigning; that some groups have set points of orbit 
while others do not. This cleavage is vital, as it is important to define the deliberative 
use of satellite campaigns by parties separately from “satellite” campaigns that 
provide incidental aid. Campaign Together has no central orbiting point, is not party-
linked and is independent, Campaign Together may incidentally help the Labour 
Party but is not linked with the party. Thus, Campaign Together and Momentum are 
different entities and need to be conceptualised differently. Dommett & Temple’s 
definition of satellite campaigns fails to address the huge differences seen between 
these two groups natures, goals and activities.  
What is required is a typology of the different categories of satellite 
campaigns that exist on Facebook using more nuanced descriptors, whilst where 
pertinent still conceptualising these different groups under the umbrella term of 
satellite campaigns. This chapter consequently creates a more comprehensive 
typology of different types of satellite campaigns seen via Facebook. Using the 
example of the Labour Party, Table 32 includes four core differentiated types of 
party-linked satellite pages found on Facebook. The central dichotomy generated is 
between official party-linked and indirectly party-linked satellite campaigns based 
upon relationship to party. Further, the new typology offers a reclassification of non-
party affiliated campaigns such as Campaign Together, to definition outside of party-
satellite campaigning as incidental campaigns. The central orbiting point, around 
which party-linked pages are satellite to, is the Labour party and leader pages. As 
previously asserted these pages are the ‘traditional Facebook campaign’ the core 
of parties’ campaigns on Facebook and thus the pivot point around which satellites 






Table 32. Conceptualisation of the seven forms of satellite campaign pages seen on Facebook  




Mon-party incidental campaigns (independent) 
Type Party movement Local pages Individual MP’s pages 
Traditional democratic 
intermediaries 




Labour Leave, Blue 
Labour 
Milton Keynes Labour 
Party, Labour South West 
John McDonnell, Ben 
Bradshaw 
Institute for Public 
Policy Research 
Grime4Corbyn, Jeremy 
Corbyn: The People's PM 
38 Degrees, Tactical Vote - Stop the 
Tories, Rize Up 
Save the Children, 
Demos 
Example Used Momentum Cardiff Central Labour Rebecca Long-Bailey Unison JeremyCorbyn4PM Campaign Together 
National Education 
Union 
Link to Party 
Official formal links 
with party 
Official formal links with 
party 
Official formal links 
with party 
Official formal links 
with party 
Unofficial emotional links 
with party 




















Central links are to 
leader page 
Central links are to party 
page 
Central links are 
dependent on the MP 
Central links are with 
other democratic 
intermediaries 
Central links are to other 
‘fan’ pages 
Central links are to other 
‘reformist/tactical’ pages 




Support left wing of 
Labour Party and 
Corbyn. Defeat 
opposition 
Promote local issues 
Promote the MP and 
local issues 
Support unionism, 
union workers interests 
and the Labour party 
Support Jeremy Corbyn 
Promote progressive candidates, 
tactical voting 
Support unionism, union 
workers interests 
Membership 
Has monetary backing 
and membership 
Has monetary backing and 
membership 
Has monetary backing 
and membership 
Has monetary backing 
and membership 
Purely online and operated 
via donations 
Operates via donations but purely 
online 
Has monetary backing 
and membership 
Online or Offline 
Can act online and 
offline 
Can act online and offline 
Can act online and 
offline 
Can act online and 
offline 
Campaigns online, offline 
campaigning is incidental 
Mainly campaigns online, offline 
campaigning is incidental 
Can act online and 
offline 
Online Presence 
Has its own party 
apparatus and online 
eco-systems like 
websites 
Often has own party 
apparatus and online eco-
systems like websites 
Uses local networks, 
often has online eco-
systems like websites 
Has own organisational 
apparatus and online 
eco-systems like 
websites 
Does not have its own 
party apparatus and only 
presence is via social 
media 
May have websites but does not have 
its own party apparatus and main 
presence is via social media 
Has own organisational 






core staff, although 
wider staff will be 
voluntary 
Features a 
professionalised paid core 
staff, although wider staff 
will be voluntary 
Features a 
professionalised paid 
core staff, although 






of a small scale and totally 
voluntary, content will be 
crowd sourced 
Features a professional but voluntary 
staff 
Semi-professionalised, 




created in house, 
reissues other page’s 
content, uses humour 
and ‘internet style’ 
Some bespoke content, 
reissues other page’s 
content, local focus 
Some bespoke content, 
reissues other page’s 
content, may be 
personalised, local 
focus 
Uses bespoke content 
created in house 
Little bespoke content, 
reissues other page’s 
content, uses humour and 
‘internet style’ 
Uses bespoke content created in 
house 
Some bespoke content 
created in house, 







Examining Table 32, firstly, there are party linked official satellite campaigns. 
The first of these are party movement satellite pages, these often feature an internal 
political dimension and as such semi-independence but are still formally linked with 
the mother campaign. Momentum is a perfect example of this, with its links centrally 
seen to the leader page. Secondarily, there are a huge number of local, county, 
regional and subnational party groups, often representing local party organisations 
that campaign during the election. These are centrally linked to the party page and 
are focussed on local issues. Examples include groups such as Cardiff Labour or 
Cheltenham Labour. Thirdly, and highly related to local pages, are the hundreds of 
MP pages that exist on Facebook. For example, every Labour MP has their own 
Facebook page that campaigns during elections. These pages’ link to the party or 
leader page depending on their internal party-political position. Finally, akin to the 
offline world, there are the online representations of party-linked traditional 
democratic intermediaries including entities such as unions and think tanks. Unison 
is an example of this for Labour, with central links to the party page and other 
Labour-affiliated unions. 
As well as official party-linked satellite campaigns, an unofficial party-
associated satellite campaign theme is defined. Fan/grassroots pages are not party-
linked but are party supporting pages usually run by volunteers. As such one cannot 
label their impact as incidental as these pages are run explicitly to support a party, 
however equally they are clearly not part of any official satellite campaign page 
network. Fan-made pages can utilise a less formal approach and are often 
interlinked with other fan-made or alternative sources. For example, 
JeremyCorbyn4PM is interlinked with Corbyn’s page as well as the Artist Taxi Driver 
and Another Angry Voice. The changing political landscape on Facebook has seen 
these unofficial satellite pages become more influential. Dozens of these pages exist 
for all the major parties, with their capacities for campaigning leading to many 
interesting developments in the use of fan pages for what I term ‘cluster 
campaigning’. This defines campaigning based upon numerous seemingly 
independent sources but controlled by a close band of creators. This is important 
because some of these supposedly unofficial pages are clandestinely being used 
by parties’ campaigns, examples are provided later. In future, the typology of 
satellite campaigns may need to include some seemingly independent fan pages as 






and unofficial satellite campaigns are blurring. Currently, given how fan pages are 
a relative unknown and need far more study, they are not defined as officially linked.  
The final two types of pages shown within Table 32 are labelled as non-party 
incidental campaigns. These groups are not labelled as satellite campaigns because 
these pages have no specific party of orbit. Instead the term incidental campaign is 
created as these groups can help certain parties, but this is not their specific aim. 
For example, Campaign Together promotes ‘progressive candidates’ tactical voting 
and as such can help Labour, but the primary focus of the page is to help non-
Conservative candidates. Alongside these pages, akin to the offline world, there are 
also the online representations of unaffiliated traditional democratic intermediaries 
including entities such as unions, think tanks and charities. As shown via Unison 
these can explicitly help a party, but other non-political independent examples exist 
that may only incidentally help a party. The detachment of these incidental campaign 
groups from satellite campaigns makes defining the role and influence of satellite 
campaigns much clearer. 
Finally, hyper-partisan media organisations and opinion leaders were not 
included within this typology as these areas are too broad and are more clearly 
defined within other theoretical areas. Hyper-partisan media organisations such as 
Skwawkbox and Novara Media are particularly linked with the Corbyn/Labour 
project. This may lead one to argue they act akin to unofficial satellite fan pages. 
However, as these groups are primarily alternative media sources, current 
understandings of hyper-partisan news are better suited to explaining their electoral 
role (Potthast et al., 2017) than the concept of satellite campaigning. Similarly, 
opinion leaders with social media presences (who have also been termed 
‘outriders’– see Cohen, 2019) can also be clearly linked to parties. Owen Jones is 
a clear example, the Guardian journalist and Labour activist campaigned for the 
Labour Party during the 2017 General Election. These individuals with large 
Facebook presences may be asserted to be satellites of the Labour Party. However, 
Jones as well as other individuals such as Aaron Bastani and Ash Sarkar of Novara 
Media, did not campaign extensively on their own, instead they all campaigned via 
Momentum. The fact that these ‘outriders’ engaged in a party-linked satellite 
campaign speaks to the difference of opinion leaders to satellite campaigns. These 
individuals appreciate that there is a clear difference between a professionalised 






communications. As such merging the idea of opinion leaders with satellite 
campaigning is problematic, as not only would the concept become too large and 
unwieldy, but also the pre-existing ideas of opinion leadership via Lazarsfeld et al. 
(1957) explains the role of these individuals better than the idea of satellite 
campaigning.  
 
Conceptualising Janus-faced campaigning - the ‘traditional’ and ‘new 
methods’ Facebook campaign 
 
Campaigns on Facebook have moved beyond the use of party pages as seen 
in 2010, past the combination of leader and party pages seen in 2015, towards the 
use of multiple pages all utilising different approaches in 2017. Parties are now 
harnessing Facebook with great complexity, with campaigns more multi-faceted, 
nebulous and hard to discern. The key elements of this new trajectory in 
campaigning must be defined, with Janus-faced campaigning a definitional term 
used to describe how parties are now campaigning using Facebook.  
Janus-faced campaigning centrally defines a tactic that has always been 
important to parties’ campaigns; the sending of different messages to different voter 
groups using different methods, styles and approaches. Janus-faced campaigning 
on Facebook is defined in this thesis as a party; using different pages with different 
approaches to reach different audiences, thus presenting different faces of the same 
political party to the public. Campaign complexity and multi-faceted approaches are 
arguably nothing new, for example, leaflets have been heavily localised in the UK 
for decades. Examining the constituency level Shephard (2007) finds evidence of 
local targeting of party message to suit constituency profile interests. However, 
social media in the modern era presents a large cleavage in the capacity of parties 
to action far more diverse strategies both via targeted and organic communications.  
Janus-faced campaigning has been seen continuously throughout this thesis, 
through parties using leader and party pages for different purposes. However, 
Janus-faced campaigning is also a typological concept that groups pages according 
to their campaign use. This chapter discerns two elements from studying the Labour 
campaign. There is firstly the use of a ‘traditional Facebook campaign’ made up of 
the party and leader page as outlined in Chapter 6. While alongside this is the 






Figure 3. Visualisation of Janus-faced campaigning. Blue denotes clear party 
association/control, red denotes potential clandestine operation/control. Circle 
denotes traditional campaign; squares denote new methods. 
 
Janus-faced campaigning describes a powerful campaign dynamic. Through 
the replication of a national broadcast campaign via the traditional Facebook 
campaign, parties can influence the mass public. With approach focused on broader 
topics of public concern, information rather than participation and voting/registration 
participation content, parties can reach out to the median voter in considered 
language. Alongside this central core, through the new methods element of Janus-
faced campaigning, parties can benefit from novel approaches. Approach can be as 
broad as the number of satellite pages a party has, with approach informed by the 
nature and audience of each page. For example, Momentum focuses on 
participation and emotive partisan information, Grime4Corbyn focusses on younger 
black audiences and cultural/identity politics, while Cardiff Labour focusses on 
Cardiff infused partisan Labour politics. The new methods campaign gives parties 
new capacities that the traditional campaign cannot, including a focus on partisan 
content, participation and novel communications forms. Thus, through both these 


















worlds. Parties are not only able to reap the sociological rewards of more traditional 
broadcast approaches to campaigning, but also utilise narrowcast targeted 
approaches. This system operates across both organic communications and 
targeted advertising, giving parties radical new dimensions of campaign approach. 
Table 33 outlines the differences between the elements. 
 
Table 33. Outline of traditional and new methods within Janus-faced campaigning 
 Janus-faced campaigning 
 Traditional Facebook campaign New methods campaign 
Source 
The core pages – party and 
leader pages 
Satellite pages - party controlled pages or 
acquiesced fan pages, traditional democratic 
intermediaries, MP page’s, regional pages 
Logic 
Facebook offers access to 
millions of voters; a 
professionalised party presence 
online will help in elections and 
the permanent campaign 
Facebook offers new ways to campaign to many 
different groups. The capacity to reach and 
organise them is tied heavily to the approach 
taken. There is room for alternative approaches 
rather than replication of a traditional campaign 
online 
Activities 
Replicate a broad offline 
campaign online to win votes 
and enthuse support 
Use novel approaches to reach different 
demographics/areas, communications using the 
language of these groups  
 
Parties can now use many different types of satellite pages as part of a new 
methods campaign, with the clandestine use of fan/public pages a recent 
phenomenon. The use of fan/public pages shows the nefarious aspects of Janus-
faced campaigning; parties can use pages that appear out of direct party control but 
are actively still part of their campaign. Examples of this campaign tactic are 
becoming more common. During the Brexit referendum Lynton Crosby’s CTF 
partners utilised various ‘grassroots’ groups to spend up to £1 million on targeted 
advertisements (Waterson, 2019). Equally, Scientists for EU, professionalised 116 
smaller pro-EU fan pages using a £100,000 donation to centralise all 
communications through one office (Manthorpe, 2019). Recently, during the 2019 






Choice or Third party, advertised in support of the Conservatives. The background 
operations of these pages showed clear association with the Conservative Party 
(Hotham, 2020). All these examples show parties branching out within the new 
methods campaign element of Janus-faced campaigning. It also presents an issue 
with understanding modern campaigns on Facebook. The clandestine utilisation of 
satellite pages by political parties means Janus-faced campaigning must be a 
supply-side concept. It is getting harder to appreciate the pages that constitute 
Janus-faced campaigning, with the circumstances leading to a blurring of 
boundaries between what is, and what is not, part of a party’s Facebook campaign. 
Nevertheless, although important, nefarious activity is the extreme end of new 
methods. Instead, most party activity is part of the visible iceberg, with the varied 
use of party, leader and party-linked satellite pages the core of Janus-faced 
campaigning online.  
Finally, Janus-faced campaigning is also a fluid concept, as there is both 
party based nuance towards the traditional and new methods campaigns, as well as 
clear possibilities for parties to shift their approach over time. Some satellite pages 
may see themselves dragged in to being part of the traditional campaign as new 
satellites are formed. The evolution of this system will be heavily related to page 
audience, campaign goal and wider political tactics. Nevertheless, the core 
approach of multiple satellite pages alongside the party and leader page, is the new 
campaign normal on Facebook. Janus-faced campaigning thus defines how parties 
will be campaigning on the platform in future, as party presences on the platform 
continue to fracture and grow. 
In an era of the slow decline of traditional one-step flow communications 
forms such as television, the rise of multi-level approaches seen in Janus-faced 
campaigning across both targeted advertising and organic communications, may 
define a new epoch. Campaigning is moving further away from mass-
communications towards micro-communications via smaller groups receiving 
different messages. Individual voters can be sold different promises, with this 
presenting new opportunities for political parties, but also presenting new issues for 
the action of democracy. Academics and activists have repeatedly pointed out the 
threats of targeted advertising from parties. However, the complexity and diffusion 
of modern campaigns is seeing potential problems exacerbated across both the 






The variance of organic Facebook campaigning is mirroring trends seen within the 
wider media system, stimulating further political volatility within Britain. 
 
The permanent campaign 
 
Vergeer, Hermans and Sams (2011) suggest; “with the advent of the Internet, 
permanent campaigning to build public support becomes easier” (Vergeer et al., 
p.485). Chapter 5 showed that engagement levels are high across the permanent 
campaign, with leader and party pages offering parties a consistent gateway to the 
public year-round. Although the campaign period features higher average 
engagement, the nature and capacity of satellite campaigns to permanently 
campaign is an area requiring further investigation. Satellite pages feature 
innovative permanent campaigning potentials because permanent campaign 
interest will likely trend towards virtual members rather than the general public. 
Thus, as these pages often have smaller but highly active support bases, they have 
unique abilities to generate, activate and sustain virtual members. Thus, within 
parties’ wider approaches to Facebook, satellite pages can lead from the front in 
novel permanent approaches.  
James Dennis examined Momentum’s national Facebook content alongside 
Portsmouth’s local Momentum page, across one month of the 2018 permanent 
campaign (2019). Although centrally interested in organisational dynamics (in which 
he finds traditional controlled interactivity), his study also examined the Momentum 
page’s permanent campaign practices. Dennis found that “Momentum replicates 
some of the organizing and campaigning practices of political parties”, with the 
group “instructing members to undertake an action on the request of the leadership” 
(Dennis, 2019, p.98). Across both local and national levels Dennis finds Momentum 
to be definable as what Kavada labels a ‘movement party’ (2019), with the group 
acting as both a pressure group and campaign organisation. Clearly the group is 
campaigning permanently, with Dennis positing that there may be some hybridity in 
how Momentum campaigns on Facebook across permanent and electoral periods. 
He argues that “Momentum can undertake both internally and externally-facing 
political action” (Dennis, 2019, p.109), however as he did not study the whole year 






chapter expands upon Dennis’ hypothesis that Momentum is used differently across 
electoral periods, through examining the full permanent and election campaign 
periods.  
Through studying a party-movement page like Momentum, we not only see 
how the wider Labour Party campaigns during an election, but also how internal 
pressure groups operate permanently. Given the changing nature of the Labour 
Party’s membership, Momentum may have a clear role not only for campaigning for 
the party, but also permanently campaigning for its own ideology within the Labour 
Party. Consequently, this chapter examines Momentum’s approach across 2018. 
Momentum’s approach may shift from tactics used to reach the general public, 
including a focus on information and organisation during the election campaign, 
towards membership and internal partisan activities during the 2018 permanent 
campaign. Further study will need to be undertaken in future on how party and 
leader pages approach the permanent campaign. 
 
Satellite pages and engagement 
 
 Digital media is reconfiguring party-related engagement (Vaccari & Valeriani, 
2016, p.295) with satellite pages a new part of this changing landscape. In Chapter 
4 we saw that Momentum features different virtual members to the Labour or Jeremy 
Corbyn page, however having followership is only one half of the equation. The level 
of engagement satellite pages’ offer is of importance to their capacities to carry out 
diverse roles across information and participation. To understand their potential for 
engagement and to provide some comparative understanding, two satellite pages; 
Momentum (party linked movement page) and JeremyCorbyn4PM (unofficial linked 







Graph 92. Total like engagement per year by page (n=9,418) 
Graph 92 shows that by 2017 Momentum and JeremyCorbyn4PM’s 
engagement levels were collectively higher than the Labour Party page. Although 
far behind Jeremy Corbyn’s page, 24% of the like engagement achieved by the party 
was from these two satellite pages, against 57% for Jeremy Corbyn and 20% for the 
Labour Party. 
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Satellite pages are very popular, Momentum and JC4PM nearly overtook the 
Conservative Party page in like engagement in 2017, receiving only 500,000 fewer 
likes. It is apparent that certain Facebook users are interested in receiving 
information from less establishment pages such as Momentum or JC4PM, rather 
than policy orientated professionalised campaigns. Satellite campaigns are thus 
important as not only can they reach a different audience to other pages, but when 
using a constellation of satellite pages, as many Facebook users can be reached as 
via official party pages. As such they are a vital part of parties’ Janus-faced 
campaigning and highlight the logic of having multiple Facebook pages as part of a 
campaign.  
 
7.2: Momentum’s information approaches  
  
To appreciate the scale of what the data represents, below in Table 34 the 
number of cases from a selection of percentages is shown for each page. All data 
across all graphs are shown across 25%, 50% or 100% scale, this is to make 
comparison fair and allow for comprehension of less common content forms. 
 
Table 34. How many posts each percentage represents for each page (n=695) 
 
Number of 
posts 2% 25% 50% 100% 
Momentum page 2017 153 3 38 77 153 
Momentum page 2018 120 2 30 60 120 
Labour Party page 278 6 70 139 278 
Jeremy Corbyn page 144 3 36 72 144 
 
 Although academics and commentators have outlined what satellite 
campaigns are in the broadest sense, it is not known how they operate or what 
strategies they use for information. Satellite campaigns have the potential for 
innovation (Dommett & Temple, 2018), with abilities to adopt internet-culture, 
divergent viewpoints or ultra-partisan takes on politics. Overleaf are a series of 






Image Set 4: Post examples – structure, information and participation 
  
 
Video, Meme, use of opposition leader Video, internal partisanship, join party News link, use of anti-figure Video, reuse of others content 
Use of Poll 
Use of party politician, media news, 
informal language 
Use of leader, praise of campaigners, call 
to join, call to help doorstep campaign 







How does Momentum approach structural content? 
 
 The first key area of analysis is content structure. Examining the 2017 
General Election in Graph 94, Momentum followed the Labour Party page’s video 
trend. Momentum’s posts in 2017 were 75% video content, behind the Labour Party 
page (100%) but ahead of Corbyn’s page (64%). Momentum is following the latest 
trends in campaign information delivery despite reduced resources, the group does 
not suffer from the normalisation gap previously seen in Chapter 5. The high use of 
video speaks to Momentum’s integration within modern understandings of how 
social media works, with usage showing that reduced monetary resources is no 
barrier to video content. There are clear differences between the pages, especially 
in the use of links and the amount of video used. However, generally a coherent 
trend is visible, with video clearly in supremacy and then photo or link content 
subsidiary.  
Graph 94. Content approaches (n=695) 
 
Regarding the 2018 permanent campaign, Momentum’s approach clearly 















































23pp) and photo content (-28pp). The decline in video content towards photo shows 
that resources clearly shift, with cheaper re-issued external sources receiving 
greater use during the permanent campaign. Thus, although a structural form 
normalisation trend is not seen in Momentum during the 2017 election campaign, it 
is shown during the permanent campaign. This contrasts with the Labour Party 
page, which in Chapter 4 saw video use decline far less during the permanent 
campaign. There was therefore greater money and professionalised effort put into 
Momentum’s election campaign versus the permanent campaign, this suggests a 
clear shift in how the page was used across these two periods.  
 












































































































153 75% 21% 3% 0% 4% 3% 2% 
Momentum page 
2018 
120 52% 29% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 
Labour Party 
page 
278 100% 3% 0% 6% 58% 2% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 
page 
144 64% 18% 0% 3% 8% 2% 0% 
 
 Examining video across the 2017 General election in Table 35, Momentum’s 
approach was particularly different to the Labour Party page and closer to Jeremy 
Corbyn’s page. Unlike the Labour Party page, Momentum did not extensively utilise 
infographic videos (4%), instead they favoured mainstream media content (21%). 
Momentum consistently reused media especially news, but also other cultural 
programming like Question Time or comedy staples like The Office. Momentum 
spoke in a different more experimental way, with this further seen through their 
application of Facebook Live (3%), alternative media (3%) and music videos (2%). 
The group avoided talking like a political party, they did not use any PEBs and 
avoided long-form content, highlighting the younger digital savvy audience they 






outside of the remit of the traditional Facebook campaign. Momentum was able to 
innovate by trying new things to reach a different audience than the leader or party 
page. The decline of some of these novel methods during Momentum’s 2018 
permanent campaign, also shows that some of these approaches (such as music 
videos) were used to reach the general public, rather than virtual or official member 
support. In 2017 Momentum had a real belief in novel viral content for public 
consumption, a tactic that worked so well that Momentum’s video content was re-
used during the 2019 General Election.  
 
 
Image 25. 2017 Momentum use of meme in video71 
Image 26. 2017 Momentum use of music video72 
 
Examining photo approaches in detail, although overall use of photo was 
remarkably similar between Corbyn and Momentum’s page across the 2017 
election, Momentum clearly used more novel approaches to the form. Momentum 
extensively used meme’s, with 14% of their content meme’s, against 0% for the 
party page and 1% for Corbyn. The use of meme’s shows Momentum was pushing 
boundaries, using the language of the internet to communicate in a new way to a 
different audience. Momentum was utilising what is referred to as mediated 
authenticity (Enli, 2015), their position as a satellite campaign allowed the 




71 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=461391127539613 accessed 13/3/2020 













































































































153 25% 1% 1% 10% 3% 14% 5% 0% 19% 
Momentum 
page 2018 
120 20% 0% 0% 17% 1% 4% 0% 1% 13% 
Labour Party 
page 
278 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 
page 
144 26% 0% 1% 1% 8% 1% 2% 1% 0% 
 
Another key difference across the election was Momentum’s use of text-only 
images (10%), a defunct format across all the other pages studied, the high 
incidence rate is mainly due to the use of screen captures of Twitter comments 
(19%). Momentum extensively brought Twitter content to Facebook, this interlinking 
of two social networks shows how Momentum treated Facebook as part of a wider 
social network eco-system, but only as an information source. Twitter content was 
used but not linked, users were not promoted to leave the page. Instead, Twitter 
content was used on Facebook to feed into the formation of a collective identity (akin 
to that seen with movement parties as per Kavada, 2019), and help develop the 
narrative of left versus right politics. Momentum thus used Twitter content to inflame 
partisan passions and prompt activity on Facebook itself.  
Comparing the 2017 and 2018 Momentum approaches, general trends in 
photo approach continued, however there was a large decline in Momentum’s use 
of meme’s (-10pp), a growth in text only images (+7pp) and lower use of Twitter 
screen captures (-6pp). The data shows that photo approach, just like video 
approach, shifts from election to permanent campaign. The decline in meme’s and 
Twitter screencaps show that the page became less interested in using humorous 






campaign via humour and Twitter content, during the permanent campaign the 
group focused more on information rich photo content.  
Image 27. 2017 Momentum use of poster73 
 
Overall, across photo and video content, the Labour campaign was using 
different pages to inform dissimilar audiences in diverse ways. Clear structural styles 
informed by intended and expected audiences are visible. Momentum approached 
in a novel manner with sights clearly set on a younger more radical internet disposed 
audience. Corbyn’s page mixed some more novel elements seen via Momentum 
with core traditional approaches to speak to the wider public young and old. The 
Labour Party page was focussed heavily on informative video content for a broad 
audience. The capacity for Labour to present a frivolous younger face to certain 
groups including those put off by traditional party politics, alongside a more serious 
and leadership personalised presence to the broad userbase, signals the benefits 
of Janus-faced campaigning. The party could do it all, via presenting itself differently 
to groups.  
 
73https://www.facebook.com/PeoplesMomentum/photos/a.160217227657006.1073741829.155710






Is Momentum using different topics? 
 
Momentum was not used to deliver as many political topics (1.63) as the party 
page (1.98), with the page using a similar number of topics per post to Corbyn’s 
page (1.60). Both Momentum and Corbyn’s page fit in as a middle information tool, 
in contrast the official party page takes on the role of disseminating more complex 
information. The focus of the Corbyn and Momentum pages’ is centred less on 
policy and core political issues, instead they are more focused on ideas and actions. 
There was a small drop in Momentum’s topic complexity between the 2017 General 
Election (1.63 average) and the 2018 permanent campaign (1.5 average). This 
reflects the group switching away from broader campaign issues, to content 
designed for virtual members. Nevertheless, even during the permanent campaign 
topic use is still well above one, showing how imperative it is for analyses of 
Facebook to engage in multi-level topic study.  
Graph 95. Average number of topics per post (n=695) 
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Examining the topics covered, Momentum’s main 2017 topics centred on the 
economy, protection, party action and leadership. There was a 59pp primary topic 
choice difference between Momentum and Corbyn’s page, as opposed to 79pp for 
the Labour Party page. Although Momentum’s approach mirrors some elements of 
the Labour and Corbyn page, the group sent by far the least broad range of primary 
topics. 86% of content occurred from the five most used topics, as opposed to 64% 
for the party page and 60% for the leader page. A large amount of focus was placed 
on two areas, with 64% of primary topic content centred on leadership and party 
action. Momentum as an organisation in-part founded to support Corbyn and his 
politics, understandably has high rates of leadership content (26%). The party 
heavily fed into Corbynmania and heavily personalised the leader. Momentum’s 
even greater focus on party action content (39%) shows a role apart from the other 
pages. As examined later when looking at participation approaches, the group 
heavily focused on activating the public and virtual members.  
Graph 97. Difference of Momentum content to party / leader page (n=1,211)
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Although Momentum’s topic use expanded across subsequent topic choices, 
compared to the other Labour pages they were unconcerned with promoting 
electorally important policy areas, such as social care or the economy. The page 
was not primarily concerned with political information and policy, leaving these 
elements to the traditional Facebook campaign. Instead, Momentum’s satellite 
campaign was designed to energise certain elements of the electorate, engage with 
more radical information topics and engender virtual member participation. This was 
not a narrow approach however, the group showed disinterest in narrowcast social 
identity or young people focussed content. This is surprising given that the 
organisation is thought to be narrow in focus; being youth orientated and interested 
in issues of racism, equality and social justice. Instead, during the election 
Momentum was trying to reach a large more radical group of voting public than the 
party or leader page.  
 
Graph 98. Momentum 2018 permanent campaign difference vs. 2017 General 
Election campaign approach (n=1,211) 
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Examining changes across the permanent campaign 2017 to 2018, 
Momentum’s permanent campaign was clearly far less focussed on party action or 
leadership content. Smaller declines were seen in economy, protection and social 
care, with major positive changes seen in the use of social identity, education, 
immigration and the apolitical. Momentum appears to be trying to speak to a smaller 
partisan audience in 2018. Thus, the organisation switches from a mainstream more 
externally focused campaign page to an internal campaigning organisation. This 
reflects Dennis’ posited idea of the potential hybridity of Momentum (2019), proving 
that the group do alternate their campaign nature depending on electoral period. 
Image 28. 2017 Momentum use of leadership primary content74 
 
Overall, Momentum was engaging in different topics to the other pages. 
Labour’s topic frequency and diversity shows that the party was engaging in Janus-
faced campaigning. A ‘traditional’ Facebook campaign was centrally being run by 
the party and leader page, designed to deliver core political information for the 
general public, while Momentum tried to bring home wayward left-wing groups, 
activate virtual members and develop Corbynmania. Through all three pages Labour 
was able to reach out to the core groups they needed to succeed in the election, 
whilst not undermining the character of each individual page. 
 






Does Momentum use complex information? 
 
The trends seen across topic choice, including the role of Momentum as a 
tool not centred on policy and political information but instead on participation, 
organisation and leadership, is clearly also seen in use of policy detail. Momentum 
across both 2017 and 2018 featured low levels of policy detail (13%), although levels 
of political information were still high (97 & 98%). The organisation still delivered 
political information but was focussed on broader debates and ideas related to 
politics, not direct policy. The differences across the pages show the official party 
page used for detailed information, Momentum for ideological political information 
and Corbyn’s page for a mixture of both. The sentiment of the political information 
delivered is also different across the pages. Momentum featured more negative 
political information (52%) than the leader (44%) or party page (31%), alongside 
less positive information (71%) than the party page (90%). In the sentiment of the 
political information used, Momentum more closely follows Corbyn’s page than the 
party page, the group communicates in a more emotionally charged manner, 
showing their interest in speaking to a more partisan audience. 




















Graph 100. Use of policy detail (n=695) 




































The use of position issues also varies by page, Momentum (17%) features 
similar positive position issue use to Corbyn’s page (16%), with the Labour Party 
page using more of the form (51%). Negative position issues are also more clearly 
used by the leader (40%) and party page (40%) rather than Momentum. Some 
commentators and Labour MP’s have criticised Momentum as a Militant-style 
organisation75, asserting the group to be particularly left wing and radical. However, 
it was the more moderate Labour Party page that pushed these combative 
ideological position issues. In contrast, Momentum and Corbyn pushed a broader 
political idealism that was an inclusive vision and not focused on combative policy. 
Examining Momentum’s 2018 permanent campaign, the trends change 
enormously, although policy detail remains low in use, positive position issue use 
accelerates (from 17% to 59%). This increase in position issue use is tied to the 
internal campaigning dimension Momentum evolved into during the permanent 
campaign. Momentum was focussed on the #JC9 campaign to elect Corbyn friendly 
politicians to the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party. All nine of the 
promoted candidates gained seats on the NEC, with the campaign a complete 
success76. Alongside this campaign, Momentum was also part of the 2018 local 
election push, supported striking workers and for Labour adoption of radical policy 
areas such as Universal Basic Income. These internally orientated campaigns saw 
the page promote left-wing politicians, policy and ideals; explaining the huge jump 
in positive position issues. Equally, given this was internal campaigning, it also 




with-unite-seize-control-of-labour accessed – 4/9/2019 






Graph 102. Use of position issues (n=695) 
 
Overall, Momentum was not focused on as complex a level of information as 
the party or leader page during the 2017 General Election. This Janus-faced use of 
different pages is important because the Labour Party was delivering a diverse level 
of political detail, across a range of issues, with different sentiments. All the pages 
promoted the Labour manifesto’s radical policies but differed in how they were 
delivered. The party page was centred on specifics; high levels of detail and political 
information saw the page delivering radical policy in both a positive and negative 
way. Corbyn was used in a middle role, both used to inject emotion into the Labour 
policy agenda but still with policy detail. Momentum was there to inform and activate 
a different audience, detail was minimal with focus on narrative and emotion. 
Examining the permanent campaign, Momentum was successful in pushing and 
framing radical policy. Labour’s change from a centre-left force in 2015 to one that 
was more radical in 2019 did not occur in isolation, Momentum was a key part of 











































Image 29. 2018 Momentum use of negative  
position issue77 
 
Is Momentum using expertise or celebrity? 
 
Chapter 5 showed that across party and leader pages Labour’s use of 
expertise was subsidiary to celebrity. Facebook offers new avenues for the 
utilisation of experts and celebrities, with satellite campaigns offering even greater 
scope for the use of cultural figures that can speak to different audiences. Due to 
their smaller audience targets, satellite campaigns such as Momentum can use 
more specific experts or celebrities than the party or leader page. This is seen within 
Momentum, as well-respected left of centre academics such as Joseph Stieglitz and 
Noam Chomsky are used as experts, while other important cultural figures such as 
Stormzy are used as celebrities. Overall, as Graph 103 shows in contrast to the 
leader and party page’s, Momentum is much more interested in using experts than 
celebrities. As Momentum champions more radical causes, experts are used to 
argue ideological positions within a wider left-wing vision both during elections and 
permanently. Equally, Momentum uses experts like celebrities, as figures such as 
Noam Chomsky have a large amount of cultural capital as left-wing figures. 
 
 






Graph 103. Use of expertise or celebrity (n=695)78 
Image 30. 2017 Momentum use of expert79 
Image 31. 2017 Momentum use of celebrity80 
 
 
78 Worked out from use positive and negative use of non-political and political experts, alongside 
male and female use of celebrities. 
79 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=461652557513470 accessed 1/5/2020 
80https://www.facebook.com/PeoplesMomentum/photos/a.160217227657006.1073741829.155710





















Examining the use of expertise in detail within Graph 104. Momentum like 
the other Labour pages favoured using non-political experts over party-political 
experts. The pages appreciate the influence sources outside the party can have for 
persuasion. Usage of experts during the election campaign was generally positive. 
14% of 2017 Momentum election content used non-political experts positively, with 
usage rates far above Corbyn (9%) or the Labour Party page (5%). Momentum’s 
use of experts was also higher (7%) compared to the other pages (4%). However, 
a marked shift in negative use of expertise occurred during the permanent 
campaign. 20% of Momentum’s permanent campaign content used experts in a 
negative way, with positive use of experts declining to only 9% of content. 
Momentum shifted from positive expertise used to influence the wider public during 
the election campaign, to negative expertise to internally campaign to virtual 
members during the permanent campaign. During this internal campaign, the 
negative use of experts was used to battle soft-left figures and ideas.  
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This trend between a more insular permanent campaign and a broader public 
facing election campaign is also seen when examining Momentum’s use of 
celebrities. During the election campaign, 14% of Momentum’s content used a 
celebrity endorsement; standing close to the approach seen by the party page (17%) 
and the leader page (13%). However, the groups use declined rapidly across the 
permanent campaign to 4%. Momentum, during the election campaign fits the wider 
Labour model of using celebrity endorsements to influence and engage with the 
wider public. However, when Momentum was campaigning internally during the 
permanent campaign, there was less incentive to reach out to different audiences 
and thus motivation to use opinion leaders. Within the celebrities used, Labour was 
shrewd in how they exploited celebrities and their networks. Momentum was clearly 
trying to reach different demographics and parts of society to the other pages.  
Graph 105. Use of celebrity (n=695) 
 
Momentum’s celebrities were more specific opinion leaders, including left-
wing figures such as Michael Rosen or Billy Bragg, or important figures within 





















on household names such as Steve Coogan. Labour clearly had an appreciation of 
the way different celebrities can influence different sociological networks, with 
Momentum using celebrities to break into communities more likely open to 
Momentum’s more radical message. Overall, unlike the other pages Momentum 
favours expertise equally with celebrity. Momentum’s interest in experts rather than 
celebrities during the permanent campaign shows the organisation shifting towards 
internal partisan battles, with ideology and expertise more important for political 
outcomes.  
 
How is news and other media used by the group? 
 
Momentum’s approach to media sources during the 2017 General Election is 
relatively reflective of the other Labour pages, with a few unique approaches that 
set the organisation apart. Momentum, like the other Labour pages did not use news 
media links; Labour were interested in keeping audiences on Facebook except for 
specific participatory purposes. Examining mainstream media use, Momentum 
utilise media content but only if it can be edited. Momentum’s use of positive and 
negative mainstream media (positive 12%, negative 14%) is found at rates very 
similar to the leader page (positive 13%, negative 13%), in contrast, the party page 
did not use mainstream media content (0% positive, 5% negative). During the 
election Momentum used mainstream media creatively. The group used many 
different types of mainstream content to promote or attack politicians and leaders in 
novel ways. Examples include editing images of The Office alongside Theresa May, 
the use of Question Time or news interviews. The group used a novel approach, 
because as Dennis notes, Momentum was “operating outside of the restrictions of 
formal party politics” (2019, p.110). Momentum was free to communicate in a 
different way to the other pages.  
Outside of mainstream media use, Momentum was the only page interested 
in promoting the party’s campaign success via polling content (6%). This occurred 
centrally via Twitter screen captures. A fundamental area of difference is seen in the 
groups use of alternative media, Momentum used alternative media positively (6%), 
while the other Labour pages did not. For Momentum, alternative media sources 






Skwawkbox news content. One of the benefits for Momentum over Labour, is 
because it is not an official page it can use an informal style and sources outside of 
the mainstream. This allows Momentum to tap into a vast array of left-wing bloggers, 
YouTubers and partisan news, that the other more establishment pages distance 
themselves from. This gap gave Labour the capacity to campaign both as a radical 
outsider, as well as maintain a sense of official competency.  
Image 32. 2018 Momentum use of alternative news source by link81 
Image 33. 2018 Momentum use of mainstream news source by link82 
 
81 https://www.facebook.com/155710354774360/posts/584163171929074/ accessed 13/11/2019 
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 Large changes occurred from the 2017 election to the 2018 permanent 
campaign. Bespoke content reduced during the permanent campaign; the page 
instead relied more on reposting other pages or groups content. Momentum more 
often reshared other Facebook page’s content during the permanent campaign 
(5%), with a large shift seen in using mainstream media and news content. 
Momentum’s use of news increased, with use of mainstream media content via 
sources and links, newspaper content and negative alternative media all increasing. 
The page also adopted a strategy of attacking media organisations such as the Sun 
and Daily Mail, 7% of all 2018 content attacked the media. This again speaks to 
Momentum trying to activate a smaller closer-knit band of supporters during the 
permanent campaign, generating a radical identity. As Dennis notes upon the 
permanent campaign; “rather than avoiding it, antagonistic news coverage of 
Momentum is embraced by the leadership and used to further claim that they are 
outsiders, somehow distinct from the norms of party-political organizing that have 
given rise to a sense of anti-politics in the UK” (Dennis, 2019, p.109). Momentum 
clearly use Facebook selectively depending on expected audience.  
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Examining the use of external content, across the 2017 election, Momentum 
were keener to reuse content than the other Labour pages, including positive and 
negative use of external content. 42% of Momentum’s election content reused 
external content, as opposed to 24% of Corbyn’s content and only 3% of Labour 
Party page content. Momentum used the platform to energise support via recasting 
and reacting to the news of the day, with a bonus being that news media provides 
a cheap, consistent and easy source of content. The reuse of external content was 
stable across the permanent campaign (+6pp), with large increases in negative use 
of external content (+14pp). Given reduced staff and funds, Momentum sought easy 
sources of content for the page. 
 Overall, the Labour Party was selective in how each page used media 
content. Momentum, and to a lesser extent Corbyn’s page, are there to fit their 
campaigns into a more aggressive news-orientated environment, while the Labour 
Party page continued with its focus on policy information. The heavy use of linked 
media content during Momentum’s permanent campaign shows a greater 
traditional/social media hybridity (Chadwick, 2013). Thus, the systematic reduced 
use of links to keep users on the platform via internal media hybridity is an electoral 
approach. 
 
Does Momentum focus on depiction? 
 
One would expect Momentum, as a younger more diverse organisation, to 
depict more diverse minority groups and wider issues. However, when examining 
the 2017 election in Graph 10883, Momentum did not depict minority groups issues 
in the non-text and text elements of posts at rates higher than the other Labour 
pages. Reflecting the findings seen in topic choice, Momentum like the other Labour 
pages generally focussed on broader groups and issues.  
 
83 One should note that across text elements Momentum’s use of depiction is consistently low 
because the group barely used the text element of posts, their average post word counts never 














































Labour Party page Jeremy Corbyn
page
Momentum page Momentum page
2018
















Use of women's issue Use of minority issue Use of religion - Christianity
Use of religion - Islam Use of religion - Hinduism Use of religion - Sikhism






Image 34. 2017 Momentum use of Christianity and Islam84 
 
The only underrepresented group that is relatively depicted across the pages 
was women through use of women’s issues. However, Momentum and Corbyn 
practically ignored the issue (only 1-3% across text and non-text elements) with the 
greatest amount of focus given by the party page (8% non-text, 6% text). Momentum 
showed no special interest in depicting or talking about issues concerning 
underrepresented groups. Greater depiction of these groups is seen across 
Momentum’s permanent campaign. However, use only reaches 11% of non-text and 
8% of text content. Momentum does appear to particularly care about minority 
issues, especially when speaking to their virtual members during the permanent 
campaign. Some narrowcast focus is seen, showing a more representative and 
radical internal political agenda. However, as seen next from the use of core groups, 













Graph 109. Depiction of age groups (n=1390, n of non-text elements = 695, n of 
text elements = 695) 
 
Examining the depiction of core age groups during the election, Labour was 
not using Facebook to narrowcast campaign. Groups depicted and issues talked 
about concerned the many not the few. There were some page-based differences 
during the election campaign; Momentum generally depicted more young and 


















































































































































seen more via the party and leader page. This use of different pages to depict 
different audiences shows some demographic logic behind the traditional or new 
methods elements of the Labour campaign. Nevertheless, the clearest takeaway is 
that all the pages were geared to speak to the wider Facebook userbase during the 
election campaign.  
 
Graph 110. Use of issues associated with age groups (n=1390, n of non-text 
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Examining the use of issues associated with age groups presents a different 
picture, the data shows how the Labour Party page is the central vehicle used to 
talk about core groups issues, reflecting the page’s policy and information focus. In 
contrast, the Momentum and Corbyn pages are not overly concerned with issue 
areas. What this tells us is that Momentum and Corbyn’s pages were more 
concerned with the depiction and imagery of the public, rather than actual policy 
affecting the public. Their content was designed to resonate with the people on an 
emotive level. With political information kept as broad as possible, an inclusive 
vision was developed above narrowcast specifics. Investigating the permanent 
campaign across depiction and issue use, we saw a shift in Momentum’s approach. 
The group increased their use of depiction and issue usage. Central shifts were in 
featuring more middle-aged depiction (+11pp), and far more interest in using issues 
effecting all age groups, especially young people and parents. Momentum during 
the permanent campaign were more interested in breaking down policy areas and 
narrowcasting ideas to groups, while not necessarily depicting these groups more.  
When questioning who these pages are depicting, examining the use of the 
public across the 2017 General Election in detail, Graph 111 shows Momentum’s 
interest in using the publics’ voice more than other Labour pages. 24% of their 
content used a public person’s voice, in contrast to 9% of the party and 10% of the 
leader page. The group also used relevant public workers more than the other pages 
(27% Momentum, 17% leader, 21% party page). However, across other avenues of 
depiction, Momentum saw reduced use of non-political ordinary public especially 
minorities. Although depiction of these groups increased during the permanent 
campaign, it is clear Momentum was more interested than the party or leader pages 















Graph 111. Use of general public’s voice (n=695) 
Image 35. 2017 Momentum use of general public’s voice85 
 

















Graph 112. Depiction of the public in text content (n=695) 
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For Momentum depiction is about grass-roots political expression. Many 
videos used bespoke Vox pop style interviews of the public, opinion pieces of 
ordinary public members and edited Question Time audience member comments. 
Therefore, use of core groups was not reflected in use of issues during the election 
campaign. Momentum created the appearance of ground-up support for Corbyn 
through using and depicting the public, this was similarly seen via Corbyn’s page. 
Momentum’s use of imagery accelerated during the permanent campaign, reflecting 
a change in audience and reduction in bespoke campaign content, with the groups 
use of issues more tied to its use of depiction.  
Overall, the common parlance is that Labour is identity obsessed. Depiction 
is common, but this is only for the broadest and most electorally important groups. 
Even within Momentum, the ‘wokest’ element of Labour, we only see partially 
increased interest in depicting minority groups. Many within Momentum have 
highlighted a lack of representation as a major issue (Jossette, 2019), as Momentum 
like Labour and all other UK parties, is particularly white, male and middle class 
(Bale, Webb & Poletti, 2019). Nevertheless, Labour and especially Momentum is far 
ahead of its competitors in representing modern Britain via Facebook. Dennis notes 
in describing Momentum on Facebook, that they “use the language and imagery 
associated with movement politics to position the organization as representative of 
ordinary people who are mobilizing against political elites” (Dennis, 2019, p.110). 
Dennis notes an important trend that is clearly visible, however a very similar 
language and imagery approach is seen across all of Labour’s pages. Labour, not 
just Momentum, was pushing themselves as the representative of ordinary people. 
However, it is important to note that the party’s use of the public was grounded in 
symbolism and imagery not in dialogue. Momentum was the only page to frequently 
use more genuine representations of the public, allowing them to use their own 
voices to convey political ideas.  
 
How is Momentum’s content framed?  
 
Momentum has been labelled a radical element within the Labour Party, with 
some commentators referring to it as a negative force. However, across the 2017 






than the leader page (61%) although not as positive as the party page (88%). The 
group utilised levels of negativity (47%) similar to the leader page (44%) but was far 
more negative than the party page (29%). Momentum clearly utilised sentiment 
more strongly than the other pages, with content tending towards sentiment 
extremes. However, the page was only similar in sentiment to Corbyn’s page, the 
idea that the group framed content in a more extreme manner during the election 
campaign is not visible. Throughout the 2018 permanent campaign, Momentum did 
become more extreme in its sentiment. The group became less positive (-18pp) and 
far more negative (+21pp). The shift shows how Momentum was switching from 
positive content to energise wider audiences, towards negative content designed to 
activate partisans. Negative campaigning from the group appears to be saved 
somewhat for internal campaigning. The negativity seen from the group against 
other sections of the Labour Party was quite striking. Dennis notes in his analysis 
that “Momentum represent something dramatically different from the stage-
managed communication that characterizes other actors… They develop this 
distinctive voice by sharing adversarial messages… This “us versus them” dynamic 
operates at multiple levels, as Momentum stands in opposition to its ideological 
adversaries” (2019, p.108). For Momentum, it appears their ideological adversaries 
are within the party as much as without, the group clearly present themselves 







Graph 114. Sentiment across Labour pages (n=695) 



















































































Examining approaches to problems and solutions, across the 2017 election, 
Momentum’s use of pledges was small compared to the other pages (10% 
Momentum, 66% party page), reflecting a low interest in policy content. 
Momentum’s diagnosis of success was higher (27% Momentum, 15% leader, 21% 
party page), while use of how we solve problems was lower (52% Momentum, 90% 
party page). In most other aspects Momentum was clearly used in a similar way to 
the other pages, for example, Momentum utilised diagnosis content at rates (92%) 
akin to the party page (90%).  
 
Image 36. 2017 Momentum use of diagnosis and 










Graph 116. Use of pledges (n=695) 
 
Although slightly more radical in its framing than the other pages, Momentum 
was still clearly centred on the public during the election campaign. Across Graph’s 
117, 118 and 119 framing approaches are seen in detail. Content was designed to 
cause reaction and influence people’s broader political discussions and positions, 
but not be so radical as to become insular and incapable of spreading. Of interest 
is that the differences between the permanent campaign and the 2017 election 
appear to be relatively minimal. The page uses a set approach to problems and 
solutions across both temporal periods for internal and external campaigning. 
However, the increased use of negative problem is defined (+8pp), why we should 
solve this problem (+7pp) and motivation (+7pp), signals how the group was using 
































































































































































 Momentum features incredibly short text messages, while videos are 
conversely rather long. This is because the organisation used several long 
Facebook Live videos in 2017, these included training videos of how to campaign 
on the doorstep, a 2-hour promotion of registering to vote and a long-form interview 
with Corbyn. Momentum’s use of Facebook Live to organise and teach virtual 
members is a truly novel application of social media to an election campaign. It 
points to the interesting approaches the group takes towards activism online and 
offline. Excluding these longer approaches Momentum’s video length is like the 
other Labour pages, shorter videos are becoming the norm. Momentum’s video 
length was much shorter across the 2018 permanent campaign; videos were less 
complex with reduced uses of novel instances such as Facebook Live.  
 


























153 12 114 00:02:54 60% 31% 9% 
Momentum page 
2018 
120 13 62 00:01:15 44% 51% 5% 
Labour Party 
page 
278 37 277 00:01:45 68% 25% 7% 
Jeremy Corbyn 
page 
144 50 98 00:01:33 58% 35% 7% 
 
 
Overall, Momentum reflected many of the approaches seen across the other 
Labour pages especially during the election campaign. Momentum presented a 
friendlier more accessible face to the public during the election campaign, a broader 
approach reflective of Labour’s wider campaign vision. However, when internally 






Personalisation and rhetoric, a Momentum form? 
 
 As a group founded to support Corbyn and his politics, Momentum 
understandably heavily featured Corbyn in 2017, 36% of Momentum content praised 
Corbyn in contrast to 15% for the party page. Momentum had an explicit goal of 
promoting the leader, with Corbyn featuring in nearly as many videos via Momentum 
(30%) as via his own leader page (38%). Corbyn was also consistently referenced 
in the small amount of text Momentum content featured (16%). The former Labour 
leader appears front and centre in Momentum’s campaign, with the group clearly a 
satellite of Corbyn rather than the Labour Party page. 
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Graph 121. Praise of leader (n=695) 
 
 During the permanent campaign, there was a clear shift away from 
representing Corbyn. Although praise was still high (22%), use of Corbyn declined 
rapidly especially in video (-29pp) and text (-16pp). Momentum clearly saw value in 
promoting Corbyn across both the election and the permanent campaign, however 
the group saw greater value in using the leader during the election to energise 
activism and increase message reach. Nevertheless, praise continued to be very 
high during the permanent campaign (22%), showing how positive personalisation 
was central to Momentum’s internal campaign. Negative personalisation was also 
heavily used by Momentum. 29% of 2017 election content negatively appraised 
opposition leader/s, with usage rates slightly above those seen by the leader page 
(26%), but far ahead of the party page (11%). Although negative personalisation 
rates were similar between Corbyn and Momentum’s page in 2017, the way these 
attacks were carried out varied enormously. Given their position as a satellite page, 
Momentum was able to engage in humorous attack lines against opposition leaders, 








































Graph 122. Negative personalisation, use of opposition leader by form (n=695) 
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Momentum’s criticism of political leaders was not just political but also 
included attacks on personality. For example, Theresa May was attacked for being 
like Alan Partridge and thus uncool. Momentum charged their negative leadership 
content with personalised antagonistic criticisms, rather than the more purely 
political nature of Corbyn or the party page’s criticisms. Thus, although all the 
Labour pages used negative personalisation, Momentum utilised the form with true 
hyperbolic venom. This approach was clearly a tactic to energise and activate virtual 
members and potential supporters. Momentum’s permanent campaign saw a large 
drop off in negative personalisation. This again suggests how the organisation 
switched from broader and catchier electorally focussed public content, towards a 
permanent role aimed at closer-knit existing (and potentially official) supporters.  
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Chapter 6 showed that while use of leaders is high, elements of true 
personalisation are lacking during election campaigns. Leaders are used as 
figureheads with genuine personality diminished. Momentum bucks this trend, as 
the groups rates of real personalisation are akin to Corbyn’s page. The use of 
personal messages is high at 21% of 2017 content, compared to 13% of Corbyn’s 
content. First-person language (46%) was also high, with rates over double the party 
page (19%) and even higher than Corbyn’s page (40%). Momentum used highly 
personalised language, offering ownership to the viewer in the way information and 
ideas are discussed. Further, when leaders or politicians were used, they often 
spoke personally from the heart. Momentum’s personalisation approach presented 
a more genuine face to the public, without the hinderance of stultifying 
professionalism or traditional rhetoric. It was also a clear electoral approach as 
changes across the permanent campaign are stark. The use of personalised 
elements drops considerably, first-person language (-34pp) dropped especially. As 
such personalised informal communications were a clear set style of Momentum’s 
attempts to reach out to a wider body of Facebook users.  
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Image 37. 2017 Momentum use of opposition MP’s87 
Graph 126. Use of opposition politicians (n=695) 
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In examining the use of party and opposition politicians during the 2017 
General Election, Momentum uses Labour’s wider base of politicians at similar rates 
to Corbyn’s page. Rates are relatively low, with it clear that Facebook is a platform 
primarily used for the promotion of leaders not party politicians. The trends changed 
across the permanent campaign. Momentum became much more ready to use party 
politicians and opposition politicians (+8pp use of party politician in text, +9% in use 
of opposition politician in video). These trends are partly tied to both the #JC9 
campaign as well as the local elections. The increased use of party and opposition 
party politicians was part of a clear strategy to energise membership support and 
increase politician awareness for internal campaigns. 
  










































Graph 128. Use of humour in detail (n=695) 
 
Humour was underutilised by the party and leader pages during the 2017 
General Election; this is not the case with Momentum. 25% of all the content sent 
by Momentum in 2017 featured some form of humour, this contrasts with only 3% 
for the Labour Party page and 7% for Corbyn. The humour used was broader, as it 
encompassed meme, general and political humour at high rates. As such humour 
was used to broaden the potential reach of political information, as political humour 
was often merged with meme style humour. For example, in Set 1 a screen cap of 
a video entitled ‘Theresa May is just like Alan Partridge’ can be seen. Video’s such 
as these melded pop culture and politics together and were very popular. The most 
popular Momentum video entitled ‘Tory Britain 2030’ with the by-line ‘Brutal 
response 😂 (wait for it)’, received 13,000,000 views and well over 100,000 
shares88. Through these humorous video’s Momentum achieved true virality while 
also pushing political messages. The use of humour clearly shows Momentum was 
 















































trying to reach a different audience in a different way, fulfilling a role Corbyn or the 
party page could not. Given their success, the high rates in the use of humour 
continued across the permanent campaign, although there was some decline (-
10pp). As such, the permanent campaign was likely not just solely focused on virtual 
members. Through humour, the group continued to try and reach out to wider 
audiences but also activate the base. 
 
 
Image 38. 2017 Momentum use of humour and  
relaxed language in non-video content89 
Image 39. 2017 Momentum use of humour and 
 relaxed language in video content90 
 
The use of meme style humour, an approach not seen in the party or leader 
page’s, shows the unique way Momentum was communicating and who they were 
trying to reach. Momentum adopted the internet style of meme pages seen on 
Facebook, with their communications mirroring popular pages such as Lad Bible. 
As Dennis argues, Momentum “draws on a youthful, digitally-enabled civic 
vernacular that exists online. Whereas party political campaigning online often 
replicates professional norms refined across other media (Lilleker et al., 2017), 
Momentum embraces the humour and irony that typifies the social web” (Dennis, 
2019, p.98). Momentum was aping a stylistic approach designed to engage younger 










Graph 129. Use of rhetorical tools (n=695) 
 
Momentum also utilised a large array of rhetorical tools; however, rates of 
use were generally far below the other party pages. Party catch phrase use was 
particularly minimal (6%), showing how Momentum is a force apart from the official 
party and leader pages, where use was particularly common (69% leader, 80% party 
page). Repetition is seen (29%) with use higher than the party (22%), but lower than 
the leader page (44%), us versus them rhetoric is also favoured (24%) but again is 
seen less than both leader (39%) and party pages (38%). The lack of rhetorical tools 
is in part due to Momentum’s style, text is fleeting with the organisation utilising a 
straightforward seemingly non-political approach favouring brevity over rhetoric. 
This rejection of traditional rhetoric is further seen in the utilisation of other 
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Examining the permanent campaign, there was a slight increase in rhetoric, the use 
of traditional political rhetoric appears to be favoured when Momentum is 
campaigning towards a smaller more political audience.  
 
Graph 130. Use of rhetorical tools (n=695) 
 
Overall, Momentum is clearly not a traditional campaign page; approach uses 
fewer formal communications. Momentum’s professionalism is separate from that 
of the other pages, as its professionalization is in its ‘internet style’ communications, 
humour and nonchalance, as opposed to formal rhetorical political dialogue. 
Momentum heavily uses personalisation, Corbyn is widely represented and praised. 
However, alongside this figurehead use of the leader, the group also used more 
genuinely personalised approaches such as personal stories and language. This 
approach, alongside a focus on humour and informal communications approaches, 
shows Momentum as a page apart. The group used a novel communications 
approach to draw in a different type of support during the election, as well as to 
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7.3: Momentum’s participation approaches 
  
Given the use of party action topic content, Momentum clearly operates as a 
distinctive tool to the other Labour pages, the page focuses on a different audience 
and speaks in a dissimilar way. This uniqueness is more clearly manifested when 
examining participation content in detail. 
 
Does Momentum focus on partisanship and praise? 
 
Labour focuses on depiction; this extends to the depiction of party activists 
and members with Momentum also using the form. Graph 131 shows that across 
Momentum’s 2017 election posts, 20% of post in-text elements featured ordinary 
party members. However, use was not much higher than the other pages (17% 
leader, 16% party page). Momentum, like the other party pages, was more 
interested in representing the general public rather than members during the 2017 
campaign. Reflecting earlier findings that Momentum is less interested in identity 
issues than one may expect, use of minority party members was seen less via 
Momentum (9%) than the other pages (16% party page, 12% leader). The only 
instance in which Momentum tried harder to represent membership diversity was 
via their depiction of minority Labour politicians (2%). Overall, during the election 
Momentum are shown to be interested in party member depiction at rates like the 

























































































































Use of ordinary party members Use of minority ordinary party members Use of male politician of same party
Use of Female politician of same party Use of LGBT politician Use of Disabled politician
Use of minority politician of same party
357 
 
Across the permanent campaign increases were seen in Momentum’s use 
of ordinary party members (+5pp) and minority ordinary party members (+9pp). 
This increase coincided with the organisation engaging in a campaign to “support 
and train 250 young BAME Momentum members from across the country in 
media and campaigning skills” (Josette, 2019). In 2018, Momentum became more 
interested in representing the diversity of Labour and Momentum members. This 
trend reflects a swing away from trying to reach the broader public, to drawing in 
new diverse grassroots members. 























Graph 133. Partisanship, party praise in detail (n=695) 
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Image 40. 2018 Momentum use of alt/far-right figure91 
 
Examining 2017 election approaches to praise and negativity, use of praise 
is very stable across the pages. Momentum generally follows the leader and party 
page in praising campaigners, members and certain MP’s. However, the different 
Labour pages supported very diverse types of MP’s. Momentum put great effort 
into supporting left-wing pro-Corbyn MP’s such as Rebecca Long-Bailey. In 
contrast, the Labour Party page focused on certain core shadow Cabinet 
members like John Ashworth; while Corbyn’s page focused on important 
politically allied politicians like John McDonnell and Diane Abbott. The different 
pages optimised their use of MP’s for their intended audience.  
In the negative use of opposition MP’s Momentum’s use (5%) was higher 
than the party page (3%), but reflective of the leader page’s approach (6%). One 
area of interest was Momentum’s negative appraisal of Tony Blair, with 1% of 
content during the election campaign negative about the previous Labour Prime 
Minister. This internal partisanship shows that the political battle within Labour 
 






was not totally called off during the election campaign, with Blair negatively used 
by Momentum to activate virtual members and potential voters. Overall, Labour 
ran a positive campaign in terms of generating partisan sentiment, any negativity 
against the opposition centred on the use of opposition leaders, not politicians or 
party members.  
Momentum’s use of partisanship changed during the permanent 
campaign. Momentum became a more radical group in 2018. Their push towards 
internal politics shifted approach from a campaign page used to reach broader 
demographics, to an internal political tool. 3% of 2018 content saw Momentum 
being negative about other Labour politicians, this internal partisanship direction 
is very important for understanding the role and importance of permanent satellite 
campaigns. Momentum has already enacted many changes within Labour, with 
the influence the group exercised after the 2017 election important for 
appreciating how the Labour Party campaigned (and failed) in 2019. Outside of 
internal critique, Momentum pushed all forms of partisanship more during the 
permanent campaign. This also included the novel negative appraisal of alt-right 
figures (7%). Momentum, through approaches like these, was speaking to a 
smaller more partisan audience, focused on activating them for Labour’s internal 
elections. 
Overall, Momentum focused on partisanship and praise to a similar degree 
to the other Labour pages during the election campaign. The page like the others 
was clearly focused on reaching outside their own membership or virtual 
members. In contrast, Momentum’s approach shifted post-election, the group 
refocused on internal campaigns and were happy to train their guns on the right-
wing of the party itself. Momentum’s success in the #JC9 campaign showed how 
they energised their supporters. This success from internal satellite campaigning 











Momentum’s links, internal or external?  
 
 Chapter 5 showed Labour and the Conservative’s to be disinterested in 
getting users to leave their Facebook page during the election campaign. Equally, 
within Labour during the 2017 election campaign, party websites were not heavily 
pushed by either the leader (15%) or party page (12%). Momentum breaks this 
trend as they heavily pushed their party websites (53%), they were focussed on 
activating and organising their online support. Momentum promoted participation 
extensively, with the group happy for users to be guided off their Facebook 
content onto party websites. This is because a core goal was participation not just 
information. In contrast to the use of party websites, Momentum used lower rates 
of calls to visit other websites (5%), than the party (12%) or leader page (15%). 
The central reason is because Momentum did not extensively link the UK 
Government’s register to vote website. The registration drive was mainly seen via 
the party and leader websites. The lack of this registration drive is because 
Momentum’s approach was dualistic, the page centred on informing the broader 
public as well as activating their virtual members, a group who given they are 
politically interested are more likely to be registered. Finally, the use of calls to 







Graph 135. Calls to visit locations (n=695) 
 
Momentum’s 2018 permanent campaign saw pushes to get users to visit 
party websites decline considerably (-30pp), while calls to visit other websites 
increased (+22pp). This is because of news links; during the permanent campaign 
the group was less concerned about driving its audience off the platform to non-
party websites for participation. Nevertheless, although seeing considerable 
decline, the continued high number of party website links (23%), at rates seen 
above the other Labour pages during the election campaign, shows the always 
on nature of Momentum. The group were continually searching for new members, 
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Image 41. 2017 Momentum use of link 
 to party website for shop92 
 
Graph 136 outlines the external links, and Graph 137 the internal links, 
used by the pages. It is important to note that some of the difference between 
Graphs 135 & 136 is because Momentum would often not provide a physical link 
to the web-location they pushed a user to visit. Examining external links, 31% of 
2017 Momentum content linked to a party webpage, much higher than the party 
(12%) and leader page (3%). While, in contrast external webpage links were lower 
(6%) compared to the party (12%) and leader page (14%). Novel use of hashtags 
is more readily seen via Momentum, 16% of Momentum’s 2017 content used the 
form, more than Corbyn (10%) or the party page (2%). The use of hashtags 
speaks to how Momentum was more up to date with communication tools, as use 
allowed Momentum to tie in Twitter and wider internet trends with their Facebook 
content. No links were seen to Instagram or YouTube, if YouTube content was 
used it was reissued via Facebook video.  
 
92https://www.facebook.com/PeoplesMomentum/photos/a.160217227657006/458617567816969
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Examining the permanent campaign, Momentum’s approach was similar, 
although there was a large rise in news link content (+21pp) and a slight increase 
in alternative media links (+3pp). As campaign activists who created election 
content left the group, the page relied more on the content of others. The 
increased use of news content shows that resources were more limited, with news 
key for the permanent campaign due to ease of use. Further, during the 
permanent campaign, the page was much more willing to push users into the 
wider internet media system, showing the group to be less concerned about 
keeping users on their own content.  
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Examining internal links during the 2017 General Election. Momentum did 
not extensively link to any party Facebook page (8%), with rates like the party 
page (12%) but far below Corbyn’s page (31%). Momentum was more self-
isolated within the wider Facebook Labour network. Momentum, if it did internally 
link, linked to other non-Labour Facebook pages, these included people such as 
Owen Jones or celebrities such as Stormzy. This is interesting as approach 
shifted across the 2018 permanent election, with an increase of party page links 
(15%). The reason for this is because during the campaign Momentum was trying 
to connect to certain areas of Facebook’s wider network, promoting audience 
exchange. During the permanent campaign we saw the internal #JC9 campaign. 
To push their candidates, Momentum used more party Facebook page links to 
get supporters to campaign across various Labour pages. This mirrors the way 
Corbyn used links to the opposition across the 2017 General Election, but in an 
internally partisan manner.  























Facebook data Give phone number
Give location Give name






Data gathering practises were slightly lower via Momentum (9%) than for 
the leader page (15%), but higher when compared to the party page (5%). 
Momentum was clearly interested in gathering information from supporters, 
however this was mostly location information, because Momentum’s tool 
‘mynearestmarginal.com’ pushed users for location ID. The data shows that 
Momentum was driving individuals to their websites for other functions such as 
organisation, rather than for data gathering. Overall, it appears Labour centrally 
used Corbyn to gather data, with this a smart move because of the huge array of 
new support the leader brought in. The use of data gathering is also only seen 
during election time. Momentum did not see value in trying to gather information 
of the smaller core group of supporters that engage with content across the 
permanent campaign (0% of content).  
Overall, Momentum in contrast to the party and leader pages, favours 
external links to internal links across both the 2017 election and 2018 permanent 
campaign. This shows the differentiated role the page has from the traditional 
Facebook campaign, Momentum are utilising their audience in a different manner, 
with the page much more comfortable sending viewers off Facebook because 
participation is a central focus. The group truly believed in the power of Facebook 
to reach out to and organise virtual members and the wider public. 
 
Is Momentum using participatory practises? 
 
 As suggested earlier from the lack of external links, as shown in Graph 
139, during the 2017 campaign Momentum was much less concerned with getting 
people to register to vote (3%), than the party (14%) or leader (11%) page. 
Momentum’s limited voter registration efforts were centrally targeted at younger 
people, rather than the general approach seen via the other Labour pages. 
Instead of voter registration, Momentum concentrated on participation via getting 
viewers to visit campaign pages. The group showed a focus on a different class 
of audience than the party and leader page. Rather than the less likely registered, 
less politically attentive mass public; Momentum was centrally targeting both a 
wider band of the politically interested radical public, alongside virtual members. 






‘mynearestmarginal.com’ and ‘Momentum.org’. In contrast, only 3% for the leader 
and 12% for the party page did the same function. These pages, especially 
‘mynearestmarginal’, engaged in open ended ‘just turn up’ style electoral 
participation, promoting doorstep campaigning within important marginal seats. 
Momentum was clearly utilising a more fluid structure towards participation and 
organisation, showing some elements of what Margetts labelled the Cyber Party 
(2001).  
Graph 139. External to Facebook non-member forms of online participation 
(n=695) 
 
Examining the permanent campaign, interest in getting users to visit 
campaign pages was markedly lower (-34pp) but still used (13%), while 
registration efforts declined further (1%). This is due to both the local elections 
and the #JC9 campaign, effort was clearly proportional to both the importance of 





















are more likely to be official members and thus registered voters. Equally, the lack 
of party website use suggests Momentum’s internal party election campaign was 
using other traditional avenues such as email or meetings.  
Image 42. 2017 Momentum use of link to party  
website for volunteering93 
 
Other online forms of participation were also popular across both the 
election and permanent campaign. Graph 140 shows Momentum’s 2017 
campaign use of other approaches to online participation (7% total), was much 
higher than the other Labour pages (1% total). In terms of Momentum’s focus, 
although signing petitions (1%) and a shop (1%) saw minimal use, funding was a 
clear area of interest (5%). Momentum was trying to monetarily capitalise on its 
newfound online support. This use of crowdfunding during an election campaign 
is novel, most groups gather resources before a campaign starts. The approach 
worked however, as the group raised £260,000 across the one-month 
campaign94. During the 2018 permanent campaign, use of some online 
 
93 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=444532175892175 accessed 10/10/2019 
94 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/04/labours-momentum-raises-250000-in-six-






participation forms increased such as interactive polls (+5pp), while others fell 
back such as funding (-4pp). Permanent campaign participation efforts thus 
transitioned from website-based forms to Facebook based forms, with a focus on 
less committal participation. 
Graph 140. Other external to Facebook non-member forms of online participation 
(n=695) 
 
Alongside a strong interest in pushing online forms of participation through 
Facebook activities and party websites, Momentum placed a huge amount of 
effort in getting supporters to volunteer and campaign offline. Graph 141 shows 
that during the 2017 General Election, Momentum was trying to use their virtual 






















virtual members and viewers to help doorstep campaign (48%), volunteer (49%) 
and sign up to campaign (42%). Momentum’s rates of participation content were 
considerably higher than the other Labour pages, for example 49% of 
Momentum’s content pushed for volunteering, vastly higher than the leader (2%) 
or party page (7%). Although much of this volunteering was filtered through 
Momentum’s websites, thus showing a more traditional style of organisation. 
Participation was also directly generated via Facebook. Events and protests were 
encouraged (2% total), while organic information dissemination was promoted 
through asking users to talk to their friends and family (10%). This was also seen 
via Corbyn’s page (6%), but much less commonly via the party page (2%).  
 
Image 43. 2017 Momentum call to talk to friends and family95 
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Momentum clearly believed in the power of individuals’ organic 
communications and the sociological model. A major example of this tactic was 
the group’s efforts in asking supporters to ‘talk to your grandparents’, pushing 
virtual members to phone up their family and persuade them of the importance of 
a Labour government. Momentum clearly threw itself into the idea that you can 
mobilise online support and break outside the echo-chamber, through utilising the 
genuine social networks individuals have. Usage of these offline participation 
forms radically dropped across the 2018 permanent campaign, for example 
volunteering fell by 42 percentage points. Nevertheless, Momentum’s offline 
participation efforts during 2018 (22% sum), were at similar levels to those seen 
across the party (22%) and leader (17%) pages during the 2017 election 
campaign. Momentum was still interested in getting supporters to participate 
offline during the permanent campaign, however priorities shifted towards easier 
online activism and information provision.  
Image 44. 2017 Momentum use of  
website and polling data96 
 
96https://www.facebook.com/PeoplesMomentum/photos/a.160217227657006.1073741829.1557






Examining calling for votes in Graph 142. Momentum across the 2017 
election was very much trying to reach a broad, but clearly more partisan, 
audience than the other Labour pages. Although Momentum did call for votes 
(12% in 2017), usage was well below the party (85%) and leader page (60%). 
The group was clearly not part of the traditional Facebook campaign, but was 
orientated as much around participation as novel approaches to information. 
Though Momentum was still trying to speak to a broad audience, it was clearly 
not as broad as the other Labour pages and far more partisan and politically 
engaged. During the permanent campaign calls for votes remained stable at 11%, 
while calls to join the party considerably increased to 17%. Given the context of 
both local and internal Labour elections, the group was trying to activate their 
broader audience and virtual members to join and vote, while stimulating their 
official members to vote in the Labour elections. Core membership pushes via 
Facebook therefore occur months before, or straight after an election. The low 
level of interest during election campaigns is likely due to the page’s not wanting 







Graph 142. External to Facebook non-member forms of offline participation 
(n=695) 
 
Overall, the Momentum campaign was dualistic. Momentum’s viral 
memetic information approach showed the group was trying to inform a broader 
younger radical public, de-aligned groups and radical voters who had drifted away 
from Labour. While equally, the group pushed open ended participation to activate 
this broader radical public, virtual members and their official members. 
Momentum’s approach did not care about official traditional networks of party 
membership, instead Momentum pushed for participation without boundaries. 
The data shows that Momentum was clearly interested in novel approaches to 
participation, rather than traditional avenues like those seen via the party and 
leader pages. The heavy use of Facebook to develop offline forms of participation, 
clearly shows a movement that was engaging in a cyber-party framework 
(Margetts, 2001), as well as citizen-initiated campaigning (Gibson, 2015). The 











































any barriers to individual’s participation, thus generating a novel system for online 
and offline Facebook campaigning. 
Image 45. 2018 Momentum call to join party97 
 
Does Momentum promote engagement? 
 
 Although party and leader pages showed minimal interest in participation, 
they did appreciate the social nature of share engagement to improve the power 
of their communications. Examining Momentum across the 2017 election, the 
promotion of sharing is also popular. 32% of Momentum content pushed users to 
share, as opposed to 59% for the party, and only 8% for the leader page. 
Approaches to engagement were stable across the 2017 election and 2018 
permanent campaign, with the promotion of shares slightly dipping by 3 
percentage points. Over time blanket calls to share are declining, it is possible 
that the Labour Party is experimenting using Corbyn’s page without the form. 
Given that the leader page receives far more engagement, the use of prompts for 
 






engagement may appear unnecessary, with page operators intending to 
maximise engagement via not using traditional style calls to engagement.  
Graph 143. Prompting of engagement forms (n=695) 
 
Across all the Labour pages’ engagement is shown to clearly be important. 
Labour in 2017 appreciated that the right sort of content, spread through the right 
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This is a system that is not easily replicable through other tools. For more internet 
savvy audiences, e.g. via Momentum and Corbyn’s page’s, engagement was less 
heavily pushed. While for more traditional Facebook content engagement was 
summarily prompted. Overall, engagement was used by Labour in a nuanced and 
subtle manner depending on page and audience. Labour pushed consistent (but 
undramatic) engagement via the party page, the leader page did not push 
engagement as it would appear impersonal, while Momentum engaged in a more 
speculative approach that sometimes led to impressive virality. Momentum 
wanted engagement but used pushes for engagement selectively, not at the risk 
of appearing demanding, obscuring the impact of content or looking impersonal.  
 
7.4: Conclusion  
What role does Momentum play in Labour’s Facebook campaign? 
 
Research question one asked the role Momentum has for Labour’s 
campaign. Examining the 2017 General Election, Momentum clearly had a 
differentiated style, intended audience and political goal to the other Labour 
pages. Momentum evidently fulfilled a specific role, with approach informed by 
the core goals of the group, and what it could offer to the wider Labour campaign. 
Through supporting the leader, promoting broad novel political information and 
focussing on participation and organisation, Momentum offered to the Labour 
campaign something that was not available before. Dennis notes that; 
“Momentum replicates some of the organizing and campaigning practices of 
political parties (Kreiss, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014)… and draws on the 
organizational practices and modes of engagement associated with social 
movements...” (2019, p.110). However, as this chapter has shown, Momentum 
does more than just replicate the organizing and campaigning practices of political 
parties. The group goes much further than the other party pages, showing a 
genuine interest in the power of social media to change political campaigning. 
Momentum may draw on the ‘organizing and campaigning practices of political 
parties’, but as is seen, through utilising novel approaches the group is taking 






Across information the page was less focussed on policy and political 
detail, instead the organisation focussed on broader political ideas, harnessing 
areas of major ideological cleavage. Momentum activated ideas not policy detail, 
using experts and celebrities to inform groups who were looking for more spirited 
political campaign discourse. Momentum was clearly trying to activate its own 
support, alongside left-wing partisans and young people. As Fraser Watt, a 
campaigns officer for London Young Labour asserted in 2017, “Labour appealed 
to a generation that came of age during the financial crisis” (Savage & Hacillo, 
2017). Momentum was also targeting people who had been pushed away by 
Labour’s previously centrist position, utilising a political platform and style that 
appeared anti-establishment and as far away from New Labour as possible. As 
Dennis notes, Momentum has worked hard to “position the organization as 
outsiders (see Watts & Bale, 2019), as they are simultaneously distinct from the 
norms and practices of Westminster politics but also dissimilar to competing 
factions” (2019, p.109). Overall, Momentum was clearly not targeting everyone, 
with their approach engaging, through virtual members, a wider group of the 
politically interested, who then in turn managed to reach the less politically 
interested. The groups viral success came organically from a combination of good 
content reaching the right initial, secondary, and then tertiary audience.  
Emma Rees, national organiser for Momentum stated in 2017, “we’re out 
engaging ordinary people, making politics feel like… not politics. It’s something 
the Tories could never replicate” (Rees, 2017). Momentum’s humorous, frivolous 
approach using a language heavy internet-users understood, led to Momentum 
reaching a different audience. As Adam Klug, one of the Momentum’s central 
team asserts, "we way beyond our own bubble – we only have 24,000 
members"98. McDowell-Naylor argues this more fluid ‘deterritorialization’ 
approach was important to Momentum’s success, as they could avoid the 
baggage of party bureaucracy (McDowell-Naylor, 2019). Indeed, through content 
designed to energise a broader partisan group that subsequently gained traction, 
Momentum achieved impressive virality. The group displayed the power of 
Facebook engagement, as well as the sociological nature of the platform, 
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breaking across many barriers. From a small core of under 300,000 virtual 
members, in the “last week of the campaign over 1 in 3 Facebook users in the UK 
watched an entire Momentum video. With the best performing video, ‘Tory Britain 
2020’, reaching 5.4 million views in just two days” (Momentum website, 201999). 
Thus, Momentum not only went viral to heavy internet users but also within the 
broader Facebook public. Momentum shows that consistent, negative, impactful 
and emotionally resonant messaging can spread unabated across a Facebook 
network population. Momentum’s information was hard to ignore, thus it 
subsequently reached voters across age, class, geography and political affiliation. 
Participation approaches showed the group wanted to activate virtual 
members and the broader public. Margetts’ (2001) cyber party model was clearly 
apparent. Whereas the other pages pushed traditional avenues of political 
participation. Momentum used Facebook as a source of human resources without 
interest in presenting hoops for potential activists to jump through. From heavily 
pushing Facebook users to visit Momentum websites, to online training sessions 
and pushes to organise online. Momentum struck a very different approach to the 
other party pages. Little interest was shown in Momentum enforcing membership 
or any systemic approach to the utilisation of virtual supporters offline. Instead the 
group enacted a ‘just turn up’ policy. This approach was in part adopted from the 
USA, as Bernie Sanders campaign was actively copied by Momentum (Rhodes, 
2019). The organisation was helped through direct advice from key Sanders 
campaign figures; Grayson Lookner, Jeremy Parkin, Kim McMurray, and Erika 
Uyterhoeven. these figures were brought in "to give advice in activist training 
sessions, focusing on sending activists to the right places and ensuring people 
turned out" (Savage & Hacillo, 2017).  
Momentum’s copying of Sanders campaign was dualistic. Penney states 
“while the “official” Sanders organization-built applications to transform supporters 
into a tightly controlled distribution network for its social media messaging, this 
was complemented by “unofficial” grassroots networks that circulated more 
informal and culturally oriented appeals” via “self-organized connective action in 
digital social movements” (2017, p.402). Similarly, Momentum utilised both semi-
official tools such as mynearestmaginal.com and the Momentum App, as well as 
 






engendering ‘just turn up’ Facebook delivered participation. Overall, Momentum’s 
online activity via Facebook was effective, “volunteers signed up online to help 
and were dispatched to nearby marginal seats” (Savage & Hacillo, 2017). 100,000 
people used the ‘mynearestmarginal’ app to canvass in key marginal seats 
(Momentum website, 2019100). As Tariq Parkes, activist and branch secretary in 
Hastings and Rye said, “we had 10 times more activists than in 2015… 
Momentum activists were at the college and the university – signing people up 
left, right and centre” (Savage & Hacillo, 2017). These offline activities are on top 
of other successes in online activation, such as in funding or in talking to friends 
and family. Momentum’s efforts for organic participation online and offline led to 
real results.  
One may question the value of the study of Labour and Momentum, as it 
may be argued to be a very specified example of a satellite campaign and thus 
offer little insight into other satellite campaigns. However, Momentum as an 
organisation is of direct pertinence to understanding other satellite campaigns 
from the activities of Latinos for Trump to Unison. This is because of the way 
Momentum uses social media and the goals it has, alongside its relationship to 
its mother organisation. Firstly, the findings from this chapter speak directly to 
other cases across the world, because although a left-wing group within a left-
wing party; Momentum’s approach is to activate support based around a selected 
in-group or an out-group through appropriate means. This is the same process 
that we see for other satellite campaign examples, including various identity 
focused Facebook pages that support Trump or activist pages create to support 
party factions. Content sent is specifically designed for the satellite campaigns 
purpose, for Momentum it is to gather and organise like-minded people to push 
for left-wing reform within Labour and during election times a Labour government. 
This goal is clearly seen in the content the organisation sent, showing that satellite 
pages have an ability to activate small but enthused audiences, including clear 
evidence that these individuals can be made to do complex campaign oriented 
activities such as doorstep campaigning. This is a vital finding that is of pertinence 
to understanding other satellite campaigns, as these capacities can be harnessed 
to achieve their disparate goals. Momentum proves that satellite pages have a 
 






clear content function that is going to continue to grow in importance, as the 
fracturing of audience online is pushing the need for a core Facebook campaign 
and a growing periphery of satellite campaign. The second key reason 
Momentum is a pertinent example is its relationship to the core Labour campaign. 
The group is part of big tent party that is representative of many larger parties of 
government seen across the world. Momentum is, like these other satellite 
campaigns, trying to navigate internal political struggles and seek greater 
influence. The dynamics of how Momentum operates across the permanent 
campaign as well as the election campaign gives wider insights into how satellite 
campaigns act within party structures. Momentum within the Labour campaign 
thus offers a powerful case of how satellite campaigns fit into the wider campaign, 
and how they allow a big tent party to address issues of political division and 
disillusion. 
Thus, although a specific party in a unique political circumstance, 
Momentum’s campaign within the Labour Party although not perfectly 
generalisable offers clear insight for other satellite campaigns worldwide. Across 
Momentum’s use as a satellite campaign, the permanent campaign and Janus-
faced campaigning, Facebook is not just adding to the campaign toolkit but does 
represent a fundamental change. Facebook has offered parties new avenues for 
their communications that were previously not available, with the implications of 
this impacting on the parties themselves. Overall, Momentum as a satellite 
campaign offered the Labour Party a source for new volunteers, a viral engaging 
source for information delivery and the capacity to reach different audiences. 
Table 38 overleaf outlines a comparison using the findings of this chapter, it 
clearly summarises the differences between the pages, and thus the exact 
function of the Momentum satellite campaign. 
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Table 38. Central approaches of the pages 
Approach Labour Party page Labour Leader page Momentum page 
Content structure Video  Video  Photo  Link Video Photo 
Structural forms Infographics 
Mainstream 
media 
Posters Government website Mainstream media Twitter, memes 
Topic choice 
frequency 
High topic frequency Medium topic frequency Medium topic frequency 
Topic choice diversity 
Specific focus on economy, health and social 
care, party action 
Broad focus but core approached towards economy, 
protection, health and social care, party action, 
leadership 
Specific focus on economy, protection, party action, 
leadership 
Policy detail and 
political information 
High policy detail 
High levels of positive political information 
High mixed sentiment, use of position issues 
Medium policy detail  
Negative mixed sentiment political information  
Low position issue use 
Low policy detail 
Negative mixed sentiment political information 
Medium negative use of position issues 
Expertise and 
celebrity 
Celebrity over expertise 
High celebrity use, low expertise use 
Celebrity over expertise  
High celebrity use, low expertise use 
Expertise over celebrity  
High use of both 
News media use 
Low negative mainstream media use 
Low reuse of external content  
Medium mainstream media use equally positive and 
negative 
Use of newspaper sources and newspaper sources via 
link  
Medium reuse of external content 
Medium mainstream media use, equally positive 
and negative 
Use of alternative media, polling 
High reuse of external content 
Depiction 
Use of women’s issues and depiction 
Low interest in minority depiction 
Balanced depiction of all age groups and issues 
associated especially the young  
Low use of general public’s voice  
High use of public and relevant workers 
Low interest in women’s issues and minority depiction,  
Depiction of all age groups and issues associated but 
focus on young and old people 
Low use of general public’s voice 
High use of ordinary public and relevant workers 
Low interest in women’s issues and minority 
depiction  
Depiction of all age groups and issues associated 
but focus on young, middle-aged and children 
High use of general public’s voice and relevant 
workers, but low use of ordinary public 
Framing 
More neutral than other pages, more positive 
than negative 
High focus on pledges, diagnosis, prognosis and 
motivation 
Short videos, medium length messages 
Mixed, equally negative and positive  
High focus on pledges, diagnosis, prognosis and 
motivation Short videos, long messages 
Bipolar, very positive and negative 
High focus on diagnosis and prognosis, low 
motivation content 







rhetoric and humour 
Some praise of leader, low use of Corbyn in 
content 
Low use of opposition leader, low negative 
appraisal of opposition,  
Low personalised language 
Low use of humour 
High use of rhetorical tools especially us versus 
them rhetoric, catch phrase, three-part lists, 
questions and repetition 
Low praise of Corbyn, high use of leader in video, 
imagery and text 
High use of opposition leader, high negative appraisal 
of opposition 
High personalised language 
Low use of humour 
Medium use of rhetorical tools especially us versus 
them rhetoric, catch phrase and repetition 
High praise of Corbyn, high use of leader in video, 
imagery and text 
High use of opposition leader, high negative 
appraisal of opposition 
High personalised language 
High use of humour 
Low use of rhetorical tools especially repetition and 
us versus them rhetoric 
Links 
Medium calls to visit party website 
Medium calls to visit other websites 
Medium party website links 
Low use of hashtags 
Low data gathering 
Medium party internal links, low opposition 
internal links 
Low links to other Facebook pages 
Low calls to visit party website 
Medium calls to visit other websites  
Low party website links 
Medium use of hashtags  
Medium data gathering 
High party internal links, high opposition internal links 
High links to other Facebook pages 
High calls to visit party website 
Low calls to visit other websites 
High party website links 
Medium use of hashtags 
Low data gathering 
Low party internal links, low opposition internal 
links 
High links to other Facebook pages 
Partisanship 
Medium use of party members  
High use of minority party members 
Medium praise of campaigners 
Medium use of party members 
Medium use of minority party members 
Medium praise of campaigners 
High use of party members 
Low use of minority party members 
High praise of campaigners 
Negative appraisal of same party leaders/MP’s 
Participatory 
practices 
Medium register to vote 
Low visit campaign page 
No other forms of online participation 
Low talk to friends 
High call for vote  
Low call to join party 
Medium register to vote 
Low visit campaign page 
No other forms of online participation 
Medium talk to friends 
Medium call for vote 
Low call to join party 
Low register to vote 
High visit campaign page 
Low other forms of online participation, polls, 
petitions, shop, medium calls for funding  
High help doorstep campaign, volunteer and sign-
up, Medium talk to friends 
Low call for vote or to join party 
Engagement 
Low interest in engagement 
High promotion of sharing 
Low interest in engagement 
Low promotion of sharing 
Low interest in engagement 






What are satellite campaigns used for during the 2018 permanent 
campaign? 
 
Research question two asked; what are satellite campaigns used for during 
the 2018 permanent campaign? It is important to note that Momentum’s role does 
not end at the election campaign, its role as a permanent campaign vehicle is as 
important. With the groups approach explaining how Labour changed from the 
inside after Corbyn’s rise to power. As Emma Rees, national organiser of 
Momentum asserted three weeks after the 2017 General Election, “…we’re entering 
permanent campaign mode... This must be the mentality of both Momentum and the 
Labour Party. If the wicked don’t rest then neither can we, and a permanent 
campaign footing – a sense that our movement is always both potent and fragile – 
is how we’ll keep up our guard while pushing for a new, emboldened politics” (Rees, 
2017). Momentum early on saw the value of the permanent campaign, however in 
reality the permanent campaign is not purely about beating the opposition as Rees 
alludes to above. Instead, the permanent campaign appears to have as much of an 
internal partisan role as an external role.  
Dennis noted the possibility of some element of campaign hybridity between 
an external election campaign focus, and then an internal permanent campaign 
focus (2019). Examining Momentum across 2018, the group clearly became an 
internal partisan campaign group. Across the #JC9 campaign, the organisation 
pushed for the left of Labour to be in supremacy, alongside securing Jeremy 
Corbyn’s premiership. In information approaches the permanent campaign saw the 
organisation focus on a smaller more partisan blend of political areas. Leadership 
content declined as Corbyn’s position stabilised after the election success, while the 
page was trying to reach and inform a less broad audience. In participation, 
Momentum’s strategy adjusted towards smaller scale activation of party members, 
campaigning directly to these individuals to help elect the #JC9. Momentum 
switched from a page trying to reach and organise a larger base, to a place for the 
activation and organisation of a smaller band of engaged users. 
The internal political dimension of satellite campaigns also presents new 
questions for parties like Labour. As Dommett and Temple state; “satellite 
campaigns also raise multiple questions regarding party control, specifically in terms 






has been argued that “satellite campaigns appeal to activists who consider 
themselves as ‘doers’ and not ‘joiners’ (Scarrow, 2015). If these satellite campaigns 
become more embedded in the campaign landscape in the long term; negotiating 
the boundary between a satellite and central party page will become key (Dommett 
& Temple, 2018). This is because satellite campaigns can change the nature of the 
mother party.  
In Momentum’s case there have been consistent tensions between the group 
and many of the Parliamentary Labour Party, with this often playing out on social 
media. Although the Parliamentary Labour Party has re-asserted control via Keir 
Starmer’s election, despite a great challenge Labour has changed dramatically 
since Corbyn was elected. Today a large segment of membership consistently 
supports Corbyn-style politics, with groups like Momentum playing an important role 
in policy direction. This political makeup did not develop in isolation, groups such as 
Momentum have been pushing for radical change from the inside for three years. 
Facebook has given satellite campaign groups a novel avenue for influence, with 
Momentum’s skill on social media leading to continued relevance. This will lead to 
a strange party-political dynamic as the left continues to maintain influence online, 
whilst the right maintains structural power.  
Despite this ideological battle, it is important to note the importance of both 
wings working together. In 2017, the party found an appropriate balance between 
left-wing radical and centrist moderate vision. This was successful sold to the public 
through smart use of pages in a Janus-faced way. However, by 2019 the left of the 
party was in total control, the left took the wrong lessons from 2017. Success was 
attributed to themselves, rather than a big-tent left and right collective effort, an 
approach this thesis has shown. between. This led to hubris and failure, during the 
campaign there was a less moderate approach across the different Labour pages. 
For example, Corbyn’s page became more like Momentum’s meaning the party was 
speaking in a more extreme manner. Labour thus failed to “reach or win over a wide 
enough range of voters”, recreating a more insular version of the radical elements 
of the 2017 campaign (Labour Together Report, 2020). 
As Rees argues, “political transformation isn’t bracketed by electoral cycles… 
this is how we’ll transform Britain. Not merely by occupying the halls of Westminster, 
but by bringing politics into the community” (Rees, 2017). Momentum is now a 






influence Labour. Momentum is becoming a core part of the Labour movement with 
this largely due to Momentum’s permanent campaign practices. Table 39 outlines 
the approach Momentum took across the 2017 General Election and 2018 








Table 39. Comparison of Momentum’s permanent vs. electoral campaign approach 
Approach Election campaign Permanent campaign 
Audience Broader public, but continuing focus on members and virtual members Focus on core support, members and virtual members 
Content structure Heavy use of video, some photo no link content Video but in lower quantity, less photo but much more link content 
Topic choice 
Medium topic complexity, core issues of; party action, leadership, 
economy and protection. Core issues favoured over smaller issues. 
Medium topic complexity, core issues of; party action, leadership, 
economy and apolitical. Core issues see decline to benefit of partisan 
issues. 
Policy detail and 
political information 
Low policy detail, but lots of more general political information. 
Approach bipolar very positive and negative. Low use of position issues 
Low policy detail, but lots of more general political information. 




Expertise over celebrity. Medium use of experts and heavy use of 
celebrities 
Expertise over celebrity. Heavy use of experts and low use of celebrities 
News media use 
Medium news use, mainstream media used via sources not links, use of 
polling 
High news use, mainstream media and newspapers used via sources 
and links, use of alternative media, attacks on media 
Depiction 
Low interest in depicting smaller groups, only interest in in larger age 
groups. Focus on young people and middle-aged depiction. Focus across 
all age groups in issues used. Heavy use of general public’s voice and 
relevant public workers. Medium use of ordinary public. 
Low but larger interest in depicting smaller groups, only interest in in 
larger age groups. Focus on middle-aged people depiction. Focus on 
young people and child issues in issues used. Medium use of general 
public’s voice. Large use of general public’s voice and relevant public 
workers. Large use of ordinary public. 
Framing 
Overall positive, but uses bipolar sentiment, is rarely neutral. Focus on 
diagnosis of problems and prognosis of how to fix them. Longer videos. 
Overall, more negative but uses bipolar sentiment. Focus on diagnosis 







rhetoric and humour 
Heavy use of leader in video and text, medium in image content, 
alongside consistent praise of Corbyn. High use of opposition leaders. 
High use of genuine personalised communications, first person 
language and personal messages. Low use of party and opposition 
politicians. Heavy use of humour, especially political humour. Medium 
use of rhetorical tools. 
Heavy praise of Corbyn, but low use of leader in video, image and text 
content. Low use of opposition leaders. Medium use of genuine 
personalised communications, first person language and personal 
messages. Medium use of party and opposition politicians. Medium use 
of humour, especially political humour. High use of rhetorical tools. 
Links 
High use of calls to visit party website, low calls to visit another website. 
Low news links. Medium data gathering. Low party internal link use, 
medium another page internal link use. 
Medium use of calls to visit party website, medium calls to visit another 
website. Medium news links. No data gathering. Medium party internal 
link use, low another page internal link use. 
Partisanship 
Medium use of ordinary party members, low use of minority party 
members. Low praise of members, medium praise of campaigners, low 
negative appraisal of opposition MP’s. 
High use of ordinary party members, medium use of minority party 
members. High praise of members, high praise of campaigners, high 
negative appraisal of opposition MP’s. Use of anti-figures e.g. Alt-right. 
Participatory 
practices 
Low interest in registering people to vote. High interest in getting users 
to visit a campaign page. Medium interest in other forms of online 
participation. High interest in promoting offline participation, especially 
volunteering and signing up to campaign. Medium interest in calling for 
vote or asking to join the party. 
Low interest in registering people to vote. Low interest in getting users 
to visit a campaign page. Medium interest in other forms of online 
participation. Low/medium interest in promoting offline participation, 
medium interest in volunteering and signing up to campaign. Medium 
interest in calling for vote, medium interest in asking to join the party. 






Is Labour engaged in Janus-Faced campaigning? 
 
Research question three asked; was Labour engaged in Janus-faced 
campaigning? Labour was utilising both a traditional Facebook campaign, as well 
as a new methods campaign. Labour’s approach to Facebook showed capacities 
for both “controlled interactivity” (Freelon, 2017) as seen via the Labour Party page, 
and “self-organised movements” (Penney, 2017) as seen via Momentum. Across 
the two pages that made up the traditional Facebook campaign. The Labour Party 
page was the positive ‘official’ professionalised presence of the party on Facebook, 
it focussed on detailed political information of a core array of electorally important 
topics. The page was designed for the public, linking mainly to government and party 
websites, using catch phrases, celebrity over expertise, and focusing on infographic 
videos. The page focussed on information over participation, depictions of the public 
and fact over emotion, with any focus on participation surrounding the act of voting 
and registering to vote.  
Within the traditional Facebook campaign, across the leader page element, 
Jeremy Corbyn’s page was a mixed sentiment leadership vehicle for a more radical 
and emotional version of the party page’s politics. Both negative and positive, and 
often targeting opposition leaders. The page focused on a broader array of political 
topics, through more varied structural approaches that featured less political detail 
but used more emotion and personalised communication. The page was designed 
to activate the public, using celebrities over expertise, public depiction, mainstream 
media content and a focus on information over participation. Internal links were 
common, while participation was focussed towards voting and registering to vote. 
Corbyn was vital to both his personal page and Momentum’s campaign, as Matt 
Zarb-Cousin, Corbyn’s former spokesman stated, “he was much more recognised 
as an opposition leader than Ed Miliband” (Savage & Hacillo, 2017). 
Outside of the traditional Facebook campaign, we saw Labour utilising new 
methods through its satellite campaign Momentum. Momentum’s page was 
designed for a combination of core virtual members and the radical public. An 
innovative vehicle for participation, the group pushed for fluid, barrier free, online 
and offline participation. Their approach to information was emotive, humorous and 
deliberately lacked detail, content was often video based, mixed in sentiment, using 






virality. Focussing on a few core areas especially leadership and party action, 
political information was ideological and general, but used expertise over celebrity. 
Partisanship was pushed and campaigners praised, with the page splitting from 
Labour’s recent past to speak successfully to a new audience of younger people. 
Keen to use the public as its voice when using its own narrative, Momentum used 
an ‘internet style’ in its communications.  
Momentum offered Labour many benefits. One of the major ones is a new 
resource for activists. As Dommett & Temple contend; “Enos and Hersh’s work 
(2015) has shown parties’ reliance on members that are unrepresentative of the 
general public can prove counterproductive in attempts to campaign” (2018, p.198). 
Momentum through its more fluid approach to activism, offered to the Labour 
campaign a new online and offline resource that could be harnessed. These 
younger individuals were also more diverse and active online, capable of 
appreciating how to help content go viral, and more technologically competent than 
average Labour activists. Momentum also offered innovation. As Dommett and 
Temple assert, satellite campaigns are “organisations less restricted by legal 
requirements and responsibilities, these bodies have the space to innovate and trial 
new tools that parties may be wary of promoting” (2018, p.196). Momentum were 
radical, using humour and a less serious nature to create engaging content, they 
could use less stringent sources and campaign more around ideas than policies. 
This offered Labour fluidity in the messages they could be sending, as they already 
had policy covered by the party page, and leadership covered by Corbyn’s page.  
Overall, Labour ran a successful 2017 General Election campaign, “…people 
felt Labour’s message was authentic and speaking to them and their lives. You see 
that in things like the polling on what policies people recall – they recalled positive 
offers from the Labour party and negative things about the Conservatives” – Labour 
campaign source, 2017101. Part of this was because Labour was communicating to 
people via Facebook through varied and appropriate ways. Labour was using 
different pages with different approaches to reach different audiences, presenting 
different faces of the same political party to the public. With the successful 
implementation of this strategy likely at the centre of Labour’s 2017 campaign 
success. While their failure to utilise the same system as effectively in 2019 appears 
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a likely part of their failure. This will need to be studied in detail, with it clear that in 
2017, Labour was using Momentum, the party and leader pages in different ways 
for different purposes. Table 40 outlines Labour’s approach to Janus-faced 
campaigning via the party, leader and Momentum pages. It is vital we appreciate 
this new phenomenon. This is because the evidence suggests that campaigning is 
not blending particularly between offline and online, or through traditional and new 
media forms (as per Chadwick, 2013). Instead, Facebook campaigns are becoming 
more distinct from other approaches, with greater internal complexity.  
Overall, this chapter has shown satellite campaigns and Janus-faced 
campaigning to be new core approaches to how parties are using Facebook. 
Although multi-faceted approaches are not revolutionary, their use via Facebook 
represents a huge evolutionary leap in how parties are campaigning on the platform. 
Momentum are revealing the future direction of campaigns, because they clearly 
engage with the idea that online activity can lead to offline action. Lines were blurred 
between online activism and offline action, with the party interested in more fluid 
conceptions of membership and how to run a political campaign. At the edges of the 
Labour campaign we are therefore seeing the rise of new methods in Facebook use, 
as well as the lines of distinction between online and offline campaigning being 
blurred. As such, further study of Momentum must occur given they are altering how 







Table 40. 2017 General Election Labour party-controlled Janus-faced campaigning of three core pages  
 Party controlled 
Theme Traditional Facebook campaign New method example 
Page type Party Page Leader Page ‘Party movement satellite campaign’ 
Party Control Central office control Central office and leader office controlled Party-linked and influenced but operates via Momentum offices 
Example Labour Party Page Jeremy Corbyn Page Momentum Page 
Target audience Public Facebook users 
Public Facebook users, virtual members and 
supporters 
Centrally virtual members and supporters but also public 
Attitude to parent 
organisation 
Represents Labour officially 
Represents Labour officially, but represents leader 
specifically 
Internally partisan represents Labour left-wing 
Information or 
participation focus 
Information Information Participation 
Information approach 
Broad public focus, focus on core important 
policy and political information 
Broad public focus, focus on wide policy, core policy 
and political information 
Mixed focus on public and supporters, focus on political information but not 
on policy detail 
Participation approach 
Broad public focus - Focus on participation as 
voting 
Broad public focus - Focus on participation as 
attendance of events and as voting 
Narrow focus on virtual members – Focus on participation via organising 
virtual members and official party members to campaign offline 
Goal 
Promote Labour Party policy and ideas, win 
elections for Labour 
Promote Labour Party policy and ideas, win elections 
for Labour, promote Corbyn as leader 
Promote Momentum membership, Corbyn as leader and the left of the 
Labour Party 
Professionalisation 
Is a professionalised entity using bespoke 
content in a formal style 
Is a professionalised entity using bespoke content in 
a formal style 
Is less professionalised entity, uses some bespoke content, but also reissues 
others content, also utilises a less formal approach including the use of an 
‘internet’ style and humour 
Sense of self Formal party Formal party leader 
Grassroots organisation viewed as a ‘movement’ with direct relationship with 
the people 
Personalisation Depersonalised, Corbyn absent Corbyn heavily personalised and used Corbyn heavily personalised and used 
Sources 
Labour website’s, mainstream news via video 
edited content 
Labour website’s, mainstream news via video edited 
content, news links 
Twitter screencaps, Momentum websites, mainstream and alternative news 








































8: Conclusion  
 
The central research questions of this thesis are examined in reverse order 
due to their specificity. Analysis covers data gathered, created and analysed 
within this thesis, alongside pertinent areas of discussion related to the 2019 
General Election and more recent developments. Subsequently, across 
methodological, theoretical, and conceptual flaws, the limitations of this research 
are explored, with future essential analysis outlined. 
 
8.1: How are parties making use of Facebook in terms of 
the scale of communications, the dissemination of 
information and the encouragement of participation in 
the content they post? 
 
The use of Facebook’s features by parties since 2010 is clearly a story of 
evolution not revolution. Although clear differences in approach are seen across 
time periods, parties, page types and election years, a picture of slow evolution is 
apparent. This evolutionary approach is marked by clear strategic undercurrents 
that have influenced how political parties have used Facebook since 2010. The 
key political undercurrent has been that parties have been using Facebook as a 
broadcast tool, appreciating genuine capacities to speak through virtual members 
to the broader public. This strategic foundation mirrors Vissers’ vision of parties 
‘preaching through the converted’ (2009) and Gibson’s ideas of ‘citizen-initiated 
campaigning’ (2015). It is a feature that has strongly influenced how the platform 
has been used over the last decade. It will also likely continue to influence how 
parties use Facebook’s features in future.  
Throughout this thesis’ examination we have seen a continued interest 
from parties in maintaining and not threatening broadcast use of Facebook (a 
trend seen in other studies e.g. Lee & Campbell, 2016; Bene, 2017; Gerbuado et 
al., 2019; Heiss et al., 2019). This prerogative has in turn also informed the 
development of more novel uses of Facebook’s features, through other avenues 
such as satellite pages. Facebook is used differently by parties depending on 






novel avenues are being developed that do unleash alternative and powerful 
features of the platform. Overall, by the 2017 General Election all the studied 
parties were making adept use of most of Facebook’s features for a new scale of 
communications and reach. However, in examining information and participation, 
although Labour made more use of the features of Facebook, both Labour and 
the Conservatives deliberately underutilised Facebook’s features for their central 
campaigns. Instead, as Labour showed with Momentum, powerful features of 
Facebook were used selectively via satellite campaigns, with approach more 
adventurous due to audience and aims. 
Across the theme of scale, Facebook offers to parties an infinite canvass 
for messaging, as well as the ability to create many different pages. However, the 
most important factor is the ability to gather virtual members for their pages. 
Firstly, Facebook does not require traditional resources and thus offers a novel 
creative canvass for political messaging. Parties can now campaign permanently 
and during election campaigns at very high intensity levels (as seen in other 
studies of posting frequency e.g. Lilleker, 2016; Bene, 2017). The ability to 
permanently campaign is powerful, given the high levels of engagement parties 
receive year-round. It is thus a feature that has been taken full advantage of. 
Permanent campaigning also offers a key role to satellite pages internal 
campaigns, as Chapter 7 showed, Momentum exhibited internally targeted 
partisan content shifts across 2018. Permanent campaigning means both parties 
and pressure groups have gateway access to the public all the time. Parties are 
using their pages to send many messages every day, especially during election 
time, with frequencies generally increasing over the last decade. However, parties 
are careful to not over saturate their audience, as such the parties are not sending 
as many messages as they physically could, instead focusing on quality over 
quantity. This is a deliberate action to increase the effectiveness of their 
communications, as parties’ central goal is to influence and activate the broader 
public, through getting their virtual members to share their content. Sending too 
many messages means that engagement gets spread out over too many 
messages, limiting parties’ abilities to break out of partisan echo chambers 






Secondly, in the creation of pages, we have seen parties take advantage 
of Facebook’s abilities to take up political space and develop nuanced 
communities. Although studies have examined leader pages (e.g. Gerodimos & 
Justinussen, 2015) as well as satellite pages (Dennis, 2019), this thesis has 
outlined in detail the wider campaign presences parties use. The nature of parties’ 
campaigns on Facebook is becoming more complex over time, as presences are 
split across different pages for diverse audiences. The internet’s power comes 
with its capacities for personalisation, with parties following this trend on the 
platform. Today, alongside the central core of party and leader pages, we also 
see MP pages, local pages, and a wide variety of satellite pages. Currently the 
logic of British political page development follows geography, the nature of offline 
political organisation, political position, or interests. Our parties could instead do 
more through creating socio-demographic, or interest based, political pages. This 
would help them enhance their audience saturation of certain groups. This is 
something we see from the 2020 Trump campaign; through large Facebook 
pages such as Evangelicals for Trump, Students for Trump, Veterans for Trump 
and Black Voices for Trump. This divergence of presence, as part of Janus-faced 
campaigning, will be the principal campaign trend we see for the next decade on 
Facebook 
The most vital aspect of scale is in parties’ abilities to generate and sustain 
virtual members. Facebook allows parties to not only ‘preach to the converted' 
(Norris, 2003), but also ‘preach through the converted’ (Vissers, 2009). As we saw 
clearly in Chapter 5, huge levels of party engagement are seen, actioned primarily 
through virtual members. Margetts’ cyber party model (2001), avowed that the 
internet would create a more fluid relationship between parties and internet users. 
We would see reduced costs to political participation, and party organisation 
reinvigorated through online meetings and canvassing. This new online support 
could engender “virtual belonging towards specific online groups, enhanced by 
the possibility of interacting directly with likeminded people” (Bartlett et al., 2013, 
p.11). In virtual membership there is a real benefit for parties given; declining 
official memberships, the potential to develop different more diverse audiences 
than their official members, and the potential of message spread through virtual 






This thesis has found virtual membership is clearly of value, standing 
between official membership and indifference. Virtual members are politically 
interested but do not necessarily want to be official members. Facebook is the 
perfect location to attract, socialise and activate this wider group of people, a 
cohort who otherwise would be inaccessible and thus unorganisable. Virtual 
belonging has also been generated through parties developing broad content that 
most effectively speaks to who their virtual member audiences are. Pages can 
also generate and maintain virtual members, as Chapter 4 showed, although now 
saturated, numbers of followers can radically increase, but rarely decline. In 
Chapter 4 we saw that leader pages surpassed party pages in virtual member 
numbers in 2016. By the end of 2017, Labour was amassing a huge amount of 
its virtual member support through Jeremy Corbyn, rather than via the party page.  
Differences in virtual membership are seen across party and page types. 
As Chapter 4 showed, virtual membership is offering all the UK parties access to 
a larger, younger and more female group of people than their official members. 
Through virtual member engagement, parties can reach a vast swathe of the UK’s 
40 million strong online public. This is important, as the UK Facebook userbase 
is more representative of the UK electorate, than other platforms such as Twitter. 
Virtual member demographic differences are seen across page types, for 
example, the data shows older people prefer to follow leaders over party pages. 
Parties must therefore appreciate the abilities and pitfalls different pages bring in 
virtual membership. Political parties have over time through virtual membership, 
developed a real opportunity to influence more varied socio-demographic strata. 
However, this ability to speak through virtual members, utilising their sociological 
characteristics and networks, requires content that is engaged with. This is not a 
given, as Chapter 5 showed that engagement is volatile and discerning. Parties 
must therefore develop engrossing effective content that speaks to audiences 
effectively.  
Although an important new resource, it is important to note some 
limitations of virtual members. The virtual members the parties have gathered on 
Facebook are older than the average UK Facebook population, with big 
demographic differences by party. This trend is especially seen for right wing 






UK Facebook population, given the greater age skew of right-wing parties official 
memberships, right-wing parties have the greatest benefit from Facebook virtual 
members. The overall trends show that parties must use other social networks 
and other offline campaign tools to reach the total public. Facebook may cover a 
broad group of people, but given changing patterns of social media, parties must 
utilise a patchwork of platforms. For example, TikTok to reach Generation Z and 
Instagram for Millennials. Overall, the political parties studied have fully utilised 
Facebook’s abilities to gather virtual members. However, as seen within parties’ 
approaches to participation, the use of virtual members is generally limited to their 
use as mouthpieces via engagement. Only groups like Momentum are attempting 
to use these individuals as traditional style campaign human resources, upsetting 
the organisational barriers between official and virtual memberships. 
In information Facebook offers new features for how parties can 
communicate. Facebook gives parties a tool that allows information to be 
delivered straight to the public without any intermediary, the platform therefore 
offers complete artistic control. The platform offers novel capacities across 
structure, style and content type, with the options available to parties having 
evolved over time (reflecting other content studies’ results Conroy et al., 2012; 
Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015; Bene, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2019). Today, a wide 
range of structural communications forms are available such as video, live video, 
posters or memes. Upon this creative foundation parties have carte blanche to 
utilise stylistic forms, with the content options parties can use limited by 
determination not technology.  
In the specifics of approach, Facebook offers a wide range of options. For 
example, topic content can be delivered in a complex way through policy detail or 
broadcast uses of simpler political information. New information features have 
become well used. In Chapter 5, the rise of photo and then video content is seen 
across all the political parties. Thus, parties are willing to alter approach and utilise 
more of Facebook features if they clearly benefit. However, the broader trends 
seen in information dissemination show a deliberate evolutionary conservatism. 
Central party and leader page campaigns are cautious, while more radical 
utilisation is seen from smaller satellite pages such as Momentum. This 






different pages, and how they believe they can effectively communicate with 
them. Thus, through information provision a dynamic between a traditional 
Facebook campaign and a new methods campaign becomes apparent.  
Parties have opportunities to develop novel content by using other 
sources. Parties can create content such reused or edited news. This is powerful, 
because parties can harness trusted sources with the ability to edit the content to 
their own narrative. Posts can also use interesting ways of framing content, such 
as in the use of humour (reflecting Bene, 2017; Dennis, 2019) or in the depiction 
of groups (also see identity ownership Kreiss et al., 2020). Overall, Facebook 
offers parties a superior creative canvass. How parties can communicate is freer 
than in the past as stylistic options are less bounded, with the central limitations 
to parties’ information approaches, an appreciation of what the page’s audience 
likes to consume. It is this political reality that has meant that parties’ information 
approaches are not using all the features Facebook offers, instead focusing on 
an evolved traditional communication approach.  
In Chapter 6 we saw that Labour and the Conservatives, through their 
leader and party pages, are careful of how they send information, because their 
central focus upon broadcast style communications. The platform is used as a 
mainstream information tool, with parties utilising select features that can 
enhance broad campaign learning and persuasive impact. Chapter 6 showed how 
we have seen high levels of; policy detail, expert and celebrity use, edited media 
sources, broad group depiction and leadership personalisation. These core 
elements are well used because they promote virtual members’ engagement but 
without putting off or excluding certain groups. Facebook is thus centrally used by 
the parties for inclusive content, with more specified content avenues used via 
other subsidiary pages such as Momentum. In Chapter 7 we gained insight into 
Momentum’s new methods campaign. The page saw wholesale use of more 
adventurous information features including the use of; meme’s, pop culture, 
negative personalisation, internal partisanship and greater levels of aggressive 
partisan content. This approach was successful, the page was able to reach out 
to younger and more partisan voters in a language and style they appreciated. 
However, this approach has natural limitations. This vigorous style, if replicated 






Thus, through a Janus-faced approach, Labour used Facebook’s information 
content features in a nuanced manner depending on audience.  
Overall, the party and leader pages could have been more adventurous 
and used more novel information features like we saw via Momentum. However, 
this fails to appreciate the reasoning behind the parties’ approaches on Facebook. 
Through the traditional Facebook campaign, the platforms’ information capacities 
are deliberately underutilised, as we see parties using Facebook as an online 
recreation of traditional campaigning best practice. This sees parties push a broad 
campaign centred on campaign learning. A radical use of all of Facebook’s 
features would likely be inefficient given the different page’s audiences, with 
avenues such as Momentum the appropriate location for these more experimental 
applications. Given the vital nature of campaigning is - sending the right message 
to the right person in the way that is best for them, this natural limitation has seen 
parties engage in caution on Facebook. Focus has clearly been set on big tent 
broadcast approaches, while more novel approaches were seen via smaller more 
precise avenues. However, as the radical approach of the Conservative Party in 
2019 shows, tactics can evolve and change, with engagement volatility showing 
that to gain attention parties must continually innovate. 
Facebook has powerful features for generating participation online and 
offline (Bimber, 2014; Boulianne, 2018). There are potentials in the promotion of 
core electoral forms of participation within the broader public, such as voting 
mobilisation or registering to vote. Equally, there are opportunities to organise and 
develop other diverse forms of participation more likely of interest to virtual 
members, such as; joining a party, doorstep campaigning or filling in a poll. 
Finally, through user engagement, parties can spread their information or 
participation messages throughout virtual members’ networks. Thus, through 
Facebook parties have new abilities to develop user participation of different 
forms online and offline.  
Overall, despite clear capacities, participation content via Labour and the 
Conservative’s party and leader page’s is unadventurous (reflecting some studies 






al., 2014; Oelsner & Heimrich, 2015; Lee & Campbell, 2016; Gerbaudo, 2019)102. 
Use of participation is conservative, as Stromer-Galley states “campaigns 
ultimately construct and use citizens as objects they need to manage through 
controlled interactivity, in order to reach their objective” (2014, p. 177). Neither 
major party is making the most of Facebook’s participation features except 
through the promotion of broad participation forms and engagement.  
As seen in Chapter 6, from the 2015 to 2017 General Election, the party 
and leader page’s participation content shifted from prompting users to visit 
traditional party websites, to Facebook located activity. This was a clear evolution 
in approach, with the shift towards Facebook as the medium and location for 
participation, showing the parties moving away from structurally hybrid campaign 
systems (Chadwick, 2013). Differences in participation content were also seen 
via page type. For Labour, adventurous uses of internal-to-Facebook participation 
were generated via Corbyn’s use of opposition leader links, while in contrast, the 
party page pushed more traditional online to offline conversation. There were also 
clear differences between the parties. Although both Labour and the 
Conservative’s centrally used engagement and other broad forms of participation. 
Labour clearly had a greater focus on electoral participation than the 
Conservatives across both elections. For example, Labour placed much greater 
focus on registration, voting and organised conversation content. The 
Conservatives are clearly not as focussed on Facebook’s abilities for complex 
participation, instead focusing solely on information, voting and engagement.  
Thus, across both parties participation content is seen, but focus is upon 
wider core avenues of participation such as voting and getting people registered 
to vote. As such, the traditional Facebook campaign shows the parties’ having 
little interest in using virtual members as official members, with any Cyber Party 
framework underutilised (Margetts, 2001). In Chapter 7, outside the traditional 
Facebook campaign, party difference is heavily exacerbated by the role of 
Momentum. The group used more of Facebook’s features for participation and 
organisation. This included; breaking down activism barriers through using a just 
turn up logic, the use of events, training videos and bespoke activism websites. 
 
102 However, the thesis’ results when compared to other studies (e.g. Magin et al., 2017), show 






These efforts were designed to get Momentum’s virtual members working like 
official members. 
In contrast to more advanced elements of participation, engagement is a 
clear focus, with parties clearly pursuing virtual member engagement. Rather than 
using virtual members as offline human resources, the parties are centrally using 
them as online mouthpieces to influence their subsequent online networks. Virtual 
members are centrally a digital resource used to propel messages forward, 
campaign online and potentially be drafted in as official members. As such, virtual 
membership for the parties stands in a middle position between; Margetts 
theorised fluid “technologically-aided relationships between party and voters” 
(2001, p.1) and Margolis & Resnick’s ideas of politics as usual (2000). Thus, 
virtual membership stands as a looser semi-utilised party/voter relationship. This 
focus on engagement from the parties, shows they view Facebook as an 
influential additional location for socialisation, network building and limited 
organisation, a useful tool in an era of declining social capital and the breakdown 
of offline community (Putnam, 2000). However, as Momentum’s approach shows, 
virtual members can be used in a manner akin to official members. Given that the 
direction of travel of the traditional Facebook campaign is currently an unknown, 
we may see more adventurous uses of virtual members in the future.  
Overall, although parties have amassed large online virtual memberships 
that are younger, more representative and active in online engagement. Parties 
are shown to be mainly interested in gathering their engagement and activating 
core forms of participation such as voting. Parties are currently showing limited 
interest in using virtual members to campaign in complex ways. Only via more 
specified avenues, such as Momentum, do we see barriers between official and 
virtual membership more dissolved. Instead, the data shows that party and leader 
pages are cautious (as per Kalsnes, 2016), working hard to ‘preach through the 
converted’ (Vissers, 2009). This focus on engagement shows the parties centrally 
appreciate the sociological nature of the Facebook network (as per Lazarsfeld, 
1944; Bond et al., 2012). Parties are using their virtual members as modern-day 
digital doorknockers within their own networked digital doorsteps. Virtual 
members are being used to deliver broad leaflet style communications to their 






slacktivism, but a force that can have real impact, given how virtual members can 
influence their own networks. Parties today can generate and maintain local 
experts, individuals that maintain strong influence within their communities, in a 
manner unlike the past. The power to steer influential voices, whilst still allowing 
the messages to be personalised by sharers local and socio-demographic 
characteristics, is a system that is bringing a fundamental campaign power online. 
This ability to push party politics through enthused individuals, within a more fluid 
but still sociologically led network, is a vast power the parties are clearly centrally 
focused upon. This externalising capability (for the moment) outweighs any 
capacity or potential from the use of virtual members like traditional official 
members. 
A further question this thesis has investigated is the equalisation or 
normalisation debate. In examining the use of Facebook’s features by party size, 
Chapters 4 and 5 showed the two major parties are better able to use the platform. 
Not only have the two major parties gathered larger virtual memberships, but they 
have also consistently used more complex content forms such as video. However, 
there is also a large degree of volatility between equalisation and normalisation. 
For example, although in the content features used, Facebook generally supports 
a framework of normalisation (supporting Van Aelst et al., 2017). As shown in 
Chapter 5, smaller parties can make big impacts as well as utilise a large amount 
of Facebook’s features (supporting Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Samuel-Azran, 
Yarchi & Wolfsfeld, 2015). For example, in terms of engagement UKIP was a 
colossal phenomenon from 2013-2015. Small parties can gain huge impetus on 
Facebook. Equally, in the use of participation and information features, satellite 
group Momentum, shows that reduced resources do not mean novel impactful 
viral content cannot be created. Thus, although generally presenting a normalised 
environment, Facebook clearly offers opportunities for smaller parties.  
The structural character of page types also provides debate, with how 
different types of pages use Facebook’s features a further question of importance. 
Leader pages generally lagged the approach seen via party pages, such as in the 
use of video or personalisation. However, by 2017 leader pages were pushing 
ahead, using avenues such as leadership personalisation and live events. Today, 






how tied to political personalisation leader pages are, usage can fluctuate 
considerably. For Labour, the leadership of Keir Starmer presents new issues, his 
small virtual membership is in great contrast to Boris Johnson. Labour to some 
extent is now having to build up from nowhere on Facebook, a similar situation to 
what faced the Conservatives in 2017, due to Theresa May’s small audience. The 
parties should be smarter, permanent pages that can be handed on to the next 
leader should be developed. 
To conclude; in scale, parties have taken full advantage of Facebook to 
develop virtual membership bases, create new political pages and send many 
new forms of communications. However, within the heart of campaigns via central 
party and leader pages, approach to information and participation is more 
conservative. Information is valued over participation, with content that could spur 
complex offline participation underutilised. This conservatism is however 
deliberate, because the Facebook features parties’ are centrally interested in are 
those that have the widest impact. Facebook is used by parties as a mass 
broadcast tool for information dissemination and basic participation forms such 
as voting. More radical avenues for information and participation are instead seen 
by subsidiary satellite campaigns such as Momentum. The more radical role of 
Facebook, via the use of virtual members as official member human resources, 
is currently subsidiary to other roles. Thus, parties are not making the most of 
Facebook’s features, but they are making the most of Facebook’s aptitudes.  
 
8.2: How does the content posted on Facebook by 
parties retain the features of traditional campaign 
material? 
 
Facebook is used dualistically, with the way parties are using the platform 
best understood through the concept of Janus-faced campaigning, via the 
traditional and new methods Facebook campaigns. As outlined across Chapters 
6 & 7, the concept defines that through Facebook, parties are using different 
pages with different approaches to reach different audiences, thus presenting 






Firstly, parties’ use of Facebook embraces some of the most important as 
well as most mundane aspects of traditional campaigning. In the traditional 
campaign literature, parties send voters information to develop campaign 
learning, prime voters and persuade them to vote in a certain way. Political 
campaigns thus disseminate authoritative and persuasive information to the 
voting public, with resultant campaign learning able to influence election 
outcomes (Lenz, 2009). Traditional campaigns use communications mediums 
such as the media, leaflets, or face to face contact, to prime individuals on what 
issues they should evaluate the candidates. This process is being replicated on 
the platform through the traditional Facebook campaign. This approach gives 
political parties the ability to take the best elements of tried and tested traditional 
campaign approaches and recreate them online. As such, Facebook’s use as a 
campaign tool has not started from zero, its use follows the model seen in other 
tools. We see billboard style posters recreated online, PPB’s rebroadcast or recut 
into new videos and interactive infographic content developed akin to leaflet 
content. Facebook use by parties is thus generally reflective of other tools, with 
organic Facebook communications a middle tool between targeted advertising 
and leaflets.  
Similarities to traditional campaigning in how parties are communicating 
are very clear. A considerable amount of professionalised evolution has occurred 
in order to reach a position where parties are effectively recreating enhanced 
traditional campaign content online. This structure has taken time to develop. For 
example, from 2010-2012 it was not uncommon to see wordy reposts of entire 
speeches or large amounts of apolitical content. Today, information approaches 
are focused on core policy and accessible political information. Equally, factors 
designed to enhance message effect are kept broad, such as public depiction, 
use of experts and celebrities, alongside negative and positive leadership 
personalisation. Facebook is thus operated within a wider campaign mindset, that 
holds that voting behaviour can be affected by awareness of political parties, 
candidates and associated causes (Schmitt-Beck, 2004). As such, the Facebook 
content we see today is akin to vastly enhanced interactive leaflets. However, the 
key for party campaign’s is that rather than being delivered by partisan 






This content is delivered via people’s friends and family, and thus can cause 
discussion and wider impacts. Thus, the broadcast focus seen, is because the 
parties’ clearly believe Facebook is giving them opportunities to inform social 
groups in an accessible impactful way. Facebook therefore represents an 
evolution of the traditional campaign, rather than something that cannot be 
compared to what came before.  
Secondarily, at a smaller scale (for the moment), during the 2017 General 
Election Labour was using a new methods campaign through satellite page 
Momentum. Satellite pages offer parties an important subsidiary avenue to 
campaign, with Facebook (and the internet) offering democratic intermediaries 
something new rather than stasis (supporting Edwards, 2006; in contrast to 
Bryan, Tsagarousianou & Tambini, 2002). Through the subsidiary use of different 
pages and thus audiences, Labour could benefit from being more adventurous in 
information and participation approaches. Momentum for example, showed the 
revolutionary implementation of novel participation and information content. This 
Janus-faced campaigning approach meant Labour were able to match messaging 
more effectively with audience. The party were able to reach partisans and 
younger people via Momentum, while the broader public were reached through 
their leader and party pages. Facebook was thus used in a dualistic manner; used 
both in the model of a traditional campaign with all the benefits that entails, 
alongside a more radical manner offering new features for their campaign. It was 
this balance that Labour struck so well in 2017; radical politics were matched by 
sensible broadcast representations of policy. In contrast, Labour lost control of 
this delicate balance in 2019. The parties’ success in 2017 arguably led the left 
of the party towards hubris, believing it was the radical elements not also the 
mainstream elements, that had led to a successful campaign. The party did not 
focus as much on a broad mainstream campaign to balance out Momentum style 
partisan content. While most problematically Corbyn’s page, a page that 
previously struck a powerful position via mixing politics, personality and emotion, 
became in content approach, more akin to Momentum. Thus, the entire campaign 
was not as effective in utilising a Janus-faced approach, as a radical more 






Overall, Facebook gives parties the best of both worlds if used correctly. 
Parties have been given both an evolved and more powerful traditional campaign 
tool, alongside avenues for more radical applications of Facebook features. The 
balance between these elements will likely shift in future, depending on 
Facebook’s userbase and parties’ audiences. The concept of Janus-faced 
campaigning is fluid, as the idea does not define the weight of the two campaign 
elements, but instead their existence. Campaign approaches will shift, a 
traditional Facebook campaign in 2024 may include shitposts and memes, rather 
than infographics and posters, an evolution of the small-scale application we saw 
from the Conservative Party page in 2019. Thus, a key element in delimiting the 
concept is in appreciating what is at the centre of parties’ approaches on the 
platform, and how other peripheral party pages on the platform operate. It is 
possible that we may see a switch. The new method campaign may grow in 
importance over time, to a point where is overtakes the traditional campaign. In 
this situation the concept of Janus-faced campaigning continues, but with a shift 
of the new method campaign to the central core of how parties use the platform, 
while the traditional campaign lies around the periphery.  
 
8.3: What are the likely longer term implications of 
parties’ use of Facebook, in terms of broader 
campaigning practices? 
 
It has been argued that there is nominal difference across the 
fundamentals of what we term the ‘ground war’, with campaigns in key seats 
“conducted along similar lines” (Lilleker & Pack, 2016, p.42). Today, the Facebook 
catalyst is offering political parties superior abilities and tactics that have led to a 
more volatile political campaign environment. New complexities have shaken the 
once rigid foundations of campaigning, as posters, canvassing and television 
have been reinterpreted via Facebook. Facebook shows a wide level of difference 
across party tactics, audience and impact. Although clear overall trends are seen 
across parties, it is apparent that the era of nominal campaign difference is over. 
Led by Facebook, social media have ushered in an era of change for party 






the parties’ have on the platform change, for the near future Facebook presents 
the greatest single campaign tool available to political parties.  
This thesis has found that at the core of party campaigns on Facebook is 
the recreation of a traditional campaign online. However, this lack of radical 
change does not mean that Facebook fails to present new implications for party 
campaigns. This is because Facebook is offering the enhancement of previously 
understood campaign avenues, with the impact Facebook has had on party 
campaigns centrally within the functionality of broadcast campaigns. If we saw 
volatile risky approaches as the central way of campaigning, this signals a small 
audience and reduced electoral impact. Despite a radical change in technology 
over the last decade, parties are not flying blind, as they are able to combine new 
technology with previously effective political campaign content. Facebook offers 
new implications for party campaigns because it is a tool that offers the choice of 
revolutionary and evolutionary campaign capacities, within a powerful 
sociological network. The central limitation occurring from how parties are using 
the platform is tactical choice, as Facebook offers abilities to mix novel with 
traditional styles. In scale, information, participation and organisation, Facebook 
allows for parties to engage in effective applications of new, improved or 
replicated capacities. Facebook’s impact therefore occurs from its pluralistic 
abilities, rather than the more limited impacts of each separate capacity.  
During a traditional campaign, parties send voters information to increase 
campaign learning, prime voters and generate participation. Information can 
increase voters issue knowledge (Seldon & Snowdon, 2005; Fridkin & Kenney, 
2011), determining how voters make up their minds via issue saliency (Iyengar & 
Simon, 1993; Togeby, 2007). Facebook offers parties an enhanced electoral and 
permanent campaign, information and participation tool. Evidence for social 
media’s impact on participation is growing (Boulianne, 2018), with Facebook a 
tool clearly used by parties campaigns for basic forms of participation and 
mobilisation. Facebook can be used like leaflets, tv ads or posters, while novel 
application such as live-stream video or memes, can be deployed. Approach can 
be dictated by data, both from previous content, as well as from a deep 
understanding of audience. Content can be A/B tested and refined, alongside 






advertising an important future research question. Broadcast and narrowcast 
approaches are available, meaning that Facebook can be used by parties to 
inform a range of voters. Facebook thus offers new implications for party 
campaigns because of the flexible ways parties can use information for campaign 
learning and participation. The platform offers abilities to develop novel 
approaches, as well as utilise traditional campaign factors, all within an 
environment that enhances effect.  
Alongside content abilities, Facebook offers new implications for party 
campaigns because of its options for identity flexibility. From the use of leader 
pages to satellite pages, Facebook’s ability for using different page types, offers 
parties total control in how their voice is projected to different groups. This brings 
new implications for party campaigns, as parties would be able to localise content 
but not combine broadcast and narrowcast applications like they can do today. 
Message differentiation has always occurred, such as via different content 
approaches through billboard or newspaper advertising campaigns in different 
electoral seats. However, Facebook offers considerable improvement over 
previous capacities, giving parties the best of both worlds. Today, through Janus-
faced campaigning, Facebook can be used in a manner that matches approach 
to audience. Parties can use the novel content aspects of Facebook to attract 
partisans and younger voters. Whilst through more mundane communications, 
parties can reach older voters in a manner to which they are accustomed. Thus, 
parties through using different pages can not only utilise traditional structures of 
voter behaviour, but also activate different avenues to socialise new groups, such 
as through speaking to identity, interests, ideology or representation.  
Facebook also offers further flexibility from its ability as a permanent 
campaign tool (supporting Vergeer, Hermans and Sams, 2011; Dennis, 2019). A 
radical new ability for parties, Facebook shows continuous campaigning by 
politicians is on the rise (updating evidence from other earlier studies, e.g. Klinger, 
2013; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Strandberg, 2013). Parties are consistently trying 
to inform, persuade, organise and activate their virtual members. This thesis also 
supports Ceccobelli’s findings that there are; “qualitative and quantitative 
differences between campaign and peace-time periods” (2017, p.122). Today, 






utilised permanently, helping parties to inform and socialise voters, develop 
members and organise. 
Facebook also presents new implications for party campaigns through the 
development of virtual members. In traditional campaigning, parties’ support 
mobilisation concentrates on making sure that pre-identified supporters have 
voted (Denver & Hands, 2002). Facebook has empowered parties to reduce 
support mobilisation challenges (Ward et al., 2008; Gibson, 2012), because 
parties can build online communities and engender activities (Gibson, 2015). 
Usage of virtual members is however not utopian; virtual members are not 
generally used as human resources like official members. This refutes what 
Chadwick and Stromer-Galley argue as the idea of; “digital media foster(ing) 
cultures of organizational experimentation and a party-as-movement mentality 
that enable many to reject norms of hierarchical discipline and habitual partisan 
loyalty” (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016, p.283). Instead, parties are so far 
being cautious, with satellite campaigns such as Momentum, the location for 
cyber party style experimentation. Although not a revolution, virtual members are 
a radical opportunity because they have rejuvenated the political parties activism 
networks. Through their engagement and online activism these individuals 
rebroadcast party content, acting like digital doorstep campaigners, delivering 
political content with their own social characteristics. This is a fundamental power 
that other networks do not offer in the same way, because other networks are 
less focused on real-world offline connections. If as Lazarsfeld et al. state, “social 
characteristics determine political preference” (1968, p.27), then Facebook is 
opening new avenues for political parties through virtual member activism. This 
is because people do not trust politicians, they trust their friends and family.  
Facebook offers parties a different audience as well as a novel location to 
speak to audiences. Unlike other social networks, Facebook contains many older, 
rural and less wealthy voters. While, when compared to the UK population, still 
offering a proportionally young and more female userbase. As such, unlike other 
social networks, a traditional Facebook campaign makes sense, with Facebook 
offering a location for both specific and general campaign approaches. Therefore, 
more specific campaigns are something we see occur via other social networks, 






Twitter. Although Facebook is only one of several social media platforms used by 
parties, and clearly successful campaigns use each medium for its audience. 
Facebook is by far the most diverse and impactful. Currently, only Facebook 
offers a broad range of voters who can be reached in one place. This in turn 
promotes what this thesis describes as Janus-faced campaigning. Other social 
networks do not have the same impact as Facebook, because their userbases 
are more specific, networks are interest based and users less representative of 
electoral populations. Facebook as a space is instead far less partisan, more 
representative of users real offline social networks and thus more emotionally 
resonant. Thus, the power and impact of a traditional or new methods campaign 
is multiplied on Facebook. 
Beyond the general audience available, it is the nature of the Facebook 
network - a system that bridges party to public, that is the central reason why 
Facebook is having an impact on party campaigns. Although parties only use the 
public as mouthpieces, with the platform not used for genuine two-way dialogue 
(as per Oelsner & Heimrich, 2015). Facebook, through engagement and 
followership, offers parties a clear novel avenue for campaigning. This is because 
of new capacities for multistep-flow processes, in which campaign 
communications are distributed via a multitude of channels (Iyengar, 1994; Burt, 
1999; Park, 2013). The parties appreciate the importance of engagement, as 
throughout the data, parties have clearly shown they want to maximise 
engagement whilst balancing accessibility. This speaks to studies that find the 
sociological dimensions of Facebook, is as key to effectiveness as the content. 
As Bond et al. found “the effect of social transmission on real-world voting was 
greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves” (2012, p.295). Parties 
are using virtual members as their own semi-autonomous mouthpieces, with the 
platform offering new implications for party campaigns because Facebook 
recreates users’ real sociological connections within an online environment.  
Facebook offers parties a powerful avenue for socially located message 
spread. Facebook users’ looser but still genuine social network’s (Dunbar, 2016), 
allow for ‘‘socially-located opinion leaders (to) spread information to many kinds 
of people, including citizens with little interest’’ (Thorson & Wells, 2012, p.13). 






is allowing for information rich, leaflet style content, to be delivered not by 
unwelcome doorknockers but through friends and family. Other social networks 
do not offer this ability. They may be too open in network formation for impactful 
information dissemination (e.g. Twitter), have ineffective architecture (e.g. 
Snapchat) or heterogenous users (e.g. TikTok & Twitter), thus making pluralistic 
campaigning unworkable. Facebook is the only location that offers such an 
effective system. It is also why parties should ignore organic campaigning at their 
peril, for these sociological pressures are something that targeted advertising just 
cannot recreate.  
Overall, Facebook has presented clear new implications for party 
campaigns. The platform recreates the effectiveness of previously existing 
campaign tools but in an online environment, while equally offering parties other 
novel avenues for smaller scale radical approaches. Facebook is currently 
centrally used by the parties as a broadcast tool; however, this could change as 
the new methods campaign expands. Although we are not seeing utopian ideas 
of the breakdown between official and virtual membership, cyber party 
manifestations or radical content approaches that break the campaign norm. 
Facebook nevertheless offers parties evolved online resources that enhance their 
campaigns. Through abilities to utilise superior communications forms, generate 
virtual members, develop user engagement and social message transmission; 
parties can develop online and offline impacts. The platform is powerful not 
because it necessarily strikes new ground, but because it changes what was so 
central before, through amplifying and altering traditional social networks. Indeed, 
the lack of revolution in approach is symptomatic of Facebook’s importance, as 
the platform can reach normal voters. The universality of the platform means 
novel approaches are instead seen only around the edges. Thus, when compared 
to other social networks, Facebook is clearly of superior importance and is offering 
parties powerful new abilities. However, the platform is still only useful as part of 
a wider toolkit. Although so many are on the platform, many predominately older 
voters are still not internet users, while others such as younger people are 
specifically avoiding the platform. Given this fact, Table 41 expands upon the 
current campaign landscape we see from political parties. The current stage of 






novel digital tools in practical ways. Effective modern campaigns appreciate 
where the audience is and how to effectively communicate with them. This has 
been a never-ending battle for political campaigners; however, it is one that has 








8.4: Hypothesis validation 
 








8.5: What do the results mean for political parties and 
other campaigns? 
 
 Facebook is clearly here to stay, with this thesis illuminating how parties 
are connecting to users through political content. The insights within this thesis 
have a wide use for campaigners and political campaigners. The content analysis 
undertaken offers important insights for both the studied parties, but also other 
parties and campaigns worldwide. The detail undertaken for this thesis has not 
been seen in any other study ever, meaning that this thesis offers unique insights 
into complex aspects of how parties are using Facebook to campaign. The data 
generated offers a route map of where Facebook campaigns are heading, 
allowing those who read the data closely to either catch up quickly with the 
approaches of the mainstream major parties, or potentially jump ahead.  
The theoretical and conceptual developments generated within this thesis 
offer interested actors, parties, and other types of digital campaigns new 
understandings to help them use Facebook more effectively. The main theoretical 
finding of this thesis is that campaigners must value a nuanced approach to the 
platform that matches message to audience. Through Janus-faced campaigning, 
parties can speak more effectively to audiences that matter, allowing parties to 
benefit from both a broadcast traditional Facebook campaign approach, as well 
as more novel methods through the new method campaign. This nuanced ability 
to present different faces to different audiences across social media is also 
something that more general campaign groups should pay attention to. A greater 
appreciation that different audiences want different things could help many 
different types of campaign organisations have impact. For example, the ability 
for a charity or union to develop a more nuanced campaign presence on social 
media through using different pages would maximise the impact they can make. 
Parties must therefore be dutiful in their use of Facebook, appreciating that the 
Facebook audience is ageing and becoming more fragmented, while maximising 
their presence through the development of different types of Facebook pages.  
The thesis finds the generation and maintenance of followers is vital as 
they are the gateway to engagement and influence. While, within their audiences, 






campaign on a party’s behalf is a real opportunity for all those who use the 
platform to campaign. Momentum shows that in breaking down of barriers 
between official and virtual memberships, you can maximise impact despite being 
a small organisation. Through deciding to trust their audience the group benefitted 
from having an enthusiastic active support base. If mainstream political parties 
have the will and determination to apply elements of this model, they could 
benefit. Parties could merge the participation benefits of the new methods 
campaign with the information capacities of the traditional Facebook campaign. 
Given followership is the gateway to virtual membership parties should work 
tirelessly to generate and socialise followers. Parties should also be maximising 
the longevity of their pages through creating leader pages that can be transferred 
on. Theresa May for example was severely hampered through her low audience 
numbers despite the fact that David Cameron had accumulated 1.3 million 
Facebook followers by 2017. If parties applied this focus, we could see huge new 
reservoirs of activism being used for campaigns, with parties able to further 
harness the sociological power of Facebook. 
Overall, this thesis offers insights into how campaign groups and parties 
should develop their campaign communications on Facebook. If parties worked 
harder to adopt more complex uses of Facebook, utilising these aspects 
coherently on top of their traditional campaigns, many of the issues plaguing 
political parties such as reduced membership or political disillusion would be 
diminished. Facebook used in the right way would allow for parties to be more 
connected to the public, national discussion and help make politics more 
representative and responsive.  
 
8.6: Limitations, future work, and final thoughts 
 
This thesis’ has limitations; firstly, this work has suffered from a lack of data 
access or ability to match social media data with other sources. Secondly, given 
the vast scale of social media campaigning in the modern era, as exemplified by 
Janus-faced campaigning and the use of satellite pages, this thesis only covers 
the most important part of the visible Facebook iceberg. In future more joined up 






pages that now make up the political Facebook eco-system. Finally, the third 
limitation this thesis has suffered from is in how to effectively capture Facebook 
content. Facebook campaigning must be understood with an appreciation of the 
wide way that parties can now campaign. So much has changed over the last 
decade, with analysis of Facebook as a two-dimensional entity a limited and 
incorrect approach. Future analysis must implement coding schemes that 
appreciate Facebook content as multifaceted and diverse, an approach that is 
vital for appreciating the impact Facebook is having on party campaigns.  
The first major challenge this thesis has encountered has been the 
availability of data, with data access having shifted enormously over the last few 
years. This thesis used Netvizz, an open resource that has now been shut down. 
Originally replaced with no alternative, recently academic researchers with full 
positions in universities, can use Crowdtangle to access political page public data 
(like what Netvizz offered). However, although an improvement, access to the 
public, students or even salaried university researchers interested in non-political 
subjects, is not possible. Facebook content for researchers is vital given the 
influence and importance of the social network, but now Facebook’s API is a 
closed system, threatening our knowledge of the world. How can people examine 
or question posts that are fake news, or appreciate whether a party has fulfilled 
the promises they made in the past; if they are hidden from view? Why are fields 
such as psychology and gender studies excluded from Crowdtangle? I studied 
Facebook data for my master’s dissertation, without which I would not be writing 
these words. Now that avenue is closed for everyone. A new balance needs to 
be struck; we must open Facebook’s data so we can better comprehend the 
platform. Facebook’s mission statement is to “give people the power to build 
community and bring the world closer together”103. Currently the platform is failing 
its task. Through not helping to build a research community that can help fight the 
harms of social media and promote the good, Facebook themselves are helping 
those who wish to drive communities and our world apart. Facebook must take 
the challenge to become more transparent and not less so, helping to develop 
 
103https://investor.fb.com/resources/default.aspx#:~:text=Founded%20in%202004%2C%20Face






core values at the heart of democracy, including information access and 
democratic accountability, rather than hinder them. 
The second issue this research has had to deal with, has been in deciding 
what to analyse. Facebook is vast; the party pages studied within this thesis 
(albeit the most important) only make up the tip of a much larger iceberg. The 
changing nature of the platform and the massive complexity visible, is exemplified 
by my study of the targeted advertising campaign during the 2019 General 
Election. From the 1st to the 12th December 2019, I categorised 2481 political 
Facebook pages that sent adverts (excluding non-party-political pages such as 
those that promote voting) (Hotham, 2020)104. This huge number of advertisers 
signals the growing problem we have in understanding Facebook political 
campaigns. In 2010 we had party pages, by 2015 we had party, leader, local and 
MP pages, by 2017 this list included satellite campaigns, while by 2019 we saw 
the rise of 3rd party satellite actors. As discussed in Chapter 7, there is now a vast 
hidden iceberg of political pages on Facebook. Some satellite pages, such as fan 
pages or third-party advertising pages, are used in a clandestine manner, having 
closer relationships to parties than they allude too. This has become a large 
legalistic grey area for both organic campaigns and targeted advertising, it is vital 
that groups such as the Electoral Commission investigate. Figure 4 highlights how 
little of the political landscape this thesis has touched upon, although clearly the 
most important to analyse, there is still so much to be done to understand modern 
Facebook campaigns. 
 
104 Facebook is the centre of activity for this huge number of actors, in contrast Snapchat and 
Google saw more limited numbers, over the same period, only 9 political pages were advertising 
on Snapchat and only 12 political pages on Google/YouTube. 
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Figure 4. The tip of the iceberg, how parties use pages to campaign on Facebook, 2017 Labour Example
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The third limitation this thesis has worked within, has been in how to 
capture Facebook content effectively. This thesis has used content analysis to 
capture how parties are now campaigning using social media, with a central focus 
on making sure codes are not mutually exclusive because Facebook content is 
not one-dimensional. This has led to some codes potentially double counting, a 
flaw that is counterweighted by the benefits of more accurately reflecting the 
complexity of modern campaign content. This new approach to content analysis 
is largely due to the rise of video content. Coding schemes and styles designed 
for the analysis of one- or two-dimensional content, such as posters, no longer 
pass muster for appreciating modern communications approaches. Future 
analysis must follow this thesis in implementing coding schemes that allow for the 
coding of multiple values. Hopefully future analysis will improve on this thesis’ 
approach, as in developing a whole new coding approach, this thesis’ scheme 
has missed some areas of pertinent analysis, as well as failed to effectively 
capture some complex aspects such as the use of valence issues.  
Finally, is the issue of the data-science-ification of political research. Today 
it seems that political expertise is second order to data science abilities, with the 
study of social media a clear example. Already we can see many groups line up 
to utilise novel applications of machine learning and AI on social media data. 
However, due to content complexity and data access, we are already seeing a 
focus on text analysis, a system that will misrepresent or fail to accurately 
measure the content voters are sent. We are years away from effective automated 
approaches for the analysis of video content, thus we are in an important period 
where researchers must not get ahead of themselves. Although computer 
scientists have important and valuable skills, this thesis has always tried to bridge 
data with qualitative insights, because campaigning is as much of an art form as 
it is a science. As we move forwards towards the analysis of ever more complex 
forms of data, especially video, we must remember the importance of accurately 







In terms of future work, the research field could benefit from applying this 
analysis to the UK 2019 General Election. Further, a study of a wider band of 
satellite campaigns would help illuminate the scale of their role within a party 
campaign. The data gathered from this thesis could also be used to engage in a 
full comparison between targeted advertising content, alongside organic content. 
Through comparing information and participation elements, it would allow us to 
understand what targeted advertising is for within the wider campaign toolkit. 
Further, comparison of Facebook content with content sent via other campaign 
tools such as Twitter, is another avenue of worth. An analysis of this would allow 
us to appreciate audience and tactics across platforms. A longer frame analysis 
of UKIP and the Brexit campaign on Facebook is also warranted. It appears no 
accident that voters in the Red Wall broke away in such large numbers in 2019, 
the Conservatives in gaining this group found that the work was already done. 
For the last half decade, a huge cohort of voters have been primed through UKIP, 
the Brexit Party, Leave.eu and other Brexit pages. Through virtual members and 
large amounts of engagement, a small number of enthused activists primed a 
large cohort of voters, centrally through Facebook. A study of UKIP’s 
engagement, audience and geography over the last decade may offer a glimpse 
into how smaller radical campaigns can have big influences through social 
media.  
There are also ideas thrown up from the organic campaign and 
engagement. I am interested in the intersection of real-world networks and 
geography alongside online networks and digital geography; questioning how 
relations interpose with political campaigns. The nature of politics means that 
insular cores of supporters can form in enclaves with an inability to expand their 
influence networks. This can happen offline and online. Labour’s national 
campaigning decline may show the party suffering from elements of this 
networked imprisonment. Labour’s enclaved nature from their official and virtual 
members socio-demographic, geographical and cultural clustering, may be 
harming their communications abilities. Labour needs to work harder on 
diversifying where they campaign, as the 2017 General Election proves that 
when messages do break out, they can be extremely effective. There is even the 






externalised networks. Social power offline may now be enhanced online by 
social media. For example, it is possible that those in the middle class have more 
powerful influences, thus we may be generating a new digital class system for 
political campaigns. Finally, the wider question of the impact of Facebook on vote 
choice, is a massively important question that needs analysing. It will take a long 
time to answer, given the complexity of study needed. However, I hope this thesis 
provides aid in understanding the delivery side of that great question.  
Future work is also needed on where we draw the line in regulating 
targeted advertising. The nature of how campaigns operate is changing, with 
microtargeting allowing for new capacities for hyper local campaigning to small 
groups or even individuals. Although we are not there yet (as groups such as 
Cambridge Analytica overemphasise their abilities), campaigners clearly have 
greater abilities to target than ever before. Campaigns today no longer focus on 
Mondeo man or Worcester woman but on more refined groups of people. 
Although evidence of hyper-precise targeting is limited, a new zeitgeist of 
campaigning has dawned. Given technological change, abilities will soon be 
hyper-charged through AI and machine learning. For example, the ability to use 
GPT-3 to refine messages and research individual voters backgrounds instantly, 
will provide new abilities to match message and audience. Social media is thus 
entering a new era where research will be pivotal for reducing harms. However, 
it is often forgotten that targeted advertising can do clear good as well as harm, 
such as in getting people to vote or engage with politics. Thus, luddite calls for 
banning advertising is wrong, instead goals for regulation must be towards 
greater transparency, alongside proportionate regulations that limit harm.  
As to Facebook and social media’s broader impact on our politics. Social 
media networks are certainly creating new considerations for the operation and 
health of democracy. New worries are seen in the digital realisation of old threats, 
such as dis- and mis-information, engagement powered by divisiveness, 
astroturfers and fake news. While new threats such as bots and micro-
personalised targeting, present questions for how we can protect key democratic 
processes. Given we are so early in the social media era and data access has 
been so limited, impacts are yet to be clearly seen. However, in the wake of the 






social media. Unfortunately, in the same way divisive content often gains more 
attention upon social media; in the news media stories of good are ignored for 
sensationalised stories of ill. This has created an incorrect vision of social media 
because platforms like Facebook act as mediators of democratic goods as well 
as ills. However, this incorrect framing goes further as the major core of social 
media’s impact is being ignored. Edge cases are being focused upon, despite 
the reality being that much of what is occurring on- or via- social media is 
replicating what occurred before. This means that when it comes to studying 
platforms like Facebook, it is vital we develop a representative research agenda 
that appreciates the radical edges (fake news, misinformation, clandestine third 
parties) as well as the central core (parties traditional Facebook campaigns, 
peer-to-peer conversation). Social media networks encompass billions of human 
interactions, to ignore this reality and focus solely on nefarious activities not only 
distorts public understanding but also means we will struggle to demystify the 
true political impact of social media. 
This thesis’ title is; “How do political parties use Facebook and what does 
it offer to their campaigns?”. Through this study it has been made apparent that 
Facebook offers fundamental change. Facebook has had a strong impact on 
party campaigns, because of the platforms’ abilities for both novel as well as 
traditional approaches. Parties can utilise the appropriate avenues for the right 
audiences, with this flexibility central to Facebook’s impact. Parties are thus 
engaged in multidimensional thinking as to how best use the opportunities the 
platform offers; with the studied period this thesis examines a decade of cautious 
experimentation. How the platform is used will clearly evolve further in future, as 
Facebook’s ageing userbase, as well as new technology, adjusts best practice. 
There are challenges ahead for the platform, Facebook’s UK userbase is now 
saturated and regulators are finally growing teeth. However, Facebook is clearly 
here to stay, with the platform likely to continue to dominate elections for 
decades. Nevertheless, like networks before it such as Myspace or Bebo, a time 
may well come where Facebook is overshadowed. Although Facebook may be 
replaced, the nature of the platform will live on. Facebook will never truly die, as 
its nature will live on through the network/s that replace it, because recreating 
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10: Appendix  
Appendix 1: Studying British politics and parties  
 
2010 saw the use of Facebook as a background tool not a serious 
campaign tool. Cleggmania was the main theme of the 2010 General Election, 
with the parties having small presences on the platform. Social media use was 
similarly limited during the 2011 AV Referendum. However, by the 2014 Scottish 
Independence Referendum, we had witnessed the first large-scale UK use of 
targeted advertising and organic campaigning on Facebook (Shephard & 
Quinlan, 2015). However, given the specific focus, it took the 2015 General 
Election to clearly identify this new system of Facebook campaigning in Britain. 
Over the 12 months before the election the parties spent £1.3m on social media, 
with the Electoral Commission estimating that 99% of this spending was on 
Facebook (Sabbagh, 2018). The Conservative Party used targeted Facebook 
adverts to reach marginal seats, reaching 80.6% of all Facebook users in key 
constituencies105, while also being popular organically. In contrast, Labour almost 
entirely pursued organic Facebook popularity in conjunction with a '4 million 
doorstep conversations' campaign, an approach which failed to impact where it 
mattered. Neither Ed Miliband nor Labour’s policy ideas generated large 
amounts of organic engagement, while given a lack of targeted advertising, the 
party failed to make an impact. As Andrew Cooper a Conservative peer tweeted 
after the election, ‘big data, micro-targeting and social media campaigns just 
thrashed; “5 million conversations” and “community organizing”106. This election 
set the scene as Facebook was now unquestionably of central importance to 
modern British election campaigns.  
The 2016 Brexit Referendum changed the narrative further. As an event, 
it was heavily defined by the huge role Facebook had both in organic and 
targeted campaigning. The Leave campaign finished what UKIP had started, as 
the campaign built upon a large group of voters who had become primed via 
 
105 Facebook Business page deleted 
https://www.facebook.com/business/success/conservative-party accessed 19/01/2015 







Facebook. The Leave campaign managed to engage in powerful targeted 
advertising alongside generating huge organic popularity, while also smartly 
splitting itself into a more respectable Vote Leave campaign and a more virulent 
Leave.eu campaign. This approach allowed the campaign to use different 
narratives and adjust messaging online to different audiences. In contrast, the 
Remain campaign was behind consistently on Facebook, with tactics failing to 
break outside of certain pro-EU groups. Finally, post-referendum the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal broke. This shifted public opinion upon targeted advertising, 
however its most powerful ramification was in making many forget that the true 
power of social media is in organic campaigning.  
By the 2017 General Election, the Conservatives were spending more on 
targeted advertising but were somewhat ignoring their organic campaign. In 
contrast, Corbyn a politician propelled to leadership via his radical viral social 
media presence and a new wave of anti-centrist members; successfully used 
organic popularity and new satellite organisations such as Momentum to reach 
out to new, old, and young voter groups. As well as spending more on adverts 
(£600,000), Labour benefitted from a viral organic campaign. Their posts 
generated huge amounts of reach in a manner unseen since UKIP or the Brexit 
Referendum. Momentum claim almost a quarter of all UK Facebook users (12.7 
million people) viewed a Momentum video on Facebook in the last week of the 
campaign107. Labour pushed ideas, innovated and was not afraid to try new 
things. In contrast, the Conservatives stagnated, repeating their 2015 campaign 
but with a personalised over emphasis on a robotic Theresa May, targeted 
advertising, and single-message Brexit policy.  
Inevitably things were set to change again by the 2019 General Election. 
The Conservatives had learnt their lesson and considerably innovated, the party 
paid much greater attention to organic engagement and on developing core 
policy ideas. The party through Boris Johnson now had a leader who attracted 
attention, although the party had learnt the limits of personalised campaigning 
(see Hotham, 2019). Brexit was talked about but so were other key issues such 
as policing and healthcare, while the party concentrated not only on targeted 
advertising but also organic engagement. In contrast, Labour suffered from 
 






hubris failing to transform approach. Corbyn’s popularity had stalled and the 
Brexit issue had caught up with the party. Labour’s organic engagement was 
static from 2017 and their targeted advertising was lacklustre. An illustrative sign 
of their campaign’s failure was that the party even reused content from 2017. 
Labour stagnated while the Conservative Party adapted, with the Conservatives 
reaching out successfully to Brexit voting Labour voters, as well as benefitting 
from Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party. Overall, this last decade clearly shows the 
parties learning from mistakes and evolving best practice, but also failing to adapt 
to changing circumstances. Facebook is a volatile environment where approach 
does matter; engagement is not a given, campaign skill is rewarded, and 
complacency is punished.  
 
Appendix 2: Literature review  
Twitter  
 
Andreas Jungherr undertook a thorough literature review of Twitter in 
2016, within which he outlines that the literature centres on studies of usage, 
content analyses and participation. Evidence of usage shows that major 
opposition parties and candidates are more likely to use Twitter (Hemphill, 
Otterbacher, & Shapiro, 2013; Jaidka & Ahmed, 2015; Plotkowiak & Stanoevska-
Slabeva, 2013). With it used to a larger extent by candidates of well-established 
major parties (Amirullah, Komp, & Nurhadryani, 2013; Evans, Cordova, & Sipole, 
2014), incumbents (Evans et al., 2014) and those with high budgets (Peterson, 
2009; Gilmore, 2012). Thus, whilst also utilised by non-mainstream parties and 
those in power, it has been found that Twitter is used significantly as an attacking 
tool to challenge existing government. Further to this, young urban politicians 
appear to be more likely to use the platform (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; Vergeer 
& Hermans, 2013; Straus et al., 2013), with Twitter use found to correspond 
highly to electoral competition intensity (Vergeer & Hermans, 2013; Evans et al., 
2014).  
Interactivity on Twitter is found to be under used, with candidates from 
opposition parties tending to use Twitter in a more interactive way (Ahmed & 






Kalsnes, 2014). The ability to generate public interaction with candidates on 
Twitter is one of the unique and powerful elements of social media but is found 
to be relatively non-existent. This highlights the use of Twitter as a broadcast 
device (Golbeck et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2014; Kruikemeier, 2014), with 
interactions that do occur, found to be focused towards fellow politicians or 
journalists (Ahmed & Skoric, 2014; D’heer & Verdegem, 2014). This supports the 
idea of Twitter being a platform for the elite, with its propensity to be a news 
device and informational echo chamber (Adams & McCorkindale, 2013; Ahmed 
& Skoric, 2014; İkiz et al., 2014; Jaidka & Ahmed, 2015). It has been stated that 
some candidates do use Twitter to interact with normal users (Graham et al., 
2013, 2016), however the literature provides little evidence of Twitter being used 
as campaign tool to generate dialogue between parties, candidate’s and voters.  
The other central focus of Twitter studies are content analyses, with 
evidence from many sources proposing the increased importance of 
personalisation (Evans et al., 2014; Kruikemeier, 2014). Concurrent to this 
importance of personalisation, it has been found that personalized messages 
have robust effects on voters “recognition, recall, feelings of social presence, and 
imagined intimacy” (Lee & Oh, 2012, p.3). Interestingly, given its propensity to 
send political information, GOTV or fund-raising posts have also been rarely 
seen in the literature (Ahmed & Skoric, 2014; Evans et al., 2014). However, the 
content forms of Twitter as a ~140-character medium is far reduced compared 
to Facebook, and posts are less enduring, with candidates valuing “Facebook 
over Twitter as a campaign tool given its larger audience reach” (Quinlan et al., 
2018). 
With regards to participation and voting, Dimitrova et al., evidenced that 
following candidates on Twitter is related to a slight upsurge in political learning, 
but gives no positive effects on political participation (Dimitrova, Shehata, 
Strömbäck, & Nord, 2014), whilst in Japan, evidence supporting this asserted 
that followers of a prominent candidate’s Twitter feed showed an increased 
positive attitude toward that candidate, but exhibited no changes in their voting 
intentions (Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015). In contrast, Kruikemeier (2014), Spierings 
& Jacobs (2014) found a modest association between Twitter and the number of 






on participation or voting is poor, with those examinations giving positive results 
suffering from a lack of causation evidence, whilst those with negative results 
may be highly correlated to external campaign factors. This constant issue of 
determining correlation or causation is highly problematic within all social media 
studies, given that use of social media by candidates is also highly correlated 
with other potentially effective campaigning methodologies108.  
Jungherr’s review highlights the innate problem with the literature for any 
electoral connection between use of Twitter as a campaign tool and election 
results; “…no clear picture emerges regarding the connection between Twitter 
use, public attention on Twitter, and popularity or electoral chances. Some 
studies identify a link between Twitter use and electoral wins (LaMarre & Suzuki-
Lambrecht, 2013) while others do not (Vergeer et al., 2011; Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 
2015). In the same vein, some studies find links between the mentions political 
candidates or parties received on Twitter and their election results (DiGrazia et 
al., 2013; McKelvey, DiGrazia, & Rojas, 2014) while others do not (Jungherr, 
2013; Murthy & Petto, 2014). Thus, if there is a relationship between Twitter use 
and electoral success, this seems to be an indirect one, highly dependent on the 
respective electoral context” (2014, p.4). 
Twitter has use as an informational, news generation and communication 
tool, but has poor targeting and data capabilities, lacks real world representation 
of users, is less demographically representatively used, is more partisan, and is 
more nebulous in its network construction via its basis in interests not offline 
social networks. However, it is widely used by elites and news stations, is real 
time and interactive, making it useful to prime elites in the media or politics. Thus, 
as a campaign tool Twitter matters as it is useful in specific ways as a part of the 
social media toolkit, but its unique abilities are far outweighed by Facebook. 
However, the academic community has continually examined Twitter, whilst in 
contrast Facebook has seen far less academic interest, despite it being the 
largest and most powerful social media network within the UK.  
 
108 BES studies have shown that parties who campaign most intensively gain an electoral vote 
dividend (Denver et al., 2003; Fisher et al., 2011), with voters who are contacted by a party or a 
candidate showing a small but higher propensity to vote for that party than those who have not 







Engagement forms  
 
Engagement is the catch all term for users’ total interactions with 
Facebook content delivered in the form of posts. Consisting of likes, shares and 
comments, Facebook users have been shown to engage with Facebook content 
for four main reasons. Due to subjective norms, where the behaviour of a user is 
influenced by the behaviour of others, engagement for social identity, 
engagement for entertainment and engagement for interpersonal connectivity 




Liking is the act of a Facebook user clicking the ‘like button’ on a specific 
post sent by themselves or others. Added in February 2009, it is the simplest 
form of engagement on Facebook, it is therefore usually the most numerous. The 
action only requires one click and is a clear and quick act. However, Facebook 
in October 2015 added a new element to the like action, by allowing users to add 
character to their like interactions via a drop-down menu of ‘reactions’. As an 
extension of the like button, the collection of reactions includes; Like, Love, Haha, 
Wow, Sad and Angry109. Thus, liking is not as pure an interaction form as it was 
before reactions were implemented, however the use of reactions in comparison 
to normal liking is minimal and thus is not problematic for this study, in fact the 
added detail from reactions allows for sentiment analysis of posts. 
Understanding what a like means is highly problematic. Within a user’s 
actions, it is unknown what a like means, however logically for the user it 
arguably displays some form of approval of the contents of a post, as it makes 
the liking of said content public. However, construing intent from someone hitting 
a button on Facebook is incalculable complex as one cannot know the 
influencing factors behind the action, including the time, age, gender, mood, 
personality, place, context, and people involved in the like (Bouchard et al., 2013; 
 






Krishnan & Atkin, 2014; Oliveira, Huertas, & Lin, 2016). However, despite 
complexity, the need to understand and quantifying what a ‘like’ means is 
becoming required, as the rise of fake news and the policing of social media has 
meant that ascribing likes tangible value is becoming important. Indeed, liking 
something can now have real world consequences; a Swiss court recently fined 
an individual 4,000 Swiss francs for liking a series of Facebook posts falsely 
accusing an animal rights activist of being a racist and fascist110, viewing liking 
as an ‘endorsement’. Contrastingly, in the United States there is a debate 
continuing, upon whether a ‘like’ is ‘speech’ and thus protected by the 1st 
Amendment, as seen in Bland v. Roberts in the United States111 (see Sarapin & 
Morris, 2014). This new legal arena is one which requires further research as 
within the context of bots, fake news and anti-democratic trolls, a like is still 
arguably an unknown quantity.  
Research has examined the factors behind liking, much of it rests within 
psychology. Psychological research has asserted that liking is used to express 
‘virtual empathy’ or unity with a friend and their way of thinking (Mayshak et al., 
2017), or to present a positive online image (Oliveira, Huertas, & Lin, 2016). 
Some studies have asserted personality factors as important to liking (Krishnan 
& Atkin, 2014), with one study (Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel, 2013) asserting that 
liking is an action used to affirm something about ourselves. In their study of 
more than 58,000 US users who made their likes public, they found that likes 
could predict several identification traits that users had not disclosed. This 
included race with 95% accuracy, sexuality with 88% accuracy, and even 
identified participants as a Democrat or Republican with 85% accuracy. Thus, 
even subconsciously a user liking certain content will reveal themselves. It is 
therefore arguable that Facebook knows us very well just from our likes, and thus 
to content creators and those with access to the resultant data likes matter. 
Political parties if they have access to this data, have the capacity to hone 
content and target information to individuals that they do not even realise they 
will appreciate.  
 
110http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/31/technology/facebook-like-defamation/switzerland.html 
111 In 2013, some employees at a Sheriff's department were fired after having liked the 
Facebook page of the sheriff's opponent before an election. The employees sued and first lost. 
They then won on appeal, with three-judges unanimously asserting that a like is speech and is 






The area requires further research, however for clarity this thesis asserts 
the innate complexity of a like, with likelihood being that a like is highly specific 
to an individual and their circumstances, and as such is incalculably difficult to 
determine intent. This thesis thus approaches its understanding of what a like is, 
and why it is actioned by users through its effects. As Facebook asserts; “Clicking 
like below a post on Facebook is an easy way to let people know that you enjoy 
it… people will be able to see that you liked it… a story will be posted on your 
timeline that you liked it… and the person who posted the video will get a 
notification that you liked it” (Facebook website, 2018112). What is thus clear, is 
that the act of liking a post, endorses the content, with the user happy for this act 
to be publicly visible within their ego network, or if on a public page post 
completely public. Similarly, Facebook's algorithm takes likes to mean that the 
post should be amplified, and shown to more people, meaning to Facebook a 
like is both an endorsement and a positive signal. 
For users, liking is important as engagement is vital to the social media 
experience. As its raison d'être, engagement generally allows users to feel 
involved with the content parties send, campaign online, organise and debate 
with others. Whilst, through liking, a user (but to a lesser extent than sharing) 
becomes an opinion leader. For political parties liking is important as users liking 
a party’s posts increases the posts reach to other users, especially those liking 
users’ friends on Facebook. This allows some capacity for the post to reach out 
of its follower base, into ego-networks less associated with the page. Likes also 
increase Facebook reach without the user inputting their own contributions or 
changing the message (unlike with sharing), helping parties maintain positive 
interactions (unlike with comments) and develop a wider view of their content 




The other foremost form of Facebook post engagement is sharing113. 
Through one click, a user will replicate the post on their own personal Facebook 
 
112 https://www.facebook.com/help/like accessed 1/2/2019 
113 Related to sharing is the capacity for tagging, this is where a user upon a post can ‘tag’ one 






page, this will then be placed (owing to the algorithm) within their own circle of 
friends via the news feed. The share function thus allows users to become 
arbitrators of other pages content, acting as what Bruns and Highfield (2012) call 
“produsers”, as gatekeepers for others (Sundar & Nass, 2001). Sharing 
consequently opens new interaction channels for the post in the user’s own ego-
network, opening the capacity for the content to be further liked, shared and 
commented upon through a multi-step flow of communication. The shared post 
will be semi-detached from its original context meaning that the new audience 
may respond differently to the content, as the new post will only be seen within 
their own and the sharer’s ego-networks, and be associated with a user’s profile 
and opinion, not a political page. In questioning what a share means, a share 
(similar to a like) potentially shows approval given the user is replicating the 
content of a post, however the context that this share is placed within is 
important. People can share content they disagree with and include their own 
views. What is clear to this thesis, is that sharing a post shows that a user is 
happy for the content they have shared to be public within their ego-network, and 
for their action to be viewed publicly on the original post. 
For users, sharing is a powerful tool allowing users to act as opinion 
leaders and disseminate information they agree or disagree with. Research 
highlights that the same reasons exist for sharing as liking, however given its 
function is different, research has emphasised the greater empowering effect of 
sharing (Stavrositu & Sundar, 2012). This is because, sharers can take 
information and recast it making it personally relevant to their ego network, this 
includes reframing the content in positive, negative or neutral lights. However, 
the shares key power lies in its capacity to open new interaction channels, 
making it as the most powerful type of interaction occurrent on Facebook.  
For parties generating shares is critical as it is the most important device 
of virality, allowing content to be sent at different levels. Sharing is also a vital 
function within Facebook, but also without. Sharing has become important to the 
whole internet ecosystem, with Facebook shares one of the leading referrers to 
news sites, and other websites through links (Hopkins, 2010; as cited in Baresch, 
 
process does not replicate the content on the user’s own page but can mean the content is 






Knight, Harp, & Yaschur, 2011). Sharing also improves organic reach, as the 
reach usually attained is via a page’s followers and the number of likes posts 
receive. This is problematic as the content will often remain isolated to those 
individuals who are already interested agents. Instead, shares can open political 
content into new ego-networks as the posts can cascade through different 
networks. This is also important as it reduces the party-political element of the 
message, instead enhancing the personalised aspect of the sharers opinion and 
personality. This arguably enhances the message as it is socially mediated, with 
social mediation through friends a key tenet of Facebooks approach to targeted 
advertisements114. However, for parties, sharing is not a purely neutral tool of 
transmission, meaning the capacity for negative transmission is just as powerful. 
Overall, for parties, sharing is imperative as it; spreads their messages more 
widely, engages more users with political content, and delivers more widely the 




Commenting is an integral element of the social nature of Facebook. 
However, within the political arena, content that is controversial generally attracts 
the greatest number of comments. This is inherent given human nature, but the 
capacity for debate on Facebook is part of the user experience, although the 
recent rise in trolling and threats across social media, has led to new questions 
as to how people should act on social media.  
It is difficult to define what commenting means given the subjective nature 
of comments and their variety. As they have no collective meaning, this thesis 
understands comments through an appreciation that they show a user’s 
engagement with the content provided, whether positive or negative. The effect 
of a comment however is clearer, a post with large numbers of comments is 
promoted by Facebook’s algorithm, meaning the post may be seen by the 
members of the commenting user’s ego-network via their News Feeds. This 
 
114 86.9% of all ads served by the Conservative Party Page during the 2015 General Election 
had a social context, that means that when advertised the post featured a user’s friends in the 
title. This was via the form “Joe Bloggs likes the Conservatives”, with the message contents 
then following. This means that 13.1% of those targeted-on Facebook by the Conservatives, 






makes the original post commented upon visible and ‘reactable’ to their 
Facebook friends. Nevertheless, a comment does not open a new interaction 
channel outside of the original post but rather does so within the post, within an 
internal network where comments can receive likes, reactions and replies. This 
leads to a situation when viewing posts that one can view the most ‘liked’ 
comments first, or by date. Thus, the internal commenting network is important 
to parties as negative comments with large numbers of likes will be visible directly 
beneath their content, this is something both major parties have suffered from 
enormously.  
For users, commenting inherently enables the utmost self-presentation 
and interaction with the content, as under a post, users can express their 
personal opinions, offer support, link in friends via tagging, post links, spread 
memes and images, question the content or the author of the post, and interact 
with other users within a cascading comment network. Comments allow a fuller 
level of interaction in comparison to other engagement forms, as a user can post 
infinite numbers of posts and use their own words. For parties, every single 
comment raises the chance of visibility, so a heated debate between users under 
the post can be useful in terms of information dissemination, even if there is 
negativity. However, as it is not a neutral transmitter often negative or humorous 
comments are the most influential, frequently ending up as the most liked posts. 
However, parties can delete comments and ban users from their pages, but 
these actions claim additional resources and may entail harmful consequences, 
and as such is not actioned often. Similarly, Facebook removes comments that 
break the community guidelines, for actions such as racism and threats of 
violence. Overall, for parties commenting is useful as it; allows for two-way 
discourse with voters, games to algorithm to spread their messages more widely, 
and engages more users with political content via debate. However, in 
comparison to other engagement forms, it is the mode they would lose first. 
Alashri et al. (2016), examined comments in relation to content. In 
examining 12,050,595 Facebook comments posted on candidates posts during 
the 2016 US Presidential Elections, “commentators on Republican candidate 
pages expressed negative sentiments toward current public policies…, whilst 






support for the continuation… of existing policies” (Alashri et al., 2016, p.795). 
Interestingly however “the significance (strong/weak) and nature 
(positive/negative) of sentiment varied between candidates within political parties 
based on perceived credibility of the candidate on a given issue” (Alashri et al., 
2016, p.795), highlighting how the offline world influences online interaction. A 
similar study by Babac & Vedran (2017) of the 2015 Croatian General Election 
also found that “messages with positive emotions evocate positive comment 
responses from citizens, while neutral content is more likely to invoke negative 
comments and criticism” (Babac & Vedran, 2017, p.2). Recently Moody-Ramirez 
& Church (2019) examined Facebook meme groups during the 2016 Presidential 
election finding that meme pages popular content was negative content informed 






Appendix 3: Typology coding scheme 











































































































CNT - EU 
CNT - Austerity 
CNT - Manifesto 
CNT - Immigration 
CNT - Young People 
CNT - Old People 
CNT - Healthcare 
CNT - Foreign Policy 
CNT - Leadership 
CNT - Defence 
CNT - Education 
CNT - Transport 
CNT - Social Care / benefits 
CNT - Housing 
CNT - Policing  
CNT - Energy 
CNT - Environment 
CNT - Security 
CNT - Economy + Taxation 
CNT - Social Justice 
CNT - Workers Rights 
CNT - Benefits 
CNT - Campaigner Praise 
CNT - Participation/GOTV 
CNT - Religion 
CNT - A - Political 
CNT - Disabled 
CNT - Football 
CNT - Human Rights 
CNT - Vote 
CNT - Join 
CNT - Farming 
CNT - Parliamentary change 
CNT - Patriotism 
CNT - Women 
CNT - Local candidate 
CNT - Homeless 
CNT - LGBT 
CNT – Anti-Right 
CNT – Insider Information 
CNT – Racism 



















CNT - AS Least utilised topic (total) 
CNT - AS Topic agenda specificity 
CNT - AS Agenda frequency  















CNT – Key words average per post 

















FRAME  -  ASF Political Information 
FRAME  -  ASF Pledge 
FRAME  -  ASF Diagnosis 
FRAME  -  ASF Negative problem is defined 
FRAME  -  ASF Positive success is defined 
FRAME  -  ASF Prognosis (forecast) 
FRAME  -  ASF Positive How we will solve problem  
FRAME  -  ASF Negative How problem won’t be solved  
FRAME  -  ASF Motivation  
FRAME  -  ASF Why we should solve this problem is defined (ideology) 



























MOB  -  PARTY Leadership positive TOTAL 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of Leader 
















MOB  -  PARTY Leadership negative TOTAL 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition Leader 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of former Leader 












MOB  -  PARTY Positive TOTAL 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of party members 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of party campaigners 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of party MP 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of party politician in text 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of party politician in video 












MOB  -  PARTY Negative TOTAL 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition party members 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition MP’s 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition party campaigners 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition party 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of opposition party politician in text 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of opposition party politician in video  































PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Personalisation in text TOTAL 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses I 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses My 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Me 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Mine 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Our 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Ours 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Us 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses We 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses You 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Your 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses You're 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses They 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Them 
PERS  -  PERSO  -  LANG Uses Their 








PERS  -  HUM Persuasion Humour TOTAL 
PERS  -  HUM Use of humour 
PERS  -  HUM Use of meme humour 
PERS  -  HUM Use of general humour  -  a-political 













PERS  -  T Persuasion Tone TOTAL of (Formal language, Informal language, Mixed 
language, Use of colloquialisms, Content mainly rhetorical not factual). 
PERS  -  T Formal language 
PERS  -  T Informal language 
PERS  -  T Mixed language 
PERS  -  T Use of colloquialisms  
PERS  -  T Content mainly rhetorical not factual 
PERS  -  LANG  -  RHE Persuasion  -  Rhetoric  -  Language – TOTAL of (Use of rhetorical 
devices, Use of repetition, Use of us v them rhetoric, Use of metaphors, Use of three - 
part list, Use of Party catch phrase, Use of Labelling of group identity, Use of 
Patriotism/nationalism/patriotic imagery) 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of rhetorical devices 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of repetition 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of us v them rhetoric 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of metaphors 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of three - part list 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of Party catch phrase 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of Labelling of group identity 
PERS  - LANG  -  RHE Use of Patriotism/nationalism/patriotic imagery  













PERS - Personal Language positive Personalised forms TOTAL 
PERS  -  HUM Cuteness usage puppies/babies/children 
PERS  -  PERSO Post is positively personalised 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of party leader in imagery (non - video)  
PERS  -  PERSO Use of party leader in video 
PERS  -  PERSO Personal message (thoughts etc  -  not a political issue) 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of party leader in text 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of politician family 
PERS  -  PERSO Non - political personal public story 
PERS  -  PERSO Non - political personal expert story 
































PERS - Personal Language negative Personalised forms Total 
PERS  -  PERSO Post is negatively personalised 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of opposition leader in imagery (non - video)  
PERS  -  PERSO Use of opposition leader in video 










PERS – Celebrity TOTAL of (Use of male and female celebrity) 
PERS  -  PERSO Use of male celebrity  
PERS  -  PERSO Use of female celebrity 



















PERS  -  TAR  - All ages 
PERS  -  TAR  - Message target Ages TOTAL (Young people, Middle aged People, Old 
People)  
PERS  -  TAR  - Young people 
PERS  -  TAR  - Middle aged people 
PERS  -  TAR  - Old people 
PERS  -  TAR  - Message target Groups TOTAL  
PERS  -  TAR  - Minority voters 
PERS  -  TAR  - Parents 
PERS  -  TAR  - Women 
PERS  -  TAR  - Men 
PERS  -  TAR  - LGBTQ 
PERS  -  TAR  - Disabled people 
PERS  -  TAR  - Class lower 
PERS  -  TAR  - Class middle 
PERS  -  TAR  - Class upper 
PERS  -  TAR  - Ethnicity Black  



























PERS  -  TAR  - Sub nations (NI, SCO, WAL) 
PERS  -  TAR  - Sub nations ENG 
PERS  -  TAR  - Sub nations NI 
PERS  -  TAR  - Sub nations SCO 











PERS  -  TAR  - Londoner’s 
PERS  -  TAR  - Northerner’s 
PERS  -  TAR  - Southerner’s 
PERS  -  TAR  - Midlander’s 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions TOTAL (NE, NW, SE, SW, EM, WM, LON) 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions NE 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions NW 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions SE 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions SW 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions EM 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions WM 
PERS  -  TAR  - Regions LON 
PERS  -  TAR  - All locations 
PERS  -  TAR  - Rural voters 
PERS  -  TAR  - City voters 


















PERS  -  CNT FRM Text TOTAL 
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is text only  








PERS  -  CNT FRM Video TOTAL 
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is video Uses content from mainstream media  
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is video Uses content from alternative media  
PERS  -  CNT FRM Video is alternated opposition PEB 
PERS  -  CNT FRM Video is PEB 
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is Infographic video 
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is meme  
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is FB Live Video  



















PERS  -  CNT FRM Image TOTAL 
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is newspaper frontpage   
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is Image  
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is image collection  
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is poster  
PERS  -  CNT FRM Is Infographic 































PERS  -  CNT FRM Is Audio  

































INF  -  TBE Positive Expertise TOTAL 
INF  -  TBE positive use of non - political expert 
INF  -  TBE positive use of party - political expert 















INF  -  TBE Negative Expertise TOTAL 
INF  -  TBE negative use of non - political expert 













FRAME  -  LLL Legitimacy Lateral linkage TOTAL 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page party 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page other 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page opposition 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook webpage news – mainstream 



















FRAME  -  LLL Positive Legitimacy Lateral linkage 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page party 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page other 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page opposition 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook webpage news – mainstream 



















FRAME - LLL Negative Legitimacy Lateral linkage TOTAL 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page party 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page other 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook page opposition 
FRAME  -  LLL Link to Facebook webpage news – mainstream 




















INF  -  TBE positive use of external newspaper source 
INF  -  TBE positive use of external newspaper source via link 
INF  -  TBE positive use of magazine 
INF  -  TBE positive use of mainstream media 
INF  -  TBE positive use of alternative media 
INF  -  TBE media endorsement 
INF  -  TBE business endorsement 




















INF  -  TBE Negative External Legitimacy TOTAL 
INF  -  TBE negative use of external newspaper source 
INF  -  TBE negative use of external newspaper source via link 
INF  -  TBE negative use of magazine 
INF  -  TBE negative use of mainstream media 















FRAME  -  R   Use of external content within altered context – e.g. Tv interviews cut and 
edited – reframed to political party TOTAL 
FRAME  -  R Positive use of external content within altered context  
























PERS - PERSO Use of general public's voice 


















FRAME - LEL Legitimacy External Social TOTAL 
FRAME - LEL Link to social media Twitter 
FRAME - LEL Link to social media Instagram 
FRAME - LEL Link to social media YouTube 










































FRAME - LEL Link to external webpage other 
FRAME - LEL Link to external webpage news – mainstream 


























INF  -  PI Political Information Issues TOTAL of (positive valance issue, negative valance 
issue, position issue, position issue) 
INF  -  PI positive valance issue 
INF  -  PI negative valance issue 
INF  -  PI positive position issue 
INF  -  PI negative position issue 
INF  -  PI Political Information TOTAL of (features political information, positive political 
information, negative political information) 
INF  -  PI features political information 
INF  -  PI positive political information 
INF  -  PI negative political information 




















FRAME  -  O Orientation National TOTAL 
FRAME  -  O National orientation (UK) 
FRAME  -  O Sub national orientation (England, wales, NI, Scotland 
















FRAME  -  O Positive orientation (praise, pride, success reporting, transfer to something) 
(only for political content 
FRAME  -  O Negative orientation (criticism, attack, regret) (only for political content 
FRAME  -  O Neutral Political orientation 
















FRAME  -  MS  -  Message Scale 
FRAME  -  MS Post word count short  -  under 25 
FRAME  -  MS Post word count medium -  25  -  100 
FRAME  -  MS Post word count long  -  over 100 
FRAME  -  MS Post word count long  -  over 200 
FRAME  -  MS Post word count long  -  over 400 
CNT - No. Words 
NUM  -  Video length 
FRAME  -  MS Video length  -  short  -  under 1 min 
FRAME  -  MS Video length  -  medium  - 1 min  -  3 mins 
















FRAME  -  TQ post_published_sql 
FRAME  -  TQ Is Day or Night 
FRAME  -  TQ Is morning 
FRAME  -  TQ Is Afternoon 
FRAME  -  TQ Is Evening 
FRAME  -  TQ Post 6am  -  9am 
FRAME  -  TQ 9am - 12pm 
FRAME  -  TQ 12pm - 3pm 
FRAME  -  TQ 3pm - 6pm 
FRAME  -  TQ 6pm - 9pm 
FRAME  -  TQ 9am - 12am 
FRAME  -  TQ 12 - 6am 
DATE  -  post_published 
DATE  -  pos 
DATE  -  Day 
DATE  - Year 
DATE  - Month 
DATE  -  Days to GE day 





























































INF  -  TBR Trust Building Representation (Non - text) TOTAL 
INF  -  TBR Use of relevant public worker to issue raised e.g. nurse 
INF  -  TBR Use of non - political ordinary public 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority non - political ordinary public 
INF  -  TBR Use of ordinary party members 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority ordinary party members 
INF  -  TBR Use of male politician of same party 
INF  -  TBR Use of Female politician of same party 
INF  -  TBR Use of female issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority politician of same party 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Christianity 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Islam 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Hinduism 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Sikhism 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Judaism 
INF  -  TBR Use of LGBT politician 
INF  -  TBR Use of LGBT people 
INF  -  TBR Use of LGBT issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of Disabled politician 
INF  -  TBR Use of Disabled people 
INF  -  TBR Use of Disabled issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of old people  
INF  -  TBR Use of old people issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of young people 
INF  -  TBR Use of young people issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of middle - aged people 
INF  -  TBR Use of middle - aged people issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of children 





































































































INF  -  TBR Representation in text TOTAL 
INF  -  TBR Use of relevant public worker to issue raised e.g. nurse 
INF  -  TBR Use of non - political ordinary public 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority non - political ordinary public 
INF  -  TBR Use of ordinary party members 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority ordinary party members 
INF  -  TBR Use of male politician of same party 
INF  -  TBR Use of Female politician of same party 
INF  -  TBR Use of female issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority politician of same party 
INF  -  TBR Use of minority issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Christianity 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Islam 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Hinduism 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Sikhism 
INF  -  TBR Use of religion  -  Judaism 
INF  -  TBR Use of LGBT politician 
INF  -  TBR Use of LGBT people 
INF  -  TBR Use of LGBT issue  
INF  -  TBR Use of Disabled politician 
INF  -  TBR Use of Disabled people 
INF  -  TBR Use of Disabled issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of old people  
INF  -  TBR Use of old people issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of young people 
INF  -  TBR Use of young people issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of middle - aged people 
INF  -  TBR Use of middle - aged people issue 
INF  -  TBR Use of children 
















































































MOB  -  Mobilisation Organisation TOTAL 
MOB  -  ORG Organisation TOTAL of Organisation Internal and External 
MOB  -  ORG Community building internal core – TOTAL of Organisation Internal Online 
Organisation – Partisanship, participation online, participation offline and Interactivity. 
MOB  -  ORG Community building external core  -  TOTAL of Organisation Internal Online 

























MOB  -  PARTY Partisanship TOTAL 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of party members 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of party campaigners 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of party MP 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of Leader 
MOB  -  PARTY Praise of former Leader 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of former Leader 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition party members 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition MP’s 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition party campaigners 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition Leader 
MOB  -  PARTY Negative appraisal of opposition party 





















MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Core support Participation internal ONLINE TOTAL 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Register to vote 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Sign up to campaign 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Visit party website 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Poll 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Visit another website 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Visit other social media 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Sign petition 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Share content to network 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Visit campaign page 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Funding 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Shop 
MOB  -  PAR  -  INT ONLINE Talk to friends’ family 

















MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Core support Participation internal OFFLINE TOTAL  
MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Visit hustings 
MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Visit event 
MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Help doorstep campaign 
MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Attend rally 
MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Attend demonstration/protest 
MOB  -  ORG  -  INT  -  OFFLINE Volunteer 










 MOB  - ACTIVE Interactivity TOTAL 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to Like 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to Share 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to Comment 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to tag friends 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to visit party website 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to visit another website 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to join/visit other medium 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to join/visit Other social media 
MOB  - ACTIVE Use of question to the audience? 
MOB  - ACTIVE GOTV 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call for vote 






























MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT    Non - core support Organisation External Participation ONLINE 
TOTAL 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Join party 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Register to vote 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Sign up to campaign 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Visit party website 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Poll 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Visit another website 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Visit other social media 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Sign petition 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Share content to network 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Engage with content, like comment 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Visit campaign page 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Funding 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  - ONLINE Shop 
















MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT    Non - core support Organisation External Participation OFFLINE 
TOTAL 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Call for vote 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Join party 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Register to vote 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Visit hustings 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Visit event 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Help doorstep campaign 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Attend rally 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Attend demonstration/protest 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  OFFLINE Volunteer 


























MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  -  Data gathering TOTAL 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  -  Give data to party website 
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  -  Give email address  
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  -  Give name   
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  - Give location   
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  - Give phone   
MOB  -  ORG  -  EXT  -  ONLINE DATA  - Facebook data 










 MOB  - ACTIVE Interactivity TOTAL 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to Like 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to Share 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to Comment 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to tag friends 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to visit party website 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to visit another website 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to join/visit other medium 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call to join/visit Other social media 
MOB  - ACTIVE Use of question to the audience? 
MOB  - ACTIVE GOTV 
MOB  - ACTIVE Call for vote 


























NUM  - Total engagement - engagement_fb TOTAL 
NUM  - Likes - likes_count_fb 
NUM  - Comments - comments_count_fb 
NUM  - Shares - shares_count_fb 
NUM  - Reactions – TOTAL (love, haha, wow, sad, angry, thankful) 
NUM  - Love - rea_LOVE 
NUM  - Haha - rea_HAHA 
NUM  - Wow - rea_WOW 
NUM  - Sad - rea_SAD 
NUM  - Angry - rea_ANGRY 
NUM  - Thankful - rea_THANKFUL 
NUM  -  Video views 
NUM  -  Video length 
NUM  -  Video views from specific post 
NUM  -  Video views of video total 









CNTRL  -  Weighted activity score 
DATE  -  Days to GE day 
CNTRL  -  Terrorism response 
CNTRL  -  Deaths in Med 
CNTRL  -  Is reshare from another FB page 


















Reformed topic coding scheme for simplified analysis 
 
Given the original coding scheme includes many topics of content, to 
engage in a more concise analysis the codes have been grouped into thematic 
areas. The original 37 variables were merged into 12.  
  
New code Code formulated from 
Economy 


















Young people Young People 
Government practise Parliamentary Change 
Environment and energy 
Energy 
Environment 


























Appendix 4: Krippendorf testing 




Cohen's Kappa Krippendorf's 
Alpha 
INF - PI positive position issue 80 0.55 0.55 
INF - PI negative position issue 82 0.64 0.64 
INF - PI features political information 84 0.66 0.66 
INF - PI positive political information 57 0.10 -0.03 
INF - PI negative political information 77 0.47 0.47 
INF - PI features policy detail 87 0.73 0.73 
INF - TBE positive use of non-political 
expert 
99 0.90 0.90 
INF - TBE negative use of non-
political expert 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE positive use of party 
political expert 
99 0.88 0.88 
INF - TBE negative use of party 
political expert 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE positive use of external 
newspaper source  
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE negative use of external 
newspaper source  
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE positive use of external 
newspaper source via link 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE negative use of external 
newspaper source via link 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE positive use of magazine 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE negative use of magazine 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE positive use of mainstream 
media 
99 0.92 0.92 
INF - TBE negative use of 
mainstream media 
95 0.68 0.68 
INF - TBE positive use of alternative 
media 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE negative use of alternative 
media 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE media endorsement 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBE celeb endorsement 98 0.85 0.85 
INF - TBE business endorsement 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of relevant public 
worker to issue raised e.g nurse 
95 0.79 0.79 
INF - TBR Use of non-political 
ordinary public 
95 0.89 0.89 
INF - TBR Use of minority non-
political ordinary public 
95 0.81 0.81 
INF - TBR Use of ordinary party 
members 






INF - TBR Use of minority ordinary 
party members 
99 0.93 0.93 
INF - TBR Use of male politician of 
same party 
98 0.86 0.86 
INF - TBR Use of Female politician of 
same party 
98 0.79 0.79 
INF - TBR Use of female issue 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of minority politician 
of same party 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of minority issue 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - 
Christianity 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Islam 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Hinduism 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Sikhism 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Judaism 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of LGBT politician 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of LGBT people 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of LGBT issue  100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of Disabled politician 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of Disabled people 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of Disabled issue 99 0.00 0.00 
INF - TBR Use of old people  96 0.82 0.82 
INF - TBR Use of old people issue 97 0.83 0.83 
INF - TBR Use of young people 94 0.76 0.77 
INF - TBR Use of young people issue 94 0.72 0.72 
INF - TBR Use of middle aged people 92 0.70 0.70 
INF - TBR Use of middle aged people 
issue 
92 0.51 0.51 
INF - TBR Use of children 96 0.80 0.80 
INF - TBR Use of child issue 99 0.90 0.90 
INF - TBR Use of relevant public 
worker to issue raised e.g. nurse 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of relevant public 
worker to issue raised e.g. nurse 
94 0.75 0.75 
INF - TBR Use of non-political 
ordinary public 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of ordinary party 
members 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of minority ordinary 
party members 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of male politician of 
same party 
98 0.79 0.79 
INF - TBR Use of Female politician of 
same party 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of female issue 99 0.66 0.66 
INF - TBR Use of minority politician 
of same party 
100 1.00 1.00 






INF - TBR Use of religion - 
Christianity 
100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Islam 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Hinduism 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Sikhism 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of religion - Judaism 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of LGBT politician 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of LGBT people 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of LGBT issue  100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of Disabled politician 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of Disabled people 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of Disabled issue 99 0.66 0.66 
INF - TBR Use of old people  100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of old people issue 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of young people 97 0.65 0.65 
INF - TBR Use of young people issue 98 0.86 0.86 
INF - TBR Use of middle aged people 98 0.66 0.66 
INF - TBR Use of middle aged people 
issue 
97 0.75 0.75 
INF - TBR Use of children 100 1.00 1.00 
INF - TBR Use of child issue 99 0.88 0.88 
FRAME - ASF Pledge 91 0.82 0.82 
FRAME - ASF Negative problem is 
defined 
89 0.78 0.78 
FRAME - ASF Positive success is 
defined 
89 0.74 0.74 
FRAME - ASF Prognosis (forecast) 85 0.64 0.64 
FRAME - ASF Positive How we will 
solve problem  
88 0.70 0.70 
FRAME - ASF Negative How problem 
won’t be solved  
88 0.57 0.58 
FRAME - ASF Why we should solve 
this problem is defined (ideology) 
83 0.65 0.65 
FRAME - ASF Why we solved this 
problem is defined (ideology 
98 0.86 0.86 
FRAME - LEL Link to other social 
media Twitter 
100 1.00 1.00 
FRAME - LEL Link to other social 
media Instagram 
100 1.00 1.00 
FRAME - LEL Link to other social 
media YouTube 
100 1.00 1.00 
FRAME - LEL Link to external 
webpage party 
98 0.93 0.93 
FRAME - LEL Link to external 
webpage other 
97 0.75 0.75 
FRAME - LEL Link to external 
webpage news – mainstream 
99 0.88 0.88 
FRAME - ASF Link to external 
webpage news - alternative 
100 undefined* undefined* 






FRAME - LLL Link to Facebook page 
of party leader or party page 
98 0.92 0.92 
FRAME - LLL Link to Facebook page 
other 
96 0.65 0.65 
FRAME - LLL Link to Facebook page 
opposition leader or party page 
100 1.00 1.00 
FRAME - LLL Link to Facebook 
webpage news – mainstream 
100 1.00 1.00 
FRAME - LLL Link to Facebook 
webpage news - alternative 
99 0.00 0.00 
FRAME - R Use of external content 
within altered context – e.g. Tv 
interviews cut and edited – reframed 
to political party 
98 0.93 0.93 
FRAME - R Positive use of external 
content within altered context – e.g. 
Tv interviews cut and edited. – 
reframed to political party 
96 0.58 0.58 
FRAME - R Negative use of external 
content within altered context – e.g. 
Tv interviews cut and edited. – 
reframed to political party 
98 0.90 0.90 
FRAME - O National orientation (UK) 96 0.00 -0.02 
FRAME - O Sub national orientation 
(England, Wales, NI, Scotland 
98 0.49 0.49 
FRAME - O Local orientation (sub 
national regional, town, city, region, 
county 
100 1.00 1.00 
FRAME - O Positive orientation 
(praise, pride, success reporting, 
transfer to something) (only for 
political content 
87 0.67 0.67 
FRAME - O Negative orientation 
(criticism, attack, regret) (only for 
political content 
94 0.86 0.86 
FRAME - O Neutral Political 
orientation 
99 0.00 0.00 
FRAME - O More negative than 
positive (primary focus) 
91 0.76 0.76 
MOB - PARTY Praise of party 
members 
98 0.82 0.82 
MOB - PARTY Praise of party 
campaigners 
98 0.82 0.82 
MOB - PARTY Praise of party MP 99 0.90 0.90 
MOB - PARTY Praise of Leader 98 0.92 0.92 
MOB - PARTY Praise of former 
Leader 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PARTY Negative appraisal of 
former Leader 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PARTY Negative appraisal of 
opposition party members 






MOB - PARTY Negative appraisal of 
opposition MP 
98 0.74 0.74 
MOB - PARTY Negative appraisal of 
opposition party campaigners 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PARTY Negative appraisal of 
opposition Leader 
99 0.97 0.97 
MOB - PARTY Negative appraisal of 
opposition party 
89 0.61 0.60 
MOB - PAR - INT Register to vote 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PAR - INT Sign up to campaign 99 0.85 0.85 
MOB - PAR - INT Visit party website 99 0.96 0.96 
MOB - PAR - INT Poll 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PAR - INT Visit other website 99 0.94 0.94 
MOB - PAR - INT Visit other social 
media 
99 0.85 0.85 
MOB - PAR - INT Sign petition 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PAR - INT Share content to 
network 
96 0.91 0.91 
MOB - PAR - INT Visit campaign page 98 0.74 0.74 
MOB - PAR - INT Funding 99 0.66 0.66 
MOB - PAR - INT Shop 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - PAR - INT Talk to friends 
family 
99 0.88 0.88 
MOB - PAR - INT Profile pic change 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - EXT -ONLINE Join party 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - INT - OFFLINE Visit 
hustings 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - INT - OFFLINE Visit 
event 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - INT - OFFLINE Help 
doorstep campaign 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - INT - OFFLINE Attend 
rally 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - INT - OFFLINE Attend 
demonstration/protest 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - INT - OFFLINE 
Volunteer 
100 1.00 1.00 
MOB - ORG - EX - OFFLINE Call for 
vote 
91 0.82 0.82 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to Like 98 0.49 0.49 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to Share 93 0.85 0.85 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to Comment 99 0.00 0.00 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to tag friends 100 1.00 1.00 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to visit party 
website 
95 0.75 0.76 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to visit other 
website 
99 0.93 0.93 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to join/visit other 
medium 






MOB -ACTIVE Call to join/visit Other 
social media 
99 0.85 0.85 
MOB -ACTIVE Use of question to the 
audience? 
98 0.91 0.91 
MOB -ACTIVE GOTV 99 0.80 0.80 
MOB -ACTIVE Call to share I’m voting 
message 
100 1.00 1.00 
Is reshare from other FB page 100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - CNT FRM Is newspaper 
FrontPage   
98 0.00 -0.01 
PERS - CNT FRM Is video Uses 
content from mainstream media  
98 0.86 0.86 
PERS - CNT FRM Is video Uses 
content from alternative media  
97 0.00 -0.01 
PERS - CNT FRM Is text only  95 0.68 0.68 
PERS - CNT FRM Is Image  92 0.74 0.74 
PERS - CNT FRM Is image collection  99 0.88 0.88 
PERS - CNT FRM Is Text only image  96 0.76 0.76 
PERS - CNT FRM Is poster  98 0.94 0.94 
PERS - CNT FRM Is Infographic  99 0.00 0.00 
PERS - CNT FRM Is Infographic video 97 0.88 0.88 
PERS - CNT FRM Is Audio  100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - CNT FRM Is link EX  97 0.91 0.91 
PERS - CNT FRM Image defunct 100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - HUM Use of humour 99 0.94 0.94 
PERS - HUM Use of general humour - 
apolitical 
99 0.93 0.93 
PERS - HUM Use of political humour 98 0.66 0.66 
PERS - HUM Cuteness usage 
puppies/babies/children 
96 0.73 0.73 
PERS - T Content mainly rhetorical 
not factual 
66 0.32 0.31 
PERS - PERSO Use of general public's 
voice 
98 0.88 0.88 
PERS - PERSO Attack on leader  98 0.94 0.94 
PERS - PERSO Post is positively 
personalised  
83 0.65 0.65 
PERS - PERSO Post is negatively 
personalised  
97 0.91 0.91 
PERS - PERSO Use of party leader in 
imagery (non-video)  
99 0.96 0.96 
PERS - PERSO Use of opposition 
leader in imagery (non-video)  
100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Use of party politician 
in imagery (non-video  
99 0.90 0.90 
PERS - PERSO Use of opposition 
party politician in imagery (non-
video)  
100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Use of party leader in 
video  






PERS - PERSO Use of opposition 
leader in video  
100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Use of party politician 
in video  
100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Use of opposition 
party politician in video  
100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Personal message 
(thoughts etc. - not a political issue 
87 0.41 0.41 
PERS - PERSO First person language 83 0.64 0.64 
PERS - PERSO Use of party leader in 
text  
98 0.93 0.93 
PERS - PERSO Use of opposition 
leader in text  
100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Use of party politician 
in text  
98 0.82 0.82 
PERS - PERSO Use of opposition 
party politician in text  
99 0.00 0.00 
PERS - PERSO Use of male celebrity  99 0.92 0.92 
PERS - PERSO Use of female celebrity  100 1.00 1.00 
PERS - PERSO Non-political personal 
public story  
91 0.26 0.26 
PERS - PERSO Non-political personal 
expert story  
95 0.26 0.26 
PERS - PERSO Use of politician family  98 0.74 0.74 
PERS - PERSO Use of a-political 
personal information and interests 
95 0.64 0.64 
PERS - PERSO Use of patriotic 
imagery 
94 0.63 0.64 
PERS -LANG - RHE Use of repetition 83 0.63 0.63 
PERS -LANG - RHE Use of us v them 
rhetoric 
88 0.72 0.73 
PERS -LANG - RHE Use of metaphors 98 0.66 0.66 
PERS -LANG - RHE Use of three-part 
list + 
70 0.41 0.39 
PERS -LANG - RHE Use of Party catch 
phrase 
86 0.70 0.70 
PERS -LANG - RHE Use of Labelling of 
group identity 
96 0.48 0.48 
 
96.67317 0.81 0.81 
 








Information 97.19 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Framing 95.32 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Mobilisation 98.55 0.84 0.84 0.84 







Appendix 5: Counts of users  
2018 and 2019 Party and leader page followers and interested users 
Page Early 2019 followers Late 2018 interested 
users 
Labour 1,034,070 2,500,000 
Conservatives 652,556 1,500,000 
Liberal Democrats 188,469 Data not available 
UKIP 580,848 900,000 
Green Party 302,066 400,000 
SNP 290,955 500,000 
Theresa May 515,501 700,000 
David Cameron 1,192,922 350,000 
Jeremy Corbyn 1,425,142 1,500,000 
Ed Miliband 145,451 150,000 
Nigel Farage 822,454 600,000 
Caroline Lucas 95,190 100,000 
Natalie Bennett 52,648 45,000 
Nicola Sturgeon 301,410 250,000 
Alex Salmond 169,098 150,000 
Nick Clegg Page private (working for FB) 50,000 
Vince Cable 13,839 Data not available 
Tim Farron 30,410 Data not available 
Momentum 237,191 300,000 
Total 7,812,729 9,695,000 
 





Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total 
Members 150,000 188,000 51,000 42,000 61,000 110,000 602,000 






Appendix 6: Demographics  
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Appendix 7: Number of posts 














































































































































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of posts by Labour Party Number of posts by Conservative Party Number of posts by Liberal Democrats





















































































































































































































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Theresa May David Cameron Jeremy Corbyn Ed Miliband Nigel Farage Vince Cable






Appendix 8: Campaign vs. permanent campaign engagement  












































































































































































































































































































































2015 and 2017 Percentage of average engagement, campaign period against non-campaign period (n = 4,059) 
 
2015 2017 
Conservative Party campaign period 115% 329% 
Conservative Leader campaign period 59% 186% 
Conservative Average 87% 258% 
Labour Party campaign period 131% 178% 
Labour Leader campaign period 125% 231% 
Labour Average 128% 205% 








Appendix 9: Engagement 


























































2010-2017 Percentage of total like engagement with party page vs. 
percentage engagement with relevant party leader of the time; as a 























































Percentage of engagement with party page over time.







Appendix 10: Content codes 





Video is alternated 
opposition PEB 
Photo - Is 
newspaper front-
page 
Positive Use of 
Magazine 
Negative Use of 
Magazine 
2017 Labour Party 278 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 144 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2017 Conservative Party 95 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Theresa May 50 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2015 Labour Party 237 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Ed Miliband 78 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
2015 Conservative Party 188 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
David Cameron  138 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Leader average 410 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Party average 798 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2015 641 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2017 567 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 






2015 and 2017 Depiction of politician members (n = 2,416)
1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1%
1%




















































































































































































2015 and 2017 Internal links news (n = 1,208) 
 














   Positive Negative Positive Negative 
2017 Labour Party 277 1 88% 29% 100% 0% 
Jeremy Corbyn 98 37 62% 44% 59% 43% 
2017 Conservative 
Party 
38 45 53% 61% 78% 36% 
Theresa May 23 19 78% 43% 100% 5% 
2015 Labour Party 105 131 54% 50% 80% 20% 
Ed Miliband 4 24 100% 25% 79% 33% 
2015 Conservative 
Party 
49 81 71% 53% 74% 43% 
David Cameron 27 66 81% 37% 95% 18% 
Leader average 152 146 80% 37% 84% 25% 
Party average 469 258 67% 48% 83% 25% 
2015 185 302 77% 41% 82% 29% 
2017 436 102 70% 44% 84% 21% 
Average of posts   74% 39% 80% 28% 
Average of pages   73% 43% 83% 25% 

























Link to Facebook news – mainstream Link to Facebook news - alternative
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